custody-ledger 0.3.0__tar.gz

custody_ledger-0.3.0/.github/workflows/publish.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+name: publish
+
+# Publishing happens on a version tag, and only after the tests pass.
+#
+# There is no API token anywhere in this workflow or in the repository secrets.
+# PyPI Trusted Publishing exchanges GitHub's OIDC identity for a short-lived
+# upload token at the moment of publish, so there is no long-lived credential to
+# leak, rotate, or find in a repo three years from now. For a project whose
+# subject is evidence integrity, a stored publishing secret would be a poor look.
+#
+# One-time setup on PyPI (Your projects -> Publishing -> Add a pending publisher):
+#     PyPI project name  custody-ledger
+#     Owner              Himansh97
+#     Repository name    custody
+#     Workflow name      publish.yml
+#     Environment name   pypi
+#
+# Then:  git tag v0.2.0 && git push origin v0.2.0
+
+on:
+  push:
+    tags: ["v*"]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    # Publishing an artifact nobody ran is how a broken release reaches people
+    # who trusted the version number. The whole suite gates the upload.
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      - name: Install
+        run: |
+          python -m pip install --upgrade pip
+          pip install -e .
+      - name: Run the suite
+        run: |
+          set -e
+          for t in tests/test_*.py; do
+            echo "--- $t"
+            python "$t"
+          done
+      - name: Verify the demo ledger the way a browser would
+        run: |
+          python demo/pipeline.py
+          node tests/verify_like_the_page.js demo/ledger.json
+
+  build:
+    needs: test
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      - name: Build
+        run: |
+          python -m pip install --upgrade pip build twine
+          python -m build
+          twine check dist/*
+      - name: Install the built wheel and exercise the CLI
+        # The wheel is what users get, so the wheel is what gets tested -- not
+        # the source tree it came from. This is the step that caught page.html
+        # missing from the package and serve dying on a second thread.
+        run: |
+          python -m venv /tmp/check
+          /tmp/check/bin/pip install dist/*.whl
+          cd /tmp
+          /tmp/check/bin/custody keygen --out k.key
+          printf 'Wages 98,410.00\n' > w2.txt
+          printf '{"fields":{"wages":98410.0},"confidence":0.95,"citations":{"wages":"w2"}}\n' > r.json
+          /tmp/check/bin/custody run --loan 1 --principal ci@example.com \
+            --instruction "Extract wages." --doc w2.txt --replay r.json --key k.key
+          /tmp/check/bin/custody verify custody.db
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: dist
+          path: dist/
+
+  publish:
+    needs: build
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    environment: pypi
+    permissions:
+      id-token: write        # the only credential involved; nothing is stored
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: dist
+          path: dist/
+      - uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1

custody_ledger-0.3.0/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+.venv/
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+*.db
+dist/
+build/
+*.egg-info/
+custody-signing.key

custody_ledger-0.3.0/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.5
+Name: custody-ledger
+Version: 0.3.0
+Summary: A signed chain of evidence for AI decisions in mortgage lending
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://himansh97.github.io/custody.html
+Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/Himansh97/custody
+Author-email: Himanshu Srivastava <hsrivast22@gmail.com>
+License: MIT
+Keywords: ai-governance,audit,compliance,ll-2026-04,mortgage
+Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Financial and Insurance Industry
+Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Office/Business :: Financial
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=41
+Provides-Extra: anthropic
+Requires-Dist: anthropic>=0.40; extra == 'anthropic'
+Provides-Extra: azure
+Requires-Dist: azure-identity>=1.15; extra == 'azure'
+Requires-Dist: azure-keyvault-keys>=4.9; extra == 'azure'
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: anthropic>=0.40; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: azure-identity>=1.15; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: azure-keyvault-keys>=4.9; extra == 'dev'
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+
+# Custody
+
+**A signed chain of evidence for AI decisions in mortgage lending.**
+
+Fannie Mae Lender Letter [LL-2026-04](https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/news-events/lender-letter-ll-2026-04-governance-framework-use-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning)
+took effect on 6 August 2026. Seller/servicers using AI or ML in origination or
+servicing must have policies governing its development, use and maintenance,
+must extend governance no less protective to their vendors, and **on Fannie
+Mae's request must promptly disclose the types of AI/ML in use, the purpose and
+manner of that use, and the safeguards implemented to mitigate the risks.**
+
+There are two ways to answer that request. One is a document describing what you
+intend to happen. The other is a record of what did happen, decision by decision,
+that the person asking can verify without taking your word for it.
+
+Custody produces the second.
+
+**It is worth being precise, because vendor summaries of this letter are not.**
+LL-2026-04 does not specify a record schema, does not name any fields, and does
+not require append-only or signed logs. The design below is one implementation of
+the letter's disclosure and safeguard obligations — a defensible one, and the one
+this library takes. It is not a transcription of Fannie Mae's instructions.
+`docs/ll-2026-04.md` sets out the letter's actual requirements and marks the
+boundary between them and our choices.
+
+**[Live demo](https://himansh97.github.io/custody.html)** — a synthetic loan file
+through five AI steps, with the hash chain re-verified in your own browser. Break
+a record and watch it get caught.
+
+---
+
+## The idea
+
+Compliance logging fails when it is a separate step. Someone adds a model call in
+a hurry, the `log.write(...)` after it never gets written, and nobody notices
+until an examiner asks. So here the call *is* the record:
+
+```python
+from custody import Ledger
+
+ledger = Ledger(policy="uw-policy-v3.2", signing_key=key)
+
+with ledger.decision(loan="1000254", principal="jane@lender.com",
+                     purpose="income_calculation", identifiers=[borrower]) as d:
+
+    out = d.call(model="claude-sonnet-5", prompt=prompt,
+                 sources=[paystub, w2], invoke=call_the_model)
+
+    verdict = d.gate(out, citations={"monthly_income": "paystub-2026-07-15"},
+                     confidence=0.91)
+
+    if verdict.ok:
+        d.commit(outcome=out)
+    else:
+        d.route_to_human(queue="uw-review")
+```
+
+Every field is filled as a side effect of normal use. A decision
+that is opened and abandoned still writes a record. One that raises writes a
+record and re-raises. An audit trail with holes where the awkward cases were is
+worse than none, because it looks complete.
+
+## The gate
+
+Deterministic checks only — no model judges another model. Given the same output
+and the same sources, the verdict is the same forever, and an examiner can re-run
+it.
+
+| Check | Rejects |
+|---|---|
+| Figure binding | a number in the output that appears in no supplied source document |
+| Field grounding | an extracted field that cites no source |
+| Closed vocabulary | a classification outside its allowed set |
+| Confidence floor | *routes to a human* below threshold — not being sure is not being wrong |
+
+Verdicts are `pass` / `review` / `reject`. That verdict is the recorded
+`response_treatment` — the evidence that a safeguard ran and what it concluded.
+
+## The chain
+
+Each record's hash covers the previous record's hash, and each hash is signed.
+The two answer different questions: the chain says *was anything changed or
+removed*, the signature says *did this come from the system that claims to have
+written it*. The chain needs no key to verify, which is why the demo page can
+re-verify in a visitor's own browser.
+
+Storage is append-only, enforced by SQLite triggers rather than by convention,
+and appends are atomic so concurrent writers cannot fork the chain.
+
+## Where the signing key lives
+
+A key in a file is a development convenience, and the first thing a lender's
+security review will object to. So the signer is pluggable:
+
+```python
+from custody.signing import KeyVaultSigner
+ledger = Ledger(policy="uw-v3", signer=KeyVaultSigner(vault_url, "custody"))
+```
+
+The private key never enters the process. Custody sends a digest and gets a
+signature back; the most an attacker gets from a compromised host is the ability
+to sign while they hold the credential, which the vault logs.
+
+**Azure Key Vault has no Ed25519** -- EC and RSA only, and AWS KMS is the same.
+So the algorithm is a parameter, not a constant: `ed25519` locally,
+`ecdsa-p256-sha256` (ES256) in a vault. It is written into the hashed body of
+every record, so a downgraded algorithm claim breaks the chain before anyone
+reaches a signature check.
+
+```bash
+az keyvault key create --vault-name <vault> --name custody --kty EC --curve P-256
+export CUSTODY_KEY_VAULT=https://<vault>.vault.azure.net/
+export CUSTODY_KEY_NAME=custody
+```
+
+## Verifying without trusting us
+
+`verify_packet.py` is a single file with no dependency on this package and
+nothing outside the standard library. An auditor reads it end to end in a few
+minutes and satisfies themselves the cryptography is real:
+
+```bash
+python3 verify_packet.py packet.json
+```
+
+With `cryptography` installed it checks signatures too; without it, it checks
+the chain and says plainly that it did not check signatures rather than printing
+a bare OK. It also states what it cannot prove -- that the records are *true*,
+and that nothing was withheld -- because a verifier that only ever says OK
+teaches people to over-read it.
+
+## Install and run it
+
+Not on PyPI yet, so install from the repo:
+
+```bash
+pip install "git+https://github.com/Himansh97/custody"   # one dependency: cryptography
+custody keygen                                           # Ed25519 signing key, mode 600
+
+custody run --loan 1000254 --principal you@lender.com \
+    --instruction "Extract qualifying monthly income." \
+    --doc paystub.txt --doc w2.txt \
+    --redact "Borrower Name" --model claude-sonnet-5
+
+custody verify custody.db --public-key <hex>   # recompute the chain
+custody packet 1000254 --out packet.json       # evidence for one loan
+custody serve                                  # prints a URL with a one-time token
+```
+
+`custody serve` binds loopback and mints a token unless you supply one, and
+refuses outright to bind anywhere else without one &mdash; it is serving an audit
+trail containing loan numbers. A shared token is a floor, not a control; put it
+behind your SSO before anyone but you uses it.
+
+`custody run` calls a real model when `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` is set
+(`pip install "custody-ledger[anthropic] @ git+https://github.com/Himansh97/custody"`), or replays a fixed response with
+`--replay fixture.json`. The gate neither knows nor cares which.
+
+Custody does not call your model on your behalf in library use &mdash; it wraps a
+call you already make. A governance layer that requires you to rewrite your AI
+does not get adopted.
+
+## From a source checkout
+
+```bash
+python demo/pipeline.py      # the synthetic loan, produces demo/ledger.json
+python demo/build_page.py    # bakes the review page from that ledger
+python tests/test_chain.py   # and test_gate, test_ledger, test_crosslang
+node tests/verify_like_the_page.js demo/ledger.json
+```
+
+The demo's model outputs are fixed, so the ledger is reproducible byte-for-byte
+by anyone who clones this.
+
+`tests/test_crosslang.py` diffs the Python and JavaScript canonicalisers against
+every shipped record. If they ever drift, the browser would report tampering on
+an honest ledger &mdash; the most damaging failure this project could have &mdash; so
+the agreement is tested rather than assumed.
+
+## What this is not
+
+Not legal advice, it does not certify compliance, and it is not a statement of
+what Fannie Mae requires. It does no bias or fair-lending
+testing — that is an ECOA and fair-lending obligation rather than something this
+letter specifies, it is a separate product, and vendors already occupy it. It writes to no loan origination system. It cannot
+inventory models it never sees.
+
+`docs/ll-2026-04.md` sets out what the letter actually says, what Custody helps
+with, and the obligations it does not touch at all.
+
+`docs/information-security.md` does the same against Fannie Mae's Information
+Security and Business Resiliency Supplement, control by control. It says no five
+times &mdash; encryption at rest, encryption in transit, real access management, log
+retention, and independent review of the cryptography. A buyer should start from
+that page rather than from a questionnaire.
+
+## Data
+
+All demo data is synthetic — borrower, employer, documents, loan number. There is
+no real PII in this repository. The demo signing key is committed on purpose so
+the shipped ledger verifies for anyone who clones it; a real deployment keeps its
+private key in a KMS and never in source.

custody_ledger-0.3.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+# Custody
+
+**A signed chain of evidence for AI decisions in mortgage lending.**
+
+Fannie Mae Lender Letter [LL-2026-04](https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/news-events/lender-letter-ll-2026-04-governance-framework-use-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning)
+took effect on 6 August 2026. Seller/servicers using AI or ML in origination or
+servicing must have policies governing its development, use and maintenance,
+must extend governance no less protective to their vendors, and **on Fannie
+Mae's request must promptly disclose the types of AI/ML in use, the purpose and
+manner of that use, and the safeguards implemented to mitigate the risks.**
+
+There are two ways to answer that request. One is a document describing what you
+intend to happen. The other is a record of what did happen, decision by decision,
+that the person asking can verify without taking your word for it.
+
+Custody produces the second.
+
+**It is worth being precise, because vendor summaries of this letter are not.**
+LL-2026-04 does not specify a record schema, does not name any fields, and does
+not require append-only or signed logs. The design below is one implementation of
+the letter's disclosure and safeguard obligations — a defensible one, and the one
+this library takes. It is not a transcription of Fannie Mae's instructions.
+`docs/ll-2026-04.md` sets out the letter's actual requirements and marks the
+boundary between them and our choices.
+
+**[Live demo](https://himansh97.github.io/custody.html)** — a synthetic loan file
+through five AI steps, with the hash chain re-verified in your own browser. Break
+a record and watch it get caught.
+
+---
+
+## The idea
+
+Compliance logging fails when it is a separate step. Someone adds a model call in
+a hurry, the `log.write(...)` after it never gets written, and nobody notices
+until an examiner asks. So here the call *is* the record:
+
+```python
+from custody import Ledger
+
+ledger = Ledger(policy="uw-policy-v3.2", signing_key=key)
+
+with ledger.decision(loan="1000254", principal="jane@lender.com",
+                     purpose="income_calculation", identifiers=[borrower]) as d:
+
+    out = d.call(model="claude-sonnet-5", prompt=prompt,
+                 sources=[paystub, w2], invoke=call_the_model)
+
+    verdict = d.gate(out, citations={"monthly_income": "paystub-2026-07-15"},
+                     confidence=0.91)
+
+    if verdict.ok:
+        d.commit(outcome=out)
+    else:
+        d.route_to_human(queue="uw-review")
+```
+
+Every field is filled as a side effect of normal use. A decision
+that is opened and abandoned still writes a record. One that raises writes a
+record and re-raises. An audit trail with holes where the awkward cases were is
+worse than none, because it looks complete.
+
+## The gate
+
+Deterministic checks only — no model judges another model. Given the same output
+and the same sources, the verdict is the same forever, and an examiner can re-run
+it.
+
+| Check | Rejects |
+|---|---|
+| Figure binding | a number in the output that appears in no supplied source document |
+| Field grounding | an extracted field that cites no source |
+| Closed vocabulary | a classification outside its allowed set |
+| Confidence floor | *routes to a human* below threshold — not being sure is not being wrong |
+
+Verdicts are `pass` / `review` / `reject`. That verdict is the recorded
+`response_treatment` — the evidence that a safeguard ran and what it concluded.
+
+## The chain
+
+Each record's hash covers the previous record's hash, and each hash is signed.
+The two answer different questions: the chain says *was anything changed or
+removed*, the signature says *did this come from the system that claims to have
+written it*. The chain needs no key to verify, which is why the demo page can
+re-verify in a visitor's own browser.
+
+Storage is append-only, enforced by SQLite triggers rather than by convention,
+and appends are atomic so concurrent writers cannot fork the chain.
+
+## Where the signing key lives
+
+A key in a file is a development convenience, and the first thing a lender's
+security review will object to. So the signer is pluggable:
+
+```python
+from custody.signing import KeyVaultSigner
+ledger = Ledger(policy="uw-v3", signer=KeyVaultSigner(vault_url, "custody"))
+```
+
+The private key never enters the process. Custody sends a digest and gets a
+signature back; the most an attacker gets from a compromised host is the ability
+to sign while they hold the credential, which the vault logs.
+
+**Azure Key Vault has no Ed25519** -- EC and RSA only, and AWS KMS is the same.
+So the algorithm is a parameter, not a constant: `ed25519` locally,
+`ecdsa-p256-sha256` (ES256) in a vault. It is written into the hashed body of
+every record, so a downgraded algorithm claim breaks the chain before anyone
+reaches a signature check.
+
+```bash
+az keyvault key create --vault-name <vault> --name custody --kty EC --curve P-256
+export CUSTODY_KEY_VAULT=https://<vault>.vault.azure.net/
+export CUSTODY_KEY_NAME=custody
+```
+
+## Verifying without trusting us
+
+`verify_packet.py` is a single file with no dependency on this package and
+nothing outside the standard library. An auditor reads it end to end in a few
+minutes and satisfies themselves the cryptography is real:
+
+```bash
+python3 verify_packet.py packet.json
+```
+
+With `cryptography` installed it checks signatures too; without it, it checks
+the chain and says plainly that it did not check signatures rather than printing
+a bare OK. It also states what it cannot prove -- that the records are *true*,
+and that nothing was withheld -- because a verifier that only ever says OK
+teaches people to over-read it.
+
+## Install and run it
+
+Not on PyPI yet, so install from the repo:
+
+```bash
+pip install "git+https://github.com/Himansh97/custody"   # one dependency: cryptography
+custody keygen                                           # Ed25519 signing key, mode 600
+
+custody run --loan 1000254 --principal you@lender.com \
+    --instruction "Extract qualifying monthly income." \
+    --doc paystub.txt --doc w2.txt \
+    --redact "Borrower Name" --model claude-sonnet-5
+
+custody verify custody.db --public-key <hex>   # recompute the chain
+custody packet 1000254 --out packet.json       # evidence for one loan
+custody serve                                  # prints a URL with a one-time token
+```
+
+`custody serve` binds loopback and mints a token unless you supply one, and
+refuses outright to bind anywhere else without one &mdash; it is serving an audit
+trail containing loan numbers. A shared token is a floor, not a control; put it
+behind your SSO before anyone but you uses it.
+
+`custody run` calls a real model when `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` is set
+(`pip install "custody-ledger[anthropic] @ git+https://github.com/Himansh97/custody"`), or replays a fixed response with
+`--replay fixture.json`. The gate neither knows nor cares which.
+
+Custody does not call your model on your behalf in library use &mdash; it wraps a
+call you already make. A governance layer that requires you to rewrite your AI
+does not get adopted.
+
+## From a source checkout
+
+```bash
+python demo/pipeline.py      # the synthetic loan, produces demo/ledger.json
+python demo/build_page.py    # bakes the review page from that ledger
+python tests/test_chain.py   # and test_gate, test_ledger, test_crosslang
+node tests/verify_like_the_page.js demo/ledger.json
+```
+
+The demo's model outputs are fixed, so the ledger is reproducible byte-for-byte
+by anyone who clones this.
+
+`tests/test_crosslang.py` diffs the Python and JavaScript canonicalisers against
+every shipped record. If they ever drift, the browser would report tampering on
+an honest ledger &mdash; the most damaging failure this project could have &mdash; so
+the agreement is tested rather than assumed.
+
+## What this is not
+
+Not legal advice, it does not certify compliance, and it is not a statement of
+what Fannie Mae requires. It does no bias or fair-lending
+testing — that is an ECOA and fair-lending obligation rather than something this
+letter specifies, it is a separate product, and vendors already occupy it. It writes to no loan origination system. It cannot
+inventory models it never sees.
+
+`docs/ll-2026-04.md` sets out what the letter actually says, what Custody helps
+with, and the obligations it does not touch at all.
+
+`docs/information-security.md` does the same against Fannie Mae's Information
+Security and Business Resiliency Supplement, control by control. It says no five
+times &mdash; encryption at rest, encryption in transit, real access management, log
+retention, and independent review of the cryptography. A buyer should start from
+that page rather than from a questionnaire.
+
+## Data
+
+All demo data is synthetic — borrower, employer, documents, loan number. There is
+no real PII in this repository. The demo signing key is committed on purpose so
+the shipped ledger verifies for anyone who clones it; a real deployment keeps its
+private key in a KMS and never in source.

custody_ledger-0.3.0/demo/build_page.py

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+"""Bake the static demo page from the committed ledger.
+
+Built rather than hand-written so it cannot drift from the ledger it claims to
+display: run `pipeline.py`, then this, and the page is showing the records the
+library actually produced.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import pathlib
+import sys
+
+ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "src"))
+
+from custody.render import build_html  # noqa: E402
+
+LEDGER = ROOT / "demo" / "ledger.json"
+DEFAULT_OUT = pathlib.Path.home() / "careeros-portfolio" / "custody-ledger.html"
+
+
+def build(out: pathlib.Path = DEFAULT_OUT) -> pathlib.Path:
+    if not LEDGER.exists():
+        raise SystemExit("demo/ledger.json is missing - run demo/pipeline.py first")
+    bundle = json.loads(LEDGER.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    if not bundle["chain"]["verified"]:
+        # Publishing a page whose headline claim is "this verifies" while the
+        # ledger behind it does not would be the worst thing this could ship.
+        raise SystemExit(f"refusing to build: the ledger does not verify - {bundle['chain']}")
+    out.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    out.write_text(build_html(bundle), encoding="utf-8")
+    return out
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    target = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]) if len(sys.argv) > 1 else DEFAULT_OUT
+    written = build(target)
+    print(f"wrote {written} ({written.stat().st_size:,} bytes)")

custody_ledger-0.3.0/demo/fixtures/bank-statement-2026-06.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+NORTHWIND CREDIT UNION — STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT
+Statement period: 06/01/2026 - 06/30/2026
+Account ending: 4471
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+Beginning balance                                18,204.11
+Total deposits                                    6,380.48
+Total withdrawals                                 4,912.30
+Ending balance                                   19,672.29
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+06/15  DIRECT DEP  ACME LOGISTICS PAYROLL         3,190.24
+06/30  DIRECT DEP  ACME LOGISTICS PAYROLL         3,190.24

custody_ledger-0.3.0/demo/fixtures/paystub-2026-07-15.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+ACME LOGISTICS LLC                       EARNINGS STATEMENT
+1400 Corporate Drive, Irving TX 75038
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+Employee: [BORROWER]            Employee ID: E-40881
+Pay period: 07/01/2026 - 07/15/2026      Pay date: 07/15/2026
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+                       CURRENT        YEAR TO DATE
+Regular              3,846.15            50,000.00
+Overtime               359.85             4,672.00
+Gross pay            4,206.00            54,672.00
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+Federal income tax     694.00             9,022.00
+Social Security        260.77             3,389.66
+Medicare                60.99               792.74
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+Net pay              3,190.24            41,467.60

custody_ledger-0.3.0/demo/fixtures/w2-2025.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+FORM W-2 WAGE AND TAX STATEMENT — TAX YEAR 2025
+Employer: ACME LOGISTICS LLC        EIN: 75-3310042
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+Box  1  Wages, tips, other compensation          98,410.00
+Box  2  Federal income tax withheld              16,229.00
+Box  3  Social Security wages                    98,410.00
+Box  5  Medicare wages and tips                  98,410.00
+Box 12  D  401(k) elective deferrals              7,200.00