correctover-ccs-mcp 1.0.0__tar.gz

correctover_ccs_mcp-1.0.0/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+Elastic License 2.0
+
+URL: https://www.elastic.co/licensing/elastic-license
+
+## Acceptance
+
+By using the software, you agree to all of the terms and conditions below.
+
+## Copyright License
+
+The licensor grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free, worldwide,
+non-sublicensable, non-transferable license to use, copy, distribute, make
+available, and prepare derivative works of the software, in each case subject to
+the limitations and conditions below.
+
+## Limitations
+
+You may not provide the software to third parties as a hosted or managed
+service, where the service provides users with access to any substantial set of
+the features or functionality of the software.
+
+You may not move, change, disable, or circumvent the license key functionality
+in the software, and you may not remove or obscure any functionality in the
+software that is protected by the license key.
+
+You may not alter, remove, or obscure any licensing, copyright, or other notices
+of the licensor in the software. Any use of the licensor’s trademarks is subject
+to applicable law.
+
+## Patents
+
+The licensor grants you a license, under any patent claims the licensor can
+license, or becomes able to license, to make, have made, use, sell, offer for
+sale, import and have imported the software, in each case subject to the
+limitations and conditions in this license. This license does not cover any
+patent claims that you cause to be infringed by modifications or additions to
+the software. If you or your company make any written claim that the software
+infringes or contributes to infringement of any patent, your patent license for
+the software granted under these terms ends immediately. If your company makes
+such a claim, your patent license ends immediately for work on behalf of your
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+
+## Notices
+
+You must ensure that anyone who gets a copy of any part of the software from you
+also gets a copy of these terms.
+
+If you modify the software, you must include in any modified copies of the
+software prominent notices stating that you have modified the software.
+
+## No Other Rights
+
+These terms do not imply any licenses other than those expressly granted in
+these terms.
+
+## Termination
+
+If you use the software in violation of these terms, such use is not licensed,
+and your licenses will automatically terminate. If the licensor provides you
+with a notice of your violation, and you cease all violation of this license no
+later than 30 days after you receive that notice, your licenses will be
+reinstated retroactively. However, if you violate these terms after such
+reinstatement, any additional violation of these terms will cause your licenses
+to terminate automatically and permanently.
+
+## No Liability
+
+*As far as the law allows, the software comes as is, without any warranty or
+condition, and the licensor will not be liable to you for any damages arising
+out of these terms or the use or nature of the software, under any kind of
+legal claim.*
+
+## Definitions
+
+The **licensor** is the entity offering these terms, and the **software** is the
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+
+**trademark** means trademarks, service marks, and similar rights.

correctover_ccs_mcp-1.0.0/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: correctover-ccs-mcp
+Version: 1.0.0
+Summary: Correctover CCS MCP Server — local-first MCP/Agent security tooling: receipt verification, batch audit, field-level tamper localization, and 14-rule MCP config checkup. Zero network egress, zero third-party dependencies.
+Author-email: Correctover <wangguigui@correctover.com>
+License-Expression: LicenseRef-Elastic-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://correctover.com
+Project-URL: Documentation, https://correctover.com/docs
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/DSHCorrectover/ccs-conformance-vectors
+Project-URL: Issues, https://correctover.com/support
+Project-URL: Changelog, https://correctover.com/docs/changelog
+Keywords: mcp,model-context-protocol,security,agent-security,ed25519,receipt-verification,tamper-detection,forensics,llm,ai-agent,supply-chain
+Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Information Technology
+Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.9
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Quality Assurance
+Classifier: Typing :: Typed
+Requires-Python: >=3.9
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# correctover-ccs-mcp
+
+**Correctover CCS MCP Server** — local-first MCP/Agent security tooling, exposed as MCP tools for Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf, and any MCP client.
+
+**Zero network egress. Zero third-party dependencies. Data never leaves your machine.**
+
+[![MCP](https://img.shields.io/badge/MCP-compatible-blue)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
+[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Elastic--2.0-green)](./LICENSE)
+[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.9%2B-blue)](https://www.python.org)
+
+---
+
+## Why this exists
+
+Every verification tool in this space gives you the same two-word answer: `PASS` or `FAIL`.
+
+That is not enough when you actually have to resolve an incident. When a signed agent decision record has been altered, you do not need to know *that* something changed — you need to know **which field, on which layer, changed from what to what**.
+
+This server exposes four tools, one of which does exactly that.
+
+| Tool | What it does | Who else does it |
+|---|---|---|
+| `ccs_locate_tampering` | **Field-level tamper localization** — returns RFC 6901 JSON-Pointer paths, before/after values, and severity grading | ❌ Nobody (see below) |
+| `ccs_verify_receipt` | Ed25519 signature + RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256 + schema verification | ✅ Many |
+| `ccs_audit_batch` | Batch audit up to 200 receipts, pass rate, tamper index list, optional hash-chain check | ⚠️ Few |
+| `ccs_checkup_mcp_config` | 14-rule static security checkup on MCP/Agent configs | ⚠️ Some |
+
+### The differentiator, concretely
+
+Given an original receipt and a suspect copy, `ccs_locate_tampering` returns this — not a boolean:
+
+```
+  critical  path=/checks/security/detail   (dotted: checks.security.detail)
+  critical  path=/checks/security/status   (dotted: checks.security.status)
+  high      path=/reason                   (dotted: reason)
+  critical  path=/verdict                  (dotted: verdict)
+```
+
+Sigstore, C2PA, and comparable tools return only `signatureValid: false`. That tells you the artifact is bad. It does not tell you what to fix, or what to argue in a dispute.
+
+---
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pip install correctover-ccs-mcp
+```
+
+Or from source:
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/DSHCorrectover/ccs-conformance-vectors
+cd ccs-conformance-vectors/ccs-mcp-server/correctover-ccs-mcp
+pip install -e .
+```
+
+## Configure your MCP client
+
+**Claude Desktop** (`~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json` on macOS,
+`%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json` on Windows):
+
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "correctover-ccs": {
+      "command": "correctover-ccs-mcp"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Cursor / Cline / Windsurf** use the same `mcpServers` shape. If you prefer to run it without installing:
+
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "correctover-ccs": {
+      "command": "python",
+      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/correctover_ccs_mcp/server.py"]
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Providing public keys
+
+CCS receipts carry `public_key_id`, **not** an inline public key — a self-declared key is not a trust root. Supply the key in whichever way fits your setup:
+
+| Method | How |
+|---|---|
+| Tool argument | `public_key_pem` parameter on `ccs_verify_receipt` / `ccs_audit_batch` |
+| Environment variable | `CCS_PUBLIC_KEY` — the PEM text directly |
+| Key directory | `CCS_PUBKEY_DIR` — looks up `<public_key_id>.pem` |
+
+If no key resolves, verification **fails closed** with a message telling you the `public_key_id` to fetch. It never assumes.
+
+---
+
+## Usage examples
+
+### Localize tampering
+
+> *"Compare `original.json` and `suspect-receipt.json` and tell me exactly what was changed."*
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "ccs_locate_tampering",
+  "arguments": {
+    "original": { "...": "..." },
+    "suspect":  { "...": "..." }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Audit a batch with hash-chain checking
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "ccs_audit_batch",
+  "arguments": {
+    "batch": { "receipts": [ "...", "..." ] },
+    "check_chain": true
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Returns `total` / `valid` / `invalid` / `pass_rate` / `tampered_indexes` / `fail_reason_distribution`, plus `chain_check` when requested.
+
+### Check up an MCP config before you run it
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "ccs_checkup_mcp_config",
+  "arguments": { "config": { "mcpServers": { "...": {} } } }
+}
+```
+
+Returns `risk_level` plus per-finding `rule_id`, `severity` (CRIT/HIGH/MED/LOW), `evidence`, and `remediation`.
+
+---
+
+## Verify this package yourself
+
+Nothing here asks for your trust. Three commands:
+
+```bash
+# 1. Offline self-test — runs all four tools against bundled examples
+python -m correctover_ccs_mcp.server --selftest
+
+# 2. Full test suite (42 tests, incl. real MCP subprocess handshake)
+python -m pytest tests/ -v
+
+# 3. Inspect the tool contracts without connecting a client
+python -m correctover_ccs_mcp.server --list-tools
+```
+
+All four tools are exercised in both directions — valid inputs must pass, and tampered, wrong-key, and missing-key inputs must be **rejected**, not silently allowed.
+
+---
+
+## Tool reference
+
+### `ccs_verify_receipt`
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Required | `receipt` (object) |
+| Optional | `public_key_pem` (string) |
+| Returns | `valid`, `verdict`, `public_key_source`, full `result.evidence` (JCS byte count, SHA-256 digest, content-hash match, Ed25519 status, schema check) |
+
+### `ccs_audit_batch`
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Required | `batch` (array, or `{"receipts": [...]}`) |
+| Optional | `check_chain` (bool, default `false`), `public_key_pem` (string) |
+| Limit | 200 receipts per call — **hard cap, oversized batches are rejected, never truncated** |
+| Returns | `total`, `valid`, `invalid`, `pass_rate`, `tampered_indexes`, `fail_reason_distribution`, per-receipt `results`, plus `chain_check` when requested |
+
+### `ccs_checkup_mcp_config`
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Required | `config` (object) |
+| Accepts | `{"mcpServers": {...}}`, `{"config": {"mcpServers": {...}}}`, or a bare `{name: {...}}` map |
+| Returns | `risk_level`, `summary` (per-severity counts), `findings[]` with `rule_id` / `severity` / `evidence` / `remediation` |
+
+Covers hardcoded credentials, arbitrary command execution, writable filesystem mounts, SSRF surface, cleartext HTTP, unpinned package runners, and more.
+
+### `ccs_locate_tampering`
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Required | `original` (object), `suspect` (object) |
+| Returns | `tampered` (bool), `changes[]` with `path` (**RFC 6901 JSON-Pointer**), `path_dotted` (original form), `change` type, `original` / `suspect` values, `severity`, `remediation` |
+
+---
+
+## Design decisions worth knowing
+
+**Fail-closed, not fail-open.** Missing public key, unparseable config, oversized batch, malformed diff input — every one of these returns an explicit error. There is no path where a malformed input produces an affirmative verification result.
+
+**No network imports.** The server source imports no HTTP or socket libraries. This is enforced by a test, not just a promise: `test_no_network_imports` fails the build if one is introduced.
+
+**Evidence, not verdicts.** `ccs_verify_receipt` returns the JCS canonical byte count, the recomputed SHA-256, the content-hash comparison result, and the raw Ed25519 status. You can audit our reasoning rather than accept our conclusion.
+
+**JSON-Pointer at the boundary.** The engine internally uses dotted paths; the MCP boundary normalizes to RFC 6901 and keeps the dotted form in `path_dotted`. Converted, not replaced.
+
+**No third-party dependencies.** Ed25519, JCS canonicalization, and SHA-256 are implemented against the Python standard library. `pip install` pulls nothing else.
+
+---
+
+## What this tool does NOT do
+
+- **It does not establish trust in a public key.** It verifies that a signature matches a key you supplied. Where that key came from is your problem, and rightly so.
+- **It does not prove business impact.** A receipt can be cryptographically pristine and describe something that should never have happened. Signature validity and correctness of the underlying action are different questions.
+- **It does not replace human audit.** The 14-rule checkup is a fast static triage over config documents. Runtime behavior, tool implementation code, permission boundaries, and data flows require manual review.
+- **It does not provide third-party dated attestation.** That is a separate, optional service. Everything here runs locally and produces a local verdict.
+
+---
+
+## License
+
+**Elastic License 2.0** — see [LICENSE](./LICENSE).
+
+Open standard, proprietary engine. You may use, copy, distribute, and modify this software.
+You may not provide it to third parties as a hosted or managed service.
+
+---
+
+## Support
+
+- Documentation — <https://correctover.com/docs>
+- Issues — <https://correctover.com/support>
+
+---
+
+*Correctover — AI Reliability*

correctover_ccs_mcp-1.0.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+# correctover-ccs-mcp
+
+**Correctover CCS MCP Server** — local-first MCP/Agent security tooling, exposed as MCP tools for Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf, and any MCP client.
+
+**Zero network egress. Zero third-party dependencies. Data never leaves your machine.**
+
+[![MCP](https://img.shields.io/badge/MCP-compatible-blue)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io)
+[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Elastic--2.0-green)](./LICENSE)
+[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.9%2B-blue)](https://www.python.org)
+
+---
+
+## Why this exists
+
+Every verification tool in this space gives you the same two-word answer: `PASS` or `FAIL`.
+
+That is not enough when you actually have to resolve an incident. When a signed agent decision record has been altered, you do not need to know *that* something changed — you need to know **which field, on which layer, changed from what to what**.
+
+This server exposes four tools, one of which does exactly that.
+
+| Tool | What it does | Who else does it |
+|---|---|---|
+| `ccs_locate_tampering` | **Field-level tamper localization** — returns RFC 6901 JSON-Pointer paths, before/after values, and severity grading | ❌ Nobody (see below) |
+| `ccs_verify_receipt` | Ed25519 signature + RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256 + schema verification | ✅ Many |
+| `ccs_audit_batch` | Batch audit up to 200 receipts, pass rate, tamper index list, optional hash-chain check | ⚠️ Few |
+| `ccs_checkup_mcp_config` | 14-rule static security checkup on MCP/Agent configs | ⚠️ Some |
+
+### The differentiator, concretely
+
+Given an original receipt and a suspect copy, `ccs_locate_tampering` returns this — not a boolean:
+
+```
+  critical  path=/checks/security/detail   (dotted: checks.security.detail)
+  critical  path=/checks/security/status   (dotted: checks.security.status)
+  high      path=/reason                   (dotted: reason)
+  critical  path=/verdict                  (dotted: verdict)
+```
+
+Sigstore, C2PA, and comparable tools return only `signatureValid: false`. That tells you the artifact is bad. It does not tell you what to fix, or what to argue in a dispute.
+
+---
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pip install correctover-ccs-mcp
+```
+
+Or from source:
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/DSHCorrectover/ccs-conformance-vectors
+cd ccs-conformance-vectors/ccs-mcp-server/correctover-ccs-mcp
+pip install -e .
+```
+
+## Configure your MCP client
+
+**Claude Desktop** (`~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json` on macOS,
+`%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json` on Windows):
+
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "correctover-ccs": {
+      "command": "correctover-ccs-mcp"
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Cursor / Cline / Windsurf** use the same `mcpServers` shape. If you prefer to run it without installing:
+
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "correctover-ccs": {
+      "command": "python",
+      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/correctover_ccs_mcp/server.py"]
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Providing public keys
+
+CCS receipts carry `public_key_id`, **not** an inline public key — a self-declared key is not a trust root. Supply the key in whichever way fits your setup:
+
+| Method | How |
+|---|---|
+| Tool argument | `public_key_pem` parameter on `ccs_verify_receipt` / `ccs_audit_batch` |
+| Environment variable | `CCS_PUBLIC_KEY` — the PEM text directly |
+| Key directory | `CCS_PUBKEY_DIR` — looks up `<public_key_id>.pem` |
+
+If no key resolves, verification **fails closed** with a message telling you the `public_key_id` to fetch. It never assumes.
+
+---
+
+## Usage examples
+
+### Localize tampering
+
+> *"Compare `original.json` and `suspect-receipt.json` and tell me exactly what was changed."*
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "ccs_locate_tampering",
+  "arguments": {
+    "original": { "...": "..." },
+    "suspect":  { "...": "..." }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Audit a batch with hash-chain checking
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "ccs_audit_batch",
+  "arguments": {
+    "batch": { "receipts": [ "...", "..." ] },
+    "check_chain": true
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Returns `total` / `valid` / `invalid` / `pass_rate` / `tampered_indexes` / `fail_reason_distribution`, plus `chain_check` when requested.
+
+### Check up an MCP config before you run it
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "ccs_checkup_mcp_config",
+  "arguments": { "config": { "mcpServers": { "...": {} } } }
+}
+```
+
+Returns `risk_level` plus per-finding `rule_id`, `severity` (CRIT/HIGH/MED/LOW), `evidence`, and `remediation`.
+
+---
+
+## Verify this package yourself
+
+Nothing here asks for your trust. Three commands:
+
+```bash
+# 1. Offline self-test — runs all four tools against bundled examples
+python -m correctover_ccs_mcp.server --selftest
+
+# 2. Full test suite (42 tests, incl. real MCP subprocess handshake)
+python -m pytest tests/ -v
+
+# 3. Inspect the tool contracts without connecting a client
+python -m correctover_ccs_mcp.server --list-tools
+```
+
+All four tools are exercised in both directions — valid inputs must pass, and tampered, wrong-key, and missing-key inputs must be **rejected**, not silently allowed.
+
+---
+
+## Tool reference
+
+### `ccs_verify_receipt`
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Required | `receipt` (object) |
+| Optional | `public_key_pem` (string) |
+| Returns | `valid`, `verdict`, `public_key_source`, full `result.evidence` (JCS byte count, SHA-256 digest, content-hash match, Ed25519 status, schema check) |
+
+### `ccs_audit_batch`
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Required | `batch` (array, or `{"receipts": [...]}`) |
+| Optional | `check_chain` (bool, default `false`), `public_key_pem` (string) |
+| Limit | 200 receipts per call — **hard cap, oversized batches are rejected, never truncated** |
+| Returns | `total`, `valid`, `invalid`, `pass_rate`, `tampered_indexes`, `fail_reason_distribution`, per-receipt `results`, plus `chain_check` when requested |
+
+### `ccs_checkup_mcp_config`
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Required | `config` (object) |
+| Accepts | `{"mcpServers": {...}}`, `{"config": {"mcpServers": {...}}}`, or a bare `{name: {...}}` map |
+| Returns | `risk_level`, `summary` (per-severity counts), `findings[]` with `rule_id` / `severity` / `evidence` / `remediation` |
+
+Covers hardcoded credentials, arbitrary command execution, writable filesystem mounts, SSRF surface, cleartext HTTP, unpinned package runners, and more.
+
+### `ccs_locate_tampering`
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Required | `original` (object), `suspect` (object) |
+| Returns | `tampered` (bool), `changes[]` with `path` (**RFC 6901 JSON-Pointer**), `path_dotted` (original form), `change` type, `original` / `suspect` values, `severity`, `remediation` |
+
+---
+
+## Design decisions worth knowing
+
+**Fail-closed, not fail-open.** Missing public key, unparseable config, oversized batch, malformed diff input — every one of these returns an explicit error. There is no path where a malformed input produces an affirmative verification result.
+
+**No network imports.** The server source imports no HTTP or socket libraries. This is enforced by a test, not just a promise: `test_no_network_imports` fails the build if one is introduced.
+
+**Evidence, not verdicts.** `ccs_verify_receipt` returns the JCS canonical byte count, the recomputed SHA-256, the content-hash comparison result, and the raw Ed25519 status. You can audit our reasoning rather than accept our conclusion.
+
+**JSON-Pointer at the boundary.** The engine internally uses dotted paths; the MCP boundary normalizes to RFC 6901 and keeps the dotted form in `path_dotted`. Converted, not replaced.
+
+**No third-party dependencies.** Ed25519, JCS canonicalization, and SHA-256 are implemented against the Python standard library. `pip install` pulls nothing else.
+
+---
+
+## What this tool does NOT do
+
+- **It does not establish trust in a public key.** It verifies that a signature matches a key you supplied. Where that key came from is your problem, and rightly so.
+- **It does not prove business impact.** A receipt can be cryptographically pristine and describe something that should never have happened. Signature validity and correctness of the underlying action are different questions.
+- **It does not replace human audit.** The 14-rule checkup is a fast static triage over config documents. Runtime behavior, tool implementation code, permission boundaries, and data flows require manual review.
+- **It does not provide third-party dated attestation.** That is a separate, optional service. Everything here runs locally and produces a local verdict.
+
+---
+
+## License
+
+**Elastic License 2.0** — see [LICENSE](./LICENSE).
+
+Open standard, proprietary engine. You may use, copy, distribute, and modify this software.
+You may not provide it to third parties as a hosted or managed service.
+
+---
+
+## Support
+
+- Documentation — <https://correctover.com/docs>
+- Issues — <https://correctover.com/support>
+
+---
+
+*Correctover — AI Reliability*

correctover_ccs_mcp-1.0.0/pyproject.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+[build-system]
+requires = ["setuptools>=77", "wheel"]
+build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
+
+[project]
+name = "correctover-ccs-mcp"
+version = "1.0.0"
+description = "Correctover CCS MCP Server — local-first MCP/Agent security tooling: receipt verification, batch audit, field-level tamper localization, and 14-rule MCP config checkup. Zero network egress, zero third-party dependencies."
+readme = "README.md"
+requires-python = ">=3.9"
+# SPDX 字符串形式（setuptools>=77）。Elastic-2.0 无 SPDX 官方标识，
+# 按 PEP 639 用 LicenseRef 表达，避免用已废弃的 TOML table 写法。
+license = "LicenseRef-Elastic-2.0"
+license-files = ["LICENSE"]
+authors = [{ name = "Correctover", email = "wangguigui@correctover.com" }]
+keywords = [
+  "mcp", "model-context-protocol", "security", "agent-security",
+  "ed25519", "receipt-verification", "tamper-detection", "forensics",
+  "llm", "ai-agent", "supply-chain",
+]
+classifiers = [
+  "Development Status :: 4 - Beta",
+  "Intended Audience :: Developers",
+  "Intended Audience :: Information Technology",
+  "Operating System :: OS Independent",
+  "Programming Language :: Python :: 3",
+  "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.9",
+  "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10",
+  "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11",
+  "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12",
+  "Topic :: Security",
+  "Topic :: Software Development :: Quality Assurance",
+  "Typing :: Typed",
+]
+
+[project.urls]
+Homepage = "https://correctover.com"
+Documentation = "https://correctover.com/docs"
+Repository = "https://github.com/DSHCorrectover/ccs-conformance-vectors"
+Issues = "https://correctover.com/support"
+Changelog = "https://correctover.com/docs/changelog"
+
+[project.scripts]
+correctover-ccs-mcp = "correctover_ccs_mcp.server:main"
+
+[tool.setuptools]
+package-dir = { "" = "src" }
+
+[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
+where = ["src"]
+
+[tool.setuptools.package-data]
+correctover_ccs_mcp = ["scripts/*.py", "examples/*"]

correctover_ccs_mcp-1.0.0/setup.cfg

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+[egg_info]
+tag_build = 
+tag_date = 0
+

correctover_ccs_mcp-1.0.0/src/correctover_ccs_mcp/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+"""Correctover CCS MCP Server —— 本地优先的 MCP/Agent 安全验证工具集。
+
+暴露四个 MCP 工具：
+    ccs_verify_receipt       单张收据验签（Ed25519 + JCS + SHA-256 + schema）
+    ccs_audit_batch          批量审计（≤200 张，通过率 / 篡改清单 / 哈希链）
+    ccs_checkup_mcp_config   MCP/Agent 配置 14 项静态安全体检
+    ccs_locate_tampering     字段级篡改定位（JSON-Pointer 路径 + 严重度分级）
+
+默认纯本地离线：零网络、零三方依赖、数据不出本机。
+"""
+__version__ = "1.0.0"