docker-host-audit 0.1.1__tar.gz

docker_host_audit-0.1.1/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: docker-host-audit
+Version: 0.1.1
+Summary: Read-only security audit for Docker hosts: flags root containers, exposed ports, secrets in env, privileged mode and mounted docker sockets.
+Author: Petr Hromádka
+Author-email: Petr Hromádka <109349500+petrhromadka@users.noreply.github.com>
+License-Expression: MIT
+Requires-Python: >=3.12
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+
+<div align="center">
+
+# 🛡️ container-audit
+
+**Read-only security audit for Docker hosts.**
+
+Point it at your containers and it reports the risky configuration — root users, exposed ports,
+secrets in environment variables, privileged mode, dangerous capabilities, mounted Docker sockets,
+shared host namespaces, outdated images and missing hardening — as a clean text, JSON or Markdown report.
+
+[![CI](https://github.com/petrhromadka/container-audit/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/petrhromadka/container-audit/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
+![defensive](https://img.shields.io/badge/purpose-defensive-blue)
+![read-only](https://img.shields.io/badge/access-read--only-brightgreen)
+![python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.12%2B-informational)
+![license](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-lightgrey)
+
+[Quick start](#-quick-start) · [What it checks](#-what-it-checks) · [Usage](#-usage) · [How it works](#-how-it-works) · [Safety](#-safety)
+
+</div>
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Defensive and read-only.** container-audit only runs `docker ps` and `docker inspect` (or reads
+> a saved copy of that JSON). It never starts, stops, or modifies a container, and it never sends
+> data anywhere.
+
+---
+
+## 🚀 Quick start
+
+No Docker needed to try it — the repo ships a sample `docker inspect` dump:
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/petrhromadka/container-audit
+cd container-audit
+uv run container-audit --input tests/fixtures/sample_inspect.json
+```
+
+You'll see eleven findings on the intentionally-insecure `bad-db` container and a clean bill of health
+for the hardened `good-web` one. To scan your own host instead, just run `container-audit` — it
+reads live containers via `docker ps` / `docker inspect`.
+
+---
+
+## 🔍 What it checks
+
+Severity key: 🔴 critical · 🟠 high · 🟡 medium · 🔵 low. Each finding carries a title, a plain-language
+explanation, short **redacted** evidence, and a one-line remediation.
+
+### Privilege &amp; escape
+
+| | Check id | What | Why it matters |
+| :-: | --- | --- | --- |
+| 🔴 | `docker-socket-mount` | `/var/run/docker.sock` is mounted in | Socket access is effectively root on the host: it can start any other container. |
+| 🔴 | `privileged` | Container runs `--privileged` | Disables most isolation: full device access and all capabilities. |
+| 🟠 | `root-user` | Runs as root (no `USER`, or `0`/`root`) | A process escape or file-permission bug has root inside the container. |
+| 🟠 | `dangerous-caps` | Caps like `SYS_ADMIN`, `NET_ADMIN`, `SYS_PTRACE` added | Common container-escape building blocks. |
+| 🟠 | `sensitive-host-mount` | Host paths (`/`, `/etc`, `/proc`, `/root`, …) bind-mounted | A compromised container can read or alter host config and credentials. |
+
+### Namespaces &amp; exposure
+
+| | Check id | What | Why it matters |
+| :-: | --- | --- | --- |
+| 🟠 | `host-pid` | Shares the host PID namespace (`--pid=host`) | It can see and signal every process on the host. |
+| 🟠 | `host-network` | Shares the host network namespace (`--network=host`) | Network isolation and port mapping are bypassed. |
+| 🟡 | `port-all-interfaces` | Port published on `0.0.0.0` / `::` | Reachable from every network the host is on, not just where you intend. |
+| 🟡 | `host-ipc` | Shares the host IPC namespace (`--ipc=host`) | Shared memory and semaphores cross the container boundary. |
+| 🔵 | `host-uts` | Shares the host UTS namespace (`--uts=host`) | It can change the host's hostname. |
+
+### Secrets &amp; hardening
+
+| | Check id | What | Why it matters |
+| :-: | --- | --- | --- |
+| 🟠 | `secret-in-env` | Env var that looks like a secret, or a URL with embedded credentials | Secrets in env vars leak via `docker inspect`, logs and child processes. |
+| 🟡 | `no-new-privileges-missing` | `no-new-privileges:true` is not set | setuid binaries inside the container can still escalate privileges. |
+| 🔵 | `writable-rootfs` | Root filesystem is writable (not `read_only`) | An attacker can persist changes and tooling. |
+| 🟡 | `stale-image` | Image was built more than 180 days ago | Old images usually miss security patches released since; rebuild or pull a current one. |
+| 🔵 | `unpinned-image` | Image uses `:latest`, no tag, or no digest | Pulls aren't reproducible; upstream can silently change what runs. |
+| 🔵 | `unlimited-memory` | No memory limit set | A single container can exhaust host RAM and take the host down. |
+
+---
+
+## 📦 Install
+
+Requires Python 3.12+ and [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/). The `docker` CLI is only needed to audit
+a live host; auditing a saved file with `--input` does not need it.
+
+```bash
+uv tool install .                 # install as a tool from a checkout
+uvx --from . container-audit      # or run without installing
+uv run container-audit            # or run inside the project environment
+uv run python -m ca               # module form (use this if the console script is blocked)
+```
+
+> On Windows, Smart App Control may block the generated `container-audit.exe` launcher. Run the
+> tool as a module instead: `python -m ca` (or `uv run python -m ca`).
+
+Once published to PyPI: `pipx install docker-host-audit` (then run `container-audit`), or `uvx docker-host-audit`.
+
+### Run with Docker
+
+The image ships the tool (the Docker CLI is intentionally not bundled); feed it a saved inspect dump
+on stdin:
+
+```bash
+docker build -t container-audit .
+docker inspect $(docker ps -aq) $(docker inspect -f '{{.Image}}' $(docker ps -aq) | sort -u) | docker run --rm -i container-audit --input /dev/stdin --fail-on high
+```
+
+---
+
+## 💻 Usage
+
+```bash
+container-audit                                             # audit running containers
+container-audit --include-stopped                          # include stopped ones too
+container-audit --format json                              # machine-readable output
+container-audit --format markdown > report.md              # for an issue / PR / wiki
+
+docker inspect $(docker ps -aq) $(docker inspect -f '{{.Image}}' $(docker ps -aq) | sort -u) > sample.json  # save containers + their images
+container-audit --input sample.json --fail-on high         # audit the dump; non-zero exit for CI
+```
+
+| Flag | Meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| `--input FILE` | Read `docker inspect` JSON from `FILE` instead of calling Docker. |
+| `--format FORMAT` | Output format: `text` (default), `json` or `markdown`. |
+| `--include-stopped` | Also inspect containers that are not running. |
+| `--include-host` | Include the real hostname in the report (off by default, so output is safe to share). |
+| `--min-severity LEVEL` | Hide findings below `LEVEL` (`info`, `low`, `medium`, `high`, `critical`). Default `info` (show all). |
+| `--fail-on LEVEL` | Exit non-zero if any shown finding is at or above `LEVEL` (`none`, `low`, `medium`, `high`, `critical`). Default `none`. |
+| `--version` | Print the version and exit. |
+
+**Exit codes:** `0` clean (nothing reached `--fail-on`) · `1` a finding met `--fail-on` · `2` could
+not run (Docker unavailable, or a missing/invalid `--input` file).
+
+Image age comes from `docker inspect --type image`. If an image was deleted while its container
+still runs, or the dump has no image objects, the age is unknown and `stale-image` skips that
+container. Images from reproducible builds (distroless, ko, Nix) carry a fixed 1970 date and are
+skipped too.
+
+### Coolify and other self-hosted PaaS
+
+It works unchanged on a [Coolify](https://coolify.io) host. Expect `docker-socket-mount` on Coolify's
+own `coolify-proxy` (Traefik) and `coolify-sentinel` containers: they need the socket by design. Review
+everything else, especially apps you deployed from public templates, which often publish database
+ports on `0.0.0.0` and keep passwords in environment variables.
+
+### Use in CI
+
+```yaml
+- name: Audit containers
+  run: |
+    docker inspect $(docker ps -aq) $(docker inspect -f '{{.Image}}' $(docker ps -aq) | sort -u) > containers.json
+    uvx --from git+https://github.com/petrhromadka/container-audit \
+      container-audit --input containers.json --fail-on high
+```
+
+---
+
+## ⚙️ How it works
+
+```text
+docker ps / docker inspect  ->  parse into Container objects  ->  run checks  ->  render report
+       (or --input file)                                        (pure functions)   text / json / markdown
+```
+
+1. **Collect** — list containers with `docker ps` and read their config with `docker inspect` (or
+   parse a saved copy via `--input`).
+2. **Check** — each check is a pure function over the parsed containers that yields findings. Checks
+   never talk to Docker and never change anything.
+3. **Report** — findings are sorted by severity and rendered as text, JSON or Markdown; with
+   `--fail-on`, the exit code reflects the worst severity found.
+
+<details>
+<summary>📋 Example report (from the bundled sample fixture)</summary>
+
+```text
+container-audit report
+Host:      (redacted)
+Scanned:   2 container(s)
+Timestamp: 2026-11-05T19:32:19+00:00
+Findings:  11 (critical=2, high=3, medium=4, low=2, info=0)
+
+[CRITICAL] docker-socket-mount  bad-db - Access to the Docker socket grants control of the Docker daemon, and therefore of the host.
+    evidence:    /var/run/docker.sock -> /var/run/docker.sock (rw)
+    remediation: Remove the socket mount or use a restricted docker-socket-proxy.
+[CRITICAL] privileged  bad-db - Privileged mode grants all capabilities and host device access, so a compromise is effectively a host compromise.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.Privileged=true
+    remediation: Remove `privileged: true`; add only the capabilities needed.
+[HIGH] dangerous-caps  bad-db - These capabilities allow administrative or host-affecting operations and weaken container isolation.
+    evidence:    cap_add: SYS_ADMIN
+    remediation: Remove these from `cap_add`; grant only what is required.
+[HIGH] root-user  bad-db - The main process runs as UID 0, widening the impact of an escape.
+    evidence:    Config.User=''
+    remediation: Set a non-root USER in the image or `user:` in compose.
+[HIGH] secret-in-env  bad-db - Environment variable DB_PASSWORD looks like a secret and has a literal value; it is visible via docker inspect and to anyone who can read the container configuration.
+    evidence:    DB_PASSWORD=***
+    remediation: Use Docker secrets or an env file kept outside the image.
+[MEDIUM] host-ipc  bad-db - The container can access host shared memory and IPC objects, weakening isolation.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.IpcMode=host
+    remediation: Remove `ipc: host`; do not share the host IPC namespace.
+[MEDIUM] no-new-privileges-missing  bad-db - Without no-new-privileges, setuid binaries inside the container can escalate privileges.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.SecurityOpt lacks no-new-privileges
+    remediation: Add `security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]`.
+[MEDIUM] port-all-interfaces  bad-db - The port is reachable from every network the host is attached to.
+    evidence:    0.0.0.0:5432 -> 5432/tcp
+    remediation: Bind to 127.0.0.1 (e.g. 127.0.0.1:<port>:<port>) unless public.
+[MEDIUM] stale-image  bad-db - The image is 1390 days old, so it likely lacks security patches released since it was built.
+    evidence:    image built 2023-01-15 (1390 days ago)
+    remediation: Pull or rebuild the image on a current base and recreate the container; automate updates (e.g. Renovate, Dependabot).
+[LOW] unlimited-memory  bad-db - With no memory limit, one container can exhaust the host's RAM.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.Memory=0
+    remediation: Set a memory limit (`mem_limit` in compose).
+[LOW] writable-rootfs  bad-db - A writable root filesystem lets an attacker persist changes.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.ReadonlyRootfs=false
+    remediation: Set `read_only: true` and use tmpfs or volumes for writable paths.
+```
+
+The second container, `good-web`, is hardened (non-root, read-only rootfs, memory limit,
+`no-new-privileges`, port bound to `127.0.0.1`) and produces no findings.
+
+</details>
+
+---
+
+## 🔒 Safety
+
+- **Read-only.** The only Docker commands used are `docker ps` and `docker inspect`. Nothing is
+  started, stopped, restarted, or reconfigured.
+- **Secret values are never printed.** For env vars that look like secrets, only the variable
+  **name** is reported, with the value masked to `***` — no characters of the value appear in any
+  output format.
+- **Hostname hidden by default.** Reports show `(redacted)` as the host unless you pass
+  `--include-host`.
+- **Output is sanitized.** Control and terminal-escape characters from container metadata are
+  stripped, so a report is safe to print in a terminal or paste into Markdown.
+- **No network use, no runtime dependencies.** The tool never transmits data anywhere.
+- Reports can still reveal your container names, image names, ports and mount paths — review one
+  before sharing it publicly.
+
+---
+
+## 🧰 Development
+
+```bash
+uv sync                      # create the environment
+uv run ruff check .          # lint
+uv run ruff format --check . # formatting
+uv run ty check src          # type check
+uv run pytest                # tests
+```
+
+Pre-commit hooks (ruff, gitleaks, whitespace fixes) live in `.pre-commit-config.yaml`; install them
+with [`prek`](https://github.com/j178/prek) or `pre-commit`. CI runs the same checks plus a gitleaks
+scan over the full history.
+
+To add a check, write a function that takes `list[Container]` and yields `Finding` objects, then
+register it in the `CHECKS` list of the relevant module under `src/ca/checks/`.
+
+---
+
+## 📄 License
+
+[MIT](LICENSE) © 2026 Petr Hromádka

docker_host_audit-0.1.1/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+<div align="center">
+
+# 🛡️ container-audit
+
+**Read-only security audit for Docker hosts.**
+
+Point it at your containers and it reports the risky configuration — root users, exposed ports,
+secrets in environment variables, privileged mode, dangerous capabilities, mounted Docker sockets,
+shared host namespaces, outdated images and missing hardening — as a clean text, JSON or Markdown report.
+
+[![CI](https://github.com/petrhromadka/container-audit/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/petrhromadka/container-audit/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
+![defensive](https://img.shields.io/badge/purpose-defensive-blue)
+![read-only](https://img.shields.io/badge/access-read--only-brightgreen)
+![python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.12%2B-informational)
+![license](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-lightgrey)
+
+[Quick start](#-quick-start) · [What it checks](#-what-it-checks) · [Usage](#-usage) · [How it works](#-how-it-works) · [Safety](#-safety)
+
+</div>
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Defensive and read-only.** container-audit only runs `docker ps` and `docker inspect` (or reads
+> a saved copy of that JSON). It never starts, stops, or modifies a container, and it never sends
+> data anywhere.
+
+---
+
+## 🚀 Quick start
+
+No Docker needed to try it — the repo ships a sample `docker inspect` dump:
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/petrhromadka/container-audit
+cd container-audit
+uv run container-audit --input tests/fixtures/sample_inspect.json
+```
+
+You'll see eleven findings on the intentionally-insecure `bad-db` container and a clean bill of health
+for the hardened `good-web` one. To scan your own host instead, just run `container-audit` — it
+reads live containers via `docker ps` / `docker inspect`.
+
+---
+
+## 🔍 What it checks
+
+Severity key: 🔴 critical · 🟠 high · 🟡 medium · 🔵 low. Each finding carries a title, a plain-language
+explanation, short **redacted** evidence, and a one-line remediation.
+
+### Privilege &amp; escape
+
+| | Check id | What | Why it matters |
+| :-: | --- | --- | --- |
+| 🔴 | `docker-socket-mount` | `/var/run/docker.sock` is mounted in | Socket access is effectively root on the host: it can start any other container. |
+| 🔴 | `privileged` | Container runs `--privileged` | Disables most isolation: full device access and all capabilities. |
+| 🟠 | `root-user` | Runs as root (no `USER`, or `0`/`root`) | A process escape or file-permission bug has root inside the container. |
+| 🟠 | `dangerous-caps` | Caps like `SYS_ADMIN`, `NET_ADMIN`, `SYS_PTRACE` added | Common container-escape building blocks. |
+| 🟠 | `sensitive-host-mount` | Host paths (`/`, `/etc`, `/proc`, `/root`, …) bind-mounted | A compromised container can read or alter host config and credentials. |
+
+### Namespaces &amp; exposure
+
+| | Check id | What | Why it matters |
+| :-: | --- | --- | --- |
+| 🟠 | `host-pid` | Shares the host PID namespace (`--pid=host`) | It can see and signal every process on the host. |
+| 🟠 | `host-network` | Shares the host network namespace (`--network=host`) | Network isolation and port mapping are bypassed. |
+| 🟡 | `port-all-interfaces` | Port published on `0.0.0.0` / `::` | Reachable from every network the host is on, not just where you intend. |
+| 🟡 | `host-ipc` | Shares the host IPC namespace (`--ipc=host`) | Shared memory and semaphores cross the container boundary. |
+| 🔵 | `host-uts` | Shares the host UTS namespace (`--uts=host`) | It can change the host's hostname. |
+
+### Secrets &amp; hardening
+
+| | Check id | What | Why it matters |
+| :-: | --- | --- | --- |
+| 🟠 | `secret-in-env` | Env var that looks like a secret, or a URL with embedded credentials | Secrets in env vars leak via `docker inspect`, logs and child processes. |
+| 🟡 | `no-new-privileges-missing` | `no-new-privileges:true` is not set | setuid binaries inside the container can still escalate privileges. |
+| 🔵 | `writable-rootfs` | Root filesystem is writable (not `read_only`) | An attacker can persist changes and tooling. |
+| 🟡 | `stale-image` | Image was built more than 180 days ago | Old images usually miss security patches released since; rebuild or pull a current one. |
+| 🔵 | `unpinned-image` | Image uses `:latest`, no tag, or no digest | Pulls aren't reproducible; upstream can silently change what runs. |
+| 🔵 | `unlimited-memory` | No memory limit set | A single container can exhaust host RAM and take the host down. |
+
+---
+
+## 📦 Install
+
+Requires Python 3.12+ and [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/). The `docker` CLI is only needed to audit
+a live host; auditing a saved file with `--input` does not need it.
+
+```bash
+uv tool install .                 # install as a tool from a checkout
+uvx --from . container-audit      # or run without installing
+uv run container-audit            # or run inside the project environment
+uv run python -m ca               # module form (use this if the console script is blocked)
+```
+
+> On Windows, Smart App Control may block the generated `container-audit.exe` launcher. Run the
+> tool as a module instead: `python -m ca` (or `uv run python -m ca`).
+
+Once published to PyPI: `pipx install docker-host-audit` (then run `container-audit`), or `uvx docker-host-audit`.
+
+### Run with Docker
+
+The image ships the tool (the Docker CLI is intentionally not bundled); feed it a saved inspect dump
+on stdin:
+
+```bash
+docker build -t container-audit .
+docker inspect $(docker ps -aq) $(docker inspect -f '{{.Image}}' $(docker ps -aq) | sort -u) | docker run --rm -i container-audit --input /dev/stdin --fail-on high
+```
+
+---
+
+## 💻 Usage
+
+```bash
+container-audit                                             # audit running containers
+container-audit --include-stopped                          # include stopped ones too
+container-audit --format json                              # machine-readable output
+container-audit --format markdown > report.md              # for an issue / PR / wiki
+
+docker inspect $(docker ps -aq) $(docker inspect -f '{{.Image}}' $(docker ps -aq) | sort -u) > sample.json  # save containers + their images
+container-audit --input sample.json --fail-on high         # audit the dump; non-zero exit for CI
+```
+
+| Flag | Meaning |
+| --- | --- |
+| `--input FILE` | Read `docker inspect` JSON from `FILE` instead of calling Docker. |
+| `--format FORMAT` | Output format: `text` (default), `json` or `markdown`. |
+| `--include-stopped` | Also inspect containers that are not running. |
+| `--include-host` | Include the real hostname in the report (off by default, so output is safe to share). |
+| `--min-severity LEVEL` | Hide findings below `LEVEL` (`info`, `low`, `medium`, `high`, `critical`). Default `info` (show all). |
+| `--fail-on LEVEL` | Exit non-zero if any shown finding is at or above `LEVEL` (`none`, `low`, `medium`, `high`, `critical`). Default `none`. |
+| `--version` | Print the version and exit. |
+
+**Exit codes:** `0` clean (nothing reached `--fail-on`) · `1` a finding met `--fail-on` · `2` could
+not run (Docker unavailable, or a missing/invalid `--input` file).
+
+Image age comes from `docker inspect --type image`. If an image was deleted while its container
+still runs, or the dump has no image objects, the age is unknown and `stale-image` skips that
+container. Images from reproducible builds (distroless, ko, Nix) carry a fixed 1970 date and are
+skipped too.
+
+### Coolify and other self-hosted PaaS
+
+It works unchanged on a [Coolify](https://coolify.io) host. Expect `docker-socket-mount` on Coolify's
+own `coolify-proxy` (Traefik) and `coolify-sentinel` containers: they need the socket by design. Review
+everything else, especially apps you deployed from public templates, which often publish database
+ports on `0.0.0.0` and keep passwords in environment variables.
+
+### Use in CI
+
+```yaml
+- name: Audit containers
+  run: |
+    docker inspect $(docker ps -aq) $(docker inspect -f '{{.Image}}' $(docker ps -aq) | sort -u) > containers.json
+    uvx --from git+https://github.com/petrhromadka/container-audit \
+      container-audit --input containers.json --fail-on high
+```
+
+---
+
+## ⚙️ How it works
+
+```text
+docker ps / docker inspect  ->  parse into Container objects  ->  run checks  ->  render report
+       (or --input file)                                        (pure functions)   text / json / markdown
+```
+
+1. **Collect** — list containers with `docker ps` and read their config with `docker inspect` (or
+   parse a saved copy via `--input`).
+2. **Check** — each check is a pure function over the parsed containers that yields findings. Checks
+   never talk to Docker and never change anything.
+3. **Report** — findings are sorted by severity and rendered as text, JSON or Markdown; with
+   `--fail-on`, the exit code reflects the worst severity found.
+
+<details>
+<summary>📋 Example report (from the bundled sample fixture)</summary>
+
+```text
+container-audit report
+Host:      (redacted)
+Scanned:   2 container(s)
+Timestamp: 2026-11-05T19:32:19+00:00
+Findings:  11 (critical=2, high=3, medium=4, low=2, info=0)
+
+[CRITICAL] docker-socket-mount  bad-db - Access to the Docker socket grants control of the Docker daemon, and therefore of the host.
+    evidence:    /var/run/docker.sock -> /var/run/docker.sock (rw)
+    remediation: Remove the socket mount or use a restricted docker-socket-proxy.
+[CRITICAL] privileged  bad-db - Privileged mode grants all capabilities and host device access, so a compromise is effectively a host compromise.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.Privileged=true
+    remediation: Remove `privileged: true`; add only the capabilities needed.
+[HIGH] dangerous-caps  bad-db - These capabilities allow administrative or host-affecting operations and weaken container isolation.
+    evidence:    cap_add: SYS_ADMIN
+    remediation: Remove these from `cap_add`; grant only what is required.
+[HIGH] root-user  bad-db - The main process runs as UID 0, widening the impact of an escape.
+    evidence:    Config.User=''
+    remediation: Set a non-root USER in the image or `user:` in compose.
+[HIGH] secret-in-env  bad-db - Environment variable DB_PASSWORD looks like a secret and has a literal value; it is visible via docker inspect and to anyone who can read the container configuration.
+    evidence:    DB_PASSWORD=***
+    remediation: Use Docker secrets or an env file kept outside the image.
+[MEDIUM] host-ipc  bad-db - The container can access host shared memory and IPC objects, weakening isolation.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.IpcMode=host
+    remediation: Remove `ipc: host`; do not share the host IPC namespace.
+[MEDIUM] no-new-privileges-missing  bad-db - Without no-new-privileges, setuid binaries inside the container can escalate privileges.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.SecurityOpt lacks no-new-privileges
+    remediation: Add `security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]`.
+[MEDIUM] port-all-interfaces  bad-db - The port is reachable from every network the host is attached to.
+    evidence:    0.0.0.0:5432 -> 5432/tcp
+    remediation: Bind to 127.0.0.1 (e.g. 127.0.0.1:<port>:<port>) unless public.
+[MEDIUM] stale-image  bad-db - The image is 1390 days old, so it likely lacks security patches released since it was built.
+    evidence:    image built 2023-01-15 (1390 days ago)
+    remediation: Pull or rebuild the image on a current base and recreate the container; automate updates (e.g. Renovate, Dependabot).
+[LOW] unlimited-memory  bad-db - With no memory limit, one container can exhaust the host's RAM.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.Memory=0
+    remediation: Set a memory limit (`mem_limit` in compose).
+[LOW] writable-rootfs  bad-db - A writable root filesystem lets an attacker persist changes.
+    evidence:    HostConfig.ReadonlyRootfs=false
+    remediation: Set `read_only: true` and use tmpfs or volumes for writable paths.
+```
+
+The second container, `good-web`, is hardened (non-root, read-only rootfs, memory limit,
+`no-new-privileges`, port bound to `127.0.0.1`) and produces no findings.
+
+</details>
+
+---
+
+## 🔒 Safety
+
+- **Read-only.** The only Docker commands used are `docker ps` and `docker inspect`. Nothing is
+  started, stopped, restarted, or reconfigured.
+- **Secret values are never printed.** For env vars that look like secrets, only the variable
+  **name** is reported, with the value masked to `***` — no characters of the value appear in any
+  output format.
+- **Hostname hidden by default.** Reports show `(redacted)` as the host unless you pass
+  `--include-host`.
+- **Output is sanitized.** Control and terminal-escape characters from container metadata are
+  stripped, so a report is safe to print in a terminal or paste into Markdown.
+- **No network use, no runtime dependencies.** The tool never transmits data anywhere.
+- Reports can still reveal your container names, image names, ports and mount paths — review one
+  before sharing it publicly.
+
+---
+
+## 🧰 Development
+
+```bash
+uv sync                      # create the environment
+uv run ruff check .          # lint
+uv run ruff format --check . # formatting
+uv run ty check src          # type check
+uv run pytest                # tests
+```
+
+Pre-commit hooks (ruff, gitleaks, whitespace fixes) live in `.pre-commit-config.yaml`; install them
+with [`prek`](https://github.com/j178/prek) or `pre-commit`. CI runs the same checks plus a gitleaks
+scan over the full history.
+
+To add a check, write a function that takes `list[Container]` and yields `Finding` objects, then
+register it in the `CHECKS` list of the relevant module under `src/ca/checks/`.
+
+---
+
+## 📄 License
+
+[MIT](LICENSE) © 2026 Petr Hromádka

docker_host_audit-0.1.1/pyproject.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+[project]
+name = "docker-host-audit"
+version = "0.1.1"
+description = "Read-only security audit for Docker hosts: flags root containers, exposed ports, secrets in env, privileged mode and mounted docker sockets."
+readme = "README.md"
+license = "MIT"
+requires-python = ">=3.12"
+dependencies = []
+
+[[project.authors]]
+name = "Petr Hromádka"
+email = "109349500+petrhromadka@users.noreply.github.com"
+
+[project.scripts]
+container-audit = "ca.cli:main"
+docker-host-audit = "ca.cli:main"
+
+[build-system]
+requires = ["uv_build>=0.12.23,<0.13.0"]
+build-backend = "uv_build"
+
+[tool.uv.build-backend]
+module-name = "ca"
+
+[tool.ruff]
+line-length = 100
+target-version = "py312"
+
+[tool.ruff.lint]
+select = [
+    "E",
+    "F",
+    "W",
+    "I",
+    "B",
+    "UP",
+    "SIM",
+    "RUF",
+    "S",
+    "PTH",
+]
+ignore = [
+    "S603",
+    "S607",
+]
+
+[tool.ruff.lint.per-file-ignores]
+"tests/**" = [
+    "S101",
+    "S105",
+    "S106",
+]
+
+[tool.pytest.ini_options]
+testpaths = ["tests"]
+addopts = "-q"
+
+[dependency-groups]
+dev = [
+    "pytest>=9.2.0",
+    "ruff>=0.17.4",
+    "ty>=0.0.98",
+]

docker_host_audit-0.1.1/pyproject.toml.orig

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+[project]
+name = "docker-host-audit"
+version = "0.1.1"
+description = "Read-only security audit for Docker hosts: flags root containers, exposed ports, secrets in env, privileged mode and mounted docker sockets."
+readme = "README.md"
+license = "MIT"
+authors = [{ name = "Petr Hromádka", email = "109349500+petrhromadka@users.noreply.github.com" }]
+requires-python = ">=3.12"
+dependencies = []
+
+[project.scripts]
+container-audit = "ca.cli:main"
+docker-host-audit = "ca.cli:main"
+
+[build-system]
+requires = ["uv_build>=0.12.23,<0.13.0"]
+build-backend = "uv_build"
+
+[tool.uv.build-backend]
+module-name = "ca"
+
+[tool.ruff]
+line-length = 100
+target-version = "py312"
+
+[tool.ruff.lint]
+select = ["E", "F", "W", "I", "B", "UP", "SIM", "RUF", "S", "PTH"]
+ignore = ["S603", "S607"]
+
+[tool.ruff.lint.per-file-ignores]
+"tests/**" = ["S101", "S105", "S106"]
+
+[tool.pytest.ini_options]
+testpaths = ["tests"]
+addopts = "-q"
+
+[dependency-groups]
+dev = [
+    "pytest>=9.2.0",
+    "ruff>=0.17.4",
+    "ty>=0.0.98",
+]

docker_host_audit-0.1.1/src/ca/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+"""container-audit: read-only security audit for Docker hosts."""
+
+__version__ = "0.1.1"

docker_host_audit-0.1.1/src/ca/__main__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+"""Allow `python -m ca`."""
+
+from ca.cli import main
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

docker_host_audit-0.1.1/src/ca/checks/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+"""Check registry. Each submodule exposes `CHECKS: list[CheckFn]`; we aggregate them."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from ca.models import CheckFn
+
+
+def get_checks() -> list[CheckFn]:
+    """Every registered check, across all submodules."""
+    from ca.checks import exposure, hardening, images, privilege
+
+    return [*privilege.CHECKS, *exposure.CHECKS, *hardening.CHECKS, *images.CHECKS]