ha-mcp-dev 7.6.0.dev612__tar.gz → 7.6.0.dev614__tar.gz

{ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev612/src/ha_mcp_dev.egg-info → ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev614}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: ha-mcp-dev
-Version: 7.6.0.dev612
+Version: 7.6.0.dev614
 Summary: Home Assistant MCP Server - Complete control of Home Assistant through MCP
 Author-email: Julien <github@qc-h.net>
 License: MIT

{ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev612 → ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev614}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "ha-mcp-dev"
-version = "7.6.0.dev612"
+version = "7.6.0.dev614"
 description = "Home Assistant MCP Server - Complete control of Home Assistant through MCP"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.13,<3.14"

{ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev612 → ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev614}/src/ha_mcp/auth/provider.py

@@ -7,13 +7,16 @@ provide their Long-Lived Access Token (LLAT).
 """
 
 import binascii
+import contextlib
 import hashlib
 import hmac
 import json
 import logging
+import os
 import secrets
 import time
 from base64 import urlsafe_b64decode, urlsafe_b64encode
+from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 from urllib.parse import urlencode
 
@@ -32,11 +35,12 @@ from mcp.server.auth.provider import (
     construct_redirect_uri,
 )
 from mcp.shared.auth import OAuthClientInformationFull, OAuthToken
-from pydantic import AnyHttpUrl
+from pydantic import AnyHttpUrl, ValidationError
 from starlette.requests import Request
 from starlette.responses import HTMLResponse, RedirectResponse, Response
 from starlette.routing import Route
 
+from ..utils.data_paths import get_data_dir
 from .consent_form import create_consent_html, create_error_html
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -66,9 +70,16 @@ class HomeAssistantOAuthProvider(OAuthProvider):
 
     The consent form collects the user's Long-Lived Access Token (LLAT),
     which is encoded into both access and refresh tokens as base64 JSON.
-    No server-side token state is stored, so the server survives container
-    restarts without losing sessions (clients re-register via DCR
-    automatically).
+    Tokens are stateless (HMAC-signed base64 JSON) so no per-token state is
+    stored server-side.
+
+    DCR client registrations and the HMAC signing secret are persisted to
+    ``get_data_dir() / "oauth_clients.json"`` and
+    ``get_data_dir() / "oauth_hmac_secret"`` respectively, so registered
+    clients survive container restarts.  If the data directory is not
+    writable (e.g. Docker without a mounted volume) the server falls back
+    to in-memory-only storage and logs a warning; existing clients must
+    re-register after each restart in that case.
 
     Security comes from HTTPS transport and the LLAT itself being the
     authorization boundary — revoking the LLAT in Home Assistant
@@ -117,8 +128,10 @@ class HomeAssistantOAuthProvider(OAuthProvider):
             required_scopes=required_scopes,
         )
 
-        # In-memory storage (session-scoped, not persisted)
-        self.clients: dict[str, OAuthClientInformationFull] = {}
+        # DCR client registry — persisted to disk so clients survive restarts.
+        self.clients: dict[str, OAuthClientInformationFull] = self._load_clients()
+
+        # Short-lived in-memory state (no persistence needed or wanted)
         self.auth_codes: dict[str, AuthorizationCode] = {}
 
         # Home Assistant credentials storage (keyed by client_id)
@@ -129,13 +142,149 @@ class HomeAssistantOAuthProvider(OAuthProvider):
         self.pending_authorizations: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
 
         # Server-side secret for HMAC-protecting LLATs in refresh tokens.
-        # Regenerated each startup — existing refresh tokens become invalid
-        # on restart, but that's acceptable since access tokens still work
-        # and clients will re-authenticate via the consent form.
-        self._hmac_secret = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+        # Persisted so existing refresh tokens survive server restarts.
+        self._hmac_secret = self._load_hmac_secret()
 
         logger.info(f"HomeAssistantOAuthProvider initialized with base_url={base_url}")
 
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # Persistence helpers
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _clients_file() -> Path:
+        return get_data_dir() / "oauth_clients.json"
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _hmac_secret_file() -> Path:
+        return get_data_dir() / "oauth_hmac_secret"
+
+    def _load_clients(self) -> dict[str, OAuthClientInformationFull]:
+        """Load persisted DCR client registrations from disk.
+
+        Returns an empty dict if the file is absent, unreadable, or corrupt.
+        """
+        path = self._clients_file()
+        try:
+            data: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(path.read_text())
+            clients = {
+                cid: OAuthClientInformationFull.model_validate(c)
+                for cid, c in data.items()
+            }
+            logger.info("Loaded %d OAuth client(s) from %s", len(clients), path)
+            return clients
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            logger.debug("No persistent OAuth client registry found at %s", path)
+            return {}
+        except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError, ValidationError) as exc:
+            logger.warning(
+                "Could not load OAuth client registry from %s (%s: %s); "
+                "starting with empty registry.",
+                path,
+                type(exc).__name__,
+                exc,
+            )
+            return {}
+
+    def _save_clients(self) -> None:
+        """Persist DCR client registrations to disk.
+
+        Failures are logged as warnings; the server continues with in-memory
+        state so existing sessions are not disrupted.
+        """
+        if not self.clients:
+            return
+        path = self._clients_file()
+        # Serialize before touching the filesystem. A model that won't
+        # serialize is a programming error and should surface loudly, not be
+        # swallowed as if it were a transient disk fault in the write below.
+        data = {
+            cid: client.model_dump(mode="json") for cid, client in self.clients.items()
+        }
+        payload = json.dumps(data, indent=2).encode()
+        tmp_path = path.parent / f".{path.name}.tmp"
+        try:
+            # Write to a temp file first, then atomically rename. Use os.open
+            # with mode 0o600 (owner read/write only) because a confidential
+            # client's client_secret can be stored in this file.
+            fd = os.open(str(tmp_path), os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
+            try:
+                os.write(fd, payload)
+            finally:
+                os.close(fd)
+            os.replace(str(tmp_path), str(path))
+            logger.debug("Persisted %d OAuth client(s) to %s", len(data), path)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
+                tmp_path.unlink()
+            logger.warning(
+                "Failed to persist OAuth client registry to %s (%s: %s). "
+                "Clients will need to re-register after the next restart. "
+                "Mount a persistent volume to fix this: "
+                "docker run -v ha_mcp_data:/home/mcpuser/.ha-mcp ...",
+                path,
+                type(exc).__name__,
+                exc,
+            )
+
+    def _load_hmac_secret(self) -> bytes:
+        """Load or generate the HMAC signing secret.
+
+        Persists a newly generated secret so refresh tokens survive restarts.
+        Falls back to a fresh (non-persisted) secret if the file is unreadable.
+        """
+        path = self._hmac_secret_file()
+        try:
+            hex_secret = path.read_text().strip()
+            if not hex_secret:
+                raise ValueError("HMAC secret file is empty")
+            secret = bytes.fromhex(hex_secret)
+            if len(secret) != 32:
+                raise ValueError(
+                    f"Invalid HMAC secret length: {len(secret)} bytes (expected 32)"
+                )
+            logger.debug("Loaded HMAC secret from %s", path)
+            return secret
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            pass  # first start — generate and persist below
+        except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+            logger.warning(
+                "Could not load HMAC secret from %s (%s: %s); "
+                "generating a new one — existing refresh tokens will be invalidated.",
+                path,
+                type(exc).__name__,
+                exc,
+            )
+
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+        tmp_path = path.parent / f".{path.name}.tmp"
+        try:
+            # Write to a temp file first, then atomically rename — prevents a
+            # partial write from corrupting the secret on an interrupted flush.
+            # os.open with mode 0o600 keeps the file owner read/write only.
+            fd = os.open(str(tmp_path), os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
+            try:
+                os.write(fd, secret.hex().encode())
+            finally:
+                os.close(fd)
+            os.replace(str(tmp_path), str(path))
+            logger.debug("Persisted new HMAC secret to %s", path)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
+                tmp_path.unlink()
+            logger.warning(
+                "Failed to persist HMAC secret to %s (%s: %s). "
+                "Refresh tokens will be invalidated on the next restart.",
+                path,
+                type(exc).__name__,
+                exc,
+            )
+        return secret
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # OAuthProvider interface
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
     def _sign_payload(self, payload_json: bytes) -> str:
         """Compute HMAC-SHA256 signature of a token payload."""
         return hmac.new(self._hmac_secret, payload_json, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
@@ -159,8 +308,9 @@ class HomeAssistantOAuthProvider(OAuthProvider):
         timestamp, and (for refresh tokens) client/scope metadata and
         expiry.
 
-        Tokens are invalidated on server restart (new HMAC secret).
-        Clients re-authenticate via the consent form.
+        The signing secret is persisted (see ``_load_hmac_secret``), so signed
+        tokens remain valid across server restarts. Clients re-authenticate via
+        the consent form only when a token expires or the secret is rotated.
         """
         payload: dict[str, Any] = {
             "ha_token": ha_token,
@@ -373,6 +523,7 @@ class HomeAssistantOAuthProvider(OAuthProvider):
 
         self.clients[client_info.client_id] = client_info
         logger.info(f"Registered OAuth client: {client_info.client_id}")
+        self._save_clients()
 
     async def authorize(
         self, client: OAuthClientInformationFull, params: AuthorizationParams

{ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev612 → ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev614}/src/ha_mcp/tools/tools_filesystem.py

@@ -63,8 +63,9 @@ def _version_tuple(version: str) -> tuple[int, ...]:
     segment to ``0`` would not actually achieve the "fail closed"
     intent: a malformed high-order segment like ``"1.x.0"`` would
     still parse to ``(1, 0, 0)`` and pass a ``>= (0, 5, 1)`` gate.
-    Caller routes the ValueError through ``_raise_component_too_old``
-    so the actionable update prompt fires.
+    The caller surfaces the ValueError as a distinct "malformed version"
+    error (reinstall / file-issue remediation), separate from the
+    "too old" update prompt.
     """
     return tuple(int(segment) for segment in version.split("."))
 
@@ -175,7 +176,25 @@ async def _fetch_caller_token(client: Any) -> str:
     try:
         parsed = _version_tuple(version)
     except ValueError:
-        _raise_component_too_old(f"malformed version: {version!r}")
+        # A malformed version (non-numeric segment like "1.x.0", or a
+        # future suffixed/date scheme _version_tuple can't parse) is a
+        # different failure mode from "too old": a HACS update won't help
+        # if the reported version itself is wrong. Point at reinstall /
+        # issue-filing instead of the version-bump remediation.
+        raise_tool_error(
+            create_error_response(
+                ErrorCode.COMPONENT_NOT_INSTALLED,
+                "The installed ha_mcp_tools custom component reports a "
+                f"malformed version: {version!r}, so ha-mcp can't verify it "
+                f"meets the required >= {MIN_COMPONENT_VERSION}.",
+                suggestions=[
+                    "Reinstall ha_mcp_tools via HACS",
+                    "Restart Home Assistant after reinstalling",
+                    "If the version is still malformed, file an issue at "
+                    "https://github.com/homeassistant-ai/ha-mcp/issues",
+                ],
+            )
+        )
     if parsed < _version_tuple(MIN_COMPONENT_VERSION):
         _raise_component_too_old(f"reported version is {version}")
     _CALLER_TOKEN_CACHE[client] = token

{ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev612 → ha_mcp_dev-7.6.0.dev614/src/ha_mcp_dev.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: ha-mcp-dev
-Version: 7.6.0.dev612
+Version: 7.6.0.dev614
 Summary: Home Assistant MCP Server - Complete control of Home Assistant through MCP
 Author-email: Julien <github@qc-h.net>
 License: MIT