lunixi-sdk 0.1.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/LICENSE +21 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/PKG-INFO +334 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/README.md +306 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/pyproject.toml +59 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/setup.cfg +4 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/__init__.py +114 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/api_client.py +221 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/auth/__init__.py +33 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/auth/canonical_request.py +94 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/auth/ed25519_signer.py +183 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/auth/token_manager.py +248 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/client.py +119 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/configuration.py +128 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/errors.py +152 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/fraud/__init__.py +64 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/fraud/evaluate_request.py +196 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/fraud/fraud_client.py +257 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/fraud/fraud_events.py +61 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/fraud/results.py +192 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/fraud/taxonomy.py +184 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/http/__init__.py +27 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/http/envelope.py +152 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/http/transport.py +202 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/py.typed +0 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/webhook/__init__.py +5 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi/webhook/verifier.py +215 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi_sdk.egg-info/PKG-INFO +334 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi_sdk.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +37 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi_sdk.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +1 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi_sdk.egg-info/requires.txt +4 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/src/lunixi_sdk.egg-info/top_level.txt +1 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/tests/test_api_client.py +389 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/tests/test_envelope.py +129 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/tests/test_fraud_decisions.py +350 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/tests/test_fraud_events.py +282 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/tests/test_fraud_surface.py +252 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/tests/test_signing.py +225 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/tests/test_token_manager.py +253 -0
- lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/tests/test_webhook_verifier.py +300 -0
lunixi_sdk-0.1.0/LICENSE
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2026 Lunixi
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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SOFTWARE.
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Metadata-Version: 2.4
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Name: lunixi-sdk
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Version: 0.1.0
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Summary: Lunixi platform client: Ed25519 request signing, token exchange, envelope decoding and the fraud decision and event API.
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Author: Lunixi
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License-Expression: MIT
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Project-URL: Homepage, https://lunixi.com
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Project-URL: Documentation, https://docs.lunixi.com/sdks/python
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Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python
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Project-URL: Changelog, https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md
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Keywords: lunixi,payments,fraud,ed25519,api-client
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Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
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Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.9
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
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Classifier: Typing :: Typed
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Requires-Python: >=3.9
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Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
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License-File: LICENSE
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Requires-Dist: cryptography>=3.4
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Provides-Extra: dev
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Requires-Dist: pytest>=7.0; extra == "dev"
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Dynamic: license-file
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<p align="center">
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<a href="https://lunixi.com">
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<picture>
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<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/main/.github/assets/lunixi-logo-dark.svg">
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<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/main/.github/assets/lunixi-logo.svg" alt="Lunixi" height="64">
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</picture>
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</a>
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</p>
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# Lunixi Python SDK
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[](https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [](https://pypi.org/project/lunixi-sdk/) [](https://pypi.org/project/lunixi-sdk/) [](https://pypi.org/project/lunixi-sdk/) [](https://peps.python.org/pep-0561/) [](LICENSE) [](https://docs.lunixi.com/sdks/python)
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**[Documentation](https://docs.lunixi.com/sdks/python) · [Changelog](https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) · [Issues](https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/issues) · [Security](https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/blob/main/SECURITY.md)**
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Python client for the Lunixi platform. It carries the shared core — Ed25519
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request signing, token exchange, response-envelope decoding, cursor paging and
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a typed error hierarchy — plus the fraud decision and event API on top of it.
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Türkçe: [README.tr.md](README.tr.md)
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- **Requires:** Python 3.9 or newer
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- **Dependency:** [`cryptography`](https://pypi.org/project/cryptography/) for
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Ed25519. HTTP uses the standard library, so nothing else is pulled in.
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- **Typed:** ships `py.typed`; every public function is annotated.
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- **License:** MIT
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```bash
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pip install lunixi-sdk
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```
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## Quick start
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```python
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from lunixi import Channel, Decision, LunixiClient
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client = LunixiClient(
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base_url="https://api.lunixi.com",
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key_id="kid_...", # from the console
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private_key=private_key_pem, # from your secret store
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)
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decision = client.fraud().evaluate(
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channel=Channel.STANDALONE_API,
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transaction_ref="order-2026-0001",
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payment={"amount": "149.90", "currency": "TRY"},
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customer={"id": "cus_88", "email": "buyer@example.com"},
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)
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if decision.blocked:
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refuse_the_order(decision.reasons)
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elif decision.requires_three_d:
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retry_with_3d_secure()
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elif decision.requires_review:
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hold_for_review(decision.trace_id)
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else:
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authorize()
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```
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Build the client once at start-up and share it: the access-token cache lives on
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it, so a fresh client per request means a fresh token exchange per request.
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## Authentication
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Two levels, and they are not interchangeable.
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**Token exchange.** `POST /api/v1/auth/token` is signed with your Ed25519
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private key and returns a short-lived access token. The SDK does this for you,
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caches the token and refreshes it once when the gateway reports it expired.
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**Per-request signature.** The event-ingest routes accept nothing less than a
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signature on every call: it is what binds an event to your account, so a body
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value cannot claim a different one. The SDK adds it where it is required.
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The canonical string that is signed is:
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```text
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<METHOD>\n<URL>\nX-Date:<value>\nX-Nonce:<value>[\nDigest:<value>]
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```
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`<URL>` is the path exactly as sent, **including the `/api/v1` prefix and any
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query string**. The `Digest` line appears only when a body is present.
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### Key handling
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You can generate the keypair yourself and upload only the public key, so the
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private key never exists outside your systems:
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```python
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from lunixi import generate_key_pair
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private_pem, public_pem = generate_key_pair()
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# store private_pem in your secret manager; upload public_pem in the console
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```
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Accepted private-key shapes: a PKCS#8 PEM block (recommended), base64 or hex
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PKCS#8 DER, or a bare 32-byte seed. Load it from a secret store — not from
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source, and not from a file inside your repository.
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## Fraud
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The customer-facing surface is **five routes**:
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| Call | Route |
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|---|---|
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| `fraud().evaluate(...)` | `POST /api/v1/fraud/decisions/evaluate` |
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| `fraud().decisions.list(...)` | `GET /api/v1/fraud/decision-logs` |
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| `fraud().decisions.get(trace_id)` | `GET /api/v1/fraud/decision-logs/{traceId}` |
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| `fraud().events.record(event)` | `POST /api/v1/fraud/events/transactions` |
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| `fraud().events.record_batch(events)` | `POST .../events/transactions/batch` |
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The console's own routes are not part of this surface. They carry no stability
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guarantee, so they are not published here.
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### Decision outcomes
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`allow`, `review`, `block`, `force_3d`. Note that `allowed` is **not** the
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inverse of `blocked`: `review` and `force_3d` are neither, and `force_3d` asks
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you to re-run the payment with 3-D Secure rather than refusing it.
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Field names use Python's `snake_case`; the `camelCase` spelling from the API
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reference is accepted as an alias. An unknown field raises locally and names
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the key, rather than costing you a round trip to find out.
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`tenant_id` is deliberately absent: the tenant is stamped from your access
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token, and a body value is ignored.
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### Event ingest
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Events are the history that counting rules read.
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```python
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result = client.fraud().events.record(
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{
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"eventId": "evt-0001", # your id; a retry with the same id is deduplicated
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"eventType": "card_sale",
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"subjectType": "customer",
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"occurredAt": "2026-10-11T08:29:00Z",
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},
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idempotency_key="evt-0001",
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)
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if result.deduplicated:
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... # this event was already recorded
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```
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Batches hold up to **500** events and the SDK refuses a larger one before it
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reaches the network, because the gateway rejects the whole batch.
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**A batch can succeed partially.** It answers `200` and keeps processing after
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an event fails validation, so the status code alone never proves the batch
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landed:
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```python
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result = client.fraud().events.record_batch(events, idempotency_key="feed-2026-10-11-01")
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for failure in result.failures():
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log.warning("event %s rejected: %s", failure.event_id, failure.error)
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```
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Correct the body and resend a failure with the **same** `eventId`: the gateway
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deduplicates, so a resend cannot double-count an event that did land.
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## Reading a response
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Every successful response is wrapped:
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```json
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{ "status": "success", "code": "SUCCESS", "data": {}, "pageInfo": {}, "requestId": "..." }
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```
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Two things to know if you ever read the envelope yourself:
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- **There is no `success` field.** The outcome is in `status`, as the string
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`"success"`. Code written against `response["success"]` reads `None` on every
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response. Use `lunixi.is_success(response)`.
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- **`pageInfo` is a sibling of `data`, not nested inside it.** List endpoints
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return `data` as a bare array, so paging metadata cannot live inside it.
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The feature clients already handle both.
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## Paging
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```python
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page = client.fraud().decisions.list(decision=Decision.REVIEW, limit=50)
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while True:
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for row in page.items:
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handle(row)
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if not page.has_more or not page.next_cursor:
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break
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page = client.fraud().decisions.list(
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decision=Decision.REVIEW, limit=50, cursor=page.next_cursor
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)
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```
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Or let the SDK follow the cursors:
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```python
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for row in client.fraud().decisions.iterate(decision=Decision.REVIEW, limit=50):
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handle(row)
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```
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A cursor is opaque: pass it back unchanged. Do not decode, build or edit one —
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a malformed cursor is rejected with `400`, it does not restart from page one.
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`total_count` is `None` unless the server actually counted, because a filtered
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count is expensive.
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+
## Errors
|
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+
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|
+
Every error derives from `LunixiError`.
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+
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| Class | Raised when |
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+
|---|---|
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| `ConfigurationError` | A local value is unusable; nothing was sent. |
|
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|
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| `SignatureError` | The private key could not be loaded. |
|
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|
+
| `ValidationError` | `400` — the gateway rejected the body. |
|
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243
|
+
| `AuthenticationError` | `401` / `403` — signature, token or entitlement refused. |
|
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|
+
| `RateLimitError` | `429` — carries `retry_after` and `quota`. |
|
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|
+
| `ServiceUnavailableError` | `503` — carries `retry_after`. |
|
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|
+
| `ApiError` | Any other non-2xx answer, or no answer at all. |
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+
| `WebhookVerificationError` | An inbound webhook did not verify. |
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+
|
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|
+
`retry_after` and the quota fields are `None` when the gateway did not send the
|
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+
header. It omits one rather than guessing, and so does this SDK — an invented
|
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+
number would make you retry at the wrong rate.
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+
|
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|
+
```python
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from lunixi import RateLimitError
|
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+
|
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try:
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client.fraud().events.record(event, idempotency_key=event["eventId"])
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except RateLimitError as error:
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sleep(error.retry_after or 30)
|
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|
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```
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|
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### Retries
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+
|
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|
+
A `GET`, and any request you give an `idempotency_key`, is retried after a
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transport failure or a `5xx`. Anything else is not: the SDK cannot tell a lost
|
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request from a lost response, and replaying an unkeyed write can record the
|
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+
same event twice.
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+
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`evaluate` is never retried automatically. It runs inside your payment flow, so
|
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whether a timed-out decision is retried, treated as a soft allow, or held is
|
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your policy to set.
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+
|
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## Webhooks
|
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|
+
|
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|
+
```python
|
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|
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from lunixi import FraudEvents, WebhookVerifier, WebhookVerificationError
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+
|
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|
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verifier = WebhookVerifier(endpoint_secret)
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+
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try:
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|
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event = verifier.verify(raw_body, request.headers)
|
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|
+
except WebhookVerificationError:
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|
+
return 400 # never act on an unverified payload
|
|
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|
+
|
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|
+
if event.type == FraudEvents.FLOW_ASYNC_COMPLETED:
|
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|
+
...
|
|
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|
+
```
|
|
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|
+
|
|
289
|
+
**Pass the raw body.** The signature covers the exact bytes that arrived;
|
|
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|
+
parsing JSON and re-serializing it reorders keys and changes spacing, and
|
|
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|
+
verification then fails for every webhook. Capture the raw body before any JSON
|
|
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|
+
middleware touches it.
|
|
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|
+
|
|
294
|
+
Verification is fail-closed and checks timestamp freshness within a 300-second
|
|
295
|
+
window by default. During a secret rotation the gateway sends two signature
|
|
296
|
+
items and either one verifying is enough, so your endpoint keeps working while
|
|
297
|
+
you swap secrets.
|
|
298
|
+
|
|
299
|
+
The seven fraud event types are in `FraudEvents`; `FRAUD_EVENT_TYPES` holds
|
|
300
|
+
them all.
|
|
301
|
+
|
|
302
|
+
## Extending
|
|
303
|
+
|
|
304
|
+
Any gateway route this version does not wrap is reachable with the signing,
|
|
305
|
+
retry and error handling already in place:
|
|
306
|
+
|
|
307
|
+
```python
|
|
308
|
+
envelope = client.api().request(
|
|
309
|
+
"GET", "/api/v1/some/other/route", query={"limit": 25}
|
|
310
|
+
)
|
|
311
|
+
rows = lunixi.items_of(envelope)
|
|
312
|
+
```
|
|
313
|
+
|
|
314
|
+
Supply your own HTTP stack (for pooling, proxies or tracing) by implementing
|
|
315
|
+
`HttpTransport` and passing `transport=`. In a multi-process deployment,
|
|
316
|
+
implement `TokenStore` against a shared cache and pass `token_store=` so the
|
|
317
|
+
workers share one token.
|
|
318
|
+
|
|
319
|
+
## Development
|
|
320
|
+
|
|
321
|
+
```bash
|
|
322
|
+
python -m venv .venv
|
|
323
|
+
.venv/bin/pip install -e ".[dev]"
|
|
324
|
+
.venv/bin/python -m pytest
|
|
325
|
+
```
|
|
326
|
+
|
|
327
|
+
The suite runs entirely offline: it asserts on what the SDK puts on the wire
|
|
328
|
+
through an injected transport, and verifies signing and webhook logic against
|
|
329
|
+
committed vectors. Every key in it is synthetic and grants no access.
|
|
330
|
+
|
|
331
|
+
## Samples
|
|
332
|
+
|
|
333
|
+
Runnable examples are in [`samples/`](samples/). Each reads its settings from
|
|
334
|
+
the environment, so no credential is written into a file.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
<p align="center">
|
|
2
|
+
<a href="https://lunixi.com">
|
|
3
|
+
<picture>
|
|
4
|
+
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/main/.github/assets/lunixi-logo-dark.svg">
|
|
5
|
+
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/main/.github/assets/lunixi-logo.svg" alt="Lunixi" height="64">
|
|
6
|
+
</picture>
|
|
7
|
+
</a>
|
|
8
|
+
</p>
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
# Lunixi Python SDK
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
[](https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [](https://pypi.org/project/lunixi-sdk/) [](https://pypi.org/project/lunixi-sdk/) [](https://pypi.org/project/lunixi-sdk/) [](https://peps.python.org/pep-0561/) [](LICENSE) [](https://docs.lunixi.com/sdks/python)
|
|
13
|
+
|
|
14
|
+
**[Documentation](https://docs.lunixi.com/sdks/python) · [Changelog](https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) · [Issues](https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/issues) · [Security](https://github.com/Lunixi-Payment/lunixi-python/blob/main/SECURITY.md)**
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
Python client for the Lunixi platform. It carries the shared core — Ed25519
|
|
17
|
+
request signing, token exchange, response-envelope decoding, cursor paging and
|
|
18
|
+
a typed error hierarchy — plus the fraud decision and event API on top of it.
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
Türkçe: [README.tr.md](README.tr.md)
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
- **Requires:** Python 3.9 or newer
|
|
23
|
+
- **Dependency:** [`cryptography`](https://pypi.org/project/cryptography/) for
|
|
24
|
+
Ed25519. HTTP uses the standard library, so nothing else is pulled in.
|
|
25
|
+
- **Typed:** ships `py.typed`; every public function is annotated.
|
|
26
|
+
- **License:** MIT
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
```bash
|
|
29
|
+
pip install lunixi-sdk
|
|
30
|
+
```
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
## Quick start
|
|
33
|
+
|
|
34
|
+
```python
|
|
35
|
+
from lunixi import Channel, Decision, LunixiClient
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
client = LunixiClient(
|
|
38
|
+
base_url="https://api.lunixi.com",
|
|
39
|
+
key_id="kid_...", # from the console
|
|
40
|
+
private_key=private_key_pem, # from your secret store
|
|
41
|
+
)
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
decision = client.fraud().evaluate(
|
|
44
|
+
channel=Channel.STANDALONE_API,
|
|
45
|
+
transaction_ref="order-2026-0001",
|
|
46
|
+
payment={"amount": "149.90", "currency": "TRY"},
|
|
47
|
+
customer={"id": "cus_88", "email": "buyer@example.com"},
|
|
48
|
+
)
|
|
49
|
+
|
|
50
|
+
if decision.blocked:
|
|
51
|
+
refuse_the_order(decision.reasons)
|
|
52
|
+
elif decision.requires_three_d:
|
|
53
|
+
retry_with_3d_secure()
|
|
54
|
+
elif decision.requires_review:
|
|
55
|
+
hold_for_review(decision.trace_id)
|
|
56
|
+
else:
|
|
57
|
+
authorize()
|
|
58
|
+
```
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
Build the client once at start-up and share it: the access-token cache lives on
|
|
61
|
+
it, so a fresh client per request means a fresh token exchange per request.
|
|
62
|
+
|
|
63
|
+
## Authentication
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
Two levels, and they are not interchangeable.
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
**Token exchange.** `POST /api/v1/auth/token` is signed with your Ed25519
|
|
68
|
+
private key and returns a short-lived access token. The SDK does this for you,
|
|
69
|
+
caches the token and refreshes it once when the gateway reports it expired.
|
|
70
|
+
|
|
71
|
+
**Per-request signature.** The event-ingest routes accept nothing less than a
|
|
72
|
+
signature on every call: it is what binds an event to your account, so a body
|
|
73
|
+
value cannot claim a different one. The SDK adds it where it is required.
|
|
74
|
+
|
|
75
|
+
The canonical string that is signed is:
|
|
76
|
+
|
|
77
|
+
```text
|
|
78
|
+
<METHOD>\n<URL>\nX-Date:<value>\nX-Nonce:<value>[\nDigest:<value>]
|
|
79
|
+
```
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
`<URL>` is the path exactly as sent, **including the `/api/v1` prefix and any
|
|
82
|
+
query string**. The `Digest` line appears only when a body is present.
|
|
83
|
+
|
|
84
|
+
### Key handling
|
|
85
|
+
|
|
86
|
+
You can generate the keypair yourself and upload only the public key, so the
|
|
87
|
+
private key never exists outside your systems:
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
```python
|
|
90
|
+
from lunixi import generate_key_pair
|
|
91
|
+
|
|
92
|
+
private_pem, public_pem = generate_key_pair()
|
|
93
|
+
# store private_pem in your secret manager; upload public_pem in the console
|
|
94
|
+
```
|
|
95
|
+
|
|
96
|
+
Accepted private-key shapes: a PKCS#8 PEM block (recommended), base64 or hex
|
|
97
|
+
PKCS#8 DER, or a bare 32-byte seed. Load it from a secret store — not from
|
|
98
|
+
source, and not from a file inside your repository.
|
|
99
|
+
|
|
100
|
+
## Fraud
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
The customer-facing surface is **five routes**:
|
|
103
|
+
|
|
104
|
+
| Call | Route |
|
|
105
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
106
|
+
| `fraud().evaluate(...)` | `POST /api/v1/fraud/decisions/evaluate` |
|
|
107
|
+
| `fraud().decisions.list(...)` | `GET /api/v1/fraud/decision-logs` |
|
|
108
|
+
| `fraud().decisions.get(trace_id)` | `GET /api/v1/fraud/decision-logs/{traceId}` |
|
|
109
|
+
| `fraud().events.record(event)` | `POST /api/v1/fraud/events/transactions` |
|
|
110
|
+
| `fraud().events.record_batch(events)` | `POST .../events/transactions/batch` |
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
112
|
+
The console's own routes are not part of this surface. They carry no stability
|
|
113
|
+
guarantee, so they are not published here.
|
|
114
|
+
|
|
115
|
+
### Decision outcomes
|
|
116
|
+
|
|
117
|
+
`allow`, `review`, `block`, `force_3d`. Note that `allowed` is **not** the
|
|
118
|
+
inverse of `blocked`: `review` and `force_3d` are neither, and `force_3d` asks
|
|
119
|
+
you to re-run the payment with 3-D Secure rather than refusing it.
|
|
120
|
+
|
|
121
|
+
Field names use Python's `snake_case`; the `camelCase` spelling from the API
|
|
122
|
+
reference is accepted as an alias. An unknown field raises locally and names
|
|
123
|
+
the key, rather than costing you a round trip to find out.
|
|
124
|
+
|
|
125
|
+
`tenant_id` is deliberately absent: the tenant is stamped from your access
|
|
126
|
+
token, and a body value is ignored.
|
|
127
|
+
|
|
128
|
+
### Event ingest
|
|
129
|
+
|
|
130
|
+
Events are the history that counting rules read.
|
|
131
|
+
|
|
132
|
+
```python
|
|
133
|
+
result = client.fraud().events.record(
|
|
134
|
+
{
|
|
135
|
+
"eventId": "evt-0001", # your id; a retry with the same id is deduplicated
|
|
136
|
+
"eventType": "card_sale",
|
|
137
|
+
"subjectType": "customer",
|
|
138
|
+
"occurredAt": "2026-10-11T08:29:00Z",
|
|
139
|
+
},
|
|
140
|
+
idempotency_key="evt-0001",
|
|
141
|
+
)
|
|
142
|
+
if result.deduplicated:
|
|
143
|
+
... # this event was already recorded
|
|
144
|
+
```
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
Batches hold up to **500** events and the SDK refuses a larger one before it
|
|
147
|
+
reaches the network, because the gateway rejects the whole batch.
|
|
148
|
+
|
|
149
|
+
**A batch can succeed partially.** It answers `200` and keeps processing after
|
|
150
|
+
an event fails validation, so the status code alone never proves the batch
|
|
151
|
+
landed:
|
|
152
|
+
|
|
153
|
+
```python
|
|
154
|
+
result = client.fraud().events.record_batch(events, idempotency_key="feed-2026-10-11-01")
|
|
155
|
+
for failure in result.failures():
|
|
156
|
+
log.warning("event %s rejected: %s", failure.event_id, failure.error)
|
|
157
|
+
```
|
|
158
|
+
|
|
159
|
+
Correct the body and resend a failure with the **same** `eventId`: the gateway
|
|
160
|
+
deduplicates, so a resend cannot double-count an event that did land.
|
|
161
|
+
|
|
162
|
+
## Reading a response
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
Every successful response is wrapped:
|
|
165
|
+
|
|
166
|
+
```json
|
|
167
|
+
{ "status": "success", "code": "SUCCESS", "data": {}, "pageInfo": {}, "requestId": "..." }
|
|
168
|
+
```
|
|
169
|
+
|
|
170
|
+
Two things to know if you ever read the envelope yourself:
|
|
171
|
+
|
|
172
|
+
- **There is no `success` field.** The outcome is in `status`, as the string
|
|
173
|
+
`"success"`. Code written against `response["success"]` reads `None` on every
|
|
174
|
+
response. Use `lunixi.is_success(response)`.
|
|
175
|
+
- **`pageInfo` is a sibling of `data`, not nested inside it.** List endpoints
|
|
176
|
+
return `data` as a bare array, so paging metadata cannot live inside it.
|
|
177
|
+
|
|
178
|
+
The feature clients already handle both.
|
|
179
|
+
|
|
180
|
+
## Paging
|
|
181
|
+
|
|
182
|
+
```python
|
|
183
|
+
page = client.fraud().decisions.list(decision=Decision.REVIEW, limit=50)
|
|
184
|
+
while True:
|
|
185
|
+
for row in page.items:
|
|
186
|
+
handle(row)
|
|
187
|
+
if not page.has_more or not page.next_cursor:
|
|
188
|
+
break
|
|
189
|
+
page = client.fraud().decisions.list(
|
|
190
|
+
decision=Decision.REVIEW, limit=50, cursor=page.next_cursor
|
|
191
|
+
)
|
|
192
|
+
```
|
|
193
|
+
|
|
194
|
+
Or let the SDK follow the cursors:
|
|
195
|
+
|
|
196
|
+
```python
|
|
197
|
+
for row in client.fraud().decisions.iterate(decision=Decision.REVIEW, limit=50):
|
|
198
|
+
handle(row)
|
|
199
|
+
```
|
|
200
|
+
|
|
201
|
+
A cursor is opaque: pass it back unchanged. Do not decode, build or edit one —
|
|
202
|
+
a malformed cursor is rejected with `400`, it does not restart from page one.
|
|
203
|
+
`total_count` is `None` unless the server actually counted, because a filtered
|
|
204
|
+
count is expensive.
|
|
205
|
+
|
|
206
|
+
## Errors
|
|
207
|
+
|
|
208
|
+
Every error derives from `LunixiError`.
|
|
209
|
+
|
|
210
|
+
| Class | Raised when |
|
|
211
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
212
|
+
| `ConfigurationError` | A local value is unusable; nothing was sent. |
|
|
213
|
+
| `SignatureError` | The private key could not be loaded. |
|
|
214
|
+
| `ValidationError` | `400` — the gateway rejected the body. |
|
|
215
|
+
| `AuthenticationError` | `401` / `403` — signature, token or entitlement refused. |
|
|
216
|
+
| `RateLimitError` | `429` — carries `retry_after` and `quota`. |
|
|
217
|
+
| `ServiceUnavailableError` | `503` — carries `retry_after`. |
|
|
218
|
+
| `ApiError` | Any other non-2xx answer, or no answer at all. |
|
|
219
|
+
| `WebhookVerificationError` | An inbound webhook did not verify. |
|
|
220
|
+
|
|
221
|
+
`retry_after` and the quota fields are `None` when the gateway did not send the
|
|
222
|
+
header. It omits one rather than guessing, and so does this SDK — an invented
|
|
223
|
+
number would make you retry at the wrong rate.
|
|
224
|
+
|
|
225
|
+
```python
|
|
226
|
+
from lunixi import RateLimitError
|
|
227
|
+
|
|
228
|
+
try:
|
|
229
|
+
client.fraud().events.record(event, idempotency_key=event["eventId"])
|
|
230
|
+
except RateLimitError as error:
|
|
231
|
+
sleep(error.retry_after or 30)
|
|
232
|
+
```
|
|
233
|
+
|
|
234
|
+
### Retries
|
|
235
|
+
|
|
236
|
+
A `GET`, and any request you give an `idempotency_key`, is retried after a
|
|
237
|
+
transport failure or a `5xx`. Anything else is not: the SDK cannot tell a lost
|
|
238
|
+
request from a lost response, and replaying an unkeyed write can record the
|
|
239
|
+
same event twice.
|
|
240
|
+
|
|
241
|
+
`evaluate` is never retried automatically. It runs inside your payment flow, so
|
|
242
|
+
whether a timed-out decision is retried, treated as a soft allow, or held is
|
|
243
|
+
your policy to set.
|
|
244
|
+
|
|
245
|
+
## Webhooks
|
|
246
|
+
|
|
247
|
+
```python
|
|
248
|
+
from lunixi import FraudEvents, WebhookVerifier, WebhookVerificationError
|
|
249
|
+
|
|
250
|
+
verifier = WebhookVerifier(endpoint_secret)
|
|
251
|
+
|
|
252
|
+
try:
|
|
253
|
+
event = verifier.verify(raw_body, request.headers)
|
|
254
|
+
except WebhookVerificationError:
|
|
255
|
+
return 400 # never act on an unverified payload
|
|
256
|
+
|
|
257
|
+
if event.type == FraudEvents.FLOW_ASYNC_COMPLETED:
|
|
258
|
+
...
|
|
259
|
+
```
|
|
260
|
+
|
|
261
|
+
**Pass the raw body.** The signature covers the exact bytes that arrived;
|
|
262
|
+
parsing JSON and re-serializing it reorders keys and changes spacing, and
|
|
263
|
+
verification then fails for every webhook. Capture the raw body before any JSON
|
|
264
|
+
middleware touches it.
|
|
265
|
+
|
|
266
|
+
Verification is fail-closed and checks timestamp freshness within a 300-second
|
|
267
|
+
window by default. During a secret rotation the gateway sends two signature
|
|
268
|
+
items and either one verifying is enough, so your endpoint keeps working while
|
|
269
|
+
you swap secrets.
|
|
270
|
+
|
|
271
|
+
The seven fraud event types are in `FraudEvents`; `FRAUD_EVENT_TYPES` holds
|
|
272
|
+
them all.
|
|
273
|
+
|
|
274
|
+
## Extending
|
|
275
|
+
|
|
276
|
+
Any gateway route this version does not wrap is reachable with the signing,
|
|
277
|
+
retry and error handling already in place:
|
|
278
|
+
|
|
279
|
+
```python
|
|
280
|
+
envelope = client.api().request(
|
|
281
|
+
"GET", "/api/v1/some/other/route", query={"limit": 25}
|
|
282
|
+
)
|
|
283
|
+
rows = lunixi.items_of(envelope)
|
|
284
|
+
```
|
|
285
|
+
|
|
286
|
+
Supply your own HTTP stack (for pooling, proxies or tracing) by implementing
|
|
287
|
+
`HttpTransport` and passing `transport=`. In a multi-process deployment,
|
|
288
|
+
implement `TokenStore` against a shared cache and pass `token_store=` so the
|
|
289
|
+
workers share one token.
|
|
290
|
+
|
|
291
|
+
## Development
|
|
292
|
+
|
|
293
|
+
```bash
|
|
294
|
+
python -m venv .venv
|
|
295
|
+
.venv/bin/pip install -e ".[dev]"
|
|
296
|
+
.venv/bin/python -m pytest
|
|
297
|
+
```
|
|
298
|
+
|
|
299
|
+
The suite runs entirely offline: it asserts on what the SDK puts on the wire
|
|
300
|
+
through an injected transport, and verifies signing and webhook logic against
|
|
301
|
+
committed vectors. Every key in it is synthetic and grants no access.
|
|
302
|
+
|
|
303
|
+
## Samples
|
|
304
|
+
|
|
305
|
+
Runnable examples are in [`samples/`](samples/). Each reads its settings from
|
|
306
|
+
the environment, so no credential is written into a file.
|