databricks-tellr-app 0.4.3.dev17__tar.gz → 0.4.3.dev19__tar.gz

{databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev17 → databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev19}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: databricks-tellr-app
-Version: 0.4.3.dev17
+Version: 0.4.3.dev19
 Summary: Tellr application package for Databricks Apps
 Requires-Python: >=3.10
 Description-Content-Type: text/markdown

{databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev17 → databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev19}/databricks_tellr_app.egg-info/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: databricks-tellr-app
-Version: 0.4.3.dev17
+Version: 0.4.3.dev19
 Summary: Tellr application package for Databricks Apps
 Requires-Python: >=3.10
 Description-Content-Type: text/markdown

{databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev17 → databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev19}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "databricks-tellr-app"
-version = "0.4.3.dev17"
+version = "0.4.3.dev19"
 description = "Tellr application package for Databricks Apps"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"

{databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev17 → databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev19}/src/api/main.py

@@ -494,13 +494,17 @@ async def health():
     ``encryption_key_source`` is load-bearing for deployment: ``tellr.update``
     polls it to confirm a relocated app is reading the secret before it deletes
     the Lakebase key row. Reports the source only — never the key.
+
+    ``version`` comes from the installed wheel's metadata, so it tracks the
+    deployed release; it reads "unknown" from a source checkout.
     """
+    from src.api.routes.version import get_installed_version
     from src.core.encryption import key_source
 
     return {
         "status": "healthy",
         "environment": ENVIRONMENT,
-        "version": "0.3.0",
+        "version": get_installed_version(),
         "encryption_key_source": key_source(),
     }
 

{databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev17 → databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev19}/src/api/routes/sessions.py

@@ -743,28 +743,11 @@ async def get_session_slides(session_id: str):
         ) from e
 
 
-@router.post("/cleanup")
-async def cleanup_expired_sessions():
-    """Clean up expired sessions.
-
-    Returns:
-        Number of sessions deleted
-    """
-    try:
-        session_manager = get_session_manager()
-        count = await asyncio.to_thread(session_manager.cleanup_expired_sessions)
-
-        logger.info("Session cleanup completed", extra={"deleted_count": count})
-
-        return {"status": "completed", "deleted_count": count}
-
-    except Exception as e:
-        logger.error(f"Failed to cleanup sessions: {e}", exc_info=True)
-        raise HTTPException(
-            status_code=500,
-            detail="Cleanup failed",
-        ) from e
-
+# F-CR-16 (SDR-4437): the POST /cleanup endpoint was removed — it had no
+# authorization check and allowed any authenticated CAN_USE user to delete all
+# sessions older than 24h (cascading to decks, chat history, etc.). The endpoint
+# was unused (no frontend caller, no scheduler, no script), so removal was safer
+# than gating. See SDR-4437 for details.
 
 # F-CR-10 (SDR-4437): the debug-only POST /{session_id}/export endpoint was
 # removed — it was unused by the frontend and dumped full session data (all chat

{databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev17 → databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev19}/src/api/routes/version.py

@@ -39,9 +39,13 @@ class VersionCheckResponse(BaseModel):
     package_name: str
 
 
-def _get_installed_version() -> str:
+def get_installed_version() -> str:
     """Get the installed version of databricks-tellr-app.
 
+    Shared with the ``/api/health`` handler in ``src.api.main``, which reports
+    the same value. Returns "unknown" when running from a source checkout
+    rather than an installed wheel.
+
     Returns:
         Version string or "unknown" if not installed
     """
@@ -129,7 +133,7 @@ async def check_version() -> VersionCheckResponse:
     - update_available: Whether an update is available
     - update_type: "patch" (redeploy) or "major" (run tellr.update())
     """
-    installed = _get_installed_version()
+    installed = get_installed_version()
     latest = _get_latest_version_from_pypi()
 
     update_available = False

{databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev17 → databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev19}/src/api/services/session_manager.py

@@ -2073,41 +2073,6 @@ class SessionManager:
 
             return count
 
-    # Cleanup operations
-    def cleanup_expired_sessions(self) -> int:
-        """Delete sessions that have exceeded TTL.
-
-        WARNING: user_sessions is the app's durable usage history. This
-        method is intentionally NOT scheduled anywhere — it is only
-        reachable via the manual POST /api/sessions/cleanup endpoint.
-        Do not wire it to a scheduler; doing so would destroy the
-        history that the /admin usage dashboard's pre-event-log
-        aggregations rely on.
-
-        Returns:
-            Number of sessions deleted
-        """
-        cutoff = datetime.utcnow() - timedelta(hours=self.session_ttl_hours)
-
-        with get_db_session() as db:
-            expired = (
-                db.query(UserSession)
-                .filter(UserSession.last_activity < cutoff)
-                .all()
-            )
-
-            count = len(expired)
-            for session in expired:
-                db.delete(session)
-
-            if count > 0:
-                logger.info(
-                    "Cleaned up expired sessions",
-                    extra={"count": count, "cutoff": cutoff.isoformat()},
-                )
-
-            return count
-
     def _get_session_or_raise(self, db: Session, session_id: str) -> UserSession:
         """Get session by ID or raise error.
 

{databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev17 → databricks_tellr_app-0.4.3.dev19}/src/core/databricks_client.py

@@ -191,6 +191,36 @@ def _refresh_oauth_env_token() -> None:
         pass  # non-critical; existing token may still be valid
 
 
+def sp_auth_diagnostics(client: WorkspaceClient) -> dict:
+    """Report which SP credential material the platform supplied, and what the SDK chose.
+
+    SDR-4437 F-CR-18: the SDK credential chain is ordered pat -> basic ->
+    metadata-service -> oauth-m2m, so a ``DATABRICKS_TOKEN`` in the environment
+    silently wins over the platform-injected client id/secret. ``app.yaml``
+    currently supplies that token via ``valueFrom: system.databricks_token``.
+
+    Whether the token can simply be dropped from ``app.yaml`` turns on whether
+    the platform also supplies a usable ``DATABRICKS_CLIENT_SECRET``: the SDK's
+    oauth-m2m provider requires host + client_id + client_secret together, and
+    MLflow delegates to this same chain (it needs no token of its own when
+    ``MLFLOW_ENABLE_DB_SDK`` is on, which is its default). This records the
+    answer from a running deployment instead of inferring it.
+
+    Presence booleans only — never any part of a credential value.
+    """
+    try:
+        resolved_auth_type = client.config.auth_type
+    except Exception as e:  # pragma: no cover - defensive; config access is local
+        resolved_auth_type = f"unavailable: {type(e).__name__}"
+
+    return {
+        "has_client_id": bool(os.getenv("DATABRICKS_CLIENT_ID")),
+        "has_client_secret": bool(os.getenv("DATABRICKS_CLIENT_SECRET")),
+        "has_token": bool(os.getenv("DATABRICKS_TOKEN")),
+        "resolved_auth_type": resolved_auth_type,
+    }
+
+
 def get_system_client(force_new: bool = False) -> WorkspaceClient:
     """
     Get the system-level WorkspaceClient (service principal).
@@ -271,6 +301,26 @@ def get_system_client(force_new: bool = False) -> WorkspaceClient:
                     product_version=version,
                 )
 
+            # SDR-4437 F-CR-18: record which credential material the platform
+            # supplied and which auth the SDK actually selected. Logged before
+            # the dev/test early return so it is available in every environment.
+            # Values go in the message, not ``extra``: the app boots on
+            # ``logging.basicConfig`` with a "%(message)s" format, so extra
+            # fields never reach the log.
+            # The Apps log scrubber redacts any field whose NAME contains
+            # "secret" or "token", so these labels are deliberately indirect:
+            # "has_client_secret=True" rendered in /logz as
+            # "has_client_REDACTED_SECRET" and could not be read.
+            diag = sp_auth_diagnostics(_system_client)
+            logger.info(
+                "System SP auth resolution: resolved_auth_type=%s "
+                "client_id_present=%s m2m_credential_present=%s pat_credential_present=%s",
+                diag["resolved_auth_type"],
+                diag["has_client_id"],
+                diag["has_client_secret"],
+                diag["has_token"],
+            )
+
             # Skip verification in dev/test mode
             # Allows local dev and tests without valid token
             if os.getenv("ENVIRONMENT") in ("development", "test"):