gargoyle-receipts 0.19.0.dev0__tar.gz → 0.21.0.dev0__tar.gz

gargoyle_receipts-0.21.0.dev0/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: gargoyle-receipts
+Version: 0.21.0.dev0
+Summary: Signed, single-use, argument-bound receipts and human-approval holds for agent tool calls.
+Author: Justin LaPorte
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/Elyon-Sol/Gargoyle
+Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/Elyon-Sol/Gargoyle
+Project-URL: Specification, https://github.com/Elyon-Sol/Gargoyle/blob/main/SPEC.md
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/Elyon-Sol/Gargoyle/issues
+Keywords: agents,mcp,authorization,receipts,ed25519,human-in-the-loop
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.14
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
+Requires-Python: >=3.12
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+License-File: NOTICE
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=44.0.0
+Requires-Dist: fastapi>=0.115
+Requires-Dist: uvicorn>=0.30
+Requires-Dist: requests>=2.32.3
+Provides-Extra: redis
+Requires-Dist: redis; extra == "redis"
+Provides-Extra: entra
+Requires-Dist: msal>=1.28; extra == "entra"
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.27; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=8; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: redis; extra == "dev"
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# Gargoyle
+
+Signed, single-use, argument-bound receipts and human-approval holds for
+agent tool calls.
+
+[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/gargoyle-receipts)](https://pypi.org/project/gargoyle-receipts/)
+[![CI](https://github.com/Elyon-Sol/Gargoyle/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Elyon-Sol/Gargoyle/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
+[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-blue)](LICENSE)
+
+An agent asks for permission to run a tool. Something you already trust
+decides (OPA, Cedar, a JSON rules file, your own code). Gargoyle turns that
+decision into a **receipt**: an Ed25519-signed record that names the tool,
+a hash of its arguments, the principal the decision was made for, the
+target it may be presented to, and the policy that decided. The target
+checks the receipt before it acts, and honors it once. When the policy says
+a call needs a human, the receipt is held until an approver signs a
+**grant** for exactly that decision with a key the issuing service does not
+have. After the call runs, the executor signs an **execution receipt** with
+the state before and after. The three verify together, offline, with three
+public keys.
+
+Gargoyle does not decide whether a call is allowed. It makes an allow
+decision portable, verifiable, bound to one call by one caller, and
+spendable once, and it keeps a record of what was asked, what was released,
+by whom, and what changed.
+
+## Status
+
+Pre-release `0.21.0.dev0` on PyPI as `gargoyle-receipts`. Wire format
+`gargoyle/3`, evidence log `gargoyle-evidence/4`, witness
+`gargoyle-witness/1`; all three are specified in [SPEC.md](SPEC.md) and may
+still change before a first release.
+
+**Run live, on the author's own tenant and hosts (2026-10-16 to 2026-11-01).**
+One issuer host on Ubuntu behind Apache with TLS, Claude Code clients on
+Windows 11 and on Linux, Claude Desktop on Windows 11, Entra ID for every
+identity.
+Exercised end to end and recorded in the witness: the receipt, grant and
+execution chain with offline verification; state-bound approval and undo;
+witness reconciliation and the tree check; Entra sign-in for submitters and
+for approvers with browser-held, non-exportable approver keys, including a
+lost key revoked and a new one enrolled; a hold routed to an Entra app role
+and released under it; the Claude Code hook over Bash, Edit and Write;
+discovery mode naming the side doors around the gate; declined holds with
+the reason relayed to the assistant and a cooldown on retries; Windows
+file-name canonicalization refusing names the OS would rewrite; and on the
+issuer host, `gargoyle doctor`, `gargoyle rules` and `gargoyle backup` with
+a verified `restore`.
+
+**Built and tested, not yet run against a live counterpart.** Two-signature
+(m-of-n) release with a deputy role; the Microsoft Graph adapter (tested
+against a fake Graph server); the OAuth broker for hosted connectors
+(deployed, metadata and redirect checks verified, no human sign-in through a
+connector yet).
+
+**Assurance.** 564 Python tests on Linux and Windows across Python 3.12,
+3.13 and 3.14, at dependency floors and at a lock file; a TypeScript suite
+that recomputes the conformance vectors byte for byte; two outside,
+model-driven security reviews on 2026-10-20 (ten findings, all fixed); the
+EMILIA Protocol's own verifiers accepting a live Gargoyle export unmodified,
+and EMILIA's repository carrying the Gargoyle interop pack. No human has
+reviewed the code independently of the model that wrote it. See
+[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) and [ROADMAP.md](ROADMAP.md).
+
+## How this was built
+
+Gargoyle is designed and operated by one person with an operations and
+security background and no software engineering background. The code,
+tests and most of the prose were written by an AI model (Anthropic's
+Claude) working under that person's direction: the design decisions, the
+threat judgments, the deployments and the choice of what to build, remove
+or publish are the author's; the implementation is the model's.
+
+Read that as a limit on assurance. Nobody who can read this code deeply
+has reviewed it independently of the model that wrote it. What stands
+outside that loop is listed under Status above; the test suite and CI,
+which the model also wrote, count for less. SECURITY.md says so and will
+until it is false. If you are that reviewer, open an issue.
+
+## What a receipt gives you
+
+- **Binding.** A receipt for `transfer_funds` with `{"amount": 250}` is
+  refused for `{"amount": 250000}`, for `delete_database`, and at any
+  target but the one it names.
+- **A principal.** The receipt carries the identity the issuer
+  authenticated; the target compares it with the identity it authenticated.
+  A receipt obtained by one agent cannot be spent by another. When the agent
+  acts for a user, the receipt records that too (`on_behalf_of`).
+- **Standard encodings.** A receipt can travel as a JWS (EdDSA) that any
+  JWT library verifies, and the issuer can take the caller's identity from
+  an OAuth bearer token, an RFC 8693 delegation token or a Transaction
+  Token, signed EdDSA, RS256 or ES256 by keys from the provider's JWKS.
+  With Entra ID the principal is the user's UPN and the token's groups and
+  app roles become policy inputs, so a rules file can say "finance may hold
+  invoice updates; shipping may not" without naming people.
+- **Single use.** Every receipt carries a signed `decision_id`; an executor
+  claims it exactly once. A replayed receipt is refused.
+- **Expiry.** Every receipt carries a signed `not_after` (default 300 s). A
+  captured receipt, or a leaked issuer key, is useful for minutes, not
+  forever.
+- **Currency.** The receipt pins the policy that decided. If the policy
+  changes, outstanding receipts stop being honored and the call must be
+  decided again.
+- **Holds.** A decision that requires approval is flagged inside the signed
+  receipt. The target will not run it without a grant a human signed for
+  that exact decision, under their own key, on their own device.
+- **State binding.** A held write is bound to the target's current state.
+  The approver sees the change as a diff against that state; the call is
+  refused if the target moved before it ran; the execution receipt records
+  the state before and after; an approved change can be undone through the
+  gate the same way.
+- **Proof of execution.** An executor with a key answers each honored call
+  with a signed execution receipt: the decision it fulfilled, the policy
+  version that allowed it, and a hash of the outputs. Receipt, grant and
+  execution receipt verify together, offline, with three public keys.
+
+That is the sentence Gargoyle can say: a specific policy version
+authorized a specific call for a specific principal, a human's key
+released it against a known state, and exactly that call ran once,
+verifiable offline by anyone.
+
+## Quick start: the gate in front of a filesystem MCP server
+
+    pip install gargoyle-receipts
+
+Three commands, no policy engine, no containers, no client changes:
+
+    gargoyle init /path/the/agent/may/touch     # keys, config, rules.json
+    gargoyle issuer                             # the issuing service, on rules.json
+    gargoyle approve --watch 2                  # where the approver sits (terminal)
+
+Then paste the server entry from `gargoyle-deploy/mcp-config.json` into
+your MCP client. Reads are free, writes block until the approver's key
+signs, deletes are refused; the policy is a JSON rules file you edit.
+`gargoyle init --observe` starts a deployment in record-only mode instead:
+every call allowed and recorded, nothing held, so a week of
+`gargoyle audit --summary` is the input for the hold and deny rules.
+
+Or approve in a browser: open the issuer's `/approve` page and load
+`approver-web.json`, or, with Entra configured, sign in with Microsoft. The
+console is described below.
+
+[docs/guide-hyperv-ubuntu-apache.md](docs/guide-hyperv-ubuntu-apache.md)
+is the full single-instance build: Ubuntu VM, Apache with TLS, a Windows 11
+client running Claude Code. [docs/guide-production-entra.md](docs/guide-production-entra.md)
+is the same for a Microsoft 365 tenant whose users are on Claude Desktop or
+claude.ai. [examples/filesystem-agent](examples/filesystem-agent/) walks
+through the gate with OPA in Docker for sites that run a policy engine.
+
+### The `gargoyle` command
+
+| Command | What it does | Where it runs |
+|---|---|---|
+| `gargoyle init DIR [--observe] [--approvers N] [--client claude-code]` | keys, tokens, rules file, service unit, Apache site, MCP entry | once, anywhere |
+| `gargoyle issuer` | the issuing service: receipts, holds, grants, witness, console | the issuer host |
+| `gargoyle approve --watch 2` | review and release held calls in a terminal | an approver's machine |
+| `gargoyle login --tenant T --client-id C --scope S` | sign a workstation's user in with Entra ID; receipts then name them | each workstation |
+| `gargoyle tokens --out DIR` | new client and approver tokens from the same keys | the issuer host |
+| `gargoyle approvers list` / `revoke UPN` | the enrolled approver registry; a revoke is picked up without a restart | the issuer host |
+| `gargoyle witness [--follow]` | the issuer's witness as a table | the issuer host |
+| `gargoyle doctor --env middleware.env` | preflight a workstation's gate, one PASS/WARN/FAIL line per concern | each workstation |
+| `gargoyle rules test` / `explain` / `lint` | what a rules file would do, before it is the policy | anywhere |
+| `gargoyle sidedoors --env middleware.env [--report]` | list every other way into the gated files this host shows | each workstation |
+| `gargoyle backup DIR` / `restore ARCHIVE` | the issuer host's state as one verified archive, and back | the issuer host |
+| `gargoyle audit --log audit.jsonl [--witness witness.jsonl] [--check-tree DIR] [--summary]` | verify the evidence log, reconcile it against the witness, find files changed around the gate | anywhere, offline |
+| `gargoyle emilia --log audit.jsonl` | export approved calls as EMILIA Trust Receipts | anywhere, offline |
+| `gargoyle remote` / `remote-token` | the gate as an HTTPS MCP server for hosted connectors, and a person's capability URL for it | the gate host |
+| `gargoyle hook --env middleware.env` | the Claude Code hook command (PreToolUse, PostToolUse) | each workstation, from settings |
+
+## The approval console
+
+The issuer serves a browser console at `/approve`. It shows each held call
+with its full arguments, checked against the receipt, and signs the grant
+locally with WebCrypto. Below the holds it shows the witness as
+**Activity** (who asked, which tool, what the policy did), which is the
+whole picture during an observe-mode week; every row opens its witness
+entry.
+
+**Keys and sign-in.** The approver's key never leaves the browser. With
+Entra it is generated there, non-exportable, and enrolled under the
+approver's UPN, so grants and audits name the person. One key per account:
+a second browser does not enroll until the first key consents or the
+operator revokes it. Every key an approver has held stays in
+`approvers.json` (`history`), so an audit of grants released under an
+earlier key still verifies; copy the issuer's current file beside the
+evidence before auditing.
+
+**Revocation.** An approver retires a lost or replaced key with
+`POST /approvers/revoke` from their own sign-in; the operator revokes
+anyone with `gargoyle approvers revoke <upn>` on the issuer's host, and the
+running service picks the change up without a restart. Revoked keys stay
+on file so earlier grants still audit; new grants under them are refused
+at the issuer and at every middleware on its next held call. Revocation
+retires a key, not a person: while the Approver role stands, the person can
+sign in and enroll a fresh key, so remove the role too. The role is what
+counts at release time: a grant under an enrolled key is accepted only from
+that account, under a token that carries the role now, so a role removed in
+the directory ends the power at once.
+
+**Who sees what.** Approvers, and only approvers, see the whole queue and
+the witness; everyone else sees their own holds.
+
+**More than one signature.** `"approvals": 2` on a rule, with an optional
+`"approvers": [...]` naming which keys count, puts the terms in the receipt
+itself, and `gargoyle init --approvers 2` creates the keys.
+
+**Routing by role.** `"approver_roles": ["Approver.Business"]` on a rule
+means only a sign-in whose Entra app roles include that one may release
+the hold; the issuer attests the role on the grant and the executor refuses
+a grant without the attestation. Routing is what keeps approvals rare for
+the person who should see few.
+
+**Three views of one hold.** The console renders every hold three ways for
+the same signature. The technical view shows tool, raw arguments, hashes,
+pin and the diff. The deputy and business views lead with the issuer's
+one-line description of the change (`Replace the contents of plan.md in
+/srv/clients/acme (412 bytes -> 530 bytes; +4/-1 lines)`), the change as
+before and after lines, who asked and how long is left, with the technical
+details one click away. The sentence is computed in the issuer from the
+held arguments and the bound state (`gargoyle.holdtext`), never authored;
+a hold no template can describe is offered to the business view read-only.
+The view follows the sign-in's role (`Approver.Deputy`, `Approver.Business`;
+plain `Approver` and key files get the technical view) and can be switched.
+The business view hides holds routed to other roles and the activity
+stream; its status line says how many holds the person released this week
+and which tool most of them were, the prompt to add a rule or a scoped
+grant instead. The rendering never changes what is signed.
+
+**Notice.** A hold can be announced to Slack or any webhook
+(`GARGOYLE_HOLD_WEBHOOK_URL`); the notice carries no key, so nothing in a
+chat channel can approve anything.
+
+## Claude Code's own tools: the hook
+
+Claude Code's Bash, Edit, Write and the MCP tools it calls directly do not
+pass through an MCP server the gate can front. They do pass through Claude
+Code's hooks, and `gargoyle hook` is one:
+
+    gargoyle init /path/the/agent/works/in --client claude-code   # rules for Write/Edit/Bash, claude-settings.json
+    gargoyle hook --env middleware.env [--final]                  # the hook command (PreToolUse, PostToolUse)
+
+Same issuer, receipts, holds, approvers and evidence log as the MCP gate;
+the approver sees the shell command or the file content, a held Write is
+bound to the file's state, the refusal reaches Claude by name. Deploy the
+hook from managed settings for a fleet. It covers Claude Code only, and it
+is evidence rather than containment where the user owns the workstation: a
+line typed with the `!` prefix runs in the user's shell with no hook at all
+(verified 2026-10-31), and no setting changes that.
+[docs/claude-code-hook.md](docs/claude-code-hook.md) has the setup and the
+limits.
+
+## Rules before they are the policy: `gargoyle rules`
+
+First match wins, so a rule one line too late never fires; a glob written
+for `path` never sees `move_file`, which sends `source` and `destination`;
+a role name typed once wrong routes a hold to nobody. Three commands answer
+such questions from the file alone, with the issuer's own `decide_rules`:
+
+    gargoyle rules explain --rules rules.json --tool move_file --arg destination=/x/run.ps1   # every rule, matched or why not
+    gargoyle rules test --rules rules.json --calls calls.jsonl --roles Approver,Approver.Business  # one row per call vs `expect`, then lint
+    gargoyle rules lint --rules rules.json          # UNREACHABLE, ARG_KEY_UNKNOWN, ROLE_UNKNOWN
+
+`examples/rules/` holds a Windows observe-mode pilot's rules and the
+fourteen calls it decided live, as a `calls.jsonl` the suite runs. The
+matching model is one page: [docs/rules.md](docs/rules.md).
+
+## Preflight: `gargoyle doctor`
+
+A gate that fails closed looks broken to the person installing it. The
+first tenant's install lost an afternoon to four things, none of them in
+the gate: the submitter's Entra token could not be refreshed (the API's
+enterprise application had "Assignment required" on), the console's
+browser key was no longer the one enrolled, Claude Code's own auto-mode
+classifier refused the gate's write before the gate saw it, and the
+workstation's endpoint protection flagged the signed Claude Code binary.
+The doctor reads the same `middleware.env` the gate reads and says, per
+concern, PASS, WARN or FAIL with the one fix that applies:
+
+    gargoyle doctor --env C:\gargoyle\middleware.env      # Windows workstation (the installer runs it last)
+    gargoyle doctor --env ~/.gargoyle/hook/middleware.env  # a hook host
+    gargoyle doctor --env middleware.env --json            # for a script
+
+Checks, in the order a person debugs: the env file is complete and
+private; the CA bundle names the issuer's host and has not expired; the
+issuer answers `/health` through Python's trust; the clock is within a
+minute of the issuer's; the rules pin the gate will enforce is the one the
+issuer runs; the submitter gets a token silently, now, as the named user
+(an `AADSTS50105` is translated into the Entra setting that causes it); the
+state root exists and does not hold the client's own state; the evidence
+log and snapshot folder are writable and discovery is not overdue; Claude
+Code's layers are right (side doors denied by managed settings or hooked,
+the gate's MCP tools allowed by rule, the hook registered with this env
+file); and Node, where present, trusts the issuer too. It ends with the
+note the installer needs before the EDR alert arrives. Exit 0 when nothing
+fails. It changes nothing and sends nothing but two GETs and one silent
+token refresh.
+
+## Side doors: discovery mode
+
+A gate stands in front of one tool server. The files behind it can still be
+reached around it: a second MCP server in a client's config serving the same
+folder without the gate, Claude Code's own Write and Bash with no hook, a
+project `.mcp.json` anyone who writes the folder can extend, a managed MCP
+file that is not exclusive, a share that exports the folder, a
+world-writable folder, a symlink that lands outside it, a gated file
+changed with no evidence entry, a script written through the gate that a
+person then runs outside it, Claude Code's `!` prefix, and a client's own
+state folder (`.claude/`) kept inside the gated root. None of these is an
+attack; all of them are what an audit of the evidence log cannot see. The
+gate looks for them itself (`gargoyle.sidedoors`):
+
+    gargoyle sidedoors --env middleware.env            # list them now; exit 1 when any are found
+    gargoyle sidedoors --env middleware.env --report   # also write audit.sidedoors.json and tell the issuer
+
+The MCP gate takes the same look at startup and the hook on its next run,
+whenever the last report beside the evidence log is older than
+`GARGOYLE_MCP_DISCOVERY_HOURS` (default 24; `0` disables). Findings go
+beside the evidence log with the time each was first seen, and to the
+issuer (`POST /sidedoors`), whose witness records them, so they show in the
+console's Activity and in `gargoyle audit --summary`. Each finding names a
+remedy. Discovery is notice, never admission: nothing is held or refused on
+it.
+
+## Evidence, witness and audit
+
+The MCP middleware and the hook keep an evidence log: one hash-chained line
+per decision, refusals and declined holds included, so the trail answers
+"what did the agent try" as well as "what did it do". Every entry names the
+MCP client that asked, from its initialize handshake, so a fleet with
+Claude on some desks and another client on others still has one trail. The
+replay claims that make a receipt single-use live beside the log in SQLite,
+so a restarted gate still refuses a receipt it honored.
+
+The evidence is the workstation's own statement, and the workstation
+belongs to its user. So the issuer keeps a witness: a signed, hash-chained
+record of every receipt it issued, every grant it accepted, every decline,
+enrollment, revocation and discovery report, on the operator's server.
+
+    gargoyle audit --log audit.jsonl                                   # verify every entry and the chain; prints the tail hash to note down
+    gargoyle audit --log audit.jsonl --witness witness.jsonl           # reconcile by decision id: unwitnessed receipts, releases without a grant, missing evidence
+    gargoyle audit --log audit.jsonl --check-tree /srv/shared          # hash the gated folder against the recorded states; name files changed around the gate
+    gargoyle audit --log audit.jsonl --summary                         # calls by principal and tool, side-door findings
+    gargoyle audit --log audit.jsonl --issuer https://gargoyle.lan      # take the issuer's keys and every approver key it has seen from the issuer, not from a copied file
+
+The audit needs the public keys (`public-keys.json`, by default beside the
+log or in `--out`). Grants verify against every key an approver has held,
+so an approver who re-enrolled a browser key is still audited; with
+`--issuer` that list comes from the issuer itself and a stale copy of
+`approvers.json` can no longer fail a valid grant.
+
+On a machine the user administers the gate constrains the assistant, not
+the user; these checks make the difference visible. SPEC.md section 15
+specifies the log, the witness and every reconciliation finding.
+
+A held call is approved against the state it was shown in. Before asking
+for the receipt the middleware hashes the target (a file's bytes, or its
+absence); the issuer binds that hash into the signed receipt; the console
+shows the proposed content as a diff against that state; after the human
+signs, the middleware hashes the target again and refuses if it moved; and
+the execution receipt carries the state before and after. An approved
+change can be undone the same way: the middleware keeps what a held write
+replaced and offers `gargoyle_revert`, which composes the restoring write
+and sends it through the gate, held, shown as a diff, bound to the current
+state, and refused if anything changed since. The audit marks a revert
+from the state hashes alone.
+
+## Backup and restore
+
+Everything on the issuer host that cannot be regenerated (the hold store,
+the witness, the keys, the rules, the enrolled approvers, the remote
+gates' state) goes into one archive named with the witness head:
+
+    gargoyle backup /var/backups/gargoyle          # on the issuer host, as root
+    gargoyle restore --verify-only ARCHIVE         # check it against the running state; writes nothing
+    gargoyle restore ARCHIVE --opt /opt/gargoyle   # put it back; services stopped first
+
+A backup refuses to run if it cannot read every secret it should contain,
+and writes nothing. `restore --verify-only` verifies the witness chain and
+the hold store's integrity inside the archive. [docs/operations.md](docs/operations.md) says what the archive holds,
+how to schedule it, and what a restart does to work in flight.
+
+## Scoped grants
+
+One card per held call is right for a mailbox rule and wrong for a long
+task. The assistant can ask for a plan (`gargoyle_plan`): a list of steps,
+each a tool with exact arguments or argument patterns, and a note saying
+why. The issuer judges every step under the policy, signs the plan, and
+holds it as one card; the approver signs once; each later call matching an
+unused step runs without a card of its own until the plan expires. Every
+step is still bound, claimed once, and recorded with the plan and step that
+released it. The rules file decides what may be planned (`"plan": false`
+keeps a tool individual; sends should be), because a plan approves scope
+rather than content.
+
+## Microsoft 365 and other targets: adapters
+
+What a held call changes is the adapter's business (`gargoyle.adapters`):
+it describes the target's state before and after, tells the approver what
+the call means in plain words, and composes the call that undoes it. Files
+on the executor's host are the default. `GARGOYLE_MCP_STATE_PROBE=graph`
+selects the Graph adapter for a Microsoft Graph MCP server: inbox rules,
+calendar events, contacts and Teams membership are bound to their state,
+explained on the card ("creates inbox rule 'Fwd invoices' (to an outside
+address: x@evil.example)"), undone by the inverse Graph call, and a send is
+marked as something that cannot be undone. The adapter reads state through
+the upstream server itself, so the gate needs no Graph credential of its
+own. Which tool is which is a JSON spec; the reference naming is in
+`gargoyle/specs/graph-reference.json`, and a different server's names are
+mapped there, not in code. The Graph adapter is tested against a fake
+Graph server and has not yet run against a tenant's mailbox.
+
+## Remote mode
+
+Claude's hosted connectors (claude.ai in the browser, Claude Desktop's
+custom connectors) and Microsoft 365 servers are reached over HTTPS, not
+through a local process. `gargoyle remote` runs the same gate as a
+Streamable HTTP MCP server in front of a stdio command or a remote MCP
+server (`--upstream-url`), so those paths go through it too:
+
+    gargoyle remote-token --out gargoyle-deploy --principal dana@contoso.com --url https://gargoyle.lan:8444
+    gargoyle remote --out gargoyle-deploy --port 8444 --ssl-certfile ... --ssl-keyfile ... -- python -m gargoyle.fs_server /srv/shared
+
+With Entra, the connector signs the user in: set `GARGOYLE_OAUTH_BASE_URL`
+(and the gate's own app registration, `GARGOYLE_OAUTH_ENTRA_CLIENT_ID` /
+`_CLIENT_SECRET`) and the gate is the OAuth authorization server the hosted
+client expects (metadata, dynamic registration, code flow with PKCE) while
+the sign-in itself happens at the tenant, under its MFA and Conditional
+Access. The gate then presents the user's own Entra token to the issuer,
+refreshed silently, and the receipt's principal is their UPN; the session
+ends when the tenant refuses the refresh (`gargoyle.oauth_broker`,
+[docs/guide-production-entra.md](docs/guide-production-entra.md)). Without
+a directory, each person gets a capability URL (`/mcp/<token>`) from
+`gargoyle remote-token` that names them on every receipt; the operator
+vouches for that mapping, as with an API key, so treat the URL as a
+credential. All sessions share one upstream, one replay cache, one evidence
+log and one snapshot store, so single use and undo hold across users.
+Device-bound identity remains the stdio mode's property.
+
+## Where it sits
+
+MCP gateways hold a tool call, notify a reviewer and log the click.
+Gargoyle is not a gateway. It runs beside the client, and its approval is a
+signature made with a key the issuer never holds, checked at execution and
+again by anyone later. In 2026 several Internet-Drafts describe parts of
+the same shape: Acta signed receipts (an access decision, signed), EP
+authorization receipts (a human's pre-execution signoff), XAIP receipts (a
+signed execution record). Gargoyle chains all three on one decision id with
+the policy version inside, uses the same RFC 8785 canonical form they do,
+and SPEC.md section 16 maps every field.
+[docs/comparison-2026-10-20.md](docs/comparison-2026-10-20.md) scores
+Gargoyle against its nearest peers from their primary sources;
+[docs/interop-emilia.md](docs/interop-emilia.md) records the EMILIA
+interoperation, in both directions.
+
+## Using the library
+
+### Issuing a receipt
+
+The policy is anything with `pin()` and `decide()`; see `gargoyle.policy`.
+The interaction you pass carries the call (`tool`, `args`, `principal`) and
+whatever claims your policy reads. The receipt records only the call and
+the policy pin.
+
+```python
+from gargoyle.issuer import ENVELOPE_HEADER, issue
+
+who = principal_from_token(bearer_or_transaction_token, IDP_KEYS, audience="issuer")  # gargoyle.identity
+# IDP_KEYS: pinned, or entra_keys("<tenant>") / keys_from_jwks(<provider JWKS>)
+interaction = {
+    "tool": "transfer_funds",
+    "args": {"amount": 250, "to": "acct-9"},
+    "principal": who["principal"],         # the agent, as the identity provider authenticated it
+    "on_behalf_of": who["on_behalf_of"],   # the user it acts for, when the token says so
+    **claims,                              # whatever your policy decides on
+}
+result = issue(policy, "https://tools.example.com/target", interaction,
+               signing_key=issuer_private_key, key_id="issuer-2026-10")
+
+if result.envelope is None:
+    refuse(result.decision.reason)
+elif result.decision.requires_approval:
+    hold(result.envelope)            # the issuing service does this for you
+else:
+    send(call, headers={ENVELOPE_HEADER: json.dumps(result.envelope)})
+    # or, for a target that speaks JWT: gargoyle.jws.encode_receipt(result.envelope, issuer_private_key)
+```
+
+**Open Policy Agent.** `gargoyle.opa.OpaPolicy` asks OPA's data API and
+pins the exact set of policy modules OPA holds, so editing a policy
+invalidates every outstanding receipt until the call is decided again.
+
+```python
+from gargoyle.opa import OpaPolicy
+policy = OpaPolicy("http://127.0.0.1:8181", "gargoyle/decision")
+```
+
+```rego
+package gargoyle
+default decision := {"allow": false, "reason": "DEFAULT_DENY"}
+decision := {"allow": true, "requires_approval": input.tool == "transfer_funds"} {
+    input.principal == "spiffe://example.org/agents/payments"
+    input.tool in {"read_balance", "transfer_funds"}
+}
+```
+
+OPA unreachable, an undefined document, or a result in no recognized shape
+is a refusal, never an issuance. Any other engine goes behind the same
+two-method interface.
+
+**No engine.** `gargoyle.rules.RulesPolicy` decides from a JSON file:
+first matching rule wins, globs on tool name, principal, delegation, the
+caller's groups and roles, and string arguments; actions allow, hold or
+deny; a hold may name `approvals`, `approvers` and `approver_roles`.
+Argument globs that look like paths are matched on a normalized form
+(separators, `..`, letter case, and on Windows the name the OS would
+actually open), so a rule for one folder is not slipped by traversal or
+spelling; `*` spans folders. The pin is the file's hash, so an edit
+invalidates outstanding receipts exactly as an engine change does. This is
+what `gargoyle init` sets up and `gargoyle rules` tests.
+
+### Checking a receipt
+
+Every executor runs the same check: establish the live policy pin,
+establish the trusted issuer keys, verify the receipt against the call it
+is about to run, claim the `decision_id`. `gargoyle.consumer.Consumer`
+packages it.
+
+```python
+from gargoyle.consumer import Consumer
+
+consumer = Consumer(
+    target_id="https://tools.example.com/target",
+    pinned_public_keys={"issuer-2026-10": issuer_public_key},
+    record_bytes=open("published_record.json", "rb").read(),   # {policy_id, policy_sha256}
+)
+
+call = {"tool": name, "args": arguments, "principal": peer_identity}
+verdict = consumer.check(envelope, call)
+if verdict.honored:
+    run(name, arguments)
+else:
+    refuse(verdict.reason)           # REF_VERIFY_* or REF_TARGET_*
+```
+
+`peer_identity` is who *you* authenticated as the caller (an mTLS peer, a
+bearer token's subject, an identity a trusted proxy asserted). It is never
+read from the request. A consumer refuses to be built without issuer-key
+trust, and the verifier refuses to run without it, so an unsigned receipt
+is never honored. For a flagged receipt, pass the human's grant as
+`grant=`; the consumer verifies it against the receipt's own decision and
+hold, claims it once, and only then claims the receipt.
+
+For a live pin that can be reissued, give the consumer a record source (a
+publisher-signed record with a serial and an expiry) instead of a static
+pin; for issuer keys that can be rotated and revoked, a key record source.
+Both are consulted on every check and fail closed.
+
+### Proof that it ran
+
+Give a consumer an executor key and it signs an execution receipt after the
+side effect. Anyone holding the issuer's, approver's and executor's public
+keys can then audit one call with no network and no live state:
+
+```python
+from gargoyle.execution import verify_chain
+
+chain = verify_chain(receipt, execution,
+                     issuer_public_keys=ISSUER_KEYS, executor_public_keys=EXECUTOR_KEYS,
+                     grant=grant, approver_public_keys=APPROVER_KEYS,
+                     outputs=outputs, check_outputs=True)
+chain["accepted"], chain["steps"]   # True, [("authorization", ...), ("approval", ...), ("execution", ...)]
+```
+
+The receipt, grant and execution receipt verify in Python or TypeScript
+against the same vectors; the evidence log, the witness, plans and the
+older formats verify in Python.
+
+### Approval holds without the issuing service
+
+When the policy's decision carries `requires_approval`, the receipt is
+issued with `requires_approval: true` and a signed `approval_request_id`.
+No target will run it on its own: the consumer demands a grant for exactly
+that decision and hold, verifies it (provenance, separation of duties,
+binding, expiry), claims it once, and only then claims the receipt. A human
+can run `gargoyle-approver` on a machine that holds the approver private
+key; given the receipt it shows the tool, argument hash, principal, target
+and policy that are inside the issuer's signature, and emits the grant.
+Approver keys should come from a signed key record where the key's role is
+`approver` (`gargoyle.approver_trust`), so an issuer-controlled key can
+never approve.
+
+## The shipped consumer and its configuration
+
+**MCP middleware** (`python -m gargoyle.mcp_server -- <upstream command>`):
+a stdio MCP server you put in front of any other stdio MCP server. The
+handshake, `tools/list` and everything else are relayed. A `tools/call` is
+forwarded only when `params._meta["gargoyle/envelope"]` carries a valid
+receipt for that tool, those arguments and the principal the server serves
+(and `params._meta["gargoyle/grant"]` a grant, when the receipt is
+flagged); a refused call is answered here and never reaches the upstream.
+`--env FILE` before the `--` reads the settings below from a `KEY=VALUE`
+file (variables already in the environment win), so an MCP entry that
+every local user can read, such as Claude Code's managed
+`managed-mcp.json`, names `middleware.env` instead of carrying the executor
+key. With `GARGOYLE_MCP_ISSUER_URL` and an identity it obtains a receipt
+from the issuing service for any call that carries none, and waits for the
+human's grant when the call is flagged, so clients that cannot attach
+receipts work unchanged. Configuration is by environment:
+
+| Variable | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_GATE_KEY_ID`, `GARGOYLE_MCP_GATE_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX` | the pinned issuer key |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_TARGET_ID` | the target identity receipts bind to |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_PRINCIPAL` | the client this server serves |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_RECORD_PATH`, `GARGOYLE_MCP_RECORD_URL` | the live policy pin: a file copied out of band, or (what `init` sets) the issuer's signed record at `<issuer>/record`, followed live and cached a minute, so a rule change reaches every gate without a copy or a restart |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_APPROVER_KEY_ID`, `GARGOYLE_MCP_APPROVER_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX` | the approver keys whose grants release flagged calls (optional, both or neither; comma-separated lists for several) |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_EXECUTOR_KEY_ID`, `GARGOYLE_MCP_EXECUTOR_KEY_HEX` | this server's own signing key, so honored calls carry an execution receipt in `_meta["gargoyle/execution"]` (optional, both or neither) |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_ISSUER_URL`, `GARGOYLE_MCP_CLIENT_TOKEN` | self-issue mode: the issuing service and the identity token (whose subject is this server's principal) to obtain receipts with; `GARGOYLE_MCP_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` and `GARGOYLE_MCP_POLL_SECONDS` tune the wait for a grant |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_ENTRA_TENANT`, `_CLIENT_ID`, `_SCOPE`, `_TOKEN_CACHE` | instead of a fixed client token: the user's own Entra ID token, written by `gargoyle login` (device code, MSAL cache, silent refresh); the principal is their UPN. No usable token refuses `REF_TARGET_LOGIN_REQUIRED` |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_STATE_PROBE` | `filesystem` (default) binds a held file write to the file's current state: the approver sees the change as a diff, the call refuses if the file moved before the run (`REF_VERIFY_STATE_MISMATCH`), and the execution receipt records pre and post state; `graph` selects the Graph adapter; `none` disables |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_STATE_ROOT` | the upstream's root: a relative path argument is made absolute against it before the rules, the gate-folder check, the state probe and the upstream see it, so all four look at the same file (default: the path in a `mcp://filesystem/` target id; `init` writes it). With no root, a relative path on a state-bound tool is refused with `REF_TARGET_RELATIVE_PATH`; a name Windows would rewrite (trailing dot or space, a stream suffix, a device name) with `REF_TARGET_PATH_NOT_CANONICAL`, and globs are matched against the canonical name too |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_ADAPTER_SPEC` | with `GARGOYLE_MCP_STATE_PROBE=graph`: the tool-to-resource mapping JSON (default: the reference naming) |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_SNAPSHOT_DIR` | where the bytes a held, state-bound write replaces are kept (default `snapshots/` beside the audit log; `none` disables undo); the middleware then offers a `gargoyle_revert` tool that restores an approved change through the gate, held and state-bound like any write |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_AUDIT_LOG` | the evidence log: every decision, honored or refused, as one hash-chained JSON line with its receipt, grant and execution receipt; `gargoyle audit --log` verifies the file; the replay claims that make a receipt single-use live beside it in `<log stem>.replay.sqlite` |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_DISCOVERY_HOURS` | how old the last side-door report may be before the gate looks again at startup or on the hook's next run (default 24; `0` disables) |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_INSTRUCTIONS` | replaces the standing instructions the gate hands the model in the MCP handshake (default: all work on the target goes through these tools, a wait is normal, a refusal is final, plans and undo exist); the user never has to name the server |
+| `GARGOYLE_MCP_UPSTREAM_URL`, `GARGOYLE_MCP_UPSTREAM_TOKEN` | remote mode: the MCP server to front over Streamable HTTP, and its bearer |
+| remote gate `GARGOYLE_OAUTH_BASE_URL`, `_ENTRA_CLIENT_ID`, `_ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET` (`_ENTRA_TENANT`, `_ENTRA_SCOPE`, `_REDIRECT_ALLOW`, `_ACCESS_TTL`) | the hosted connector signs the user in with Entra through the gate (RFC 8414/9728 metadata, RFC 7591 registration limited to the allowed callbacks, code flow with PKCE); the gate holds the user's Entra token for the issuer and refreshes it; sessions in `oauth-state.json` beside the gate's keys |
+
+**Issuing service** (`gargoyle.issuer_service`, run with uvicorn from
+`app_from_env()`, or `gargoyle issuer`): identity token in, receipt out,
+with the hold and grant exchange for flagged calls (`/issue`, `/pending`,
+`/grants`, `/decline`, `/record`, `/keys`, `/approvers`, `/approvers/audit`,
+`/sidedoors`) and the browser
+approval console at `/approve`. Policy from a rules file or OPA; identity
+from a pinned key or, with `GARGOYLE_ENTRA_TENANT`, the tenant's signing
+keys (both at once when a pinned key is also set).
+
+| Variable | Meaning |
+|---|---|
+| `GARGOYLE_ISSUER_AUDIENCE` | the `aud` an identity token must carry; a comma-separated list accepts several, so init-minted tokens (`gargoyle-issuer`) and a tenant's tokens (the issuer app's client id) work side by side |
+| `GARGOYLE_ENTRA_TENANT` + `GARGOYLE_ISSUER_AUDIENCE` | trust the tenant's tokens; the audience is required with a tenant (the service will not start without it), and a directory token for any other tenant is `REF_IDENTITY_WRONG_TENANT` |
+| `GARGOYLE_ENTRA_CLIENT_ID`, `GARGOYLE_ENTRA_SCOPE` | lets the console sign approvers in with Entra (code flow with PKCE, no library); the browser generates a non-exportable key and enrolls it under the UPN |
+| `GARGOYLE_APPROVERS_PATH`, `GARGOYLE_APPROVER_ROLE`, `GARGOYLE_APPROVER_GROUPS` | where enrolled approvers persist (default `approvers.json` beside the keys, with a `revoked` list, re-read when its content changes) and which Entra app role (default `Approver`) or groups may enroll, see every hold and the witness |
+| `GARGOYLE_HOLDS_PATH` | SQLite file for holds, grants, declines and plans, so a restart loses nothing a person is acting on (`gargoyle issuer` sets `holds.sqlite` beside the keys); `GET /health` reports `persistent` |
+| `GARGOYLE_MAX_OPEN_HOLDS` | how many held receipts and plans one principal may have waiting at once (default 20); the call over the cap is `REF_ISSUER_TOO_MANY_HOLDS` and nothing is stored |
+| `GARGOYLE_ALLOW_SELF_APPROVAL` | `1` lets a person release their own call; by default the approver may be neither the hold's principal nor the party acted for (`REF_ISSUER_SELF_APPROVAL`). A grant for an expired hold is `REF_ISSUER_HOLD_EXPIRED` and the hold is dropped |
+| `GARGOYLE_WITNESS_PATH` | the issuer's signed, hash-chained record of every decision (`gargoyle issuer` sets `witness.jsonl` beside the keys) |
+| `GARGOYLE_HOLD_WEBHOOK_URL`, `GARGOYLE_APPROVE_URL` | POST a notice of every new hold (Slack incoming-webhook shape, `text` plus the hold) with a link to the console; notice only, the grant still needs the approver's key |
+| `GARGOYLE_LOG_JSON` | one JSON line per decision on stderr: issued, refused, granted, declined, plan, enrolled, revoked, sidedoors |
+| `GET /health` | public: `ok`, the policy pin, pending counts, approver counts, `entra`, `persistent`, `witness_head` (the chain's tail sequence and entry hash, so a client can tell it talks to the issuer whose witness it will later reconcile against), and the week's hold and release figures by tool and by role |
+
+A declined hold carries the approver's reason back to the assistant
+verbatim, and a principal whose same tool and path have been declined
+repeatedly is refused with `REF_ISSUER_DECLINED_RECENTLY` and the earlier
+reason, without a new card.
+
+## Modules
+
+| Module | Role |
+|---|---|
+| `policy`, `opa`, `rules`, `globs` | the decision interface; the OPA adapter; a policy from a JSON rules file; argument glob matching |
+| `issuer`, `envelope`, `identity`, `jws` | ask the policy and sign; receipt construction and currency; identity tokens to principal and `on_behalf_of`; the receipt as a JWS |
+| `verifier`, `consumer`, `execution` | the pure target-side check and every refusal code; `Consumer` (pin, keys, verify, claim, attest); execution receipts and the offline chain |
+| `approval`, `approver_cli`, `approver_trust`, `approvers` | grants; the human's terminal tool; approver key trust; the enrolled-approver registry with history and revocation |
+| `state`, `revert`, `adapters`, `holdtext` | state-bound approval; undo through the gate; what a call changes, per target type; the one-line description of a hold |
+| `plans` | scoped grants: one approval for a bounded plan |
+| `evidence`, `witness`, `reconcile` | the executor's hash-chained log; the issuer's signed witness; reconciliation and the tree check |
+| `replay_cache`, `pending_store`, `holdstore` | single use for receipts and holds, in memory, SQLite or Redis; the issuer's persistent hold store |
+| `mcp_server`, `remote`, `oauth_broker`, `fs_server` | the stdio middleware with self-issue mode; the gate as a Streamable HTTP server; Entra sign-in for hosted connectors; a Python filesystem MCP server |
+| `claude_hook` | the same gate as a Claude Code hook over its own tools |
+| `sidedoors` | discovery mode: every other way into the gated files this host shows |
+| `issuer_service`, `entra_login`, `notify` | the HTTP issuing service and console; `gargoyle login`; the hold webhook |
+| `doctor`, `rulecheck`, `operations` | `gargoyle doctor`; `gargoyle rules`; `gargoyle backup` and `restore` |
+| `emilia`, `emilia_runner` | EMILIA Trust Receipt export and the EMILIA conformance runner |
+| `published_record_source`, `key_record_source` | the live policy pin as a publisher-signed record; root-signed issuer and approver keys with windows and revocation |
+| `cli` | the `gargoyle` command |
+
+## Documentation
+
+| Document | What it is for |
+|---|---|
+| [SPEC.md](SPEC.md) | the wire specification: receipt, grant, execution receipt, evidence log, witness, plans, JWS, relation to other receipt formats; every vector recomputed by the suite |
+| [ROADMAP.md](ROADMAP.md) | what was built when, what was found live, and what is next |
+| [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) | how to report a problem, what is in scope, what the design does not claim |
+| [docs/guide-hyperv-ubuntu-apache.md](docs/guide-hyperv-ubuntu-apache.md) | the single-instance build, end to end, with troubleshooting |
+| [docs/guide-production-entra.md](docs/guide-production-entra.md) | one tenant, one hosted gate, Entra ID as the control point |
+| [docs/entra-setup.md](docs/entra-setup.md) | the two app registrations, app roles, and the settings that bite |
+| [docs/claude-code-hook.md](docs/claude-code-hook.md) | the gate as a Claude Code hook, and its limits |
+| [docs/rules.md](docs/rules.md) | how a call is decided by a rules file, on one page |
+| [docs/operations.md](docs/operations.md) | what the issuer host holds, backup, restore, restart |
+| [docs/beta-checklist.md](docs/beta-checklist.md) | a first client deployment: set up, tell people, watch, back out |
+| [docs/scenario-client-workstation.md](docs/scenario-client-workstation.md) | the scenario the design answers (2026-10-16) |
+| [docs/comparison-2026-10-20.md](docs/comparison-2026-10-20.md) | Gargoyle against its nearest peers, from primary sources |
+| [docs/interop-emilia.md](docs/interop-emilia.md) | interoperation with the EMILIA Protocol, both directions |
+| [docs/ally-design.md](docs/ally-design.md) | how Gargoyle fits beside governance runtimes and the receipt drafts |
+| [ts/README.md](ts/README.md) | the TypeScript verifier and consumer |
+| [examples/](examples/) | the gated filesystem agent with OPA; a live pilot's rules and the calls they decided |
+
+## Install for development
+
+    pip install -e ".[dev]"
+    python -m pytest
+
+Python 3.12 or later. The TypeScript verifier and consumer for Node 20+
+lives in [ts/](ts/) (`cd ts && npm install && npm test`); its suite
+recomputes the same conformance vectors byte for byte, so the two
+implementations cannot drift apart silently. Redis is optional (`.[redis]`)
+and only needed to share the replay cache and pending-approval set across
+replicas of the remote gate; `.[entra]` adds MSAL for `gargoyle login`.
+
+## What Gargoyle does not do
+
+- It does not decide. The policy does, and the receipt is only as good as
+  that decision.
+- It does not authenticate principals. The issuer and the target each
+  authenticate the caller themselves; Gargoyle compares the two results.
+- It cannot stop a caller that never asks for a receipt. Only a target that
+  refuses unattested calls can. On a workstation its user administers, the
+  gate constrains the assistant, not the user; changes made around the gate
+  are detected by reconciliation, the tree check and discovery, not
+  prevented.
+- It does not judge the change. The console proves the approver saw the
+  exact arguments and the exact diff and signed; whether the change should
+  happen is the approver's call.
+- It does not distribute trust material. Issuer keys, record files, root
+  keys and the client token are the deployer's to protect.
+- The approval flow separates duties only if the approver's private key is
+  out of the issuing service's reach. That is a deployment property; the
+  browser console's non-exportable key is how the reference deployment
+  meets it.
+
+## License
+
+Apache License 2.0; see [LICENSE](LICENSE) and [NOTICE](NOTICE).