matrx-orm 3.1.215__tar.gz → 3.1.217__tar.gz

{matrx_orm-3.1.215 → matrx_orm-3.1.217}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: matrx-orm
-Version: 3.1.215
+Version: 3.1.217
 Summary: Async-first PostgreSQL ORM with bidirectional migrations, schema introspection, many-to-many relationships, and built-in state caching
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/AI-Matrix-Engine/aidream-current
 Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/AI-Matrix-Engine/aidream-current

{matrx_orm-3.1.215 → matrx_orm-3.1.217}/matrx_orm/associations.py

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ and beside the point (it is not what any other layer enforces).
 
 The organization on the EDGE is a *tenancy stamp* — which workspace this link
 belongs to, for scoping and context — never a permission. Read
-``common-docs/systems/media/file-service/FILE_HANDLING_LAWS.md`` §1: "Never
+``common-docs/systems/files/file-service/FILE_HANDLING_LAWS.md`` §1: "Never
 compare ``owner_id``/``created_by`` to a user id to authorize — that is a strict
 subset of the real policy." The same sentence is true of ``org_id``, for the
 same reason. **Wire ``access_check`` and let the policy decide.**

{matrx_orm-3.1.215 → matrx_orm-3.1.217}/matrx_orm/schema_builder/schema.py

@@ -1060,8 +1060,12 @@ class Schema:
                         # resolves at runtime to the public db/models.py `Users`. Without
                         # this, models_<schema>.py references an undefined `Users` →
                         # NameError on import (hit first by the workflow/files schemas).
+                        # The in-file stub IS auth.users and nothing else: an FK to
+                        # iam.users (same table name) must not bind to it.
                         _users_defined_in_file = (
-                            target_pascal == "Users" and self._is_public_schema()
+                            target_pascal == "Users"
+                            and self._is_public_schema()
+                            and target_schema == "auth"
                         )
                         if not _users_defined_in_file and target_pascal not in _defined_stubs:
                             forward_ref_tables.add(target_pascal)

{matrx_orm-3.1.215 → matrx_orm-3.1.217}/matrx_orm/secrets_battery/items.py

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ copied into a fork.
 A field lands here when possessing it MINTS future access rather than merely
 holding a value someone already gave you — an authenticator seed generates
 every future code for the account, forever, with nothing recording it. D-15
-(``common-docs/systems/architecture/persistent-cloud-browser/VISION.md``) ruled that a
+(``common-docs/systems/web/persistent-cloud-browser/VISION.md``) ruled that a
 seed does not travel with an account handover: the new owner enrols again.
 
 🚨 This is deliberately NOT "every ``sealed`` field". Sealed also covers OAuth

{matrx_orm-3.1.215 → matrx_orm-3.1.217}/pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "matrx-orm"
-version = "3.1.215"
+version = "3.1.217"
 description = "Async-first PostgreSQL ORM with bidirectional migrations, schema introspection, many-to-many relationships, and built-in state caching"
 readme = "README.md"
 license = { text = "MIT" }

{matrx_orm-3.1.215 → matrx_orm-3.1.217}/tests/test_secrets_minting_keys.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 """Minting keys never change hands — D-15, enforced in the battery (no DB).
 
-``common-docs/systems/architecture/persistent-cloud-browser/VISION.md`` D-15: *"A seed
+``common-docs/systems/web/persistent-cloud-browser/VISION.md`` D-15: *"A seed
 does NOT transfer with an account handover — the new owner enrolls again.
 Otherwise two people generate valid codes forever with nothing recording it."*