healthcloud-cli 3.7.8__tar.gz → 3.7.10__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/PKG-INFO +94 -35
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/README.md +93 -34
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/agents/commands.py +5 -4
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/agents/operations.py +284 -38
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/context.py +96 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/errors.py +5 -4
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/guardrails/commands.py +5 -2
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/guardrails/operations.py +115 -6
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/pretty.py +26 -13
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/results.py +15 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/.gitignore +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/hatch_build.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/admins/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/admins/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/admins/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/admins/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/agents/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/agents/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/agents/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/auth.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/compatibility.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/data_sources/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/data_sources/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/data_sources/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/data_sources/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/data_sources/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/departments/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/departments/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/departments/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/departments/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/departments/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/domain_errors.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/guardrails/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/guardrails/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/guardrails/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/organization/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/organization/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/organization/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/organization/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/organization/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/output.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/policies/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/policies/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/policies/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/policies/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/policies/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/registry.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/session.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/sessions/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/sessions/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/sessions/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/sessions/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/sessions/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/skills/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/skills/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/skills/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/skills/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/skills/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/target.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/teams/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/teams/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/teams/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/teams/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/teams/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/tools/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/tools/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/tools/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/tools/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/tools/projections.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/tuning.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/ui.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/ams/windows_files.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/cli.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/context.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/contracts/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/contracts/mcp-tools.manifest.json +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/main.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/manifest.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/output.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/params.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/tenants/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/tenants/commands.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/tenants/group.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/tenants/operations.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/healthcloud_cli/util.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/scripts/__init__.py +0 -0
- {healthcloud_cli-3.7.8 → healthcloud_cli-3.7.10}/scripts/bundle_manifest.py +0 -0
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Metadata-Version: 2.5
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Name: healthcloud-cli
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Version: 3.7.
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Version: 3.7.10
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Summary: Command-line interface for the HealthCloud MCP gateway, generated from the shared MCP tool manifest.
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Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/healthcloudservices/healthcloud-services/issues
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Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/healthcloudservices/healthcloud-services
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@@ -529,14 +529,15 @@ and a missing `--agent-id` fails with one envelope on stderr and exit 1:
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```
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Agent lifecycle changes are two first-class, send-once write commands. They
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require a saved `hc login` session (
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require a saved `hc login` session (the command refuses before any request when
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none is saved; env-var credentials are not accepted here) and the `--confirm`
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acknowledgement. `--expected-config-version` is optional:
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```bash
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uv run --frozen hc ams agents deactivate --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID \
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--agent-id AGENT_ID --expected-config-version N --confirm
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--agent-id AGENT_ID [--expected-config-version N] --confirm
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uv run --frozen hc ams agents activate --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID \
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--agent-id AGENT_ID --expected-config-version N --confirm
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--agent-id AGENT_ID [--expected-config-version N] --confirm
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```
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Each command issues exactly one `GET /agents/{agent_id}`, local pre-checks,
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fields — a disabled agent can still be selected by those paths — and that
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in-flight runs, WSS sessions and schedules are untouched by this route.
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`data.config_version_check` says which concurrent-edit check actually ran:
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`matched` (the read `config_version` equals `--expected-config-version`),
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`not_run` (the flag was omitted, so **no** version check ran and the reviewed
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target plus `--confirm` are the approval), never a silent success. It is carried
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on the confirmed, refused **and** unknown envelopes alike, so an outcome where
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the write may already have committed still says which check ran. A deployment
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whose agent payload omits or nulls `config_version` cannot honour the flag: the
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command refuses that flag with a way forward (`Re-run without
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--expected-config-version`) instead of refusing every lifecycle command forever
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and instead of interpolating a Python `None` repr.
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`mutation_replayed: false` — and closes with a
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`requested`, `config_version_check`, `evidence` (`saved`, `side_effects`,
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`runtime`), `eligibility`, `mutation_replayed: false` — and closes with a
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`verification:` block, so a
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deactivate reads `transition: deactivate`, then
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`evidence: / saved: / status: confirmed`, then `verification: / saved_state:
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confirmed`, `side_effects: unverified`, `runtime: unverified`; it is never one
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(named as having no supported reversible transition here), or a
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`config_version` that no longer matches `--expected-config-version` — all of
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these are also enforced by the preview, which still sends nothing. A missing
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`--confirm` exits 2. An `active` value the server emits as `1`/`0`/`"true"`/
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`"false"` is interpreted as a flag (an already in-effect state is still
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recognised and a correct write is still confirmed); any other value is
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unconfirmed, never a false success. That version check is a local best-effort
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guard only: the route has no `If-Match` and the server never compares the
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version, so it cannot prove atomicity and a request could still race between
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the read and the PUT.
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A transport error, a `5xx`/`408` from the PUT, or an interrupt (`Ctrl-C`) during
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`mutation_replayed: false`, `verification.saved_state: "unknown"` and a
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`reconciliation: {"status": "not_read", …}` block; the CLI sends no retry and
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does not re-read automatically — run `hc ams agents get` before doing anything
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not success). A `2xx` PUT answer whose body cannot be read as an agent object is
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error and never a
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also `outcome: "unknown"` (attempted once; the request may not have been sent
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and its saved state is unverified), never an internal error and never a
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success.
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A non-`5xx` rejection of the PUT (`409`, `422`, `400`, `403`, …) is worded as a
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**write** that the server refused, never as a read: `outcome: "failed"`,
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`verification.saved_state: "failed"`, `mutation_replayed: false`, the pre-write
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state under `data.evidence.saved.before`, and a `reconciliation` saying the CLI
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did not re-read. A `2xx` body that is not an agent object at all (for example a
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plain-text body) is a bounded `validation` refusal with the same
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`verification: not_applicable` as any read, never an `AttributeError` and never a
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traceback.
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The saved-session requirement above is enforced at the command boundary: the
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shared AMS authentication path still has the `HC_AMS_ADMIN_EMAIL`/
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`HC_AMS_ADMIN_PASSWORD` tenant-admin fallback that every AMS command group uses,
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so the guarantee is "these commands refuse without a saved session", not "no AMS
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write anywhere can reach the server on env-var credentials".
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Capability and organization assignments are one first-class, send-once write
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command. It requires a saved `hc login` session (
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`--confirm` acknowledgement of the
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command. It requires a saved `hc login` session (the command refuses before any
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request when none is saved; env-var credentials are not accepted here), an
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explicit `--expected-config-version`, and the `--confirm` acknowledgement of the
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target and the printed reviewed diff:
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```bash
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uv run --frozen hc ams agents assignments set --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID \
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capabilities.
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Deleting an agent is one first-class, send-once destructive command. It requires
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saved; env-var credentials are not accepted here) and the `--confirm`
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acknowledgement of the target and disclosure block it prints:
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confirmation read could not be read. A confirmation read that still returns the
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agent (`200`) — or a `2xx` body that cannot be read as an agent — is
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`verification.saved_state: "failed"`, never success. A confirmation read that
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answers 401/403 (or any other non-404, non-2xx status) observed nothing about
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the row, so `data.evidence.deleted.confirmation` is `unobserved` — the same
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three-way state as the guardrail delete — and never `still_present`.
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Read-only department listing and inspection use the same explicit tenant-admin
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targeting. They emit one versioned JSON result on stdout; failures emit one
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`data.guardrail` = the server's 201 readback. `--name` and
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`--created-by-user-id` are required by the server contract. The tenant comes
|
|
1529
|
+
from the saved session's authenticated admin; `--tenant-id` is accepted only
|
|
1530
|
+
as an explicit target that must match that session (a mismatch is refused
|
|
1531
|
+
before any request). `--rules-file` names an owner-only (0600) regular JSON
|
|
1532
|
+
file holding the rules object with string keys. Rules never ride argv (so they
|
|
1533
|
+
stay out of the process list) and are never echoed: an unreadable, symlinked,
|
|
1534
|
+
non-owner-only, duplicate-keyed or non-object file is refused with one fixed
|
|
1535
|
+
message that does not quote its content. Rules are write-only — they are sent
|
|
1536
|
+
but never appear in any command output, error message or readback.
|
|
1498
1537
|
- `update` sends only the options you pass (an empty `--description ""` clears
|
|
1499
1538
|
it; a `--rules-file` holding `{}` sends an empty rule set); it refuses with exit 1
|
|
1500
|
-
(`validation`) when no field option is given.
|
|
1539
|
+
(`validation`) when no field option is given. `create` treats an empty
|
|
1540
|
+
`--description ""` the same way: it is omitted rather than refused.
|
|
1501
1541
|
- `delete` is a reviewed one-shot destructor and requires `--confirm`; without
|
|
1502
1542
|
it the command exits 2 before login and sends nothing. With it the CLI makes
|
|
1503
1543
|
exactly one `GET` for the guardrail, one `GET /agents` and one `GET /policies`
|
|
@@ -1509,9 +1549,15 @@ uv run --frozen hc ams guardrails delete --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID
|
|
|
1509
1549
|
confirmed` for a 404, `data.deleted: false` with `saved_state: failed` when
|
|
1510
1550
|
the guardrail is still served, and `outcome: unknown` with
|
|
1511
1551
|
`data.mutation_replayed: false` and a `not_read` reconciliation when the
|
|
1512
|
-
answer is 5xx or the transport fails.
|
|
1513
|
-
|
|
1514
|
-
|
|
1552
|
+
answer is 5xx or the transport fails. A confirmation read that answers
|
|
1553
|
+
401/403 (or any other non-404, non-2xx status) observed nothing about the row,
|
|
1554
|
+
so `data.evidence.deleted.confirmation` is `unobserved`, never
|
|
1555
|
+
`still_present`. A 2xx answer to the `DELETE` itself (a proxy or misbehaving
|
|
1556
|
+
server returning a body) is treated as sent, not as input validation: the one
|
|
1557
|
+
confirmation `GET` still decides the outcome. It never replays, retries or
|
|
1558
|
+
re-reads on its own, and it never claims a restore: `hc ams restore` replays
|
|
1559
|
+
tuning fields onto an existing agent and can never restore a deleted
|
|
1560
|
+
guardrail.
|
|
1515
1561
|
- The server guards one reference only: an agent whose `guardrail_ids` contain
|
|
1516
1562
|
the guardrail answers 409 and nothing is deleted (the CLI reports one
|
|
1517
1563
|
`conflict` refusal). A policy whose `guardrail_ids` still name it is NOT
|
|
@@ -1519,7 +1565,9 @@ uv run --frozen hc ams guardrails delete --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID
|
|
|
1519
1565
|
that policy fails; the disclosure says so, and the printed affected references
|
|
1520
1566
|
name every policy that still points at the guardrail. When the agent or policy
|
|
1521
1567
|
catalog cannot be read, the delete is refused (`nothing was changed`) rather
|
|
1522
|
-
than executed without its disclosure
|
|
1568
|
+
than executed without its disclosure; the refusal category is the honest one
|
|
1569
|
+
(`authentication`, `authorization`, `unsupported` for a missing catalog route,
|
|
1570
|
+
`internal` for a server error, `transport` for a network failure).
|
|
1523
1571
|
- Any other 409 on `create` or `update` is one write-worded `conflict` refusal
|
|
1524
1572
|
that says the server refused the write and to review the guardrail's current
|
|
1525
1573
|
server state before retrying; no changes were made.
|
|
@@ -1527,10 +1575,21 @@ uv run --frozen hc ams guardrails delete --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID
|
|
|
1527
1575
|
the ID; a target/tenant mismatch on a write readback is a `validation` refusal
|
|
1528
1576
|
that reports the landed write truthfully: it names the guardrail and the
|
|
1529
1577
|
tenant that actually received it and points to `hc ams guardrails get`.
|
|
1530
|
-
- If the transport times out
|
|
1531
|
-
|
|
1532
|
-
|
|
1533
|
-
|
|
1578
|
+
- If the transport times out, the connection drops mid-write, the server
|
|
1579
|
+
answers 5xx/408, or a 2xx write body cannot be read as a guardrail, the
|
|
1580
|
+
write's outcome is unknown: the CLI reports `outcome: unknown` with
|
|
1581
|
+
`data.mutation_replayed: false` and a `not_read` reconciliation, and its
|
|
1582
|
+
message says the write may have landed and to check `hc ams guardrails get`
|
|
1583
|
+
before retrying. It never re-sends the write on its own. That unknown envelope
|
|
1584
|
+
carries the shared `transport` error category for **both** a 5xx/408 answer and
|
|
1585
|
+
a network failure (the disclosure reads above use `internal` for a server error
|
|
1586
|
+
and `transport` for a network failure; the send-once write helper is shared
|
|
1587
|
+
across every catalog domain, so it reports one category for either).
|
|
1588
|
+
- A drifted installed SDK is refused before the tenant-admin login: the
|
|
1589
|
+
preflight checks that `create`, `update`, `delete`, `list` and `get` accept the
|
|
1590
|
+
exact call this CLI makes, so a renamed keyword is reported as `unsupported`
|
|
1591
|
+
with "Nothing was sent" instead of being mistaken for a landed write with an
|
|
1592
|
+
unreadable answer.
|
|
1534
1593
|
|
|
1535
1594
|
Read-only tool catalog listing and inspection are complete and unpaged. The
|
|
1536
1595
|
bounded projection includes only IDs, names, read-only and confirmation flags,
|
|
@@ -511,14 +511,15 @@ and a missing `--agent-id` fails with one envelope on stderr and exit 1:
|
|
|
511
511
|
```
|
|
512
512
|
|
|
513
513
|
Agent lifecycle changes are two first-class, send-once write commands. They
|
|
514
|
-
require a saved `hc login` session (
|
|
515
|
-
|
|
514
|
+
require a saved `hc login` session (the command refuses before any request when
|
|
515
|
+
none is saved; env-var credentials are not accepted here) and the `--confirm`
|
|
516
|
+
acknowledgement. `--expected-config-version` is optional:
|
|
516
517
|
|
|
517
518
|
```bash
|
|
518
519
|
uv run --frozen hc ams agents deactivate --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID \
|
|
519
|
-
--agent-id AGENT_ID --expected-config-version N --confirm
|
|
520
|
+
--agent-id AGENT_ID [--expected-config-version N] --confirm
|
|
520
521
|
uv run --frozen hc ams agents activate --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID \
|
|
521
|
-
--agent-id AGENT_ID --expected-config-version N --confirm
|
|
522
|
+
--agent-id AGENT_ID [--expected-config-version N] --confirm
|
|
522
523
|
```
|
|
523
524
|
|
|
524
525
|
Each command issues exactly one `GET /agents/{agent_id}`, local pre-checks,
|
|
@@ -548,9 +549,21 @@ explicitly that
|
|
|
548
549
|
fields — a disabled agent can still be selected by those paths — and that
|
|
549
550
|
in-flight runs, WSS sessions and schedules are untouched by this route.
|
|
550
551
|
|
|
552
|
+
`data.config_version_check` says which concurrent-edit check actually ran:
|
|
553
|
+
`matched` (the read `config_version` equals `--expected-config-version`),
|
|
554
|
+
`not_run` (the flag was omitted, so **no** version check ran and the reviewed
|
|
555
|
+
target plus `--confirm` are the approval), never a silent success. It is carried
|
|
556
|
+
on the confirmed, refused **and** unknown envelopes alike, so an outcome where
|
|
557
|
+
the write may already have committed still says which check ran. A deployment
|
|
558
|
+
whose agent payload omits or nulls `config_version` cannot honour the flag: the
|
|
559
|
+
command refuses that flag with a way forward (`Re-run without
|
|
560
|
+
--expected-config-version`) instead of refusing every lifecycle command forever
|
|
561
|
+
and instead of interpolating a Python `None` repr.
|
|
562
|
+
|
|
551
563
|
Default `pretty` output prints those facts as labelled lines — `transition`,
|
|
552
|
-
`requested`, `evidence` (`saved`, `side_effects`,
|
|
553
|
-
`mutation_replayed: false` — and closes with a
|
|
564
|
+
`requested`, `config_version_check`, `evidence` (`saved`, `side_effects`,
|
|
565
|
+
`runtime`), `eligibility`, `mutation_replayed: false` — and closes with a
|
|
566
|
+
`verification:` block, so a
|
|
554
567
|
deactivate reads `transition: deactivate`, then
|
|
555
568
|
`evidence: / saved: / status: confirmed`, then `verification: / saved_state:
|
|
556
569
|
confirmed`, `side_effects: unverified`, `runtime: unverified`; it is never one
|
|
@@ -574,24 +587,45 @@ tenant, an already in-effect state, an unsupported `archived`/`draft` target
|
|
|
574
587
|
(named as having no supported reversible transition here), or a
|
|
575
588
|
`config_version` that no longer matches `--expected-config-version` — all of
|
|
576
589
|
these are also enforced by the preview, which still sends nothing. A missing
|
|
577
|
-
`--confirm` exits 2.
|
|
590
|
+
`--confirm` exits 2. An `active` value the server emits as `1`/`0`/`"true"`/
|
|
591
|
+
`"false"` is interpreted as a flag (an already in-effect state is still
|
|
592
|
+
recognised and a correct write is still confirmed); any other value is
|
|
593
|
+
unconfirmed, never a false success. That version check is a local best-effort
|
|
578
594
|
guard only: the route has no `If-Match` and the server never compares the
|
|
579
595
|
version, so it cannot prove atomicity and a request could still race between
|
|
580
596
|
the read and the PUT.
|
|
581
597
|
|
|
582
|
-
A transport error
|
|
583
|
-
|
|
598
|
+
A transport error, a `5xx`/`408` from the PUT, or an interrupt (`Ctrl-C`) during
|
|
599
|
+
the PUT or the readback is reported as `outcome: "unknown"` with
|
|
600
|
+
`mutation_replayed: false`, `verification.saved_state: "unknown"` and a
|
|
584
601
|
`reconciliation: {"status": "not_read", …}` block; the CLI sends no retry and
|
|
585
602
|
does not re-read automatically — run `hc ams agents get` before doing anything
|
|
586
603
|
else. A failed readback after an accepted PUT is reported the same way (unknown,
|
|
587
604
|
not success). A `2xx` PUT answer whose body cannot be read as an agent object is
|
|
588
|
-
also `outcome: "unknown"` (
|
|
589
|
-
error and never a
|
|
605
|
+
also `outcome: "unknown"` (attempted once; the request may not have been sent
|
|
606
|
+
and its saved state is unverified), never an internal error and never a
|
|
607
|
+
success.
|
|
608
|
+
|
|
609
|
+
A non-`5xx` rejection of the PUT (`409`, `422`, `400`, `403`, …) is worded as a
|
|
610
|
+
**write** that the server refused, never as a read: `outcome: "failed"`,
|
|
611
|
+
`verification.saved_state: "failed"`, `mutation_replayed: false`, the pre-write
|
|
612
|
+
state under `data.evidence.saved.before`, and a `reconciliation` saying the CLI
|
|
613
|
+
did not re-read. A `2xx` body that is not an agent object at all (for example a
|
|
614
|
+
plain-text body) is a bounded `validation` refusal with the same
|
|
615
|
+
`verification: not_applicable` as any read, never an `AttributeError` and never a
|
|
616
|
+
traceback.
|
|
617
|
+
|
|
618
|
+
The saved-session requirement above is enforced at the command boundary: the
|
|
619
|
+
shared AMS authentication path still has the `HC_AMS_ADMIN_EMAIL`/
|
|
620
|
+
`HC_AMS_ADMIN_PASSWORD` tenant-admin fallback that every AMS command group uses,
|
|
621
|
+
so the guarantee is "these commands refuse without a saved session", not "no AMS
|
|
622
|
+
write anywhere can reach the server on env-var credentials".
|
|
590
623
|
|
|
591
624
|
Capability and organization assignments are one first-class, send-once write
|
|
592
|
-
command. It requires a saved `hc login` session (
|
|
593
|
-
|
|
594
|
-
`--confirm` acknowledgement of the
|
|
625
|
+
command. It requires a saved `hc login` session (the command refuses before any
|
|
626
|
+
request when none is saved; env-var credentials are not accepted here), an
|
|
627
|
+
explicit `--expected-config-version`, and the `--confirm` acknowledgement of the
|
|
628
|
+
target and the printed reviewed diff:
|
|
595
629
|
|
|
596
630
|
```bash
|
|
597
631
|
uv run --frozen hc ams agents assignments set --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID \
|
|
@@ -688,8 +722,9 @@ carries a reference field is refused by field name by
|
|
|
688
722
|
capabilities.
|
|
689
723
|
|
|
690
724
|
Deleting an agent is one first-class, send-once destructive command. It requires
|
|
691
|
-
a saved `hc login` session (
|
|
692
|
-
|
|
725
|
+
a saved `hc login` session (the command refuses before any request when none is
|
|
726
|
+
saved; env-var credentials are not accepted here) and the `--confirm`
|
|
727
|
+
acknowledgement of the target and disclosure block it prints:
|
|
693
728
|
|
|
694
729
|
```bash
|
|
695
730
|
uv run --frozen hc ams agents delete --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID \
|
|
@@ -757,7 +792,10 @@ The same unknown outcome applies when the delete was accepted but the
|
|
|
757
792
|
confirmation read could not be read. A confirmation read that still returns the
|
|
758
793
|
agent (`200`) — or a `2xx` body that cannot be read as an agent — is
|
|
759
794
|
`outcome: "failed"` with `data.deleted: false` and
|
|
760
|
-
`verification.saved_state: "failed"`, never success.
|
|
795
|
+
`verification.saved_state: "failed"`, never success. A confirmation read that
|
|
796
|
+
answers 401/403 (or any other non-404, non-2xx status) observed nothing about
|
|
797
|
+
the row, so `data.evidence.deleted.confirmation` is `unobserved` — the same
|
|
798
|
+
three-way state as the guardrail delete — and never `still_present`.
|
|
761
799
|
|
|
762
800
|
Read-only department listing and inspection use the same explicit tenant-admin
|
|
763
801
|
targeting. They emit one versioned JSON result on stdout; failures emit one
|
|
@@ -1469,17 +1507,19 @@ uv run --frozen hc ams guardrails delete --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID
|
|
|
1469
1507
|
|
|
1470
1508
|
- `create` succeeds with `operation: "guardrails.create"` and
|
|
1471
1509
|
`data.guardrail` = the server's 201 readback. `--name` and
|
|
1472
|
-
`--created-by-user-id` are required by the server contract
|
|
1473
|
-
|
|
1474
|
-
|
|
1475
|
-
|
|
1476
|
-
|
|
1477
|
-
|
|
1478
|
-
|
|
1479
|
-
message
|
|
1510
|
+
`--created-by-user-id` are required by the server contract. The tenant comes
|
|
1511
|
+
from the saved session's authenticated admin; `--tenant-id` is accepted only
|
|
1512
|
+
as an explicit target that must match that session (a mismatch is refused
|
|
1513
|
+
before any request). `--rules-file` names an owner-only (0600) regular JSON
|
|
1514
|
+
file holding the rules object with string keys. Rules never ride argv (so they
|
|
1515
|
+
stay out of the process list) and are never echoed: an unreadable, symlinked,
|
|
1516
|
+
non-owner-only, duplicate-keyed or non-object file is refused with one fixed
|
|
1517
|
+
message that does not quote its content. Rules are write-only — they are sent
|
|
1518
|
+
but never appear in any command output, error message or readback.
|
|
1480
1519
|
- `update` sends only the options you pass (an empty `--description ""` clears
|
|
1481
1520
|
it; a `--rules-file` holding `{}` sends an empty rule set); it refuses with exit 1
|
|
1482
|
-
(`validation`) when no field option is given.
|
|
1521
|
+
(`validation`) when no field option is given. `create` treats an empty
|
|
1522
|
+
`--description ""` the same way: it is omitted rather than refused.
|
|
1483
1523
|
- `delete` is a reviewed one-shot destructor and requires `--confirm`; without
|
|
1484
1524
|
it the command exits 2 before login and sends nothing. With it the CLI makes
|
|
1485
1525
|
exactly one `GET` for the guardrail, one `GET /agents` and one `GET /policies`
|
|
@@ -1491,9 +1531,15 @@ uv run --frozen hc ams guardrails delete --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID
|
|
|
1491
1531
|
confirmed` for a 404, `data.deleted: false` with `saved_state: failed` when
|
|
1492
1532
|
the guardrail is still served, and `outcome: unknown` with
|
|
1493
1533
|
`data.mutation_replayed: false` and a `not_read` reconciliation when the
|
|
1494
|
-
answer is 5xx or the transport fails.
|
|
1495
|
-
|
|
1496
|
-
|
|
1534
|
+
answer is 5xx or the transport fails. A confirmation read that answers
|
|
1535
|
+
401/403 (or any other non-404, non-2xx status) observed nothing about the row,
|
|
1536
|
+
so `data.evidence.deleted.confirmation` is `unobserved`, never
|
|
1537
|
+
`still_present`. A 2xx answer to the `DELETE` itself (a proxy or misbehaving
|
|
1538
|
+
server returning a body) is treated as sent, not as input validation: the one
|
|
1539
|
+
confirmation `GET` still decides the outcome. It never replays, retries or
|
|
1540
|
+
re-reads on its own, and it never claims a restore: `hc ams restore` replays
|
|
1541
|
+
tuning fields onto an existing agent and can never restore a deleted
|
|
1542
|
+
guardrail.
|
|
1497
1543
|
- The server guards one reference only: an agent whose `guardrail_ids` contain
|
|
1498
1544
|
the guardrail answers 409 and nothing is deleted (the CLI reports one
|
|
1499
1545
|
`conflict` refusal). A policy whose `guardrail_ids` still name it is NOT
|
|
@@ -1501,7 +1547,9 @@ uv run --frozen hc ams guardrails delete --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID
|
|
|
1501
1547
|
that policy fails; the disclosure says so, and the printed affected references
|
|
1502
1548
|
name every policy that still points at the guardrail. When the agent or policy
|
|
1503
1549
|
catalog cannot be read, the delete is refused (`nothing was changed`) rather
|
|
1504
|
-
than executed without its disclosure
|
|
1550
|
+
than executed without its disclosure; the refusal category is the honest one
|
|
1551
|
+
(`authentication`, `authorization`, `unsupported` for a missing catalog route,
|
|
1552
|
+
`internal` for a server error, `transport` for a network failure).
|
|
1505
1553
|
- Any other 409 on `create` or `update` is one write-worded `conflict` refusal
|
|
1506
1554
|
that says the server refused the write and to review the guardrail's current
|
|
1507
1555
|
server state before retrying; no changes were made.
|
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@@ -1509,10 +1557,21 @@ uv run --frozen hc ams guardrails delete --environment dev --tenant-id TENANT_ID
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the ID; a target/tenant mismatch on a write readback is a `validation` refusal
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that reports the landed write truthfully: it names the guardrail and the
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tenant that actually received it and points to `hc ams guardrails get`.
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-
- If the transport times out
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-
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-
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- If the transport times out, the connection drops mid-write, the server
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answers 5xx/408, or a 2xx write body cannot be read as a guardrail, the
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write's outcome is unknown: the CLI reports `outcome: unknown` with
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`data.mutation_replayed: false` and a `not_read` reconciliation, and its
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message says the write may have landed and to check `hc ams guardrails get`
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before retrying. It never re-sends the write on its own. That unknown envelope
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carries the shared `transport` error category for **both** a 5xx/408 answer and
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a network failure (the disclosure reads above use `internal` for a server error
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and `transport` for a network failure; the send-once write helper is shared
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across every catalog domain, so it reports one category for either).
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- A drifted installed SDK is refused before the tenant-admin login: the
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preflight checks that `create`, `update`, `delete`, `list` and `get` accept the
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exact call this CLI makes, so a renamed keyword is reported as `unsupported`
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with "Nothing was sent" instead of being mistaken for a landed write with an
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unreadable answer.
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Read-only tool catalog listing and inspection are complete and unpaged. The
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bounded projection includes only IDs, names, read-only and confirmation flags,
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@@ -93,10 +93,11 @@ def create_lifecycle_command(dependencies: AmsDependencies, transition: str) ->
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@_agent
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@click.option(
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"--expected-config-version",
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required=True,
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type=int,
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-
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"
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default=None,
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help="Optional: the config_version read before the write. A local best-effort guard only, because "
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"the route has no If-Match. Omitting it runs no version check and says so in the envelope; a "
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"deployment that reports no config_version refuses the flag rather than the whole command.",
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)
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@click.option(
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"--confirm",
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@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ def create_lifecycle_command(dependencies: AmsDependencies, transition: str) ->
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environment: str | None,
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tenant_id: str | None,
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agent_id: str,
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-
expected_config_version: int,
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expected_config_version: int | None,
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confirm: bool,
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) -> None:
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target_data = {
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