exeradar 2026.9.1__tar.gz

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Files changed (45) hide show
  1. exeradar-2026.9.1/.github/workflows/codeql.yml +40 -0
  2. exeradar-2026.9.1/.github/workflows/docker-build-check.yml +26 -0
  3. exeradar-2026.9.1/.github/workflows/publish.yml +39 -0
  4. exeradar-2026.9.1/.github/workflows/sonarcloud.yml +44 -0
  5. exeradar-2026.9.1/.github/workflows/tests.yml +50 -0
  6. exeradar-2026.9.1/.gitignore +13 -0
  7. exeradar-2026.9.1/ARCHITECTURE.md +298 -0
  8. exeradar-2026.9.1/ATTRIBUTIONS.md +77 -0
  9. exeradar-2026.9.1/CHANGELOG.md +108 -0
  10. exeradar-2026.9.1/Dockerfile +26 -0
  11. exeradar-2026.9.1/LICENSE +21 -0
  12. exeradar-2026.9.1/PKG-INFO +119 -0
  13. exeradar-2026.9.1/README.md +73 -0
  14. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/__init__.py +1 -0
  15. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/__main__.py +4 -0
  16. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/cli.py +141 -0
  17. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/formats/__init__.py +1 -0
  18. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/formats/pe.py +176 -0
  19. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/law_cache.py +105 -0
  20. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/law_checker.py +371 -0
  21. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/law_fetcher.py +672 -0
  22. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/models.py +101 -0
  23. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/report.py +302 -0
  24. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/scanner.py +117 -0
  25. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/signature.py +258 -0
  26. exeradar-2026.9.1/exeradar/strings.py +226 -0
  27. exeradar-2026.9.1/pyproject.toml +67 -0
  28. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
  29. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/conftest.py +87 -0
  30. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/docker/__init__.py +0 -0
  31. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/docker/smoke.py +22 -0
  32. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/fixtures/cra_it_excerpt.html +467 -0
  33. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/fixtures/gdpr_it_excerpt.html +78 -0
  34. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/fixtures/nis2_it_excerpt.html +169 -0
  35. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/fixtures/python-LICENSE.txt +676 -0
  36. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/fixtures/python.exe +0 -0
  37. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/test_cli.py +257 -0
  38. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/test_law_checker.py +426 -0
  39. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/test_law_fetcher.py +205 -0
  40. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/test_pe.py +141 -0
  41. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/test_report.py +317 -0
  42. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/test_scanner.py +174 -0
  43. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/test_signature.py +162 -0
  44. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/test_skeleton.py +71 -0
  45. exeradar-2026.9.1/tests/test_strings.py +250 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
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+ name: CodeQL
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+ on:
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+ # Code scanning depends on repository settings as much as on the code, so
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+ # being able to re-run it without an empty commit is worth two lines. The
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+ # first run here failed because the repository was private and code scanning
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+ # was unavailable; nothing in the code had changed when it started passing.
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+ workflow_dispatch:
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+ push:
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+ branches: [ main ]
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+ pull_request:
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+ branches: [ main ]
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+ schedule:
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+ - cron: '30 1 * * 1'
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+ permissions:
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+ contents: read
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+ security-events: write
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+ # Private repositories only: the CodeQL action reads the workflow run through
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+ # the API to attach the results, and without this it fails with "Resource not
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+ # accessible by integration". Public repositories do not need it.
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+ actions: read
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+ jobs:
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+ analyze:
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+ # Named for the check context: the ruleset requires a name, and a job name
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+ # that says what it is survives better than the workflow name.
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+ name: CodeQL
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - name: Checkout
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+ uses: actions/checkout@v7
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+ - name: Initialize CodeQL
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+ uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4
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+ with:
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+ languages: python
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+ # Python needs no build. The autobuild step the other Radars inherited
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+ # is superfluous here and is what failed on mailradar in September.
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+ build-mode: none
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+ - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
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+ uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4
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+ with:
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+ category: "/language:python"
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
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+ name: Docker Build Check
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+ # Builds the image from the repository source and runs the smoke test without
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+ # pushing anything. The release workflow, when it exists, will publish to
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+ # Docker Hub including :latest, so there has to be a way to try a Dockerfile
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+ # change out that does not publish one.
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+ on:
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+ workflow_dispatch:
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+ permissions:
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+ contents: read
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+ jobs:
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+ build:
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - name: Checkout
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+ uses: actions/checkout@v7
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+ - name: Set up Docker Buildx
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+ uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v4
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+ - name: Build image from source
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+ uses: docker/build-push-action@v7
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+ with:
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+ context: .
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+ load: true
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+ push: false
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+ tags: exeradar:build-check
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+ - name: Smoke test
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+ run: docker run --rm -i --entrypoint python exeradar:build-check - < tests/docker/smoke.py
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+ name: Publish to PyPI
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+
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+ on:
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+ push:
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+ tags:
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+ - 'v*'
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+ workflow_dispatch:
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+
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+ jobs:
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+ build-and-publish:
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+ name: Build and publish to PyPI
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ environment:
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+ name: pypi
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+ url: https://pypi.org/p/exeradar
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+ # Trusted publishing: the token is minted for this job by GitHub and
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+ # exchanged with PyPI, so there is no API token in the repository.
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+ permissions:
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+ id-token: write
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+
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+ steps:
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+ - name: Checkout
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+ uses: actions/checkout@v7
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+
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+ - name: Set up Python
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+ uses: actions/setup-python@v7
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+ with:
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+ python-version: "3.13"
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+
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+ - name: Install build dependencies
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+ run: pip install --upgrade build hatchling # NOSONAR - trusted packages
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+
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+ - name: Build package
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+ run: python -m build
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+
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+ - name: Publish to PyPI
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+ uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1
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+ with:
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+ verify-metadata: false
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+ name: SonarCloud Analysis
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+ on:
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+ push:
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+ branches: [ main ]
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+ pull_request:
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+ types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
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+ permissions:
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+ contents: read
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+ jobs:
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+ sonarcloud:
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+ name: SonarCloud
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ # GitHub passes no Actions secrets to Dependabot or fork PRs: there the
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+ # token is empty and the scan fails with "Not authorized". A step's `if:`
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+ # cannot read `secrets`, so the job publishes only whether it exists; the
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+ # token itself stays with the scanner. Those runs still test and build
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+ # coverage. This also keeps the workflow green before the Sonar project
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+ # exists at all.
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+ env:
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+ SONAR_ENABLED: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN != '' }}
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: actions/checkout@v7
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+ with:
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+ fetch-depth: 0
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+ - name: Set up Python
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+ uses: actions/setup-python@v7
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+ with:
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+ python-version: "3.12"
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+ - name: Install dependencies
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+ run: |
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+ python -m pip install --upgrade pip
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+ pip install --group dev -e .
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+ - name: Run tests with coverage
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+ run: pytest tests/ --cov --cov-report=xml:coverage.xml
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+
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+ - name: SonarQube Scan
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+ if: ${{ env.SONAR_ENABLED == 'true' }}
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+ uses: SonarSource/sonarqube-scan-action@v8
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+ env:
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+ SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
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+
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+ - name: Report skipped scan
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+ if: ${{ env.SONAR_ENABLED != 'true' }}
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+ run: echo "::notice title=SonarCloud skipped::SONAR_TOKEN is not available to this run (Dependabot PR, fork PR, or the project is not set up yet)."
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+ name: Tests
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+ on:
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+ push:
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+ branches: [ main ]
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+ pull_request:
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+ branches: [ main ]
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+ permissions:
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+ contents: read
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+ jobs:
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+ test:
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+ name: test (${{ matrix.python-version }})
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ strategy:
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+ fail-fast: false
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+ matrix:
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+ # Keep in sync with the classifiers in pyproject.toml
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+ python-version: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13", "3.14"]
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: actions/checkout@v7
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+ - name: Set up Python ${{ matrix.python-version }}
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+ uses: actions/setup-python@v7
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+ with:
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+ python-version: ${{ matrix.python-version }}
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+ - name: Install dependencies
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+ # --group needs pip >= 25.1 to read PEP 735 [dependency-groups]
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+ run: |
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+ python -m pip install --upgrade pip
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+ pip install --group dev -e .
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+ - name: Run test suite
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+ run: pytest tests/ -v
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+
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+ summary:
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+ # The branch ruleset requires one check name that survives matrix changes.
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+ # The matrix job cannot provide it: its contexts carry the Python version,
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+ # so they change whenever the matrix does. always(): a skipped required
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+ # check counts as passed, so this has to run even when the matrix fails,
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+ # and fail explicitly in that case.
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+ name: Tests
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+ needs: [test]
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+ if: always()
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - name: All test jobs succeeded
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+ env:
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+ RESULTS: ${{ join(needs.*.result, ' ') }}
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+ run: |
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+ echo "Results: $RESULTS"
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+ for result in $RESULTS; do
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+ [ "$result" = "success" ] || { echo "::error::A required test job ended with: $result"; exit 1; }
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+ done
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+ __pycache__/
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+ *.py[cod]
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+ *.egg-info/
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+ build/
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+ dist/
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+ .venv/
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+ venv/
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+ .coverage
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+ coverage.xml
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+ htmlcov/
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+ .pytest_cache/
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+ .ruff_cache/
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+ *.sarif
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+ # ExeRadar — architecture
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+
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+ Static analysis of executables: PE first, ELF and Mach-O after.
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+
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+ This is the design, written before the code. Where it makes a claim about a
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+ library it is because the claim was measured, not remembered; the spike that
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+ produced the measurements is in `Documents/Dev/exeradar-spike/spike_lief.py`.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## 1. Layout
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+
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+ Same shape as the other Radar projects, minus the files that are dead there.
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+
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+ ```
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+ exeradar/
17
+ __init__.py __version__ — hatchling reads the version from here
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+ __main__.py
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+ cli.py typer: analyze, batch, verify
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+ scanner.py orchestrates: a path in, an ExeResult out
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+ formats/
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+ __init__.py dispatch on the magic number
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+ pe.py headers, sections, import table
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+ elf.py v2
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+ macho.py v2
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+ signature.py the three paths of section 3
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+ strings.py extraction, then classification into URL / IP / host
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+ models.py the result dataclasses
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+ report.py console, JSON, Markdown
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+ law_checker.py findings -> legal citations
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+ law_cache.py from the family, unchanged
32
+ law_fetcher.py from the family, plus annexes and the Cellar source
33
+ utils.py
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+ tests/
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+ fixtures/ sample binaries, legal HTML
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+ docker/smoke.py
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+ ```
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+
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+ Two deliberate differences from apkradar:
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+
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+ **`formats/` is a subpackage from day one.** The name promises three platforms
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+ while v1 delivers one. Splitting the parsers now makes ELF and Mach-O an
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+ addition rather than a rewrite: `scanner.py` picks a parser by magic number and
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+ works against a shared model.
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+
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+ **`report.py` is implemented.** In apkradar, `reporter.py`, `analyzer.py` and
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+ `legal.py` are empty files and the `--output` option of `audit` is declared but
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+ never read — only `batch-excel` writes anything. ExeRadar renders through one
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+ module with three outputs, and `--output` infers the format from the extension.
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+
51
+ ---
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+
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+ ## 2. Dependencies
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+
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+ | Package | Why | Measured |
56
+ | --- | --- | --- |
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+ | `lief` | PE, ELF and Mach-O in one library | 1.0.0, July 2026, 76 wheels; installs on Python 3.14 through a `cp312-abi3` wheel |
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+ | `asn1crypto` | RFC3161 timestamp decoding, and nothing else | 1.5.1, pure Python |
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+ | `typer`, `rich` | CLI and console rendering, as the family | |
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+ | `httpx` | `law_fetcher` | |
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+
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+ `pefile` was the obvious candidate and was rejected: its last release is
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+ 2024-08-26, it covers PE only, and pairing it with `pyelftools` and `macholib`
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+ for v2 would mean three parsers with three models.
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+
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+ `asn1crypto` earns its place for one job. LIEF exposes the countersignature
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+ structure but not the time inside it: the date lives in the TSTInfo and LIEF
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+ does not decode the ASN.1. Everything else — headers, sections, imports,
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+ certificate chain, `verify_signature()` — is LIEF.
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+
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+ `signify` was the first choice and was dropped after it failed on the Linux
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+ runners with `LibraryNotFoundError: Error detecting the version of libcrypto`.
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+ It depends on `oscrypto`, whose last release is 2022-03-18 and whose libcrypto
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+ version detection does not cope with OpenSSL 3.x. asn1crypto parses the same
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+ structure in pure Python, with no native library to find.
76
+
77
+ ---
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+
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+ ## 3. `signature.py` — three paths, not one
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+
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+ This is the part the spike changed. An embedded signature and a signed file are
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+ not the same thing.
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+
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+ ### A. Embedded signature — LIEF — every platform
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+
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+ The Authenticode blob is inside the PE. LIEF parses it fully: digest algorithm,
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+ the certificate chain with subjects, issuers, validity, serials and key usage,
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+ the signer, the countersignature structure, and `verify_signature()`.
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+
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+ Measured on `notepad++.exe`: SHA-256 digest, a two-certificate chain from
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+ GlobalSign to `CN=NOTEPAD++`, valid 2025-10-09 to 2028-10-09, an `MsCounterSign`
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+ RFC3161 token carrying four certificates, and `VERIFICATION_FLAGS.OK`.
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+
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+ Two gaps to work around, both in the countersignature: the timestamp date is not
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+ exposed, which is what `asn1crypto` is for, and `signers[0].cert` comes back
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+ `None` even though the certificates are present in the structure.
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+
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+ ### B. Catalog signature — Windows only
99
+
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+ The file carries no signature at all; the signature lives in a `.cat` file under
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+ `CatRoot` and covers the file by hash. Most Windows system binaries are signed
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+ this way.
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+
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+ Measured on `C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe`: LIEF reports **zero** embedded
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+ signatures, while `Get-AuthenticodeSignature` reports
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+
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+ ```
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+ status Valid
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+ type Catalog
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+ OS binary True
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+ signer CN=Microsoft Windows, O=Microsoft Corporation
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+ timestamper CN=Microsoft Time-Stamp Service
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+ ```
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+
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+ The file is validly signed and no PE parser can see it. Implementation is
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+ `WinVerifyTrust` through `ctypes`, or a `Get-AuthenticodeSignature` subprocess;
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+ the subprocess is the pragmatic first cut and the API is the version that does
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+ not pay for a PowerShell start-up per file.
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+
120
+ ### C. No signature — a finding
121
+
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+ Neither A nor B produced anything, on a platform where both could run. This is
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+ the only case that is reported as a finding with a severity.
124
+
125
+ ### The rule that follows
126
+
127
+ **On Linux and macOS, path B cannot run.** A and C still work, so an embedded
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+ signature is still parsed and verified, but the absence of one is no longer
129
+ evidence of anything.
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+
131
+ There the result is reported as:
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+
133
+ ```
134
+ catalog signature: not verifiable on this platform
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+ ```
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+
137
+ and **never** as `unsigned`. Calling a catalog-signed Microsoft binary unsigned
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+ would be the worst false positive this tool could ship — it would fire on
139
+ exactly the files that are most obviously legitimate.
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+
141
+ The same restraint applies inside a Linux container analysing Windows binaries,
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+ which is the normal case in CI.
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+
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+ | | Embedded (A) | Catalog (B) | Verdict when both are empty |
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+ | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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+ | Windows | parsed and verified | verified | `unsigned` — a finding |
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+ | Linux, macOS | parsed and verified | not verifiable | `unknown` — not a finding |
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+
149
+ ---
150
+
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+ ## 4. `law_checker` integration
152
+
153
+ The question this section opened with — what to cite for an artefact, when the
154
+ rest of the family cites the GDPR for the processing of personal data — has
155
+ been answered against the texts. The answer is the **Cyber Resilience Act**,
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+ regulation (EU) 2024/2847, and it cost two changes to machinery that was
157
+ supposed to be reused unchanged.
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+
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+ ### What the CRA actually says
160
+
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+ Its articles do not contain the requirements. Article 6 allows a product on the
162
+ market only if it "meets the essential cybersecurity requirements set out in
163
+ Part I of Annex I", and article 13(1) puts that duty on the manufacturer;
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+ both point at **Annex I** and stop. Citing them on their own would be citing a
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+ pointer, so `law_fetcher` learned to address annexes: `"Allegato I, Parte I"`
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+ is a fetchable unit, and its points resolve as `"Allegato I, Parte I(2)(f)"`.
167
+ The part belongs in the reference because Part I and Part II are both numbered
168
+ from (1).
169
+
170
+ The provision that carries the signature findings is Annex I, Part I(2)(f):
171
+ products shall *"proteggono l'integrità ... dei comandi, dei programmi e della
172
+ configurazione da qualsiasi manipolazione o modifica non autorizzata"*. A code
173
+ signature is how that integrity can be checked at all, so its absence, its
174
+ failure and the expiry of the key behind it are one requirement seen three
175
+ times.
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+
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+ ### Where the text comes from
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+
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+ Not from `eur-lex.europa.eu` any more. That host now answers every automated
180
+ request with HTTP 202 and an AWS WAF challenge (`x-amzn-waf-action: challenge`)
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+ — measured on the CRA and on the GDPR, in both languages, so it is the client
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+ being refused and not the document being missing. The Publications Office
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+ serves the same acts, in the same ELI markup, at
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+ `publications.europa.eu/resource/celex/<CELEX>`, which is the interface that
185
+ exists for machines. `fetch_act_html` tries it first and falls back to the old
186
+ page, in case the rule is relaxed again.
187
+
188
+ **This affects the whole family**: APKRadar, MailRadar, PatchRadar and
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+ CookieRadar all fetch through the blocked host and will cite from cache until
190
+ they take the same route.
191
+
192
+ ### The mapping
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+
194
+ | Finding | Cited |
195
+ | --- | --- |
196
+ | `unsigned` | CRA Annex I, Part I(2)(f); CRA art. 13(1); NIS2 art. 21(2)(d); GDPR art. 32(1) |
197
+ | `signature_invalid` | the same four |
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+ | `certificate_expired` | CRA Annex I, Part I(2)(f); GDPR art. 32(1) |
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+ | `hardcoded_ip` | CRA Annex I, Part I(2)(j) |
200
+ | `known_vulnerabilities` *(not produced yet)* | CRA Annex I, Part I(2)(a), Part II(1) and (2); NIS2 art. 21(2)(e) |
201
+
202
+ Three refusals are as much a part of the design as the citations.
203
+
204
+ - **No finding for `http://` URLs.** The obvious candidate was Annex I, Part
205
+ I(2)(e), confidentiality in transit. The only URL in this repository's own
206
+ fixture is `http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2016/WindowsSettings`, an XML
207
+ namespace from the PE manifest — a finding that fires on every Windows
208
+ binary with a manifest is not a finding.
209
+ - **`hardcoded_ip` cites one provision and admits its weakness.** Part I(2)(j)
210
+ asks products to "limit attack surfaces, including external interfaces"; it
211
+ is a general requirement, not a rule about addresses, and the report says so
212
+ in a note rather than borrowing weight from a stronger article.
213
+ - **`unknown` signatures cite nothing.** Off Windows the catalog cannot be
214
+ consulted, so the absence of an embedded signature proves nothing. The whole
215
+ of section 3 exists to avoid that false positive, and a citation is an
216
+ accusation.
217
+
218
+ Two scope notes accompany every CRA citation, because both would otherwise
219
+ mislead: the regulation **applies from 11 December 2027** (art. 71(2)), so it is
220
+ in force and not yet applicable; and it binds a manufacturer placing a *product*
221
+ on the market (art. 2(1)), which is not something a PE header can establish
222
+ about a single file.
223
+
224
+ ### What guards it
225
+
226
+ `test_every_citation_is_in_the_act` parses the acts and fails on a reference
227
+ they do not contain, so the map cannot drift into invention. It reads excerpts
228
+ of the real documents, cut from what the fetcher itself downloads; see
229
+ ATTRIBUTIONS.md.
230
+
231
+ ---
232
+
233
+ ## 5. Report
234
+
235
+ The model everything else derives from:
236
+
237
+ ```
238
+ ExeResult
239
+ file path, size, sha256, format, arch, build timestamp
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+ pe machine, subsystem, sections [name, size, entropy, characteristics]
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+ imports [{dll, functions[]}] plus derived categories
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+ (network, crypto, process, registry)
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+ strings {url[], ip[], host[], path[]}
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+ signature state (A / B / C / unknown), chain[], signer, validity,
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+ timestamp, verification result
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+ law LawCheckResult
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+ findings [{id, severity, evidence}]
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+ ```
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+
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+ Three outputs: **console** through Rich with a "Norme applicate" section at the
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+ end, as mailradar and cookieradar do; **JSON**, which serialises the whole
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+ `ExeResult` and is what makes the tool usable from a pipeline; **Markdown** for
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+ pasting into a ticket.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## 6. v1 scope
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+
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+ | Feature | Module | Note |
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+ | --- | --- | --- |
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+ | PE header | `formats/pe.py` | machine, subsystem, sections, entropy |
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+ | Import table | `formats/pe.py` | plus DLL categorisation, which is the value added |
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+ | Readable strings | `strings.py` | ASCII and UTF-16LE, then classification |
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+ | Certificates | `signature.py` | chain, issuer, subject, validity |
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+ | Signature verification | `signature.py` | the three paths of section 3 |
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+ | SHA-256 | `scanner.py` | of the file as given |
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+
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+ Section entropy is not on the original list and is kept anyway: it costs a few
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+ lines and it is the single most informative signal per unit of effort, flagging
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+ packed or encrypted binaries.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## 7. Facts and findings
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+
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+ The other Radars reach a verdict because a provision is either respected or it
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+ is not. An executable does not work that way: "imports `WinHttpConnect`" is not
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+ a defect, it is a fact. A report that lists neutral observations without a
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+ thesis is not worth reading.
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+
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+ So the report separates two registers:
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+
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+ - **Facts** — headers, imports, strings, hashes — always reported, never judged.
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+ - **Findings** — unsigned, expired certificate, invalid signature, hardcoded IP
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+ — carry a severity and may cite a provision.
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+
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+ Only findings reach `law_checker`.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## 8. Later, not now
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+
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+ - NVD lookup for known vulnerabilities in identified components.
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+ - Domain allowlist and blocklist comparison for extracted hosts.
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+ - SBOM integration.
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+ - ELF and Mach-O, through `formats/`.
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+
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+ Each of these is a reason the structure above is what it is; none of them is v1.
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
1
+ # Attributions
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+
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+ Third-party material redistributed in this repository.
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+
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+ ## `tests/fixtures/python.exe`
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+
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+ The CPython interpreter launcher for Windows, version 3.14, 106,208 bytes,
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+ SHA-256 `4942b86a6597e5aee0128daa00050ed79bc21f6e709a78eb19cbfeb0c2f39ac9`.
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+
10
+ Copyright (c) 2001-2026 Python Software Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
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+
12
+ Redistributed under the PSF License Agreement, reproduced in full in
13
+ [`tests/fixtures/python-LICENSE.txt`](tests/fixtures/python-LICENSE.txt), which
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+ permits redistribution in binary form provided the copyright notice is
15
+ retained. Python is a trademark of the Python Software Foundation; its presence
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+ here implies no endorsement of this project by the PSF.
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+
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+ ### Why this file and not another
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+
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+ The tests need a real PE: headers with real section characteristics, a real
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+ import table, and a real Authenticode signature. Three candidates were
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+ rejected before this one.
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+
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+ - **notepad++.exe**, the first suggestion, is 8.1 MB and GPL. Redistributing it
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+ from an MIT repository is a licence conflict, and it would sit in the git
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+ history permanently.
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+ - **Windows system binaries** are not redistributable at all.
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+ - **The LIEF sample corpus** lives in `lief-project/samples`, which declares no
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+ licence. No licence means no permission.
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+
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+ pefile's corpus is MIT but ships as one encrypted 64 MB archive, and LIEF's own
32
+ `tests/pe` directory holds no binaries — it pulls them from the unlicensed
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+ samples repository.
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+
35
+ Building a fixture instead of borrowing one was tried and abandoned: LIEF 1.0
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+ cannot construct a `PE.Binary` from Python, and a hand-written minimal PE turns
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+ into a PE writer, at which point the tests would be checking the writer rather
38
+ than the parser.
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+
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+ `python.exe` fits where the others did not: 104 KB, a permissive licence that
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+ names redistribution explicitly, and a genuine embedded signature from the
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+ Python Software Foundation with an RFC3161 countersignature.
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+
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+ ### One property worth keeping
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+
46
+ The signing certificate on this binary was valid from 2026-08-04 to 2026-08-07
47
+ — three days — and `verify_signature()` still returns OK today, well after it
48
+ expired. The countersignature proves the file was signed while the certificate
49
+ was valid, which is exactly what a countersignature is for.
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+
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+ That makes the fixture better than a freshly signed one: the test that asserts
52
+ a valid signature is already past the expiry date, so it cannot start failing
53
+ later for a reason that has nothing to do with this code.
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+
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+ ## `tests/fixtures/*_excerpt.html` — EU law
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+
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+ Three excerpts of EU legal acts, used by the tests that check ExeRadar cites
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+ provisions the acts really contain:
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+
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+ | File | Act | CELEX | Sections kept |
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+ | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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+ | `cra_it_excerpt.html` | Cyber Resilience Act, reg. (EU) 2024/2847 | `32024R2847` | art. 6, art. 13, Annex I |
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+ | `gdpr_it_excerpt.html` | GDPR, reg. (EU) 2016/679 | `32016R0679` | art. 32 |
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+ | `nis2_it_excerpt.html` | NIS2, dir. (EU) 2022/2555 | `32022L2555` | art. 21 |
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+
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+ Downloaded in Italian from the Publications Office of the European Union
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+ (`publications.europa.eu/resource/celex/<CELEX>`), the same service
68
+ `law_fetcher` reads at runtime, and cut down to the sections the tests need.
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+ The markup inside each file is the document's own: the excerpt is a slice, not
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+ a reconstruction, so a test that passes against it is a test against the real
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+ rendering.
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+
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+ Reuse of Commission documents is governed by Decision 2011/833/EU, which
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+ permits reuse — including for commercial purposes — provided the source is
75
+ acknowledged and the meaning is not distorted. Only the authentic text
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+ published in the *Official Journal of the European Union* has legal value;
77
+ these excerpts are test data and nothing in this repository is legal advice.