intyga-verify 1.0.0__tar.gz

intyga_verify-1.0.0/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# Changelog
+
+All notable changes to `intyga-verify` (Python) are documented here. The format follows
+[Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); versions follow [SemVer](https://semver.org/).
+
+This distribution is **assembled at build time** rather than kept as a standalone source tree:
+`scripts/build-public-tree.sh verify-python` extracts the verifier out of `sdk-python`'s
+`crypto.py` (everything above `class PolicyCrypto:`) and pairs it with the template here. So an
+entry below describes a change to that extracted surface, which usually arrives as a change to
+`packages/sdk-python` — check its changelog too when tracing a behaviour.
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [1.0.0]
+
+- Packaging: require setuptools 77+ for SPDX license metadata; include the changelog, tests and
+  shared vectors in the source distribution.
+
+- Verify profile-carried WebAuthn audit signatures with caller-trusted signer keys, origin and RP ID.
+  Report explicit per-event signature status and key trust; add strict signature acceptance for
+  single and bulk evidence. Audit signature checks do not replace full approval-receipt verification.
+
+- **DIV 1.0 pre-release correction (H1):** `verify_approval_receipt`, `verify_delegation` and
+  `verify_agent_authority` accept `expected["requirement"]`; export `WEAKER_REQUIREMENT_REASON`. The
+  signed `requirement` is authored by the signers, so one approver (possibly the requester) could
+  self-compose a 1-of-1 receipt for a 3-of-3 four-eyes action and it verified. A weaker signed
+  requirement is now refused before any signature is counted when the caller supplies its own rule
+  (DIV §5 step 3d), on approval, offline, delegation and agent-authority verification; the reason
+  starts "signed requirement is weaker than the relying party's policy". Omitting the floor keeps the
+  previous behaviour, which proves only the quorum the signers stated. No signed byte changes; shared
+  parity vectors pin it in all five languages.
+- Add opt-in RFC 3161 TimeStampToken verification through OpenSSL 3, with caller-pinned TSA
+  certificate/CA trust, explicit offline CRL or unchecked revocation, and quorum/bundle integration.
+- Scope Rekor log-key trust to one issuer for multi-issuer policies.
+
+- **Wire format: the DIV Intent Payload gained a REQUIRED `evidence` field, and it must be `null`.**
+  `div-intent-verification` and `div-offline-intent` now carry `"evidence":null` in the signed bytes
+  (DIV §4.3.4); `div-delegation`, `div-agent-authority` and `div-platform-intent` deliberately do
+  not. `null` is signed and load-bearing: it is the payload's explicit statement that the
+  authorization was not conditioned on any external fact. Verification refuses a payload whose
+  `evidence` key is absent, and refuses any non-`null` value rather than treating it as
+  unconditioned, checked before payload reconstruction so an unsupported shape does not surface as a
+  parameter mismatch. **A receipt issued before this change no longer verifies here** — DIV v1 has no
+  published consumers, so every producer, verifier and pinned vector moved together rather than a
+  version being negotiated.
+
+- Align cross-language receipt and audit verification: platform receipts, agent-authority seals,
+  self-certifying DID trust, single/multi-event bundles, embedded ES256 signatures, tenant sequence
+  checks, checkpoint continuity, anchor quorum and Rekor. Shared executable fixtures cover valid
+  artifacts and refusals; no wire format changes.
+- Refuse unknown witness signature algorithms. Require identity-bound trust when the signed
+  `requesterCannotApprove` rule is set; key-only trust cannot enforce requester identity.
+
+- **Refuse a forward-dated offline proof or delegation (DIV §5a.3 rule 3, §5a.6 step 1).** The
+  window caps bounded a proof's WIDTH but never its POSITION, so a quorum-signed proof dated years
+  ahead with a compliant 60-minute (or 72-hour) window verified today and kept verifying until that
+  date arrived. The check is unconditional — the audit/`allow_expired` override exists to re-examine
+  a proof that WAS valid and has since lapsed, which says nothing about one dated in the future.
+- **Refuse a signed `requirement.requiredApprovals` below 1 (DIV §4.3.2).** §5 step 7's "at least
+  `requiredApprovals`" is satisfied vacuously by `0`, so a receipt carrying no valid witness
+  signature could verify. The minimum is now enforced explicitly rather than by an undocumented
+  floor, and `True` is rejected along with `0` — in Python a bool is an int.
+
+
+Initial public release.
+
+- Offline approval-receipt verification (ES256 and WebAuthn) against a caller-supplied trust
+  anchor — no INTYGA secret, no network. Depends only on `cryptography`.
+- Canonical payload reconstruction held byte-identical to the TypeScript, Go, Rust and Java
+  verifiers by the shared cross-language golden vectors.
+- DEWP Core Profile primitives and §5.2 single-anchor signature verification. §5.3 anchor-quorum
+  evaluation and DIV §5b agent-authority verification are deliberately out of scope — see the
+  README's limits section, which states them precisely rather than implying full parity.

intyga_verify-1.0.0/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
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intyga_verify-1.0.0/MANIFEST.in

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+include LICENSE README.md CHANGELOG.md
+recursive-include tests *.py
+recursive-include vectors *.json

intyga_verify-1.0.0/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: intyga-verify
+Version: 1.0.0
+Summary: Offline verifier for INTYGA approval receipts — no INTYGA secret, no network
+Author: INTYGA
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://www.intyga.com
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify-python
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify-python/issues
+Keywords: verification,receipts,webauthn,es256,audit,offline
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=40.0.0
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# intyga-verify — Offline INTYGA receipt verification for Python
+
+Independently confirm that a human cryptographically approved **exactly** the action you are about to run — in your own process, with no INTYGA secret and no network call. You recompute the canonical payload from your own parameters, check it byte-matches what was signed, and verify the human's **ES256** or **WebAuthn** signature.
+
+Depends only on [`cryptography`](https://pypi.org/project/cryptography/). This is the verify-only surface of the INTYGA Python SDK, published on its own so a relying party that only needs verification does not install the full client. Its canonicalization is held byte-identical to the TypeScript, Go, Rust, and Java verifiers by shared cross-language test vectors.
+
+> The full client (which bundles this verifier) is [`sdk-python`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/sdk-python).
+
+## Install
+
+```sh
+pip install intyga-verify
+```
+
+## Verify an approval receipt
+
+```python
+import intyga_verify
+
+# The approver keys YOU trust, resolved from your own key management — never from the receipt.
+# A receipt's own `signerPublicKey` proves only that the receipt is self-consistent.
+APPROVERS = {"publicKeys": [MY_ENROLLED_APPROVER_KEY_B64]}
+
+# `expected` is what you are ABOUT to execute. `target`, `nonce` and `approvers` are REQUIRED and
+# are asserted from your side; the verifier refuses outright without them.
+EXPECTED = {
+    "target": "prod-db-cluster-01",       # THIS service (DIV Target Isolation)
+    "actionType": "wipe_production",
+    "params": {"database": "prod-db-1"},
+    "nonce": nonce,                       # the challenge YOU issued
+    "approvers": APPROVERS,
+}
+
+result = intyga_verify.verify_approval_receipt(receipt, EXPECTED)
+if not result["ok"]:
+    raise SystemExit(f"refusing to proceed: {result['reason']}")
+```
+
+One byte of drift — a swapped target, an appended region — and verification fails, because the signature was over the exact bytes you just recomputed.
+
+## Whose quorum? (the requirement floor)
+
+The signed `requirement` is the signers' own statement: its signature stops a third party from
+altering it, not the approvers it constrains from writing a weaker one. One approver who is also the
+requester can sign a 1-of-1 payload alone. **Without a floor this verifier proves only the quorum the
+signers stated.** When you know the rule, add it to the expectation (DIV §5 step 3d):
+
+```python
+EXPECTED["requirement"] = {"requiredApprovals": 3, "requesterCannotApprove": True}
+```
+
+A signed requirement weaker on any field — fewer approvals, no four-eyes or no hardware key where the
+floor demands one — is refused before any signature is counted, with a reason starting "signed
+requirement is weaker than the relying party's policy"; an equal or stricter one passes. A malformed
+floor (quorum below 1) is refused rather than ignored. The same field exists on the delegation
+expectation (pass the ordinary rule) and the agent-authority expectation (your sealing policy).
+Omitting it keeps the previous behaviour.
+
+## WebAuthn (passkey) receipts
+
+A passkey assertion harvested at *any* relying party would otherwise verify, so WebAuthn receipts require you to pin the expected origin and RP ID:
+
+```python
+result = intyga_verify.verify_approval_receipt(
+    receipt,
+    EXPECTED,
+    expected_origin="https://app.example.com",
+    expected_rp_id="app.example.com",
+)
+```
+
+`require_user_verification` defaults to `True`; pass `False` to accept mere user presence. Policy `AUTO_APPROVED` receipts carry no human signature and fail closed unless you pass `allow_auto_approved=True`.
+
+## Receipt and audit verification
+
+The package also exports `verify_platform_receipt`, `verify_agent_authority` and `ledger`.
+The ledger module exposes `verify_bundle`, `verify_evidence_bundle`, `verify_roots_chain`,
+`verify_anchor_signature` and `verify_anchor_quorum`. It is assembled from the same source as
+`intyga_sdk`, including the shared cross-language regression fixtures.
+
+RFC 3161 anchors can be checked with `verify_rfc3161_anchor(anchor, trust)` and count toward quorum
+when `external_keys={"rfc3161": {issuer: trust}}` is supplied. This optional adapter invokes an
+installed OpenSSL 3 executable without network access. Trust pins the CA and TSA certificate digest;
+`revocation` must explicitly be `"crl"` with an offline CRL or `"unchecked"`. The caller may select
+an integer `verification_time`; the default rounds the current time up by at most one second so a
+fresh fractional timestamp is not spuriously rejected. Historical verification proves certificate
+validity at issuance but cannot reconstruct historical revocation state.
+
+The five language verifiers support the same receipt and audit verification features, pinned by
+`canonical-vectors.json`, `ledger-vectors.json` and `verifier-parity-vectors.json`:
+
+- DIV approval/offline/delegation receipts, agent-authority seals (§5b), and platform receipts (§5c).
+  Platform receipts require WebAuthn and caller-pinned digest, RP, nonce, origin and subject keys.
+  Authority/delegation verification never substitutes for approval of an action.
+- Self-certifying DIDs, with explicit caller key mappings taking precedence.
+- DEWP single-event and multi-event proof bundles: inclusion, canonical content/header binding,
+  embedded ES256 signatures, tenant identity, sequence gaps/duplicates and claimed range endpoints.
+- Checkpoint continuity (§5.4), and anchor quorum (§5.3) under the caller's policy: ES256, Ed25519,
+  RSA-PSS and Rekor SET/payload verification under a separately pinned log key.
+
+Trust inputs must come from the caller. A root carried in the bundle proves only internal
+consistency; a producer's `externallyAnchored` flag is a claim, not verification. Bundle-carried
+anchors can count under caller-trusted keys, but only independently fetched, checkpoint-attributed
+anchors may establish divergence. For multi-checkpoint exports, key caller anchors by checkpoint ID
+or root; a flat list cannot establish exact attribution across checkpoints.
+For a multi-issuer policy, scope the Rekor key with `external_keys["rekor_issuer"]`; an unscoped
+legacy key is accepted only when exactly one issuer is trusted.
+
+Limits remain explicit: no NDJSON evidence streaming and no WEBHOOK
+anchor verifier. Those anchors do not count toward quorum. No implementation claims the complete
+DEWP Extended Profile (§9.2). WebAuthn audit signatures require profile-carried assertion data and caller trust; verify the
+full DIV receipt separately for authorization and quorum. Offline authority verification checks the seal, not subsequent online
+revocation. Verification does not consume a nonce or prove execution.
+
+## Also available in
+- TypeScript — [`@intyga/verify`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify)
+- Go — [`verify-go`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify-go)
+- Rust — [`intyga-verify`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify-rust)
+- Java — [`com.intyga:intyga-verify`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify-java)
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0.
+
+
+### Audit event signatures
+
+The `trust.intyga.audit.v1` profile carries WebAuthn assertion data in the committed
+`canonical.metadata.webauthn.authenticatorData` and `clientDataJSON` fields. Both single-proof and
+bulk-evidence verification check these assertions when given caller-owned signer trust. This is a
+signature over the exact `signedPayload`, not approval quorum, action authorization, hardware
+attestation, current credential status or proof that the deploy executed. Verify the full DIV receipt
+against the expected operation and approval policy for those authorization checks.
+
+The per-event signature result distinguishes `verified`, `invalid`, `not_checked` (missing trust,
+missing material or unsupported algorithm) and `not_applicable` (unsigned/system or AUTO_APPROVED).
+A reason accompanies each status. `trusted: true` requires a valid signature under a caller-supplied
+key mapped to that signer DID. WebAuthn requires caller-selected origin and RP ID, user presence and
+user verification, and refuses cross-origin assertions. Supply COSE keys for WebAuthn and SPKI keys
+for ES256. Multiple keys per DID support deliberate key rotation; the evidence's key is never added
+to the caller's trusted set.
+
+Without a signature policy, legacy ES256 checks still use the embedded key and report `trusted: false`;
+WebAuthn reports `not_checked`. Diagnostic ledger validity does not imply signature validity. The
+strict signature option requires **every selected entry** to have a verified, caller-trusted signature;
+unsigned, redacted, incomplete and invalid entries fail that option. Anchor quorum is a separate policy.
+
+Pass `signature_policy={"trustedSigners": {did: [public_key]}, "expectedOrigin": origin, "expectedRpId": rp_id}`
+and `require_signatures=True` to `verify_bundle` / `verify_evidence_bundle`.

intyga_verify-1.0.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+# intyga-verify — Offline INTYGA receipt verification for Python
+
+Independently confirm that a human cryptographically approved **exactly** the action you are about to run — in your own process, with no INTYGA secret and no network call. You recompute the canonical payload from your own parameters, check it byte-matches what was signed, and verify the human's **ES256** or **WebAuthn** signature.
+
+Depends only on [`cryptography`](https://pypi.org/project/cryptography/). This is the verify-only surface of the INTYGA Python SDK, published on its own so a relying party that only needs verification does not install the full client. Its canonicalization is held byte-identical to the TypeScript, Go, Rust, and Java verifiers by shared cross-language test vectors.
+
+> The full client (which bundles this verifier) is [`sdk-python`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/sdk-python).
+
+## Install
+
+```sh
+pip install intyga-verify
+```
+
+## Verify an approval receipt
+
+```python
+import intyga_verify
+
+# The approver keys YOU trust, resolved from your own key management — never from the receipt.
+# A receipt's own `signerPublicKey` proves only that the receipt is self-consistent.
+APPROVERS = {"publicKeys": [MY_ENROLLED_APPROVER_KEY_B64]}
+
+# `expected` is what you are ABOUT to execute. `target`, `nonce` and `approvers` are REQUIRED and
+# are asserted from your side; the verifier refuses outright without them.
+EXPECTED = {
+    "target": "prod-db-cluster-01",       # THIS service (DIV Target Isolation)
+    "actionType": "wipe_production",
+    "params": {"database": "prod-db-1"},
+    "nonce": nonce,                       # the challenge YOU issued
+    "approvers": APPROVERS,
+}
+
+result = intyga_verify.verify_approval_receipt(receipt, EXPECTED)
+if not result["ok"]:
+    raise SystemExit(f"refusing to proceed: {result['reason']}")
+```
+
+One byte of drift — a swapped target, an appended region — and verification fails, because the signature was over the exact bytes you just recomputed.
+
+## Whose quorum? (the requirement floor)
+
+The signed `requirement` is the signers' own statement: its signature stops a third party from
+altering it, not the approvers it constrains from writing a weaker one. One approver who is also the
+requester can sign a 1-of-1 payload alone. **Without a floor this verifier proves only the quorum the
+signers stated.** When you know the rule, add it to the expectation (DIV §5 step 3d):
+
+```python
+EXPECTED["requirement"] = {"requiredApprovals": 3, "requesterCannotApprove": True}
+```
+
+A signed requirement weaker on any field — fewer approvals, no four-eyes or no hardware key where the
+floor demands one — is refused before any signature is counted, with a reason starting "signed
+requirement is weaker than the relying party's policy"; an equal or stricter one passes. A malformed
+floor (quorum below 1) is refused rather than ignored. The same field exists on the delegation
+expectation (pass the ordinary rule) and the agent-authority expectation (your sealing policy).
+Omitting it keeps the previous behaviour.
+
+## WebAuthn (passkey) receipts
+
+A passkey assertion harvested at *any* relying party would otherwise verify, so WebAuthn receipts require you to pin the expected origin and RP ID:
+
+```python
+result = intyga_verify.verify_approval_receipt(
+    receipt,
+    EXPECTED,
+    expected_origin="https://app.example.com",
+    expected_rp_id="app.example.com",
+)
+```
+
+`require_user_verification` defaults to `True`; pass `False` to accept mere user presence. Policy `AUTO_APPROVED` receipts carry no human signature and fail closed unless you pass `allow_auto_approved=True`.
+
+## Receipt and audit verification
+
+The package also exports `verify_platform_receipt`, `verify_agent_authority` and `ledger`.
+The ledger module exposes `verify_bundle`, `verify_evidence_bundle`, `verify_roots_chain`,
+`verify_anchor_signature` and `verify_anchor_quorum`. It is assembled from the same source as
+`intyga_sdk`, including the shared cross-language regression fixtures.
+
+RFC 3161 anchors can be checked with `verify_rfc3161_anchor(anchor, trust)` and count toward quorum
+when `external_keys={"rfc3161": {issuer: trust}}` is supplied. This optional adapter invokes an
+installed OpenSSL 3 executable without network access. Trust pins the CA and TSA certificate digest;
+`revocation` must explicitly be `"crl"` with an offline CRL or `"unchecked"`. The caller may select
+an integer `verification_time`; the default rounds the current time up by at most one second so a
+fresh fractional timestamp is not spuriously rejected. Historical verification proves certificate
+validity at issuance but cannot reconstruct historical revocation state.
+
+The five language verifiers support the same receipt and audit verification features, pinned by
+`canonical-vectors.json`, `ledger-vectors.json` and `verifier-parity-vectors.json`:
+
+- DIV approval/offline/delegation receipts, agent-authority seals (§5b), and platform receipts (§5c).
+  Platform receipts require WebAuthn and caller-pinned digest, RP, nonce, origin and subject keys.
+  Authority/delegation verification never substitutes for approval of an action.
+- Self-certifying DIDs, with explicit caller key mappings taking precedence.
+- DEWP single-event and multi-event proof bundles: inclusion, canonical content/header binding,
+  embedded ES256 signatures, tenant identity, sequence gaps/duplicates and claimed range endpoints.
+- Checkpoint continuity (§5.4), and anchor quorum (§5.3) under the caller's policy: ES256, Ed25519,
+  RSA-PSS and Rekor SET/payload verification under a separately pinned log key.
+
+Trust inputs must come from the caller. A root carried in the bundle proves only internal
+consistency; a producer's `externallyAnchored` flag is a claim, not verification. Bundle-carried
+anchors can count under caller-trusted keys, but only independently fetched, checkpoint-attributed
+anchors may establish divergence. For multi-checkpoint exports, key caller anchors by checkpoint ID
+or root; a flat list cannot establish exact attribution across checkpoints.
+For a multi-issuer policy, scope the Rekor key with `external_keys["rekor_issuer"]`; an unscoped
+legacy key is accepted only when exactly one issuer is trusted.
+
+Limits remain explicit: no NDJSON evidence streaming and no WEBHOOK
+anchor verifier. Those anchors do not count toward quorum. No implementation claims the complete
+DEWP Extended Profile (§9.2). WebAuthn audit signatures require profile-carried assertion data and caller trust; verify the
+full DIV receipt separately for authorization and quorum. Offline authority verification checks the seal, not subsequent online
+revocation. Verification does not consume a nonce or prove execution.
+
+## Also available in
+- TypeScript — [`@intyga/verify`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify)
+- Go — [`verify-go`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify-go)
+- Rust — [`intyga-verify`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify-rust)
+- Java — [`com.intyga:intyga-verify`](https://github.com/intyga-dev/verify-java)
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0.
+
+
+### Audit event signatures
+
+The `trust.intyga.audit.v1` profile carries WebAuthn assertion data in the committed
+`canonical.metadata.webauthn.authenticatorData` and `clientDataJSON` fields. Both single-proof and
+bulk-evidence verification check these assertions when given caller-owned signer trust. This is a
+signature over the exact `signedPayload`, not approval quorum, action authorization, hardware
+attestation, current credential status or proof that the deploy executed. Verify the full DIV receipt
+against the expected operation and approval policy for those authorization checks.
+
+The per-event signature result distinguishes `verified`, `invalid`, `not_checked` (missing trust,
+missing material or unsupported algorithm) and `not_applicable` (unsigned/system or AUTO_APPROVED).
+A reason accompanies each status. `trusted: true` requires a valid signature under a caller-supplied
+key mapped to that signer DID. WebAuthn requires caller-selected origin and RP ID, user presence and
+user verification, and refuses cross-origin assertions. Supply COSE keys for WebAuthn and SPKI keys
+for ES256. Multiple keys per DID support deliberate key rotation; the evidence's key is never added
+to the caller's trusted set.
+
+Without a signature policy, legacy ES256 checks still use the embedded key and report `trusted: false`;
+WebAuthn reports `not_checked`. Diagnostic ledger validity does not imply signature validity. The
+strict signature option requires **every selected entry** to have a verified, caller-trusted signature;
+unsigned, redacted, incomplete and invalid entries fail that option. Anchor quorum is a separate policy.
+
+Pass `signature_policy={"trustedSigners": {did: [public_key]}, "expectedOrigin": origin, "expectedRpId": rp_id}`
+and `require_signatures=True` to `verify_bundle` / `verify_evidence_bundle`.

intyga_verify-1.0.0/intyga_verify/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+"""intyga-verify — offline verification of INTYGA approval receipts.
+
+The verifier and its canonicalization helpers, with no INTYGA secret and no network. This is the
+verify-only surface of the Python SDK, published on its own so a relying party that only needs to
+verify receipts does not have to install the full client. Kept byte-identical to the TypeScript, Go,
+Rust, and Java verifiers by shared cross-language test vectors.
+"""
+
+# NOTE: the pre-DIV canonical_authorization_payload / _v3 builders were removed with the v2/v3
+# formats (ADR 005/014) — do not re-add them here; verify_approval_receipt rejects v != 1.
+from . import ledger
+from .rfc3161 import verify_rfc3161_anchor
+from .crypto import (
+    canonical_agent_authority_payload,
+    canonical_platform_intent_payload,
+    verify_agent_authority,
+    verify_platform_receipt,
+    self_certifying_did,
+    stable_stringify,
+    canonical_challenge_payload,
+    canonical_intent_payload,
+    canonical_action_payload,
+    canonical_enroll_payload,
+    canonical_login_payload,
+    payload_digest_hex,
+    verification_code,
+    verify_ecdsa_p256,
+    verify_approval_receipt,
+    # DIV §5a. Without these the published verifier cannot check an offline approval or a delegation
+    # at all — the two mechanisms a relying party most needs to verify locally, since they exist
+    # precisely for when the gateway is unreachable.
+    canonical_offline_intent_payload,
+    canonical_delegation_payload,
+    verify_delegation,
+    NonCanonicalValue,
+    # DIV §5 step 3d: the refusal stem for a signed requirement below expected["requirement"].
+    WEAKER_REQUIREMENT_REASON,
+)
+
+__all__ = [
+    "ledger",
+    "verify_rfc3161_anchor",
+    "canonical_agent_authority_payload",
+    "canonical_platform_intent_payload",
+    "verify_agent_authority",
+    "verify_platform_receipt",
+    "self_certifying_did",
+    "stable_stringify",
+    "canonical_offline_intent_payload",
+    "canonical_delegation_payload",
+    "verify_delegation",
+    "NonCanonicalValue",
+    "canonical_challenge_payload",
+    "canonical_intent_payload",
+    "canonical_action_payload",
+    "canonical_enroll_payload",
+    "canonical_login_payload",
+    "payload_digest_hex",
+    "verification_code",
+    "verify_ecdsa_p256",
+    "verify_approval_receipt",
+    "WEAKER_REQUIREMENT_REASON",
+]