dash-auth-async 1.3.2__tar.gz → 1.3.4__tar.gz

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Files changed (22) hide show
  1. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2/dash_auth_async.egg-info → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/PKG-INFO +57 -1
  2. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/README.md +56 -0
  3. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/oidc_auth.py +9 -9
  4. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/version.py +1 -1
  5. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4/dash_auth_async.egg-info}/PKG-INFO +57 -1
  6. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/pyproject.toml +20 -5
  7. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/LICENSE +0 -0
  8. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/MANIFEST.in +0 -0
  9. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/__init__.py +0 -0
  10. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/_optional.py +0 -0
  11. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/auth.py +0 -0
  12. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/backends.py +0 -0
  13. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/basic_auth.py +0 -0
  14. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/group_protection.py +0 -0
  15. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/public_routes.py +0 -0
  16. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/quart_client.py +0 -0
  17. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async/websocket_auth.py +0 -0
  18. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +0 -0
  19. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +0 -0
  20. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async.egg-info/requires.txt +0 -0
  21. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/dash_auth_async.egg-info/top_level.txt +0 -0
  22. {dash_auth_async-1.3.2 → dash_auth_async-1.3.4}/setup.cfg +0 -0
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.4
2
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  Name: dash-auth-async
3
- Version: 1.3.2
3
+ Version: 1.3.4
4
4
  Summary: Dash Authorization Package.
5
5
  Author-email: Jonas Schrage <119843859+joschrag@users.noreply.github.com>
6
6
  License: MIT
@@ -261,6 +261,62 @@ auth.register_provider(
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261
 
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  Once this is done, connecting to your app will automatically redirect to the IDP login page.
263
263
 
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+ #### Running behind a reverse proxy
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+
266
+ > **Behavior change.** Earlier versions rewrote the OIDC callback host from the
267
+ > client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host` header. That header trust was **removed** — an
268
+ > attacker could set it to steer the `redirect_uri` handed to your IDP (auth-code leak /
269
+ > open redirect). The `redirect_uri` is now built **only** from the host and scheme of
270
+ > the incoming request.
271
+
272
+ The consequence: behind a proxy that terminates TLS or rewrites the host, the
273
+ `redirect_uri` comes out as `http://localhost:8050/...` and your IDP rejects it. To get
274
+ the real public host and scheme back, **restore it at the transport layer** — where the
275
+ trust can be bounded to your actual proxy, instead of trusting any client.
276
+
277
+ Two separate things to restore: **scheme** (http→https) and **host**. Most app servers
278
+ forward the scheme but **not** the host — `--forwarded-allow-ips` / `--proxy-headers`
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+ only governs `X-Forwarded-Proto`/`-For`, never the host. So:
280
+
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+ * **Scheme:** set `force_https_callback=True` on `OIDCAuth` (or pass the name of an env
282
+ var that, when present, enables it). This covers the http→https half on every backend.
283
+ * **Host:** add proxy middleware that honours `X-Forwarded-Host`, sized to your real
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+ proxy-chain length:
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+
286
+ | Backend | Server(s) | How to restore the host |
287
+ |---|---|---|
288
+ | **Flask** | gunicorn, waitress, mod_wsgi, … | `werkzeug` `ProxyFix` on the WSGI app (server-independent — gunicorn alone won't do the host) |
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+ | **Quart** | hypercorn | `ProxyFixMiddleware(mode="modern", trusted_hops=N)` — restores host and scheme |
290
+ | **Quart / FastAPI** | uvicorn | uvicorn `--proxy-headers` does scheme only; add an `X-Forwarded-Host` ASGI middleware or have the proxy rewrite the `Host` header |
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+
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+ **Flask** (WSGI — gunicorn, waitress, …):
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+
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+ ```python
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+ from werkzeug.middleware.proxy_fix import ProxyFix
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+
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+ # Counts MUST equal your real proxy-chain length — setting them higher than the
298
+ # actual chain (or enabling this with no proxy) re-opens the spoofing hole.
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+ app.server.wsgi_app = ProxyFix(app.server.wsgi_app, x_for=1, x_proto=1, x_host=1)
300
+ ```
301
+
302
+ **Quart** (served by hypercorn) — wrap the ASGI app:
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+
304
+ ```python
305
+ from hypercorn.middleware import ProxyFixMiddleware
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+
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+ # trusted_hops MUST equal your real proxy-chain length (see warning below).
308
+ app.server.asgi_app = ProxyFixMiddleware(app.server.asgi_app, mode="modern", trusted_hops=1)
309
+ ```
310
+
311
+ **FastAPI / Quart on uvicorn:** uvicorn restores the scheme (`--proxy-headers
312
+ --forwarded-allow-ips=...`) but **not** the host. Either have your proxy overwrite the
313
+ `Host` header with the public host, or add a small trusted ASGI middleware that copies
314
+ `X-Forwarded-Host` onto the `host` header — same `trusted_hops` discipline as above.
315
+
316
+ > ⚠️ Only restore proxy-header trust when a real proxy sets those headers, and set the
317
+ > hop counts to the actual chain length. A trusted-host middleware in front of *no*
318
+ > proxy lets a client spoof the host again — which is exactly the trust that was removed.
319
+
264
320
  #### Multiple OIDC Providers
265
321
 
266
322
  For multiple OIDC providers, you can use `register_provider` to add new ones after the OIDCAuth has been instantiated.
@@ -216,6 +216,62 @@ auth.register_provider(
216
216
 
217
217
  Once this is done, connecting to your app will automatically redirect to the IDP login page.
218
218
 
219
+ #### Running behind a reverse proxy
220
+
221
+ > **Behavior change.** Earlier versions rewrote the OIDC callback host from the
222
+ > client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host` header. That header trust was **removed** — an
223
+ > attacker could set it to steer the `redirect_uri` handed to your IDP (auth-code leak /
224
+ > open redirect). The `redirect_uri` is now built **only** from the host and scheme of
225
+ > the incoming request.
226
+
227
+ The consequence: behind a proxy that terminates TLS or rewrites the host, the
228
+ `redirect_uri` comes out as `http://localhost:8050/...` and your IDP rejects it. To get
229
+ the real public host and scheme back, **restore it at the transport layer** — where the
230
+ trust can be bounded to your actual proxy, instead of trusting any client.
231
+
232
+ Two separate things to restore: **scheme** (http→https) and **host**. Most app servers
233
+ forward the scheme but **not** the host — `--forwarded-allow-ips` / `--proxy-headers`
234
+ only governs `X-Forwarded-Proto`/`-For`, never the host. So:
235
+
236
+ * **Scheme:** set `force_https_callback=True` on `OIDCAuth` (or pass the name of an env
237
+ var that, when present, enables it). This covers the http→https half on every backend.
238
+ * **Host:** add proxy middleware that honours `X-Forwarded-Host`, sized to your real
239
+ proxy-chain length:
240
+
241
+ | Backend | Server(s) | How to restore the host |
242
+ |---|---|---|
243
+ | **Flask** | gunicorn, waitress, mod_wsgi, … | `werkzeug` `ProxyFix` on the WSGI app (server-independent — gunicorn alone won't do the host) |
244
+ | **Quart** | hypercorn | `ProxyFixMiddleware(mode="modern", trusted_hops=N)` — restores host and scheme |
245
+ | **Quart / FastAPI** | uvicorn | uvicorn `--proxy-headers` does scheme only; add an `X-Forwarded-Host` ASGI middleware or have the proxy rewrite the `Host` header |
246
+
247
+ **Flask** (WSGI — gunicorn, waitress, …):
248
+
249
+ ```python
250
+ from werkzeug.middleware.proxy_fix import ProxyFix
251
+
252
+ # Counts MUST equal your real proxy-chain length — setting them higher than the
253
+ # actual chain (or enabling this with no proxy) re-opens the spoofing hole.
254
+ app.server.wsgi_app = ProxyFix(app.server.wsgi_app, x_for=1, x_proto=1, x_host=1)
255
+ ```
256
+
257
+ **Quart** (served by hypercorn) — wrap the ASGI app:
258
+
259
+ ```python
260
+ from hypercorn.middleware import ProxyFixMiddleware
261
+
262
+ # trusted_hops MUST equal your real proxy-chain length (see warning below).
263
+ app.server.asgi_app = ProxyFixMiddleware(app.server.asgi_app, mode="modern", trusted_hops=1)
264
+ ```
265
+
266
+ **FastAPI / Quart on uvicorn:** uvicorn restores the scheme (`--proxy-headers
267
+ --forwarded-allow-ips=...`) but **not** the host. Either have your proxy overwrite the
268
+ `Host` header with the public host, or add a small trusted ASGI middleware that copies
269
+ `X-Forwarded-Host` onto the `host` header — same `trusted_hops` discipline as above.
270
+
271
+ > ⚠️ Only restore proxy-header trust when a real proxy sets those headers, and set the
272
+ > hop counts to the actual chain length. A trusted-host middleware in front of *no*
273
+ > proxy lets a client spoof the host again — which is exactly the trust that was removed.
274
+
219
275
  #### Multiple OIDC Providers
220
276
 
221
277
  For multiple OIDC providers, you can use `register_provider` to add new ones after the OIDCAuth has been instantiated.
@@ -249,21 +249,21 @@ class OIDCAuth(Auth):
249
249
  def _create_redirect_uri(self, idp: str):
250
250
  """Create the redirect uri based on callback endpoint and idp.
251
251
 
252
+ Host and scheme come from the request scope only. Behind a proxy,
253
+ configure the WSGI/ASGI server to populate them from forwarded headers
254
+ (werkzeug ``ProxyFix`` / hypercorn ``--forwarded-allow-ips``) — the
255
+ library must never trust a client-supplied ``X-Forwarded-Host`` to
256
+ build the IdP ``redirect_uri`` (auth-code leak / open redirect).
257
+ ``force_https_callback`` covers the scheme half of dash-auth#154.
258
+
252
259
  Returns:
253
260
  The fully-qualified OIDC callback redirect URI.
254
261
  """
255
262
  if self.force_https_callback:
256
- redirect_uri = self.backend.url_for(
263
+ return self.backend.url_for(
257
264
  "oidc_callback", idp=idp, _external=True, _scheme="https"
258
265
  )
259
- else:
260
- redirect_uri = self.backend.url_for(
261
- "oidc_callback", idp=idp, _external=True
262
- )
263
- host = self.request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Host")
264
- if host:
265
- redirect_uri = redirect_uri.replace(self.backend.current_host(), host, 1)
266
- return redirect_uri
266
+ return self.backend.url_for("oidc_callback", idp=idp, _external=True)
267
267
 
268
268
  def login_request(self, idp: str | None = None):
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  """Start the login process.
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
1
1
  """Single source of truth for the package version."""
2
2
 
3
- __version__ = "1.3.2"
3
+ __version__ = "1.3.4"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.4
2
2
  Name: dash-auth-async
3
- Version: 1.3.2
3
+ Version: 1.3.4
4
4
  Summary: Dash Authorization Package.
5
5
  Author-email: Jonas Schrage <119843859+joschrag@users.noreply.github.com>
6
6
  License: MIT
@@ -261,6 +261,62 @@ auth.register_provider(
261
261
 
262
262
  Once this is done, connecting to your app will automatically redirect to the IDP login page.
263
263
 
264
+ #### Running behind a reverse proxy
265
+
266
+ > **Behavior change.** Earlier versions rewrote the OIDC callback host from the
267
+ > client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host` header. That header trust was **removed** — an
268
+ > attacker could set it to steer the `redirect_uri` handed to your IDP (auth-code leak /
269
+ > open redirect). The `redirect_uri` is now built **only** from the host and scheme of
270
+ > the incoming request.
271
+
272
+ The consequence: behind a proxy that terminates TLS or rewrites the host, the
273
+ `redirect_uri` comes out as `http://localhost:8050/...` and your IDP rejects it. To get
274
+ the real public host and scheme back, **restore it at the transport layer** — where the
275
+ trust can be bounded to your actual proxy, instead of trusting any client.
276
+
277
+ Two separate things to restore: **scheme** (http→https) and **host**. Most app servers
278
+ forward the scheme but **not** the host — `--forwarded-allow-ips` / `--proxy-headers`
279
+ only governs `X-Forwarded-Proto`/`-For`, never the host. So:
280
+
281
+ * **Scheme:** set `force_https_callback=True` on `OIDCAuth` (or pass the name of an env
282
+ var that, when present, enables it). This covers the http→https half on every backend.
283
+ * **Host:** add proxy middleware that honours `X-Forwarded-Host`, sized to your real
284
+ proxy-chain length:
285
+
286
+ | Backend | Server(s) | How to restore the host |
287
+ |---|---|---|
288
+ | **Flask** | gunicorn, waitress, mod_wsgi, … | `werkzeug` `ProxyFix` on the WSGI app (server-independent — gunicorn alone won't do the host) |
289
+ | **Quart** | hypercorn | `ProxyFixMiddleware(mode="modern", trusted_hops=N)` — restores host and scheme |
290
+ | **Quart / FastAPI** | uvicorn | uvicorn `--proxy-headers` does scheme only; add an `X-Forwarded-Host` ASGI middleware or have the proxy rewrite the `Host` header |
291
+
292
+ **Flask** (WSGI — gunicorn, waitress, …):
293
+
294
+ ```python
295
+ from werkzeug.middleware.proxy_fix import ProxyFix
296
+
297
+ # Counts MUST equal your real proxy-chain length — setting them higher than the
298
+ # actual chain (or enabling this with no proxy) re-opens the spoofing hole.
299
+ app.server.wsgi_app = ProxyFix(app.server.wsgi_app, x_for=1, x_proto=1, x_host=1)
300
+ ```
301
+
302
+ **Quart** (served by hypercorn) — wrap the ASGI app:
303
+
304
+ ```python
305
+ from hypercorn.middleware import ProxyFixMiddleware
306
+
307
+ # trusted_hops MUST equal your real proxy-chain length (see warning below).
308
+ app.server.asgi_app = ProxyFixMiddleware(app.server.asgi_app, mode="modern", trusted_hops=1)
309
+ ```
310
+
311
+ **FastAPI / Quart on uvicorn:** uvicorn restores the scheme (`--proxy-headers
312
+ --forwarded-allow-ips=...`) but **not** the host. Either have your proxy overwrite the
313
+ `Host` header with the public host, or add a small trusted ASGI middleware that copies
314
+ `X-Forwarded-Host` onto the `host` header — same `trusted_hops` discipline as above.
315
+
316
+ > ⚠️ Only restore proxy-header trust when a real proxy sets those headers, and set the
317
+ > hop counts to the actual chain length. A trusted-host middleware in front of *no*
318
+ > proxy lets a client spoof the host again — which is exactly the trust that was removed.
319
+
264
320
  #### Multiple OIDC Providers
265
321
 
266
322
  For multiple OIDC providers, you can use `register_provider` to add new ones after the OIDCAuth has been instantiated.
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
4
4
 
5
5
  [project]
6
6
  name = "dash-auth-async"
7
- version = "1.3.2"
7
+ version = "1.3.4"
8
8
  description = "Dash Authorization Package."
9
9
  readme = "README.md"
10
10
  requires-python = ">=3.10"
@@ -77,10 +77,25 @@ dev = [
77
77
 
78
78
  [tool.uv]
79
79
  constraint-dependencies = [
80
- "setuptools<80",
81
- # GHSA: cryptography wheels < 48.0.1 bundle a vulnerable OpenSSL
82
- # (advisory 2026-06-09). Pulled in transitively via authlib.
83
- "cryptography>=48.0.1",
80
+ # GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption Bleichenbacher
81
+ # oracle below 50.0.0. Pulled in transitively via authlib.
82
+ "cryptography>=50.0.0",
83
+ # GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass via NFC/NFD
84
+ # collision below 83.0.0. Pulled in transitively via dash/build backend.
85
+ "setuptools>=83.0.0",
86
+ # GHSA-ffq3-xpv3-j92q and others: quadratic-time parsing / XSS / path
87
+ # traversal below 3.3.0. Pulled in transitively via nbconvert.
88
+ "mistune>=3.3.0",
89
+ # GHSA-vj7q-gjh5-988w: WebSocket transport missing Host/Origin
90
+ # validation below 1.28.1. Pulled in transitively via dash.
91
+ "mcp>=1.28.1",
92
+ # GHSA-6hr6-w5qg-qmwg: duplicate Host header request-smuggling risk
93
+ # at and below 4.4.0. Pulled in transitively via hypercorn.
94
+ "h2>=4.4.1",
95
+ # GHSA-mpf4-983q-p7j4 and others: unbounded urlencoded/multipart
96
+ # parsing DoS at and below 6.5.7. Pulled in transitively via
97
+ # jupyter-client.
98
+ "tornado>=6.5.8",
84
99
  ]
85
100
  override-dependencies = [
86
101
  "urllib3>=2.7.0",
File without changes