coretrace-python-analyzer 0.10.0__tar.gz → 0.11.0__tar.gz

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 0.11.0 (2026-09-25)
+
+### Detection
+
+- `code-injection` reports attacker input reaching the code `eval` or `exec` runs, with the same verdicts as the other taint rules. The globals and locals passed with the code are data, not code. `dangerous-eval` still reports every call to `eval` or `exec`, whatever it runs. The regression corpus gains three findings, each reviewed as a true positive: pygoat's `mitre_lab_25_api` and `cmd_lab2` evaluate a POST field, and the `vulnerable-flask` fixture evaluates a query parameter (#152).
+
 ## 0.10.0 (2026-09-25)
 
 ### Reports

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: coretrace-python-analyzer
-Version: 0.10.0
+Version: 0.11.0
 Summary: Static security analysis infrastructure for Python code
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/CoreTrace/coretrace-python-analyzer
 Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/CoreTrace/coretrace-python-analyzer

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/docs/usage.md

@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ variable is not treated that way yet.
 | Rule | Reached sink |
 |---|---|
 | `command-injection` | Shell or process execution (`os.system`, `subprocess` with a string, …). |
+| `code-injection` | The code `eval` or `exec` runs; the globals and locals passed with it are data. `dangerous-eval` reports every such call, this rule the ones attacker input reaches. |
 | `sql-injection` | A database statement (`cursor.execute`, SQLAlchemy `text`, Django `raw`, …). Parameters of a parameterised query are not statements. |
 | `path-traversal` | A file system path (`open`, `send_file`, `os.remove`, …). |
 | `ssrf` | The URL of an HTTP client request (Requests, httpx, `urllib`), by position or as `url=`; the body, headers and query parameters are not the destination. |
@@ -239,7 +240,7 @@ the directory of the checked file; a path outside it is printed as it is.
 ```json
 {
   "schema_version": 1,
-  "tool": {"name": "coretrace-python-analyzer", "version": "0.10.0"},
+  "tool": {"name": "coretrace-python-analyzer", "version": "0.11.0"},
   "root": "/home/me/project",
   "findings": [
     {
@@ -271,7 +272,7 @@ bytes. A single-file check lists no components.
 
 ```json
 "tool": {
-  "name": "coretrace-python-analyzer", "version": "0.10.0",
+  "name": "coretrace-python-analyzer", "version": "0.11.0",
   "components": [
     {"kind": "plugin", "name": "curated-advisories", "version": "2026.09.25", "digest": "sha256:…"},
     {"kind": "advisories", "name": "advisories.json", "digest": "sha256:…"}
@@ -434,7 +435,7 @@ project's behalf would go unseen. Without a lock file, a package is never
 `not_affected`. The document's `@id` derives from its statements, so two runs with the
 same result share it; its `author` is `Unknown Author`, as OpenVEX tools write when they
 cannot know it. Its `tooling` names the analyzer and each component with its digest
-(`coretrace-python-analyzer 0.10.0; curated-advisories 2026.09.25 (sha256:…)`), so the
+(`coretrace-python-analyzer 0.11.0; curated-advisories 2026.09.25 (sha256:…)`), so the
 `@id` changes with the advisory data a statement was decided with.
 
 ## Large projects

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "coretrace-python-analyzer"
-version = "0.10.0"
+version = "0.11.0"
 description = "Static security analysis infrastructure for Python code"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/src/coretrace_python/__init__.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 """CoreTrace's Python static analysis frontend."""
 
-__version__ = "0.10.0"
+__version__ = "0.11.0"
 

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/src/coretrace_python/bundled/models/python_stdlib/python_stdlib.py

@@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ class PythonStdlibModels(ModelPlugin):
         Sink(_sym("subprocess.check_call"), TaintKind.COMMAND),
         Sink(_sym("subprocess.check_output"), TaintKind.COMMAND),
         Sink(_sym("subprocess.Popen"), TaintKind.COMMAND),
-        Sink(_sym("builtins.eval"), TaintKind.CODE),
-        Sink(_sym("builtins.exec"), TaintKind.CODE),
+        # The code is the first argument; the globals and locals it runs with are data.
+        Sink(_sym("builtins.eval"), TaintKind.CODE, ((TaintKind.CODE, (0,)),)),
+        Sink(_sym("builtins.exec"), TaintKind.CODE, ((TaintKind.CODE, (0,)),)),
         Sink(_sym("builtins.open"), TaintKind.PATH),
         Sink(_sym("os.remove"), TaintKind.PATH),
         Sink(_sym("os.unlink"), TaintKind.PATH),

coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0/src/coretrace_python/bundled/security/code_injection/code_injection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+"""Code injection: attacker-controlled input reaching a CODE sink, such as the code
+``eval`` or ``exec`` runs. ``dangerous-eval`` reports every such call; this rule reports
+the ones attacker input reaches."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import ClassVar
+
+from coretrace_python.findings import Severity
+from coretrace_python.plugins import TaintDetector
+from coretrace_python.taint import TaintKind
+
+
+class CodeInjectionPlugin(TaintDetector):
+    name: ClassVar[str] = "code-injection"
+    rule_id: ClassVar[str] = "code-injection"
+    kind: ClassVar[TaintKind] = TaintKind.CODE
+    severity: ClassVar[Severity] = Severity.HIGH
+    title: ClassVar[str] = "Code injection"

coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0/src/coretrace_python/bundled/security/code_injection/plugin.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+name = "code-injection"
+version = "1.0.0"
+plugin_api = ">=1,<2"
+requires = ["taint.flows", "findings.refutation"]
+provides = ["vulnerability.code-injection"]
+
+[entrypoint]
+module = "code_injection"
+class = "CodeInjectionPlugin"

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/tests/regression/expected/pygoat.json

@@ -105,6 +105,13 @@
       "rule": "weak-crypto",
       "function": "csrf_lab_login"
     },
+    {
+      "file": "introduction/mitre.py",
+      "line": 218,
+      "rule": "code-injection",
+      "function": "mitre_lab_25_api",
+      "verdict": "vulnerability"
+    },
     {
       "file": "introduction/mitre.py",
       "line": 218,
@@ -175,6 +182,13 @@
       "function": "cmd_lab",
       "verdict": "vulnerability"
     },
+    {
+      "file": "introduction/views.py",
+      "line": 460,
+      "rule": "code-injection",
+      "function": "cmd_lab2",
+      "verdict": "vulnerability"
+    },
     {
       "file": "introduction/views.py",
       "line": 460,

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/tests/regression/expected/vulnerable-flask.json

@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@
       "function": "cross_site_scripting",
       "verdict": "vulnerability"
     },
+    {
+      "file": "app.py",
+      "line": 71,
+      "rule": "code-injection",
+      "function": "code_injection",
+      "verdict": "vulnerability"
+    },
     {
       "file": "app.py",
       "line": 71,

coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0/tests/test_code_injection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+"""Code injection: attacker input reaching the code ``eval`` or ``exec`` runs.
+
+``dangerous-eval`` reports every call to ``eval`` or ``exec``, whatever it evaluates;
+``code-injection`` reports the calls attacker input reaches, through the same taint
+engine and refutation as the other injection rules. Only the code counts: attacker data
+in the ``globals`` or ``locals`` a call passes is data, not code.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from coretrace_python import engine
+from coretrace_python.findings import Finding, Severity
+from coretrace_python.source import SourceManager
+
+PLUGINS = [engine.BUNDLED_PLUGINS]
+
+
+def check(text: str) -> tuple[Finding, ...]:
+    return engine.check(SourceManager().add_source("app.py", text), PLUGINS)
+
+
+def injected(text: str) -> list[int]:
+    return [f.span.start_line for f in check(text) if f.rule_id == "code-injection"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "body",
+    [
+        "    return eval(input())\n",
+        "    exec(input())\n",
+        "    code = compile(input(), '<input>', 'exec')\n    exec(code)\n",
+        "    source = 'result = ' + input()\n    exec(source, {})\n",
+    ],
+)
+def test_attacker_input_in_the_code_eval_or_exec_runs_is_a_code_injection(body: str) -> None:
+    findings = [f for f in check(f"def run():\n{body}") if f.rule_id == "code-injection"]
+
+    assert [f.span.start_line for f in findings] == [len(body.splitlines()) + 1]
+    assert findings[0].severity is Severity.HIGH
+    assert findings[0].metadata["source_label"] == "stdin"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "body",
+    [
+        "    return eval('1 + 1')\n",
+        "    return eval('x + 1', {'x': input()})\n",
+        "    exec('total = a + b', {}, {'a': input(), 'b': 1})\n",
+        "    import ast\n    return ast.literal_eval(input())\n",
+    ],
+)
+def test_constant_code_or_attacker_data_beside_it_is_no_code_injection(body: str) -> None:
+    assert injected(f"def run():\n{body}") == []
+
+
+def test_dangerous_eval_still_reports_the_call_beside_the_injection() -> None:
+    rules = sorted(f.rule_id for f in check("def run():\n    return eval(input())\n"))
+
+    assert rules == ["code-injection", "dangerous-eval"]
+
+
+def test_code_reaching_eval_through_a_project_function_is_reported_at_the_call() -> None:
+    text = "def evaluate(expression):\n    return eval(expression)\n\ndef run():\n    return evaluate(input())\n"
+
+    (finding,) = [f for f in check(text) if f.rule_id == "code-injection"]
+    assert (finding.span.start_line, finding.metadata["through"], finding.metadata["sink_line"]) == (5, "evaluate", "2")

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/tests/test_detectors.py

@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ def test_shipped_plugins_load_with_their_manifests() -> None:
         "aiohttp-models",
         "bottle-models",
         "cli-models",
+        "code-injection",
         "command-injection",
         "config-secrets",
         "credential-models",
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ def test_shipped_plugins_load_with_their_manifests() -> None:
         "weak-crypto",
         "xss",
     }
-    for rule in ("sql-injection", "command-injection", "path-traversal", "ssrf", "xss"):
+    for rule in ("sql-injection", "command-injection", "code-injection", "path-traversal", "ssrf", "xss"):
         assert by_name[rule].requires == ("taint.flows", "findings.refutation")
         assert by_name[rule].provides == (f"vulnerability.{rule}",)
     assert by_name["python-stdlib-models"].provides == ("model.python-stdlib",)

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/tests/test_django_http_clients.py

@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ def test_httpx_client_instances_and_sessions_are_ssrf_sinks() -> None:
 
 def test_detectors_stay_generic() -> None:
     assert sorted(p.name for p in (PLUGINS / "security").iterdir() if p.is_dir()) == [
+        "code_injection",
         "command_injection",
         "insecure_deserialization",
         "open_redirect",

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/tests/test_docs.py

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ def test_every_bundled_plugin_is_named_in_the_guides() -> None:
         re.search(r'^name = "([a-z-]+)"', manifest.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), re.MULTILINE).group(1)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
         for manifest in engine.BUNDLED_PLUGINS.rglob("plugin.toml")
     ]
-    assert len(names) == 35
+    assert len(names) == 36
     assert all(f"`{name}`" in text for name in names), [n for n in names if f"`{n}`" not in text]
 
 

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/tests/test_packaging.py

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ def test_bundled_plugins_live_inside_the_package() -> None:
     assert bundled == Path(coretrace_python.__file__).resolve().parent / "bundled"
     assert bundled.is_dir()
     manifests = sorted(p.relative_to(bundled).as_posix() for p in bundled.rglob("plugin.toml"))
-    assert len(manifests) == 35
+    assert len(manifests) == 36
     assert "syntax/dangerous_eval/plugin.toml" in manifests
     assert not (REPO / "plugins").exists()
 
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ def test_the_wheel_carries_the_bundled_plugins(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
 
     assert "coretrace_python/bundled/syntax/dangerous_eval/plugin.toml" in names
     assert "coretrace_python/bundled/syntax/dangerous_eval/dangerous_eval.py" in names
-    assert sum(1 for n in names if n.endswith("/plugin.toml")) == 35
+    assert sum(1 for n in names if n.endswith("/plugin.toml")) == 36
     assert not any(n.startswith("tests/") or "tests-project" in n for n in names)
 
 

{coretrace_python_analyzer-0.10.0 → coretrace_python_analyzer-0.11.0}/tests/test_release.py

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ def require_changelog() -> None:
 def test_the_version_is_declared_once_and_mirrored() -> None:
     project = tomllib.loads((REPO / "pyproject.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))["project"]
 
-    assert project["version"] == coretrace_python.__version__ == "0.10.0"
+    assert project["version"] == coretrace_python.__version__ == "0.11.0"
 
 
 def test_the_changelog_starts_with_the_current_version() -> None: