coretrace-python-analyzer 0.12.0__tar.gz → 0.14.0__tar.gz

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,25 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 0.14.0 (2026-09-26)
+
+### Precision
+
+- `ssrf` judges a flow on how `+` and f-strings build its URL. A fixed host is a limited proof: when constant text fixes `scheme://host` and ends the authority with `/`, `?` or `#` before any input, as in `"https://api.example.com/users/" + id`, the flow is a hotspot, because the input still chooses the path and a redirect may lead elsewhere. It is refuted only when the constant text fixes the path too, the input reaching the query or fragment only, and the call disables redirects (`allow_redirects=False`, `follow_redirects=False`). A module-level name counts as known text when the module binds it once to a string literal and never rebinds it. Everything else stays a vulnerability, including a base of unknown value such as an imported `BASE_URL`, which may leave the authority open. The advisory correlation keeps its own verdict. The regression corpus is unchanged: its six `ssrf` findings build their URL from values of unknown content (#165).
+
+### Plugins
+
+- `TaintDetector.judge(ctx, function, flow, verdict)` lets a rule refine the refutation's verdict on a flow for its own findings, without changing the verdict other consumers of the flow read (#165).
+
+## 0.13.0 (2026-09-26)
+
+### Precision
+
+- The text attributes and URL parameters of a request object carry no `NOSQL`. Django, REST framework, aiohttp and tornado views read a request tainted as a whole, so `request.GET["name"]` and a URL parameter were `nosql-injection` like the body. Now `GET`, `POST`, `COOKIES`, `META`, `headers`, `query_params`, aiohttp's `query` and `match_info`, tornado's `arguments` and the other text attributes are text, and so are the URL parameters a view receives after the request. The body, the files, REST framework's `data` and aiohttp's `json()` keep the kinds of the request. The other kinds are unchanged, and so is the regression corpus. A helper function the request is passed to still reads it as a whole (#162).
+
+### Plugins
+
+- A `RequestObject(symbol, text=())` model says that the inputs from an entry point, a route registrar, a typed parameter or a source are request objects, and which of their attributes are text (#162).
+
 ## 0.12.0 (2026-09-26)
 
 ### Detection

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: coretrace-python-analyzer
-Version: 0.12.0
+Version: 0.14.0
 Summary: Static security analysis infrastructure for Python code
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/CoreTrace/coretrace-python-analyzer
 Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/CoreTrace/coretrace-python-analyzer

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/docs/plugins.md

@@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ ordinary input reaching a database write is not a plaintext credential; `LOG`, f
 values that must not be written to a log as they are; and `PII`, for personal data
 that must not leave the application through a log, a third party or plain storage.
 
+A rule may know more about its own sinks than the refutation does: `judge(ctx, function,
+flow, verdict)` returns the rule's verdict on a flow, given the refutation's, and by
+default returns it unchanged. `ssrf` reads there how the URL is built. The refutation's
+verdict, which other consumers of the flow such as the advisory correlation read, does
+not change; a rule reading more analyses declares them in its `requires`.
+
 ### Security models: `ModelPlugin`
 
 Declares sources, sinks and sanitizers for a library or a framework. A model plugin
@@ -151,6 +157,7 @@ class BottleModels(ModelPlugin):
 | `SafeArgument(symbol, argument, values, position=None, kinds=ALL)` | A call to the sink `symbol` whose `argument` (by keyword, or at `position`) denotes one of `values` is not a sink for `kinds`, such as `yaml.load` with `Loader=yaml.SafeLoader`. Values are written as the analyzer records arguments: a symbol by its canonical name, a constant as Python writes it (`True`). Only a value given explicitly makes the call safe. |
 | `TemplateRender(symbol, position=0, keyword="template_name")` | A call rendering, with autoescaping, the template named by its argument at `position` or `keyword`, such as `render_to_string`. What it returns carries no `HTML` when the name is written in the call and the project's template escapes everything it prints (see the usage guide). |
 | `Validator(symbol, kinds=ALL, argument=0)` | A callable whose truth proves its argument safe for `kinds`, such as `re.fullmatch`. A flow guarded by it is refuted when it carries no other kind into the sink, and is a hotspot otherwise: a redirect validator does not make a shell command safe. `symbol` may be a function of the project, by its project symbol (`python.hc.accounts.views._allow_redirect`), which then counts wherever it is called, in its own module too. |
+| `RequestObject(symbol, text=())` | The inputs from `symbol`, an entry point, a route registrar, a typed parameter or a source, are request objects. A view receives the request first (after `self`), then URL parameters, which are text. Reading one of the request's `text` attributes gives text, as Django's `GET` or aiohttp's `query`; its body and files keep the request's kinds. An attribute read counts only when every source of the value is such a request. |
 | `AuthorizationGuard(symbol, label)` | A decorator or a condition restricting who reaches the code, such as `login_required`; a flow behind it is a hotspot. |
 | `Members(symbol, dynamic=None, defined=(), typed=())` | What the attributes and items of an instance of the class `symbol` give, for objects that give others by name. `typed` maps an attribute to the class of what it gives, called or not, since a call denotes its callee: pymongo's `get_database` gives a `Database`, as Flask-PyMongo's `db` property does. `dynamic`, when set, is the class of every item and of every attribute outside `defined` and `typed`: a pymongo client gives a `Database` by name (`client.shop`, `client["shop"]`), a database a `Collection`. Every path to a collection then denotes the collection class, so a sink on `Collection.find` covers them all. Without `dynamic`, an attribute keeps its path and an item its container's symbol, as for any class. |
 

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/docs/usage.md

@@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ variable is not treated that way yet.
 | `command-injection` | Shell or process execution (`os.system`, `subprocess` with a string, …). |
 | `code-injection` | The code `eval` or `exec` runs; the globals and locals passed with it are data. `dangerous-eval` reports every such call, this rule the ones attacker input reaches. |
 | `sql-injection` | A database statement (`cursor.execute`, SQLAlchemy `text`, Django `raw`, …). Parameters of a parameterised query are not statements. |
-| `nosql-injection` | A NoSQL query, such as a MongoDB filter, given attacker input that may hold a structure: a JSON body giving `{"$ne": null}` matches any value. The input that may hold a structure is JSON, the raw bodies a `json.loads` decodes, files, WebSocket messages and standard input. Text cannot hold an operator: form fields, query parameters, headers, cookies, URL parameters, the command line, the environment, and an entry-point parameter annotated with scalars (`str`, `int`, `Optional[str]`, `Annotated[str, Query()]`, `list[str]`, …), which FastAPI validates. Limits: a Django or aiohttp request object is tainted as a whole, so `request.GET` counts like `request.body`; the keys of a dict are not followed, so a string concatenated into `$where` is not reported. The analyzer ships no NoSQL sink: model plugins declare them. |
+| `nosql-injection` | A NoSQL query, such as a MongoDB filter, given attacker input that may hold a structure: a JSON body giving `{"$ne": null}` matches any value. The input that may hold a structure is JSON, the raw bodies a `json.loads` decodes, files, WebSocket messages and standard input. Text cannot hold an operator: form fields, query parameters, headers, cookies, URL parameters, the command line, the environment, and an entry-point parameter annotated with scalars (`str`, `int`, `Optional[str]`, `Annotated[str, Query()]`, `list[str]`, …), which FastAPI validates. A Django, REST framework, aiohttp or tornado view reads a request object: its text attributes (`GET`, `POST`, `headers`, `query_params`, `query`, `match_info`, `arguments`, …) and the URL parameters after it are text, its body, files and `data` are not. Limits: a helper function the request is passed to reads it as a whole; the keys of a dict are not followed, so a string concatenated into `$where` is not reported. The analyzer ships no NoSQL sink: model plugins declare them. |
 | `path-traversal` | A file system path (`open`, `send_file`, `os.remove`, …). |
-| `ssrf` | The URL of an HTTP client request (Requests, httpx, `urllib`), by position or as `url=`; the body, headers and query parameters are not the destination. |
+| `ssrf` | The URL of an HTTP client request (Requests, httpx, `urllib`), by position or as `url=`; the body, headers and query parameters are not the destination. How `+` and f-strings build the URL can prove part of its destination. When constant text fixes `scheme://host` and ends the authority with `/`, `?` or `#` before any input (`"https://api.example.com/users/" + id`, or a module-level string bound once and never rebound), the flow is a hotspot: the input still chooses the path, which may reach a sensitive resource, and a redirect may lead elsewhere. With the path fixed too, the input reaching the query or fragment only, and the call disabling redirects (`allow_redirects=False`, `follow_redirects=False`), the destination is fixed and the flow is refuted. Anything unproven stays a vulnerability: a base of unknown value (imported, a call result), a constant leaving the authority open (`"https:/"`, no `/` after the host, a variable port), `urljoin`, `%`, `format`, a URL built in a helper function. |
 | `xss` | An HTTP response body built without escaping. A Django template rendered by `render_to_string` escapes, where the analyzer can establish it (below). |
 | `insecure-deserialization` | `pickle`, `marshal`, `dill`, `jsonpickle`, `shelve`, and the YAML loaders (`yaml.load`, `load_all`, `full_load`, `unsafe_load` and their several-document versions); `yaml.load` and `load_all` given a safe loader (`SafeLoader`, `BaseLoader`) are not. |
 | `open-redirect` | An HTTP redirect target. |
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ the directory of the checked file; a path outside it is printed as it is.
 ```json
 {
   "schema_version": 1,
-  "tool": {"name": "coretrace-python-analyzer", "version": "0.12.0"},
+  "tool": {"name": "coretrace-python-analyzer", "version": "0.14.0"},
   "root": "/home/me/project",
   "findings": [
     {
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ bytes. A single-file check lists no components.
 
 ```json
 "tool": {
-  "name": "coretrace-python-analyzer", "version": "0.12.0",
+  "name": "coretrace-python-analyzer", "version": "0.14.0",
   "components": [
     {"kind": "plugin", "name": "curated-advisories", "version": "2026.09.25", "digest": "sha256:…"},
     {"kind": "advisories", "name": "advisories.json", "digest": "sha256:…"}
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ project's behalf would go unseen. Without a lock file, a package is never
 `not_affected`. The document's `@id` derives from its statements, so two runs with the
 same result share it; its `author` is `Unknown Author`, as OpenVEX tools write when they
 cannot know it. Its `tooling` names the analyzer and each component with its digest
-(`coretrace-python-analyzer 0.12.0; curated-advisories 2026.09.25 (sha256:…)`), so the
+(`coretrace-python-analyzer 0.14.0; curated-advisories 2026.09.25 (sha256:…)`), so the
 `@id` changes with the advisory data a statement was decided with.
 
 ## Large projects

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "coretrace-python-analyzer"
-version = "0.12.0"
+version = "0.14.0"
 description = "Static security analysis infrastructure for Python code"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/src/coretrace_python/__init__.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 """CoreTrace's Python static analysis frontend."""
 
-__version__ = "0.12.0"
+__version__ = "0.14.0"
 

coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0/src/coretrace_python/abstract/strings.py

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+"""The constant text a string starts with (architecture §18): what ``+`` and f-strings
+build from string literals and from module-level names bound once to one. Anything
+else, a parameter, a call result, an import, ``%`` or ``format``, is text of unknown
+value."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Mapping
+from types import MappingProxyType
+from typing import ClassVar
+
+from coretrace_python.analysis import Analysis, AnalysisContext, AnyAnalysis
+from coretrace_python.cfg import CFGError
+from coretrace_python.hir import nodes
+from coretrace_python.ir.lowering import (
+    MODULE_BODY,
+    LoweringError,
+    PyIRAnalysis,
+    analyzable_functions,
+)
+from coretrace_python.ir.model import (
+    BinaryOp,
+    BuildString,
+    Constant,
+    ForNext,
+    Global,
+    Instruction,
+    SetGlobal,
+    StoreLocal,
+    Value,
+)
+
+
+def leading_text(value: Value, defs: Mapping[Value, Instruction], strings: Mapping[str, str]) -> tuple[str, bool]:
+    """The constant text ``value`` starts with, and whether that text is all of it, given
+    the definitions of the function's values and the module's ``strings``."""
+
+    made = defs.get(value)
+    if isinstance(made, Constant):
+        return (made.value, True) if isinstance(made.value, str) else ("", False)
+    if isinstance(made, Global):
+        known = strings.get(made.name)
+        return ("", False) if known is None else (known, True)
+    if isinstance(made, BinaryOp) and made.operator == "add":
+        left, whole = leading_text(made.left, defs, strings)
+        if not whole:
+            return left, False
+        right, whole = leading_text(made.right, defs, strings)
+        return left + right, whole
+    if isinstance(made, BuildString):
+        text = ""
+        for part in made.parts:
+            piece, whole = leading_text(part, defs, strings)
+            text += piece
+            if not whole:
+                return text, False
+        return text, True
+    return "", False
+
+
+class ModuleStringsAnalysis(Analysis[Mapping[str, str]]):
+    """The module-level names bound once, to a string literal, and never rebound: by no
+    other statement of the module body, no function assigning them as ``global``, no
+    definition of that name. A module that does not lower entirely has none."""
+
+    name: ClassVar[str] = "abstract.module_strings"
+    requires: ClassVar[frozenset[AnyAnalysis]] = frozenset({PyIRAnalysis})
+
+    @classmethod
+    def compute(cls, ctx: AnalysisContext) -> Mapping[str, str]:
+        try:
+            functions = [ctx.get(PyIRAnalysis, function) for function in analyzable_functions(ctx.module)]
+        except (LoweringError, CFGError):
+            return MappingProxyType({})
+        body = next((function for function in functions if function.name == MODULE_BODY), None)
+        if body is None:
+            return MappingProxyType({})
+        defs = {i.result: i for block in body.blocks for i in block.instructions if i.result is not None}
+        stored: dict[str, list[Value | None]] = {}
+        for block in body.blocks:
+            for instruction in block.instructions:
+                if isinstance(instruction, StoreLocal):
+                    stored.setdefault(instruction.name, []).append(instruction.value)
+            if isinstance(block.terminator, ForNext):
+                # A ``for`` binds its target to each item.
+                stored.setdefault(block.terminator.target, []).append(None)
+        rebound = {
+            i.name for function in functions for block in function.blocks for i in block.instructions
+            if isinstance(i, SetGlobal)
+        }
+        rebound |= {s.name for s in ctx.module.body if isinstance(s, nodes.Function | nodes.Class)}
+        found: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for name, values in stored.items():
+            value = values[0] if len(values) == 1 and name not in rebound else None
+            made = defs.get(value) if value is not None else None
+            if isinstance(made, Constant) and isinstance(made.value, str):
+                found[name] = made.value
+        return MappingProxyType(found)

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/src/coretrace_python/bundled/models/aiohttp/aiohttp_models.py

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from coretrace_python.semantic.symbols import SymbolId
 from coretrace_python.taint import (
     EntryPoint,
     Model,
+    RequestObject,
     RouteRegistrar,
     Sink,
     Source,
@@ -22,6 +23,23 @@ from coretrace_python.taint import (
 _METHODS = ("get", "post", "put", "patch", "delete", "head", "options")
 _REQUEST_CLASSES = ("aiohttp.web.Request", "aiohttp.web_request.Request")
 _ROUTERS = ("aiohttp.web.Application.router", "aiohttp.web.UrlDispatcher")
+# ``@routes.get('/')`` on a ``RouteTableDef``.
+_ROUTE_TABLES = tuple(f"aiohttp.web.RouteTableDef.{method}" for method in (*_METHODS, "route", "view"))
+# ``app.router.add_route('GET', '/', handler)``, ``app.router.add_get('/', handler)`` and
+# ``app.add_routes([web.get('/', handler)])``, each with the argument naming the handler.
+_ROUTE_CALLS = (
+    *((f"{router}.add_route", 2) for router in _ROUTERS),
+    *((f"{router}.add_{method}", 1) for router in _ROUTERS for method in (*_METHODS, "view")),
+    ("aiohttp.web.route", 2),
+    *((f"aiohttp.web.{method}", 1) for method in (*_METHODS, "view")),
+)
+# What a request gives as text; its body (``json()``, ``text()``, ``read()``) may hold a
+# structure.
+_REQUEST_TEXT = (
+    "query", "rel_url", "url", "path", "raw_path", "path_qs", "query_string", "match_info", "headers",
+    "raw_headers", "cookies", "method", "host", "scheme", "remote", "forwarded", "content_type", "charset",
+    "if_modified_since", "post",
+)
 _REDIRECTS = ("HTTPFound", "HTTPMovedPermanently", "HTTPSeeOther", "HTTPTemporaryRedirect", "HTTPPermanentRedirect")
 _CLIENT_FUNCTIONS = (
     *(f"aiohttp.ClientSession.{method}" for method in (*_METHODS, "request")),
@@ -40,18 +58,12 @@ class AiohttpModels(ModelPlugin):
         # The whole request is attacker-controlled: its query, match info, headers,
         # cookies and body all come from the client.
         *(TypedParameter(_sym(cls), "http") for cls in _REQUEST_CLASSES),
-        # ``@routes.get('/')`` on a ``RouteTableDef``.
-        *(EntryPoint(_sym(f"aiohttp.web.RouteTableDef.{method}"), "http") for method in (*_METHODS, "route", "view")),
-        # ``app.router.add_route('GET', '/', handler)`` and ``app.router.add_get('/', handler)``.
-        *(RouteRegistrar(_sym(f"{router}.add_route"), 2, "http", keyword="handler") for router in _ROUTERS),
+        *(EntryPoint(_sym(table), "http") for table in _ROUTE_TABLES),
+        *(RouteRegistrar(_sym(call), argument, "http", keyword="handler") for call, argument in _ROUTE_CALLS),
         *(
-            RouteRegistrar(_sym(f"{router}.add_{method}"), 1, "http", keyword="handler")
-            for router in _ROUTERS
-            for method in (*_METHODS, "view")
+            RequestObject(_sym(symbol), _REQUEST_TEXT)
+            for symbol in (*_REQUEST_CLASSES, *_ROUTE_TABLES, *(call for call, _ in _ROUTE_CALLS))
         ),
-        # ``app.add_routes([web.get('/', handler)])``: the route definitions name the handler.
-        RouteRegistrar(_sym("aiohttp.web.route"), 2, "http", keyword="handler"),
-        *(RouteRegistrar(_sym(f"aiohttp.web.{method}"), 1, "http", keyword="handler") for method in (*_METHODS, "view")),
         Sink(_sym("aiohttp.web.Response"), TaintKind.HTML),
         Sink(_sym("aiohttp.web.FileResponse"), TaintKind.PATH),
         *(Sink(_sym(f"aiohttp.web.{exception}"), TaintKind.REDIRECT) for exception in _REDIRECTS),

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/src/coretrace_python/bundled/models/django/django_models.py

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from coretrace_python.taint import (
     AuthorizationGuard,
     EntryPoint,
     Model,
+    RequestObject,
     RouteRegistrar,
     Sanitizer,
     Sink,
@@ -88,6 +89,23 @@ _AUTHORIZATION_DECORATORS = (
 )
 
 
+# What a request object gives as text: the query string, form fields, headers, cookies
+# and path. Its body, its files and REST framework's parsed ``data`` may hold a structure.
+_REQUEST_TEXT = (
+    "GET", "POST", "COOKIES", "META", "headers", "path", "path_info", "method", "scheme", "encoding",
+    "content_type", "content_params", "resolver_match", "get_full_path", "get_full_path_info",
+    "build_absolute_uri", "get_host", "get_port", "get_signed_cookie", "query_params",
+)
+# Every input a request object comes from: an annotated parameter, a class-based view's
+# method or ``self.request``, a decorated view, a view registered in a URL configuration.
+_REQUEST_INPUTS = (
+    *_REQUEST_CLASSES,
+    *_VIEW_BASES,
+    *(f"{base}.request" for base in _VIEW_BASES),
+    *_VIEW_DECORATORS,
+    *_ROUTE_REGISTRARS,
+)
+
 _TARGET_ONLY = ((TaintKind.REDIRECT, (0,)),)
 
 
@@ -103,6 +121,7 @@ class DjangoModels(ModelPlugin):
         # ``self.request`` in a class-based view: the attribute is inherited from the base.
         *(Source(_sym(f"{base}.request"), "http") for base in _VIEW_BASES),
         *(EntryPoint(_sym(decorator), "http") for decorator in _VIEW_DECORATORS),
+        *(RequestObject(_sym(symbol), _REQUEST_TEXT) for symbol in _REQUEST_INPUTS),
         Sink(_sym("django.db.connection.cursor.execute"), TaintKind.SQL | TaintKind.CREDENTIAL, ((TaintKind.SQL, (0,)),)),
         Sink(_sym("django.db.connection.cursor.executemany"), TaintKind.SQL | TaintKind.CREDENTIAL, ((TaintKind.SQL, (0,)),)),
         Sink(_sym("django.db.models.expressions.RawSQL"), TaintKind.SQL | TaintKind.CREDENTIAL),

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/src/coretrace_python/bundled/models/tornado/tornado_models.py

@@ -8,7 +8,16 @@ from typing import ClassVar
 
 from coretrace_python.plugins import ModelPlugin
 from coretrace_python.semantic.symbols import SymbolId
-from coretrace_python.taint import TEXT_KINDS, EntryPoint, Model, Sanitizer, Sink, Source, TaintKind
+from coretrace_python.taint import (
+    TEXT_KINDS,
+    EntryPoint,
+    Model,
+    RequestObject,
+    Sanitizer,
+    Sink,
+    Source,
+    TaintKind,
+)
 
 _HANDLERS = ("tornado.web.RequestHandler", "tornado.websocket.WebSocketHandler")
 # Text, which cannot hold a query operator; the request object holds the raw body too.
@@ -16,6 +25,11 @@ _TEXT_METHODS = (
     "get_argument", "get_arguments", "get_query_argument", "get_query_arguments",
     "get_body_argument", "get_body_arguments", "get_cookie", "path_args", "path_kwargs",
 )
+# What ``self.request`` gives as text; its body and files may hold a structure.
+_REQUEST_TEXT = (
+    "arguments", "query_arguments", "body_arguments", "query", "uri", "path", "headers", "cookies",
+    "method", "host", "host_name", "remote_ip", "protocol", "version", "full_url",
+)
 _CLIENTS = ("tornado.httpclient.AsyncHTTPClient.fetch", "tornado.httpclient.HTTPClient.fetch")
 _TARGET_ONLY = ((TaintKind.REDIRECT, (0,)),)
 
@@ -33,6 +47,7 @@ class TornadoModels(ModelPlugin):
         EntryPoint(_sym("tornado.websocket.WebSocketHandler"), "http"),
         *(Source(_sym(f"{handler}.{method}"), "http", TEXT_KINDS) for handler in _HANDLERS for method in _TEXT_METHODS),
         *(Source(_sym(f"{handler}.request"), "http") for handler in _HANDLERS),
+        *(RequestObject(_sym(f"{handler}.request"), _REQUEST_TEXT) for handler in _HANDLERS),
         *(Sink(_sym(f"{handler}.write"), TaintKind.HTML) for handler in _HANDLERS),
         *(Sink(_sym(f"{handler}.finish"), TaintKind.HTML) for handler in _HANDLERS),
         *(Sink(_sym(f"{handler}.redirect"), TaintKind.REDIRECT, _TARGET_ONLY) for handler in _HANDLERS),

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/src/coretrace_python/bundled/security/ssrf/plugin.toml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name = "ssrf"
 version = "1.0.0"
 plugin_api = ">=1,<2"
-requires = ["taint.flows", "findings.refutation"]
+requires = ["taint.flows", "findings.refutation", "ir.ssa", "abstract.module_strings"]
 provides = ["vulnerability.ssrf"]
 
 [entrypoint]

coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0/src/coretrace_python/bundled/security/ssrf/ssrf.py

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+"""Server-side request forgery: attacker-controlled input reaching a SSRF sink.
+
+How the URL is built, with ``+`` and f-strings, can prove part of its destination. Constant
+text fixing ``scheme://host`` and ending the authority with ``/``, ``?`` or ``#`` before
+any input keeps the input from choosing the host; the input still chooses the path, which
+may reach a sensitive resource of that host, and a redirect may lead elsewhere, so the
+flow is a hotspot. With the path fixed too, the input reaching the query or fragment
+only, and redirects disabled in the call, the destination is fixed and the flow is
+refuted. Anything unproven, a base of unknown value or a URL built in a helper function,
+stays a vulnerability.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from typing import ClassVar
+
+from coretrace_python.abstract.strings import ModuleStringsAnalysis, leading_text
+from coretrace_python.analysis import AnyAnalysis
+from coretrace_python.findings import Severity
+from coretrace_python.findings.refutation import Status, Verdict
+from coretrace_python.hir import nodes
+from coretrace_python.ir.ssa import SSAAnalysis
+from coretrace_python.plugins import PluginContext, TaintDetector
+from coretrace_python.taint import TaintFlow, TaintKind
+
+# ``scheme://`` and an authority ended by ``/``, ``?`` or ``#``. A backslash, which some
+# URL parsers take for a slash, does not end it here.
+_FIXED_HOST = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*://[^/?#\\]+[/?#]")
+# The same with the path fixed too: what follows is query or fragment.
+_FIXED_PATH = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*://[^/?#\\]+(?:/[^?#]*)?[?#]")
+# A client honours the one of these keywords it knows and rejects the other with a
+# ``TypeError``: either way, the call follows no redirect.
+_NO_REDIRECTS = ("allow_redirects", "follow_redirects")
+
+
+class SsrfPlugin(TaintDetector):
+    name: ClassVar[str] = "ssrf"
+    rule_id: ClassVar[str] = "ssrf"
+    kind: ClassVar[TaintKind] = TaintKind.SSRF
+    severity: ClassVar[Severity] = Severity.HIGH
+    title: ClassVar[str] = "Server-side request forgery"
+    requires: ClassVar[frozenset[AnyAnalysis]] = TaintDetector.requires | {SSAAnalysis, ModuleStringsAnalysis}
+
+    def judge(self, ctx: PluginContext, function: nodes.Function, flow: TaintFlow, verdict: Verdict) -> Verdict:
+        if flow.through is not None:
+            return verdict  # the URL is built in the callee
+        ssa = ctx.get(SSAAnalysis, function)
+        defs = {i.result: i for block in ssa.blocks for i in block.instructions if i.result is not None}
+        text, _ = leading_text(flow.argument, defs, ctx.get(ModuleStringsAnalysis))
+        host = _FIXED_HOST.match(text)
+        if host is None:
+            return verdict
+        arguments = flow.sink_arguments
+        no_redirects = arguments is not None and any(arguments.given(name) == (True, "False") for name in _NO_REDIRECTS)
+        if _FIXED_PATH.match(text) is not None:
+            if no_redirects:
+                return Verdict(flow, Status.REFUTED, f"the destination is fixed by {text!r} and redirects are disabled")
+            left = "a redirect may lead elsewhere"
+        else:
+            left = "the input chooses the path" + ("" if no_redirects else ", and a redirect may lead elsewhere")
+        if verdict.status is not Status.VULNERABILITY:
+            return verdict
+        return Verdict(flow, Status.HOTSPOT, f"the host is fixed by {host.group(0)!r}, but {left}")

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/src/coretrace_python/engine.py

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from typing import Any, ClassVar
 
 from coretrace_python import __version__
 from coretrace_python.abstract import ConstantPropagation, HeapAnalysis, RangeAnalysis
+from coretrace_python.abstract.strings import ModuleStringsAnalysis
 from coretrace_python.analysis import (
     AnalysisContext,
     AnalysisManager,
@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ ALL_ANALYSES: tuple[AnyAnalysis, ...] = (
     DefUseAnalysis,
     ConstantPropagation,
     RangeAnalysis,
+    ModuleStringsAnalysis,
     HeapAnalysis,
     CallGraphAnalysis,
     SummaryAnalysis,

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/src/coretrace_python/plugins/detectors.py

@@ -13,13 +13,14 @@ from typing import ClassVar
 
 from coretrace_python.analysis import AnyAnalysis
 from coretrace_python.findings import Confidence, Finding, Severity
-from coretrace_python.findings.refutation import RefutationAnalysis, Status
+from coretrace_python.findings.refutation import RefutationAnalysis, Status, Verdict
+from coretrace_python.hir import nodes
 from coretrace_python.interprocedural import CallGraphAnalysis
 from coretrace_python.ir.model import Call, Instruction, Symbol, Value
 from coretrace_python.ir.ssa import SSAAnalysis
 from coretrace_python.plugins.api import Plugin, PluginContext
 from coretrace_python.semantic.symbols import SymbolId
-from coretrace_python.taint import TaintAnalysis, TaintKind
+from coretrace_python.taint import TaintAnalysis, TaintFlow, TaintKind
 
 
 class TaintDetector(Plugin):
@@ -40,6 +41,9 @@ class TaintDetector(Plugin):
                 if not flow.kinds & self.kind:
                     continue
                 verdict = verdicts.verdict(flow)
+                if verdict.status is Status.REFUTED:
+                    continue
+                verdict = self.judge(ctx, function, flow, verdict)
                 if verdict.status is Status.REFUTED:
                     continue
                 message = f"{self.title}: {flow.source.label} input reaches {flow.sink.symbol}"
@@ -70,6 +74,13 @@ class TaintDetector(Plugin):
                 )
         return findings
 
+    def judge(self, ctx: PluginContext, function: nodes.Function, flow: TaintFlow, verdict: Verdict) -> Verdict:
+        """This rule's verdict on ``flow``, given the refutation's: the same, unless the rule
+        knows more about its own sinks. The refutation's verdict, which other consumers
+        of the flow read, does not change."""
+
+        return verdict
+
 
 def _lower(confidence: Confidence) -> Confidence:
     return {Confidence.HIGH: Confidence.MEDIUM}.get(confidence, Confidence.LOW)

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/src/coretrace_python/taint/__init__.py

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from coretrace_python.taint.models import (
     ModelError,
     ModelTable,
     NamedParameter,
+    RequestObject,
     RouteRegistrar,
     SafeArgument,
     Sanitizer,
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ __all__ = [
     "ModelTable",
     "NamedParameter",
     "RegisteredRoutes",
+    "RequestObject",
     "RouteRegistrar",
     "Routes",
     "SafeArgument",

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.12.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.14.0}/src/coretrace_python/taint/engine.py

@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ from coretrace_python.semantic.scopes import ScopeAnalysis, ScopeId, ScopeTable
 from coretrace_python.semantic.symbols import SymbolAnalysis, SymbolId, SymbolTable
 from coretrace_python.source import SourceSpan
 from coretrace_python.taint.models import (
+    TEXT_KINDS,
     EntryPoint,
     ModelTable,
     SecurityModelAnalysis,
@@ -84,6 +85,9 @@ from coretrace_python.taint.models import (
 from coretrace_python.taint.routes import RegisteredRoutes, Routes
 from coretrace_python.taint.templates import EscapedTemplates
 
+# What only a structure carries, and text does not.
+_STRUCTURED = TaintKind.ALL & ~TEXT_KINDS
+
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class Taint:
@@ -274,19 +278,42 @@ class _TaintProblem(DataflowProblem[State]):
         taint = Taint.none()
         symbol = self.symbols.get(instruction.result) if instruction.result else None
         if symbol is not None:
-            source = self.models.source_covering(symbol)
-            if source is not None:
-                taint = Taint(source.kinds, frozenset({source}))
+            taint = self.covered(symbol)
         if isinstance(instruction, Symbol | Compare):
             return taint
         for operand in instruction.operands():
-            taint = taint.join(state.get(operand, Taint.none()))
+            operand_taint = state.get(operand, Taint.none())
+            if isinstance(instruction, GetAttr):
+                operand_taint = self.attribute(operand_taint, instruction.attribute)
+            taint = taint.join(operand_taint)
         if isinstance(instruction, BuildList | BuildTuple | BuildDict | BuildSet):
             # ``[*xs]`` and ``{**d}`` copy the contents of what they unpack.
             for unpacked in instruction.unpacked:
                 taint = taint.join(self.deep(unpacked, state))
         return taint
 
+    def covered(self, symbol: SymbolId) -> Taint:
+        """The taint of the source covering ``symbol``, if any. Below a request source, as
+        ``self.request.GET`` is, it is the taint of the request attribute read."""
+
+        source = self.models.source_covering(symbol)
+        if source is None:
+            return Taint.none()
+        taint = Taint(source.kinds, frozenset({source}))
+        if symbol == source.symbol:
+            return taint
+        read = symbol.canonical_name.removeprefix(f"{source.symbol.canonical_name}.").split(".")[0]
+        return self.attribute(taint, read)
+
+    def attribute(self, taint: Taint, name: str) -> Taint:
+        """What attribute ``name`` of a value carrying ``taint`` carries: text when every
+        source of the value is a request object listing ``name`` among its text attributes."""
+
+        requests = [self.models.request_object(source.symbol) for source in taint.sources]
+        if taint and all(request is not None and name in request.text for request in requests):
+            return taint.without(_STRUCTURED)
+        return taint
+
     def call(self, call: Call, state: dict[Key, Taint], flows: list[TaintFlow]) -> Taint:
         arguments = tuple(self.deep(a, state) for a in call.arguments)
         keywords = Taint.none()
@@ -420,11 +447,7 @@ class _TaintProblem(DataflowProblem[State]):
         if cleared:
             return everything.without(TaintKind(cleared))
         # A method on a tainted object returns tainted data (``request.args.get``).
-        everything = everything.join(state.get(call.callee, Taint.none()))
-        source = self.models.source_covering(symbol)
-        if source is not None:
-            return everything.join(Taint(source.kinds, frozenset({source})))
-        return everything
+        return everything.join(state.get(call.callee, Taint.none())).join(self.covered(symbol))
 
     def guarded(self, sink: Sink | None, arguments: Arguments) -> Sink | None:
         """The sink as this call makes it: an argument declared safe (``yaml.load`` with
@@ -777,7 +800,8 @@ def parameter_sources(
     entry point (``self`` excepted for a method), including one registered elsewhere
     (``routes``), and every parameter annotated with a typed-parameter symbol. An entry
     point's parameter annotated with scalars is text: FastAPI validates it before the
-    handler runs, and a scalar cannot hold a query operator."""
+    handler runs, and a scalar cannot hold a query operator. So are the URL parameters
+    a view receives after a request object."""
 
     owner = _owner(module, function)
     sources: dict[int, Source] = {}
@@ -786,10 +810,13 @@ def parameter_sources(
     entry = function_entry_point(function, module, models, scopes, symbols, instances, routes)
     if entry is not None:
         first = 1 if owner is not None else 0
+        request = models.request_object(entry.symbol)
         for index in range(first, len(function.parameters)):
             annotation = function.parameters[index].annotation
-            scalar = annotation is not None and _scalar(annotation, symbols, enclosing)
-            kinds = entry.kinds & ~TaintKind.NOSQL if scalar else entry.kinds
+            text = (request is not None and index > first) or (
+                annotation is not None and _scalar(annotation, symbols, enclosing)
+            )
+            kinds = entry.kinds & ~_STRUCTURED if text else entry.kinds
             sources[index] = Source(entry.symbol, entry.label, kinds)
     for index, parameter in enumerate(function.parameters):
         if parameter.annotation is None: