guardrail-middleware 0.1.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/LICENSE +21 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/PKG-INFO +160 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/README.md +131 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/pyproject.toml +37 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/setup.cfg +4 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware/__init__.py +43 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware/audit.py +88 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware/detectors.py +336 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware/engine.py +136 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware/fastapi.py +139 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware/models.py +143 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware/policy.py +117 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware.egg-info/PKG-INFO +160 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +17 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +1 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware.egg-info/requires.txt +12 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/src/guardrail_middleware.egg-info/top_level.txt +1 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/tests/test_engine.py +132 -0
- guardrail_middleware-0.1.0/tests/test_fastapi_middleware.py +78 -0
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2026 Niraj Sanjay Karnawat
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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SOFTWARE.
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Metadata-Version: 2.4
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Name: guardrail-middleware
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Version: 0.1.0
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Summary: Runtime authorization middleware for AI agent tool calls — policy checks, injection/taint detectors, and a hash-chained audit log, before any action executes.
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Author: Niraj Sanjay Karnawat
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License: MIT
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Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/Niraj21-star/guardrail-middleware
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Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/Niraj21-star/guardrail-middleware
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Keywords: ai-agents,guardrails,llm-security,middleware,fastapi,authorization
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Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
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Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
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Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
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Classifier: Topic :: Security
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Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries
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Requires-Python: >=3.10
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Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
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License-File: LICENSE
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Provides-Extra: fastapi
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Requires-Dist: starlette>=0.27; extra == "fastapi"
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Requires-Dist: fastapi>=0.100; extra == "fastapi"
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Provides-Extra: yaml
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Requires-Dist: pyyaml>=6; extra == "yaml"
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Provides-Extra: dev
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Requires-Dist: pytest>=7; extra == "dev"
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Requires-Dist: fastapi>=0.100; extra == "dev"
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Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.24; extra == "dev"
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Dynamic: license-file
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# guardrail-middleware
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**Runtime authorization for AI agent tool calls.** GuardRail sits between an AI agent and its tools: every proposed action is checked against a policy *before* it executes — and every decision is written to a tamper-evident audit log.
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An agent that can call tools can also be talked into misusing them — by a prompt injection in an email, a poisoned webpage, or its own overconfidence. GuardRail is the checkpoint that asks, deterministically and in under a millisecond: *is this role allowed to do this, to this resource, with these parameters, on the say-so of this source?*
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```
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pip install guardrail-middleware # core, zero dependencies
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pip install guardrail-middleware[fastapi] # + FastAPI/Starlette middleware
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```
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## Quick start — framework-agnostic
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```python
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from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail
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guard = Guardrail() # built-in default policy
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decision = guard.evaluate({
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"tool": "payments",
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"operation": "payment",
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"target_resource": "vendor/acme",
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"parameters": {"amount": 42000},
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"agent_role": "support",
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})
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decision.verdict # Verdict.BLOCK — role 'support' may not run payments
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decision.allowed # False
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decision.explanation
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```
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Works anywhere an agent proposes an action: LangChain/LangGraph tool wrappers, MCP servers, custom agent loops, job queues.
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## Quick start — FastAPI / Starlette middleware
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```python
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail, AuditLog
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from guardrail_middleware.fastapi import GuardrailMiddleware
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app = FastAPI()
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app.add_middleware(
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GuardrailMiddleware,
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guard=Guardrail(audit_log=AuditLog("audit.jsonl")),
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paths=["/tools/execute"],
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)
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```
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Requests to guarded paths are read as actions. **Blocked or escalated actions never reach your handler** — the client gets HTTP 403 with the full decision as JSON. Allowed actions pass through with `X-Guardrail-Verdict` and `X-Guardrail-Risk` headers set.
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## Quick start — decorator
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```python
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from guardrail_middleware.fastapi import guard_tool, GuardrailBlocked
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@guard_tool(guard, tool="payments", operation="payment", agent_role="support")
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def send_payment(amount: int, to: str):
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... # only runs if GuardRail approves
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try:
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send_payment(amount=42_000, to="vendor/acme")
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except GuardrailBlocked as stopped:
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print(stopped.decision.explanation)
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```
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## Verdicts
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| Verdict | Meaning |
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|---|---|
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| `APPROVE` | No policy issues — execute. |
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| `APPROVE_WITH_CONDITIONS` | Execute only with the attached conditions (batch it, back up first, dry-run). |
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| `ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN` | A person must approve first (over-limit payment, untrusted source, unbounded delete). |
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| `BLOCK` | Never execute (injection, unauthorized role, PII exfiltration, hard money ceiling). |
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Priority is fail-safe: any `block` finding wins, then `escalate`, then `conditions`.
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## What it checks — 7 deterministic detectors
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No LLM in the decision path: the same action under the same policy always gets the same verdict, reproducibly and fast.
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1. **Injection** — instruction-override / role-hijack / secret-extraction / policy-bypass patterns in untrusted content (email, webpage, tool output). Untrusted content is data, never instructions.
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2. **Authorization** — role × operation-class permissions (an `intern` role cannot delete, a `support` role cannot pay).
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3. **Financial limits** — per-class auto-approve and block thresholds, plus a hard ceiling no role can exceed; a payment with no verifiable amount escalates.
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4. **Bulk operations** — record-count thresholds: conditions (batch + dry-run) above the auto-approve max, escalation above the bulk ceiling.
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5. **Taint / exfiltration** — PII or secret fields flowing to an external destination is blocked; secrets inside tool-call parameters are blocked outright.
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6. **Destructive actions** — irreversible operations without a backup/confirmation marker get conditions; a delete with no target escalates.
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7. **Untrusted source** — money movement, deletion, or external sends *triggered by* email/webpage/tool-output content escalate to a human.
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## Policy
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Every threshold lives in one policy dict — tune it without touching code, or load it from YAML:
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```python
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from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail, Policy
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policy = Policy.from_yaml("policy.yaml") # see policy.example.yaml
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guard = Guardrail(policy=policy)
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# …or inline
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guard = Guardrail(policy={"approval_limits": {"payment": {"auto_approve_max": 500}}})
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```
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## Audit log
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Pass an `AuditLog` and every decision is appended as one JSON line, hash-chained with SHA-256: each entry commits to the previous entry's hash, so editing, deleting, or reordering history breaks the chain.
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```python
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from guardrail_middleware import AuditLog
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AuditLog("audit.jsonl").verify() # {'ok': True, 'entries': 128, 'broken_at': None}
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```
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## Demo & tests
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```bash
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python examples/demo.py # 5 scenarios, all four verdicts, audit verification
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pytest # 18 tests: engine, detectors, middleware, decorator, audit tampering
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```
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## Where this comes from
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`guardrail-middleware` is the reusable enforcement core extracted from **[GuardRail](https://github.com/Niraj21-star/guard_ai)** — a runtime action-authorization and behavioral-safety layer for agentic AI built at Infosys Ignite EngNext 2026 (special recognition), where the full system adds multi-step plan validation, an action-passport execution gateway, and a 42-scenario adversarial red-team benchmark. This package packages the single-action checkpoint from that system so any agent stack can adopt it in minutes.
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## Status & honesty notes
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- v0.1.0, alpha. The API may still move.
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- Detectors are deterministic heuristics, not a proof of safety — pair them with least-privilege credentials and human review for high-impact tools.
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- Plan-level (multi-step) validation lives in the main GuardRail project, not in this package yet.
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## License
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MIT © Niraj Sanjay Karnawat
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# guardrail-middleware
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**Runtime authorization for AI agent tool calls.** GuardRail sits between an AI agent and its tools: every proposed action is checked against a policy *before* it executes — and every decision is written to a tamper-evident audit log.
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An agent that can call tools can also be talked into misusing them — by a prompt injection in an email, a poisoned webpage, or its own overconfidence. GuardRail is the checkpoint that asks, deterministically and in under a millisecond: *is this role allowed to do this, to this resource, with these parameters, on the say-so of this source?*
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```
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pip install guardrail-middleware # core, zero dependencies
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pip install guardrail-middleware[fastapi] # + FastAPI/Starlette middleware
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```
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## Quick start — framework-agnostic
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```python
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from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail
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guard = Guardrail() # built-in default policy
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decision = guard.evaluate({
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"tool": "payments",
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"operation": "payment",
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"target_resource": "vendor/acme",
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"parameters": {"amount": 42000},
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"agent_role": "support",
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})
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decision.verdict # Verdict.BLOCK — role 'support' may not run payments
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decision.allowed # False
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decision.explanation
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```
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Works anywhere an agent proposes an action: LangChain/LangGraph tool wrappers, MCP servers, custom agent loops, job queues.
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## Quick start — FastAPI / Starlette middleware
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```python
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail, AuditLog
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from guardrail_middleware.fastapi import GuardrailMiddleware
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app = FastAPI()
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app.add_middleware(
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GuardrailMiddleware,
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guard=Guardrail(audit_log=AuditLog("audit.jsonl")),
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paths=["/tools/execute"],
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)
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```
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Requests to guarded paths are read as actions. **Blocked or escalated actions never reach your handler** — the client gets HTTP 403 with the full decision as JSON. Allowed actions pass through with `X-Guardrail-Verdict` and `X-Guardrail-Risk` headers set.
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## Quick start — decorator
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```python
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from guardrail_middleware.fastapi import guard_tool, GuardrailBlocked
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@guard_tool(guard, tool="payments", operation="payment", agent_role="support")
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def send_payment(amount: int, to: str):
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... # only runs if GuardRail approves
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try:
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send_payment(amount=42_000, to="vendor/acme")
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except GuardrailBlocked as stopped:
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print(stopped.decision.explanation)
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```
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## Verdicts
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| Verdict | Meaning |
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|---|---|
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| `APPROVE` | No policy issues — execute. |
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| `APPROVE_WITH_CONDITIONS` | Execute only with the attached conditions (batch it, back up first, dry-run). |
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| `ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN` | A person must approve first (over-limit payment, untrusted source, unbounded delete). |
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| `BLOCK` | Never execute (injection, unauthorized role, PII exfiltration, hard money ceiling). |
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Priority is fail-safe: any `block` finding wins, then `escalate`, then `conditions`.
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## What it checks — 7 deterministic detectors
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No LLM in the decision path: the same action under the same policy always gets the same verdict, reproducibly and fast.
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1. **Injection** — instruction-override / role-hijack / secret-extraction / policy-bypass patterns in untrusted content (email, webpage, tool output). Untrusted content is data, never instructions.
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82
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2. **Authorization** — role × operation-class permissions (an `intern` role cannot delete, a `support` role cannot pay).
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83
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3. **Financial limits** — per-class auto-approve and block thresholds, plus a hard ceiling no role can exceed; a payment with no verifiable amount escalates.
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84
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+
4. **Bulk operations** — record-count thresholds: conditions (batch + dry-run) above the auto-approve max, escalation above the bulk ceiling.
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5. **Taint / exfiltration** — PII or secret fields flowing to an external destination is blocked; secrets inside tool-call parameters are blocked outright.
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6. **Destructive actions** — irreversible operations without a backup/confirmation marker get conditions; a delete with no target escalates.
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7. **Untrusted source** — money movement, deletion, or external sends *triggered by* email/webpage/tool-output content escalate to a human.
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## Policy
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Every threshold lives in one policy dict — tune it without touching code, or load it from YAML:
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
```python
|
|
94
|
+
from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail, Policy
|
|
95
|
+
|
|
96
|
+
policy = Policy.from_yaml("policy.yaml") # see policy.example.yaml
|
|
97
|
+
guard = Guardrail(policy=policy)
|
|
98
|
+
|
|
99
|
+
# …or inline
|
|
100
|
+
guard = Guardrail(policy={"approval_limits": {"payment": {"auto_approve_max": 500}}})
|
|
101
|
+
```
|
|
102
|
+
|
|
103
|
+
## Audit log
|
|
104
|
+
|
|
105
|
+
Pass an `AuditLog` and every decision is appended as one JSON line, hash-chained with SHA-256: each entry commits to the previous entry's hash, so editing, deleting, or reordering history breaks the chain.
|
|
106
|
+
|
|
107
|
+
```python
|
|
108
|
+
from guardrail_middleware import AuditLog
|
|
109
|
+
AuditLog("audit.jsonl").verify() # {'ok': True, 'entries': 128, 'broken_at': None}
|
|
110
|
+
```
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
112
|
+
## Demo & tests
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
```bash
|
|
115
|
+
python examples/demo.py # 5 scenarios, all four verdicts, audit verification
|
|
116
|
+
pytest # 18 tests: engine, detectors, middleware, decorator, audit tampering
|
|
117
|
+
```
|
|
118
|
+
|
|
119
|
+
## Where this comes from
|
|
120
|
+
|
|
121
|
+
`guardrail-middleware` is the reusable enforcement core extracted from **[GuardRail](https://github.com/Niraj21-star/guard_ai)** — a runtime action-authorization and behavioral-safety layer for agentic AI built at Infosys Ignite EngNext 2026 (special recognition), where the full system adds multi-step plan validation, an action-passport execution gateway, and a 42-scenario adversarial red-team benchmark. This package packages the single-action checkpoint from that system so any agent stack can adopt it in minutes.
|
|
122
|
+
|
|
123
|
+
## Status & honesty notes
|
|
124
|
+
|
|
125
|
+
- v0.1.0, alpha. The API may still move.
|
|
126
|
+
- Detectors are deterministic heuristics, not a proof of safety — pair them with least-privilege credentials and human review for high-impact tools.
|
|
127
|
+
- Plan-level (multi-step) validation lives in the main GuardRail project, not in this package yet.
|
|
128
|
+
|
|
129
|
+
## License
|
|
130
|
+
|
|
131
|
+
MIT © Niraj Sanjay Karnawat
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
[build-system]
|
|
2
|
+
requires = ["setuptools>=68"]
|
|
3
|
+
build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
[project]
|
|
6
|
+
name = "guardrail-middleware"
|
|
7
|
+
version = "0.1.0"
|
|
8
|
+
description = "Runtime authorization middleware for AI agent tool calls — policy checks, injection/taint detectors, and a hash-chained audit log, before any action executes."
|
|
9
|
+
readme = "README.md"
|
|
10
|
+
requires-python = ">=3.10"
|
|
11
|
+
license = { text = "MIT" }
|
|
12
|
+
authors = [{ name = "Niraj Sanjay Karnawat" }]
|
|
13
|
+
keywords = ["ai-agents", "guardrails", "llm-security", "middleware", "fastapi", "authorization"]
|
|
14
|
+
classifiers = [
|
|
15
|
+
"Development Status :: 3 - Alpha",
|
|
16
|
+
"Intended Audience :: Developers",
|
|
17
|
+
"License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License",
|
|
18
|
+
"Programming Language :: Python :: 3",
|
|
19
|
+
"Topic :: Security",
|
|
20
|
+
"Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries",
|
|
21
|
+
]
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
[project.optional-dependencies]
|
|
24
|
+
fastapi = ["starlette>=0.27", "fastapi>=0.100"]
|
|
25
|
+
yaml = ["pyyaml>=6"]
|
|
26
|
+
dev = ["pytest>=7", "fastapi>=0.100", "httpx>=0.24"]
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
[project.urls]
|
|
29
|
+
Homepage = "https://github.com/Niraj21-star/guardrail-middleware"
|
|
30
|
+
Source = "https://github.com/Niraj21-star/guardrail-middleware"
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
|
|
33
|
+
where = ["src"]
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
[tool.pytest.ini_options]
|
|
36
|
+
testpaths = ["tests"]
|
|
37
|
+
pythonpath = ["src"]
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
"""guardrail-middleware — runtime authorization for AI agent tool calls.
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
GuardRail sits between an AI agent and its tools. Every proposed action is
|
|
4
|
+
checked against a policy — authorization, prompt-injection and taint
|
|
5
|
+
detectors, financial and bulk limits — *before* it executes, and every
|
|
6
|
+
decision is written to a tamper-evident, hash-chained audit log.
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
Quick start::
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
guard = Guardrail()
|
|
13
|
+
decision = guard.evaluate({
|
|
14
|
+
"tool": "payments", "operation": "payment",
|
|
15
|
+
"target_resource": "vendor/acme",
|
|
16
|
+
"parameters": {"amount": 42000},
|
|
17
|
+
"agent_role": "support",
|
|
18
|
+
})
|
|
19
|
+
print(decision.verdict) # ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
Extracted from the GuardRail project (Infosys Ignite EngNext 2026, special
|
|
22
|
+
recognition) so any agent stack can use the same enforcement core.
|
|
23
|
+
"""
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
from .audit import AuditLog
|
|
26
|
+
from .engine import Guardrail
|
|
27
|
+
from .models import ActionRequest, Decision, Finding, TriggeredBy, Verdict
|
|
28
|
+
from .policy import DEFAULT_POLICY, Policy
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
__version__ = "0.1.0"
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
__all__ = [
|
|
33
|
+
"Guardrail",
|
|
34
|
+
"Policy",
|
|
35
|
+
"DEFAULT_POLICY",
|
|
36
|
+
"AuditLog",
|
|
37
|
+
"ActionRequest",
|
|
38
|
+
"Decision",
|
|
39
|
+
"Finding",
|
|
40
|
+
"Verdict",
|
|
41
|
+
"TriggeredBy",
|
|
42
|
+
"__version__",
|
|
43
|
+
]
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
"""Append-only, hash-chained audit log.
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
Every decision GuardRail makes is recorded as one JSON line. Each entry
|
|
4
|
+
carries the SHA-256 hash of the previous entry, so any later edit, deletion,
|
|
5
|
+
or reordering of the log breaks the chain and is detectable with
|
|
6
|
+
:meth:`AuditLog.verify`.
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
The log is deliberately boring: a file on disk, one line per decision, no
|
|
9
|
+
database required. Point it at shared storage if several processes write.
|
|
10
|
+
"""
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
13
|
+
|
|
14
|
+
import hashlib
|
|
15
|
+
import json
|
|
16
|
+
import threading
|
|
17
|
+
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
|
18
|
+
from pathlib import Path
|
|
19
|
+
from typing import Any, Optional, Union
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
_GENESIS = "0" * 64
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
def _entry_hash(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
|
25
|
+
canonical = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)
|
|
26
|
+
return hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
class AuditLog:
|
|
30
|
+
"""Thread-safe append-only audit log with a SHA-256 hash chain."""
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
def __init__(self, path: Union[str, Path]) -> None:
|
|
33
|
+
self._path = Path(path)
|
|
34
|
+
self._lock = threading.Lock()
|
|
35
|
+
self._last_hash = self._read_last_hash()
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
def _read_last_hash(self) -> str:
|
|
38
|
+
if not self._path.exists():
|
|
39
|
+
return _GENESIS
|
|
40
|
+
last = _GENESIS
|
|
41
|
+
with open(self._path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
|
42
|
+
for line in fh:
|
|
43
|
+
line = line.strip()
|
|
44
|
+
if line:
|
|
45
|
+
try:
|
|
46
|
+
last = json.loads(line)["entry_hash"]
|
|
47
|
+
except (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError):
|
|
48
|
+
continue
|
|
49
|
+
return last
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
def record(self, *, action: dict[str, Any], decision: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
|
52
|
+
"""Append one decision; returns the new entry's hash."""
|
|
53
|
+
with self._lock:
|
|
54
|
+
payload = {
|
|
55
|
+
"ts": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
|
56
|
+
"prev_hash": self._last_hash,
|
|
57
|
+
"action": action,
|
|
58
|
+
"decision": decision,
|
|
59
|
+
}
|
|
60
|
+
entry_hash = _entry_hash(payload)
|
|
61
|
+
entry = {**payload, "entry_hash": entry_hash}
|
|
62
|
+
self._path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
|
|
63
|
+
with open(self._path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
|
64
|
+
fh.write(json.dumps(entry, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n")
|
|
65
|
+
self._last_hash = entry_hash
|
|
66
|
+
return entry_hash
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
def verify(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
|
69
|
+
"""Recompute the whole chain. Returns {ok, entries, broken_at}."""
|
|
70
|
+
prev = _GENESIS
|
|
71
|
+
count = 0
|
|
72
|
+
if not self._path.exists():
|
|
73
|
+
return {"ok": True, "entries": 0, "broken_at": None}
|
|
74
|
+
with open(self._path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
|
75
|
+
for idx, line in enumerate(fh):
|
|
76
|
+
line = line.strip()
|
|
77
|
+
if not line:
|
|
78
|
+
continue
|
|
79
|
+
try:
|
|
80
|
+
entry = json.loads(line)
|
|
81
|
+
except json.JSONDecodeError:
|
|
82
|
+
return {"ok": False, "entries": count, "broken_at": idx}
|
|
83
|
+
payload = {k: v for k, v in entry.items() if k != "entry_hash"}
|
|
84
|
+
if entry.get("prev_hash") != prev or _entry_hash(payload) != entry.get("entry_hash"):
|
|
85
|
+
return {"ok": False, "entries": count, "broken_at": idx}
|
|
86
|
+
prev = entry["entry_hash"]
|
|
87
|
+
count += 1
|
|
88
|
+
return {"ok": True, "entries": count, "broken_at": None}
|