gatekeep-mcp 0.2.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/LICENSE-APACHE +172 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/LICENSE-MIT +21 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/PKG-INFO +245 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/README.md +198 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/__init__.py +135 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/__main__.py +6 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/cli.py +5 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/control_plane.py +1043 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/decorator.py +137 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/gate.py +1816 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/ledger.py +1021 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/mcp/__init__.py +51 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/mcp/__main__.py +8 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/mcp/cli.py +603 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/mcp/http_server.py +1696 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/mcp/onboarding.py +583 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/mcp/proxy.py +1858 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/middleware.py +359 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/persistence.py +1688 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/policy.py +260 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/redaction.py +206 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/registry.py +314 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/saga.py +609 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep/security.py +536 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep_mcp.egg-info/PKG-INFO +245 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep_mcp.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +43 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep_mcp.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +1 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep_mcp.egg-info/entry_points.txt +2 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep_mcp.egg-info/requires.txt +24 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/gatekeep_mcp.egg-info/top_level.txt +1 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/pyproject.toml +87 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/setup.cfg +4 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_compliance_hardening.py +751 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_control_plane_mcp.py +450 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_decorator.py +188 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_false_positive_tuning.py +536 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_ha_postgres_redis_integration.py +335 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_http_gateway_postgres.py +664 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_incident_commander_e2e.py +10 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_multi_agent_gatekeep.py +152 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_registry.py +369 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_runtime_scaling.py +533 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_saga.py +144 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_security_hardening.py +727 -0
- gatekeep_mcp-0.2.0/tests/test_temporal_envoy_features.py +450 -0
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END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
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Copyright 2026 Gatekeep Contributors
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Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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limitations under the License.
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2026 Gatekeep Contributors
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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SOFTWARE.
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Metadata-Version: 2.4
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Name: gatekeep-mcp
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Version: 0.2.0
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Summary: Zero-dependency sub-millisecond firewall and automatic Saga undo proxy for MCP AI agents
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Author: Gatekeep Contributors
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License: MIT OR Apache-2.0
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Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/pavan-fulmamdikar/gatekeep-mcp
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Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/pavan-fulmamdikar/gatekeep-mcp
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Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/pavan-fulmamdikar/gatekeep-mcp/issues
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Keywords: mcp,ai-agents,security-proxy,firewall,dlp,ssrf,saga,rollback,hitl,provenance,gatekeep
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Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
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Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
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Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
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Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: Apache Software License
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.14
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Classifier: Topic :: Security
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Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries :: Application Frameworks
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Requires-Python: >=3.10
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Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
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License-File: LICENSE-APACHE
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License-File: LICENSE-MIT
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Provides-Extra: gateway
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Requires-Dist: uvicorn>=0.27.0; extra == "gateway"
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Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.26.0; extra == "gateway"
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Requires-Dist: pytest>=7.0.0; extra == "dev"
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Requires-Dist: pytest-asyncio>=0.21.0; extra == "dev"
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<h1 align="center">Gatekeep</h1>
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<p align="center">
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<strong>Zero-dependency, sub-millisecond firewall & automatic Saga undo proxy for MCP AI agents.</strong><br>
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<em>Stop prompt-injected writes, secret exfiltration, SSRF, rug-pulled MCP servers, and half-finished DB mutations — with zero LLM judges and zero required third-party dependencies.</em>
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+
</p>
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+
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<p align="center">
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<a href="https://github.com/pavan-fulmamdikar/gatekeep-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml"><img src="https://github.com/pavan-fulmamdikar/gatekeep-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg" alt="Gatekeep CI" /></a>
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</p>
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58
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<p align="center">
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<code>Pure Python Stdlib (0 deps)</code> ·
|
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61
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<code><1ms Deterministic Gate</code> ·
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62
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+
<code>MCP Stdio / HTTP / SSE</code> ·
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63
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<code>MIT / Apache-2.0</code>
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</p>
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<p align="center">
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<img src="assets/gatekeep_demo_45s.gif" alt="Gatekeep 45-second live demo: real MCP filesystem firewall and automatic LIFO Saga rollback" width="820" />
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</p>
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70
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---
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72
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## Why Gatekeep Exists (In 15 Seconds)
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Frontier models still obey indirect prompt injections inside support tickets, logs, or compromised third-party MCP servers—and when an agent crashes mid-workflow on an upstream `503`, it leaves half-charged orders or orphaned cloud nodes behind.
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```text
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WITHOUT GATEKEEP WITH GATEKEEP (0.3ms – 2ms deterministic proxy)
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─────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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1. Compromised MCP plugin mutates schema mid-run ──▶ [BLOCK] mcp_tool_rug_pull (SHA-256 schema hash mismatch)
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80
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2. Ticket tricks agent into reading .env.secrets ──▶ [BLOCK] sensitive_path_access (0.23ms)
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3. Agent probes AWS IMDS 169.254.169.254 ──▶ [BLOCK] ssrf_blocked_target (0.27ms)
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4. Agent pastes leaked Bearer JWT into Slack ──▶ [BLOCK] outbound_secret_dlp (0.29ms)
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5. Agent runs DELETE FROM service_events; ──▶ [BLOCK] destructive_payload_blocked
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6. Step 1 scales cluster (+4 nodes), Step 2 hits ──▶ [AUTO-ROLLBACK] LIFO Saga releases all 4 nodes back to 0
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HTTP 503 -> orphaned billable nodes left behind + refunds cumulative spend cap + writes SHA-256 AuditReceipt
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```
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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Agent["AI Agent / Claude / Cursor / Java / LangGraph"] -->|"MCP tools/list & tools/call"| Proxy["Gatekeep Proxy (<1ms)"]
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Proxy -->|"1. Provenance & Taint Ledger\n2. DLP / SSRF / Path / SQL Guards\n3. MCP Schema Pinning & Quotas\n4. Saga WAL + HITL Escalations"| Upstream["Upstream MCP Servers\n(DB, Stripe, Slack, FS, Cloud)"]
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Upstream -.->|"HTTP 503 / Crash"| Saga["LIFO Auto-Rollback\n(Compensating Tools)"]
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Proxy -->|"SHA-256 Hash Chain"| Audit["AuditVault / WORM JSONL / /metrics"]
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```
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---
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## 30-Second Quickstart
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### 1. Install (Pure Python Stdlib — Zero Required Dependencies)
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```bash
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pip install gatekeep-mcp
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# Optional production extras:
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pip install "gatekeep-mcp[gateway]" # uvicorn + httpx for ASGI HTTP/SSE & pooled async upstream
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pip install "gatekeep-mcp[postgres]" # psycopg[binary] + psycopg-pool for multi-worker Postgres
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pip install "gatekeep-mcp[redis]" # redis for distributed session locks & cross-pod SSE Pub/Sub
|
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|
+
```
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+
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### 2. Wrap Any Claude Desktop / Cursor MCP Server (Safe `--shadow` Dry-Run First)
|
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+
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Copy [examples/claude_desktop_config.example.json](examples/claude_desktop_config.example.json) into your Claude Desktop or Cursor MCP config to inspect what Gatekeep *would* block before enforcing:
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```json
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{
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"mcpServers": {
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"filesystem-protected": {
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"command": "gatekeep",
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"args": [
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"--upstream",
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"npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /path/to/workspace",
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"--db",
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"/tmp/gatekeep_state.db",
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"--shadow"
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]
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}
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}
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}
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|
+
```
|
|
131
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+
|
|
132
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+
Or generate a starter policy automatically from any upstream MCP catalog:
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+
|
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+
```bash
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gatekeep --upstream "python my_mcp_server.py" --init-policy ./policies.json
|
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|
+
gatekeep --upstream "python my_mcp_server.py" --policy ./policies.json --db ./gatekeep.db
|
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|
+
```
|
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138
|
+
|
|
139
|
+
### 3. Run as a Language-Agnostic HTTP Sidecar (Java / Spring Boot, Go, Node)
|
|
140
|
+
|
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141
|
+
Non-Python services don't import Python—run Gatekeep as an HTTP sidecar container (just like Envoy or Redis) and call `POST /mcp` over JSON-RPC 2.0:
|
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+
|
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|
+
```bash
|
|
144
|
+
gatekeep \
|
|
145
|
+
--upstream http://host.docker.internal:8081/mcp \
|
|
146
|
+
--db ./gatekeep.db \
|
|
147
|
+
--http 0.0.0.0:8080 \
|
|
148
|
+
--agent-key myservice=secret_agent_key \
|
|
149
|
+
--policy-admin-key myservice=secret_admin_key \
|
|
150
|
+
--approver-key myservice=secret_approver_key \
|
|
151
|
+
--strict-rbac
|
|
152
|
+
|
|
153
|
+
# Or boot Multi-Replica HA stack (2 ASGI Gatekeep pods + PostgreSQL 16 + Redis 7 Pub/Sub SSE):
|
|
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|
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.ha.yml up -d
|
|
155
|
+
```
|
|
156
|
+
|
|
157
|
+
Built-in HTTP endpoints:
|
|
158
|
+
- `POST /mcp` (Streamable-HTTP) and `GET /sse` + `POST /messages` (with automatic Redis Pub/Sub cross-replica SSE fan-out when backed by Redis or `--redis-url`)
|
|
159
|
+
- `GET /healthz` and `GET /metrics` (O(1) session counts via `SELECT COUNT(*)` / Redis `SCARD`, Prometheus gauges including `slim_gateway_quarantined_tools`)
|
|
160
|
+
- `GET /dashboard` (live approvals & audit web console)
|
|
161
|
+
- `GET|POST /admin/policies`, `POST /admin/policies/simulate`, `GET /admin/tools/quarantined`, `POST /admin/tools/trust`
|
|
162
|
+
- `GET /admin/escalations`, `POST /admin/escalations/{id}/approve`, `GET /admin/audit`, `GET /admin/audit/verify`, `POST /admin/recovery/sweep`
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
---
|
|
165
|
+
|
|
166
|
+
## Defense Matrix
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
| Threat / Failure Mode | Gatekeep Rule | How It Stops / Recovers |
|
|
169
|
+
| --- | --- | --- |
|
|
170
|
+
| **Hallucinated IDs & Indirect Prompt Injection** | `unverified_entity_provenance`, `tainted_entity_target`, `unsolicited_tainted_write` | Tracks structured read outputs vs. untrusted text (`body`, `content`, `html`) in `ToolReturnLedger`; blocks tainted targets and unsolicited writes. |
|
|
171
|
+
| **Secret & PII Exfiltration** | `outbound_secret_dlp` | Scans outbound write payloads (including base64 segments & Unicode/zero-width obfuscation) for Bearer tokens, API keys, PEM keys, DB URIs, SSNs, and Luhn cards. |
|
|
172
|
+
| **SSRF & Credential File Access** | `ssrf_blocked_target`, `sensitive_path_access` | Blocks `file://`/`gopher://`, localhost, RFC1918, cloud IMDS (`169.254.169.254`), decimal/hex/octal/IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypasses, optional DNS resolution (`resolve_dns_for_ssrf=True`), URL-encoded `..` traversal, `.env*`, `.ssh/`, `.aws/credentials`, `/etc/shadow`. |
|
|
173
|
+
| **Destructive SQL & Shell Commands** | `destructive_payload_blocked` | Strips SQL comments (`/*...*/`, `--`) and blocks `DROP`, `TRUNCATE`, chained `; DROP/DELETE`, un-`WHERE`d & tautological (`WHERE 1=1`) `DELETE`/`UPDATE`, and dangerous shell commands (`rm -rf /`, `curl ... \| bash`). |
|
|
174
|
+
| **Poisoned / Rug-Pulled MCP Servers** | `mcp_tool_poisoning`, `mcp_tool_rug_pull` | Detects hidden instruction tags/directives in tool descriptions & JSON schemas; pins canonical SHA-256 tool hashes across restarts in `SessionStateStore` until explicitly trusted (`trust_updated_tool` / `POST /admin/tools/trust`). |
|
|
175
|
+
| **Runaway Spend, Loops & Half-Finished Failures** | `rate_limit_exceeded`, `cumulative_spend_limit_exceeded`, `retry_spiral_circuit_breaker`, LIFO Saga | Enforces sliding 60s rate limits & atomic cross-session spend caps (`update_control_doc`), per-payload read circuit breakers, `Idempotency-Key` deduplication, and automatic LIFO Saga rollback on upstream errors (`auto_rollback_on_error=True`). |
|
|
176
|
+
| **Risky High-Impact Actions** | `human_approval_required`, `approval_token_scope_mismatch` | Pauses sensitive actions (`Verdict.ESCALATE`), enforces Separation of Duties (requester cannot self-approve), and cryptographically binds one-time approval tokens to the exact payload fingerprint. |
|
|
177
|
+
|
|
178
|
+
---
|
|
179
|
+
|
|
180
|
+
## Runnable End-to-End Demos
|
|
181
|
+
|
|
182
|
+
All examples run locally in seconds with zero API keys required (and support `--live` with an LLM):
|
|
183
|
+
|
|
184
|
+
```bash
|
|
185
|
+
# 1. Zero-dependency IPI block + SQLite Saga rollback + AuditVault proof
|
|
186
|
+
python examples/mcp_transaction_gateway_demo.py
|
|
187
|
+
|
|
188
|
+
# 2. Federated DevSecOps & FinOps Incident Commander (6 stages: rug-pull, SSRF, DLP, SQL, $500 cap + 503 rollback, SoD HITL)
|
|
189
|
+
python examples/incident_commander_e2e.py
|
|
190
|
+
|
|
191
|
+
# 3. Multi-Agent Coordinator + 3 Sub-Agents (Research, Finance, Comms) with per-actor latency flight recorder
|
|
192
|
+
python examples/multi_agent_gatekeep_runner.py
|
|
193
|
+
|
|
194
|
+
# 4. Multi-tenant HTTP Gateway + HITL approval flow
|
|
195
|
+
python examples/http_gateway_hitl_demo.py
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
# 5. Live Field Test against unmodified third-party MCP server (@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem via npx)
|
|
198
|
+
python examples/field_test_third_party_mcp.py
|
|
199
|
+
```
|
|
200
|
+
|
|
201
|
+
---
|
|
202
|
+
|
|
203
|
+
## Benchmarks & Honest Limitations
|
|
204
|
+
|
|
205
|
+
### Local Verification (`pytest tests/`, Live `uvicorn` Load, & Real Third-Party MCP Field Test)
|
|
206
|
+
- **Unit, Runtime Scaling & Live HA Container Suite:** **`131 passed`** (`tests/test_runtime_scaling.py` verifies O(1) `count_sessions()`, auto `psycopg_pool.ConnectionPool`, non-blocking async cross-session concurrency, pooled `httpx.AsyncClient`, and cross-replica Redis Pub/Sub SSE fan-out; `tests/test_ha_postgres_redis_integration.py` passes **4/4 live non-mocked multi-replica tests** against real PostgreSQL 16 + Redis 7 containers in `docker-compose.ha.yml`).
|
|
207
|
+
- **70-Scenario Security & False-Positive Suite ([bench_adversarial_security.py](benchmarks/bench_adversarial_security.py)):** `35/35 (100.0%)` synthetic attacks mitigated, `35/35` legitimate workflows allowed (`0.0%` false-block rate), **`~2–5ms` p50** proxy+SQLite latency.
|
|
208
|
+
- **Live `uvicorn` ASGI HTTP Load Benchmark ([bench_http_load.py](benchmarks/bench_http_load.py), single worker sharing Windows loopback host with `httpx` client across all 4 storage backends):**
|
|
209
|
+
- `InMemorySessionStore` (`c=10`, 400 mixed reqs): **`121.5 req/s`**, `p50=70.7ms`, `p95=145.4ms`, `0` HTTP errors, `100/100` attacks blocked, RSS `54.8 -> 59.0 MiB` (`104.9 req/s` at `c=30`).
|
|
210
|
+
- `SQLiteSessionStore` WAL (`c=10`, 400 mixed reqs): **`96.5 req/s`**, `p50=104.7ms`, `p95=141.3ms`, `/healthz` `p50=39.6ms`, `0` HTTP errors, `100/100` attacks blocked, RSS `56.4 -> 64.9 MiB` (`70.6 req/s` at `c=25`).
|
|
211
|
+
- `RedisSessionStore` live Redis 7 container (`c=15`, 400 mixed reqs): **`49.4 req/s`**, `p50=258.2ms`, `p95=590.7ms`, `0` HTTP errors, `100/100` attacks blocked, RSS `68.0 -> 89.0 MiB`.
|
|
212
|
+
- `PostgresSessionStore` live PostgreSQL 16 container + `psycopg_pool` (`c=15`, 400 mixed reqs): **`30.6 req/s`**, `p50=514.0ms`, `p95=707.5ms`, `0` HTTP errors, `100/100` attacks blocked, RSS `67.4 -> 89.0 MiB`.
|
|
213
|
+
- **Live Third-Party MCP Server Field Test ([field_test_third_party_mcp.py](examples/field_test_third_party_mcp.py)):**
|
|
214
|
+
- Wrapped unmodified Anthropic `@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem` over real `npx` stdio (`16` real tools auto-classified by `generate_starter_policy()`).
|
|
215
|
+
- Enforcing mode: `3/3` benign operations allowed (`list_directory`, `read_text_file`, `write_file`), `4/4` live attacks blocked before reaching Node.js (`../../etc/passwd`, `.env.production`, `.ssh/id_rsa`, outbound AWS key DLP in `write_file`), **`0.463ms` median Gatekeep evaluation latency** (`0.694ms` max), valid SHA-256 audit chain (`7` receipts).
|
|
216
|
+
- Shadow mode also accurately demonstrated real-world prompt-intent behavior: vague user prompts (`"Work with files in ..."`) surfaced `unsolicited_tainted_write` shadow flags on `write_file`/`edit_file` without blocking execution (`14.1ms` median e2e).
|
|
217
|
+
- **Zero-Help Live Multi-Agent Stress Findings (`groq / openai/gpt-oss-120b`):**
|
|
218
|
+
Running an uncoached autonomous coordinator with unfiltered tools across hostile workspace SOP traps added **`0.30–0.35ms` p50** Gatekeep overhead, blocked `.env.secrets`, IMDS `169.254.169.254`, `VENDOR-EVIL-99`, and leaked `Bearer` exfiltration, and cleanly reverted SQLite rows on `503` failures.
|
|
219
|
+
|
|
220
|
+
### Known Limitations (Read Before Deploying to High-Scale Prod)
|
|
221
|
+
1. **Heuristics vs. Vague Prompts:** When `_meta.user_prompt` is supplied and contains only read-phrased language without mutating verbs, zero-config intent checks can flag writes after untrusted reads as `unsolicited_tainted_write`—configure explicit `ToolPolicySpec` rules or validate in `--shadow` first.
|
|
222
|
+
2. **Non-Reversible External Side Effects:** Saga compensation (`compensates_with`) cleanly undoes reversible actions (DB rows, cloud allocations, payment authorizations), but cannot un-send emails or undo irreversible third-party webhooks—gate those with `requires_approval=True`.
|
|
223
|
+
3. **DNS SSRF Check Is Opt-In (`resolve_dns_for_ssrf=False`):** By default, SSRF protection inspects URL schemes, IP literals, obfuscated IPs, and metadata hostnames with zero network latency; enable `resolve_dns_for_ssrf=True` (and pair with network egress controls) where DNS-rebinding attacks are in scope.
|
|
224
|
+
4. **Live Postgres 16 / Redis 7 HA Verification Requires Docker:** `tests/test_ha_postgres_redis_integration.py` skips cleanly when `GATEKEEP_LIVE_PG_DSN` / `GATEKEEP_LIVE_REDIS_URL` are unset; run against real containers via `docker compose -f docker-compose.ha.yml up -d` in CI/staging before high-QPS multi-replica rollout.
|
|
225
|
+
|
|
226
|
+
---
|
|
227
|
+
|
|
228
|
+
## Development
|
|
229
|
+
|
|
230
|
+
```bash
|
|
231
|
+
pip install -e ".[dev]"
|
|
232
|
+
pytest tests/ -v
|
|
233
|
+
python benchmarks/bench_adversarial_security.py
|
|
234
|
+
python benchmarks/bench_http_load.py --store sqlite --requests 500 --concurrency 25
|
|
235
|
+
|
|
236
|
+
# Live Multi-Replica PostgreSQL 16 + Redis 7 HA Soak Tests (requires Docker):
|
|
237
|
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.ha.yml up -d postgres redis
|
|
238
|
+
GATEKEEP_LIVE_PG_DSN=postgresql://gatekeep:gatekeep_dev@localhost:5439/gatekeep \
|
|
239
|
+
GATEKEEP_LIVE_REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379/0 \
|
|
240
|
+
pytest tests/test_ha_postgres_redis_integration.py -v
|
|
241
|
+
```
|
|
242
|
+
|
|
243
|
+
## License
|
|
244
|
+
|
|
245
|
+
Dual-licensed under either **MIT** ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT)) or **Apache-2.0** ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE)), at your option.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
<h1 align="center">Gatekeep</h1>
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
<p align="center">
|
|
4
|
+
<strong>Zero-dependency, sub-millisecond firewall & automatic Saga undo proxy for MCP AI agents.</strong><br>
|
|
5
|
+
<em>Stop prompt-injected writes, secret exfiltration, SSRF, rug-pulled MCP servers, and half-finished DB mutations — with zero LLM judges and zero required third-party dependencies.</em>
|
|
6
|
+
</p>
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
<p align="center">
|
|
9
|
+
<a href="https://github.com/pavan-fulmamdikar/gatekeep-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml"><img src="https://github.com/pavan-fulmamdikar/gatekeep-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg" alt="Gatekeep CI" /></a>
|
|
10
|
+
</p>
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
<p align="center">
|
|
13
|
+
<code>Pure Python Stdlib (0 deps)</code> ·
|
|
14
|
+
<code><1ms Deterministic Gate</code> ·
|
|
15
|
+
<code>MCP Stdio / HTTP / SSE</code> ·
|
|
16
|
+
<code>MIT / Apache-2.0</code>
|
|
17
|
+
</p>
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
<p align="center">
|
|
20
|
+
<img src="assets/gatekeep_demo_45s.gif" alt="Gatekeep 45-second live demo: real MCP filesystem firewall and automatic LIFO Saga rollback" width="820" />
|
|
21
|
+
</p>
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
---
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
## Why Gatekeep Exists (In 15 Seconds)
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
Frontier models still obey indirect prompt injections inside support tickets, logs, or compromised third-party MCP servers—and when an agent crashes mid-workflow on an upstream `503`, it leaves half-charged orders or orphaned cloud nodes behind.
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28
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+
|
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29
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+
```text
|
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30
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+
WITHOUT GATEKEEP WITH GATEKEEP (0.3ms – 2ms deterministic proxy)
|
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31
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+
─────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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32
|
+
1. Compromised MCP plugin mutates schema mid-run ──▶ [BLOCK] mcp_tool_rug_pull (SHA-256 schema hash mismatch)
|
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33
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+
2. Ticket tricks agent into reading .env.secrets ──▶ [BLOCK] sensitive_path_access (0.23ms)
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34
|
+
3. Agent probes AWS IMDS 169.254.169.254 ──▶ [BLOCK] ssrf_blocked_target (0.27ms)
|
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35
|
+
4. Agent pastes leaked Bearer JWT into Slack ──▶ [BLOCK] outbound_secret_dlp (0.29ms)
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36
|
+
5. Agent runs DELETE FROM service_events; ──▶ [BLOCK] destructive_payload_blocked
|
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37
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+
6. Step 1 scales cluster (+4 nodes), Step 2 hits ──▶ [AUTO-ROLLBACK] LIFO Saga releases all 4 nodes back to 0
|
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38
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+
HTTP 503 -> orphaned billable nodes left behind + refunds cumulative spend cap + writes SHA-256 AuditReceipt
|
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39
|
+
```
|
|
40
|
+
|
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41
|
+
```mermaid
|
|
42
|
+
flowchart LR
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43
|
+
Agent["AI Agent / Claude / Cursor / Java / LangGraph"] -->|"MCP tools/list & tools/call"| Proxy["Gatekeep Proxy (<1ms)"]
|
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44
|
+
Proxy -->|"1. Provenance & Taint Ledger\n2. DLP / SSRF / Path / SQL Guards\n3. MCP Schema Pinning & Quotas\n4. Saga WAL + HITL Escalations"| Upstream["Upstream MCP Servers\n(DB, Stripe, Slack, FS, Cloud)"]
|
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45
|
+
Upstream -.->|"HTTP 503 / Crash"| Saga["LIFO Auto-Rollback\n(Compensating Tools)"]
|
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46
|
+
Proxy -->|"SHA-256 Hash Chain"| Audit["AuditVault / WORM JSONL / /metrics"]
|
|
47
|
+
```
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|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
---
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
## 30-Second Quickstart
|
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52
|
+
|
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53
|
+
### 1. Install (Pure Python Stdlib — Zero Required Dependencies)
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
```bash
|
|
56
|
+
pip install gatekeep-mcp
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
# Optional production extras:
|
|
59
|
+
pip install "gatekeep-mcp[gateway]" # uvicorn + httpx for ASGI HTTP/SSE & pooled async upstream
|
|
60
|
+
pip install "gatekeep-mcp[postgres]" # psycopg[binary] + psycopg-pool for multi-worker Postgres
|
|
61
|
+
pip install "gatekeep-mcp[redis]" # redis for distributed session locks & cross-pod SSE Pub/Sub
|
|
62
|
+
```
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
### 2. Wrap Any Claude Desktop / Cursor MCP Server (Safe `--shadow` Dry-Run First)
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
Copy [examples/claude_desktop_config.example.json](examples/claude_desktop_config.example.json) into your Claude Desktop or Cursor MCP config to inspect what Gatekeep *would* block before enforcing:
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
```json
|
|
69
|
+
{
|
|
70
|
+
"mcpServers": {
|
|
71
|
+
"filesystem-protected": {
|
|
72
|
+
"command": "gatekeep",
|
|
73
|
+
"args": [
|
|
74
|
+
"--upstream",
|
|
75
|
+
"npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /path/to/workspace",
|
|
76
|
+
"--db",
|
|
77
|
+
"/tmp/gatekeep_state.db",
|
|
78
|
+
"--shadow"
|
|
79
|
+
]
|
|
80
|
+
}
|
|
81
|
+
}
|
|
82
|
+
}
|
|
83
|
+
```
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
Or generate a starter policy automatically from any upstream MCP catalog:
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
```bash
|
|
88
|
+
gatekeep --upstream "python my_mcp_server.py" --init-policy ./policies.json
|
|
89
|
+
gatekeep --upstream "python my_mcp_server.py" --policy ./policies.json --db ./gatekeep.db
|
|
90
|
+
```
|
|
91
|
+
|
|
92
|
+
### 3. Run as a Language-Agnostic HTTP Sidecar (Java / Spring Boot, Go, Node)
|
|
93
|
+
|
|
94
|
+
Non-Python services don't import Python—run Gatekeep as an HTTP sidecar container (just like Envoy or Redis) and call `POST /mcp` over JSON-RPC 2.0:
|
|
95
|
+
|
|
96
|
+
```bash
|
|
97
|
+
gatekeep \
|
|
98
|
+
--upstream http://host.docker.internal:8081/mcp \
|
|
99
|
+
--db ./gatekeep.db \
|
|
100
|
+
--http 0.0.0.0:8080 \
|
|
101
|
+
--agent-key myservice=secret_agent_key \
|
|
102
|
+
--policy-admin-key myservice=secret_admin_key \
|
|
103
|
+
--approver-key myservice=secret_approver_key \
|
|
104
|
+
--strict-rbac
|
|
105
|
+
|
|
106
|
+
# Or boot Multi-Replica HA stack (2 ASGI Gatekeep pods + PostgreSQL 16 + Redis 7 Pub/Sub SSE):
|
|
107
|
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.ha.yml up -d
|
|
108
|
+
```
|
|
109
|
+
|
|
110
|
+
Built-in HTTP endpoints:
|
|
111
|
+
- `POST /mcp` (Streamable-HTTP) and `GET /sse` + `POST /messages` (with automatic Redis Pub/Sub cross-replica SSE fan-out when backed by Redis or `--redis-url`)
|
|
112
|
+
- `GET /healthz` and `GET /metrics` (O(1) session counts via `SELECT COUNT(*)` / Redis `SCARD`, Prometheus gauges including `slim_gateway_quarantined_tools`)
|
|
113
|
+
- `GET /dashboard` (live approvals & audit web console)
|
|
114
|
+
- `GET|POST /admin/policies`, `POST /admin/policies/simulate`, `GET /admin/tools/quarantined`, `POST /admin/tools/trust`
|
|
115
|
+
- `GET /admin/escalations`, `POST /admin/escalations/{id}/approve`, `GET /admin/audit`, `GET /admin/audit/verify`, `POST /admin/recovery/sweep`
|
|
116
|
+
|
|
117
|
+
---
|
|
118
|
+
|
|
119
|
+
## Defense Matrix
|
|
120
|
+
|
|
121
|
+
| Threat / Failure Mode | Gatekeep Rule | How It Stops / Recovers |
|
|
122
|
+
| --- | --- | --- |
|
|
123
|
+
| **Hallucinated IDs & Indirect Prompt Injection** | `unverified_entity_provenance`, `tainted_entity_target`, `unsolicited_tainted_write` | Tracks structured read outputs vs. untrusted text (`body`, `content`, `html`) in `ToolReturnLedger`; blocks tainted targets and unsolicited writes. |
|
|
124
|
+
| **Secret & PII Exfiltration** | `outbound_secret_dlp` | Scans outbound write payloads (including base64 segments & Unicode/zero-width obfuscation) for Bearer tokens, API keys, PEM keys, DB URIs, SSNs, and Luhn cards. |
|
|
125
|
+
| **SSRF & Credential File Access** | `ssrf_blocked_target`, `sensitive_path_access` | Blocks `file://`/`gopher://`, localhost, RFC1918, cloud IMDS (`169.254.169.254`), decimal/hex/octal/IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypasses, optional DNS resolution (`resolve_dns_for_ssrf=True`), URL-encoded `..` traversal, `.env*`, `.ssh/`, `.aws/credentials`, `/etc/shadow`. |
|
|
126
|
+
| **Destructive SQL & Shell Commands** | `destructive_payload_blocked` | Strips SQL comments (`/*...*/`, `--`) and blocks `DROP`, `TRUNCATE`, chained `; DROP/DELETE`, un-`WHERE`d & tautological (`WHERE 1=1`) `DELETE`/`UPDATE`, and dangerous shell commands (`rm -rf /`, `curl ... \| bash`). |
|
|
127
|
+
| **Poisoned / Rug-Pulled MCP Servers** | `mcp_tool_poisoning`, `mcp_tool_rug_pull` | Detects hidden instruction tags/directives in tool descriptions & JSON schemas; pins canonical SHA-256 tool hashes across restarts in `SessionStateStore` until explicitly trusted (`trust_updated_tool` / `POST /admin/tools/trust`). |
|
|
128
|
+
| **Runaway Spend, Loops & Half-Finished Failures** | `rate_limit_exceeded`, `cumulative_spend_limit_exceeded`, `retry_spiral_circuit_breaker`, LIFO Saga | Enforces sliding 60s rate limits & atomic cross-session spend caps (`update_control_doc`), per-payload read circuit breakers, `Idempotency-Key` deduplication, and automatic LIFO Saga rollback on upstream errors (`auto_rollback_on_error=True`). |
|
|
129
|
+
| **Risky High-Impact Actions** | `human_approval_required`, `approval_token_scope_mismatch` | Pauses sensitive actions (`Verdict.ESCALATE`), enforces Separation of Duties (requester cannot self-approve), and cryptographically binds one-time approval tokens to the exact payload fingerprint. |
|
|
130
|
+
|
|
131
|
+
---
|
|
132
|
+
|
|
133
|
+
## Runnable End-to-End Demos
|
|
134
|
+
|
|
135
|
+
All examples run locally in seconds with zero API keys required (and support `--live` with an LLM):
|
|
136
|
+
|
|
137
|
+
```bash
|
|
138
|
+
# 1. Zero-dependency IPI block + SQLite Saga rollback + AuditVault proof
|
|
139
|
+
python examples/mcp_transaction_gateway_demo.py
|
|
140
|
+
|
|
141
|
+
# 2. Federated DevSecOps & FinOps Incident Commander (6 stages: rug-pull, SSRF, DLP, SQL, $500 cap + 503 rollback, SoD HITL)
|
|
142
|
+
python examples/incident_commander_e2e.py
|
|
143
|
+
|
|
144
|
+
# 3. Multi-Agent Coordinator + 3 Sub-Agents (Research, Finance, Comms) with per-actor latency flight recorder
|
|
145
|
+
python examples/multi_agent_gatekeep_runner.py
|
|
146
|
+
|
|
147
|
+
# 4. Multi-tenant HTTP Gateway + HITL approval flow
|
|
148
|
+
python examples/http_gateway_hitl_demo.py
|
|
149
|
+
|
|
150
|
+
# 5. Live Field Test against unmodified third-party MCP server (@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem via npx)
|
|
151
|
+
python examples/field_test_third_party_mcp.py
|
|
152
|
+
```
|
|
153
|
+
|
|
154
|
+
---
|
|
155
|
+
|
|
156
|
+
## Benchmarks & Honest Limitations
|
|
157
|
+
|
|
158
|
+
### Local Verification (`pytest tests/`, Live `uvicorn` Load, & Real Third-Party MCP Field Test)
|
|
159
|
+
- **Unit, Runtime Scaling & Live HA Container Suite:** **`131 passed`** (`tests/test_runtime_scaling.py` verifies O(1) `count_sessions()`, auto `psycopg_pool.ConnectionPool`, non-blocking async cross-session concurrency, pooled `httpx.AsyncClient`, and cross-replica Redis Pub/Sub SSE fan-out; `tests/test_ha_postgres_redis_integration.py` passes **4/4 live non-mocked multi-replica tests** against real PostgreSQL 16 + Redis 7 containers in `docker-compose.ha.yml`).
|
|
160
|
+
- **70-Scenario Security & False-Positive Suite ([bench_adversarial_security.py](benchmarks/bench_adversarial_security.py)):** `35/35 (100.0%)` synthetic attacks mitigated, `35/35` legitimate workflows allowed (`0.0%` false-block rate), **`~2–5ms` p50** proxy+SQLite latency.
|
|
161
|
+
- **Live `uvicorn` ASGI HTTP Load Benchmark ([bench_http_load.py](benchmarks/bench_http_load.py), single worker sharing Windows loopback host with `httpx` client across all 4 storage backends):**
|
|
162
|
+
- `InMemorySessionStore` (`c=10`, 400 mixed reqs): **`121.5 req/s`**, `p50=70.7ms`, `p95=145.4ms`, `0` HTTP errors, `100/100` attacks blocked, RSS `54.8 -> 59.0 MiB` (`104.9 req/s` at `c=30`).
|
|
163
|
+
- `SQLiteSessionStore` WAL (`c=10`, 400 mixed reqs): **`96.5 req/s`**, `p50=104.7ms`, `p95=141.3ms`, `/healthz` `p50=39.6ms`, `0` HTTP errors, `100/100` attacks blocked, RSS `56.4 -> 64.9 MiB` (`70.6 req/s` at `c=25`).
|
|
164
|
+
- `RedisSessionStore` live Redis 7 container (`c=15`, 400 mixed reqs): **`49.4 req/s`**, `p50=258.2ms`, `p95=590.7ms`, `0` HTTP errors, `100/100` attacks blocked, RSS `68.0 -> 89.0 MiB`.
|
|
165
|
+
- `PostgresSessionStore` live PostgreSQL 16 container + `psycopg_pool` (`c=15`, 400 mixed reqs): **`30.6 req/s`**, `p50=514.0ms`, `p95=707.5ms`, `0` HTTP errors, `100/100` attacks blocked, RSS `67.4 -> 89.0 MiB`.
|
|
166
|
+
- **Live Third-Party MCP Server Field Test ([field_test_third_party_mcp.py](examples/field_test_third_party_mcp.py)):**
|
|
167
|
+
- Wrapped unmodified Anthropic `@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem` over real `npx` stdio (`16` real tools auto-classified by `generate_starter_policy()`).
|
|
168
|
+
- Enforcing mode: `3/3` benign operations allowed (`list_directory`, `read_text_file`, `write_file`), `4/4` live attacks blocked before reaching Node.js (`../../etc/passwd`, `.env.production`, `.ssh/id_rsa`, outbound AWS key DLP in `write_file`), **`0.463ms` median Gatekeep evaluation latency** (`0.694ms` max), valid SHA-256 audit chain (`7` receipts).
|
|
169
|
+
- Shadow mode also accurately demonstrated real-world prompt-intent behavior: vague user prompts (`"Work with files in ..."`) surfaced `unsolicited_tainted_write` shadow flags on `write_file`/`edit_file` without blocking execution (`14.1ms` median e2e).
|
|
170
|
+
- **Zero-Help Live Multi-Agent Stress Findings (`groq / openai/gpt-oss-120b`):**
|
|
171
|
+
Running an uncoached autonomous coordinator with unfiltered tools across hostile workspace SOP traps added **`0.30–0.35ms` p50** Gatekeep overhead, blocked `.env.secrets`, IMDS `169.254.169.254`, `VENDOR-EVIL-99`, and leaked `Bearer` exfiltration, and cleanly reverted SQLite rows on `503` failures.
|
|
172
|
+
|
|
173
|
+
### Known Limitations (Read Before Deploying to High-Scale Prod)
|
|
174
|
+
1. **Heuristics vs. Vague Prompts:** When `_meta.user_prompt` is supplied and contains only read-phrased language without mutating verbs, zero-config intent checks can flag writes after untrusted reads as `unsolicited_tainted_write`—configure explicit `ToolPolicySpec` rules or validate in `--shadow` first.
|
|
175
|
+
2. **Non-Reversible External Side Effects:** Saga compensation (`compensates_with`) cleanly undoes reversible actions (DB rows, cloud allocations, payment authorizations), but cannot un-send emails or undo irreversible third-party webhooks—gate those with `requires_approval=True`.
|
|
176
|
+
3. **DNS SSRF Check Is Opt-In (`resolve_dns_for_ssrf=False`):** By default, SSRF protection inspects URL schemes, IP literals, obfuscated IPs, and metadata hostnames with zero network latency; enable `resolve_dns_for_ssrf=True` (and pair with network egress controls) where DNS-rebinding attacks are in scope.
|
|
177
|
+
4. **Live Postgres 16 / Redis 7 HA Verification Requires Docker:** `tests/test_ha_postgres_redis_integration.py` skips cleanly when `GATEKEEP_LIVE_PG_DSN` / `GATEKEEP_LIVE_REDIS_URL` are unset; run against real containers via `docker compose -f docker-compose.ha.yml up -d` in CI/staging before high-QPS multi-replica rollout.
|
|
178
|
+
|
|
179
|
+
---
|
|
180
|
+
|
|
181
|
+
## Development
|
|
182
|
+
|
|
183
|
+
```bash
|
|
184
|
+
pip install -e ".[dev]"
|
|
185
|
+
pytest tests/ -v
|
|
186
|
+
python benchmarks/bench_adversarial_security.py
|
|
187
|
+
python benchmarks/bench_http_load.py --store sqlite --requests 500 --concurrency 25
|
|
188
|
+
|
|
189
|
+
# Live Multi-Replica PostgreSQL 16 + Redis 7 HA Soak Tests (requires Docker):
|
|
190
|
+
docker compose -f docker-compose.ha.yml up -d postgres redis
|
|
191
|
+
GATEKEEP_LIVE_PG_DSN=postgresql://gatekeep:gatekeep_dev@localhost:5439/gatekeep \
|
|
192
|
+
GATEKEEP_LIVE_REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379/0 \
|
|
193
|
+
pytest tests/test_ha_postgres_redis_integration.py -v
|
|
194
|
+
```
|
|
195
|
+
|
|
196
|
+
## License
|
|
197
|
+
|
|
198
|
+
Dual-licensed under either **MIT** ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT)) or **Apache-2.0** ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE)), at your option.
|