compliance-aiops 0.1.0__tar.gz

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/.github/workflows/publish.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+name: Publish to PyPI
+
+# Trusted Publishing (OIDC) — publishes from GitHub's runners with no API token,
+# sidestepping the local-IP / account new-project rate limit. Configure a matching
+# "trusted publisher" for this package on PyPI (see the repo release notes).
+on:
+  release:
+    types: [published]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  publish:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      id-token: write   # required for PyPI Trusted Publishing (OIDC)
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Set up uv
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+      - name: Build sdist + wheel
+        run: uv build
+      - name: Publish to PyPI (Trusted Publishing)
+        uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+.venv/
+dist/
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+.pytest_cache/
+.ruff_cache/
+*.egg-info/

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/CHANGELOG.md

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+# Changelog
+
+All notable changes to compliance-aiops are documented here. This project adheres
+to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/) and the
+[Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/) format.
+
+## [0.1.0] — preview
+
+Initial preview release: governed **compliance-evidence** tooling that reads the
+local audit trails governed AIops agents already write (`~/.<tool>-aiops/audit.db`,
+discovered via `~/.*-aiops/audit.db`) **read-only** and turns them into
+**framework-mapped, hash-chain-sealed** evidence. **No external API, no network,
+no platform credentials.** Evidence, not certification. Standalone governance
+harness bundled in the package.
+
+### Added
+
+- **15 MCP tools** (12 read/analysis, 3 write/artifact — no external mutation):
+  - **Audit reads** — `list_audit_sources`, `query_audit_events` (filter by
+    tool/skill/status/risk/approved/selector/since/until), `activity_timeline`
+    (hour/day buckets).
+  - **Framework mapping** — `list_frameworks`, `coverage_summary` (per-control,
+    one framework), `control_evidence` (evidence rows + population + reproducible
+    query for one control), `gap_analysis` (no/weak-evidence controls + honest
+    caveat + remediation).
+  - **Assurance reports** — `approval_report` (high-risk write ops + approver +
+    rationale), `exceptions_report` (denied / error / budget_exceeded).
+  - **Integrity** — `verify_source_chain` (chain head + row-id gap detection),
+    `verify_bundle` (chain + seal head + signature), `list_bundles`.
+  - **Artifacts** — `generate_evidence_bundle` (low; coverage + approval trail +
+    exceptions + sealed records → a bundle `.json`), `export_bundle` (low;
+    markdown / csv / json), `sign_bundle` (medium; HMAC over the seal).
+- **Framework catalog** (`compliance_aiops/frameworks.py`) — HIPAA §164.312,
+  PCI-DSS v4.0, SOC 2 TSC, GDPR, each control carrying an evidence-strength label
+  (`strong` / `partial`) and an honest caveat.
+- **Hash-chain integrity** (`compliance_aiops/hashchain.py`) — SHA-256 over
+  ordered records (`hash = SHA-256(prev_hash ‖ canonical_json(record))`, genesis
+  prev = 64 zeros), reproducible `chainHead`, optional HMAC signature.
+- **Ops modules** (`compliance_aiops/ops/`) — `events`, `controls`, `reports`,
+  `overview`, `bundle`, `integrity`.
+- **Encrypted signing-key store** — the bundle-signing key is stored encrypted in
+  `~/.compliance-aiops/secrets.enc` (Fernet + scrypt); unlocked via
+  `COMPLIANCE_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD`. No platform credentials are used.
+- **CLI** (`compliance-aiops`) — `init`, `overview`, `report`
+  (sources/coverage/gaps/approvals/exceptions), `bundle`
+  (generate/verify/list/export), `secret` (set/list/rm/migrate/rotate-password),
+  `doctor`, `mcp`.
+- **Deterministic offline tests** — synthetic audit DBs built via the real
+  harness `AuditEngine`, a golden reproducible `chainHead`, and tamper tests.
+
+### Known limitations
+
+- **Tamper-EVIDENT, not tamper-PROOF** — the source `audit.db` remains the system
+  of record.
+- **Evidence, not certification.** OSCAL export is a v0.2 roadmap item (v0.1 emits
+  JSON + Markdown + CSV shaped to ease a future OSCAL Assessment-Results adapter).
+- **Preview** — interfaces may change before v1.0.

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/LICENSE

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+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 wei <zhouwei008@gmail.com>
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: compliance-aiops
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: Governed compliance-evidence tooling: reads the AIops governance audit trails and produces framework-mapped (HIPAA/PCI-DSS/SOC2/GDPR), hash-chain-sealed evidence bundles with a built-in governance harness (audit, budget, risk tiers)
+Author-email: wei <zhouwei008@gmail.com>
+License-Expression: MIT
+License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Python: >=3.11
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42.0
+Requires-Dist: httpx<1.0,>=0.27
+Requires-Dist: mcp[cli]<2.0,>=1.10
+Requires-Dist: pyyaml<7.0,>=6.0
+Requires-Dist: rich<16.0,>=13.0
+Requires-Dist: typer<1.0,>=0.12
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+
+<!-- mcp-name: io.github.AIops-tools/compliance-aiops -->
+
+# Compliance AIops (preview)
+
+> **Disclaimer**: Community-maintained open-source project. **Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by any framework body or GRC vendor.** HIPAA, PCI-DSS, SOC 2, GDPR and OSCAL are referenced descriptively; the frameworks and trademarks belong to their owners. MIT licensed.
+
+Governed **compliance-evidence** tooling for AI-agent infrastructure ops. It
+**reads the audit trails your governed AIops agents already write** — the local
+`~/.<tool>-aiops/audit.db` SQLite trails, all sharing one `audit_log` schema —
+and turns that activity into **framework-mapped, hash-chain-sealed compliance
+evidence**. It **never scans your infrastructure and never replaces a GRC
+platform**: it converts the trails you already produce into auditor-ready,
+tamper-evident evidence bundles.
+
+Unlike the other tools in the AIops-tools line it is **not a platform wrapper**:
+**no external API, no network, no platform credentials**. Its only inputs are
+those on-disk audit databases, read **read-only**. That also makes it the
+easiest-to-self-test tool in the line — fully offline and deterministic.
+
+> **Preview.** Evidence, not certification. Fully offline; the source `audit.db`
+> files remain the system of record. OSCAL export is a documented v0.2 roadmap
+> item (v0.1 emits JSON + Markdown + CSV shaped to ease a future OSCAL
+> Assessment-Results adapter).
+
+## Key features
+
+- **Framework mapping with honest evidence-strength** — audit events map to
+  **HIPAA §164.312 / PCI-DSS v4.0 / SOC 2 TSC / GDPR** controls. Audit trails
+  prove *operating effectiveness* strongly but *control design / configuration*
+  only partially, and each control is labelled `strong` or `partial`.
+  `gap_analysis` says so per control, with the caveat and a remediation hint.
+- **Hash-chain-sealed evidence bundles** — SHA-256 over ordered records
+  (`hash = SHA-256(prev_hash ‖ canonical_json(record))`, genesis prev = 64
+  zeros). The `chainHead` is **reproducible** for the same (framework, period,
+  sources). `verify_bundle` catches tampering; `verify_source_chain` detects
+  row-id gaps / deletions in a source trail. An optional HMAC signature seals a
+  bundle under a stored signing key.
+- **Zero-network, read-only** — no credentials, no outbound calls, no mutation
+  of the source trails. Bundles are the only thing written, under
+  `~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/`.
+- **Deterministic, test-verified integrity** — the integrity claims are
+  themselves covered by tests: synthetic audit DBs are built through the real
+  governance-harness `AuditEngine`, a golden reproducible `chainHead` is
+  asserted, and tamper tests confirm detection. No live infrastructure needed.
+
+## Tools (15 MCP tools)
+
+### Read / analysis (12)
+
+| Tool | Purpose |
+|------|---------|
+| `list_audit_sources` | Discovered sibling audit DBs (path, tool, readable, row count) |
+| `query_audit_events` | Cross-tool event query — filter by tool/skill/status/risk/approved/selector/since/until |
+| `activity_timeline` | Event counts bucketed by hour or day |
+| `list_frameworks` | Supported frameworks + control counts |
+| `coverage_summary` | Per-control covered/weak/uncovered for ONE framework |
+| `control_evidence` | Evidence rows + population + a reproducible query for ONE control |
+| `gap_analysis` | Controls with no/weak evidence + honest caveat + remediation |
+| `approval_report` | High-risk write ops + who approved + rationale (the CC8.1 / PCI 7-8 / HIPAA §312(a) artifact) |
+| `exceptions_report` | Denied / error / budget_exceeded ops — enforcement + anomaly evidence |
+| `verify_source_chain` | Chain head + row-id gap detection for one source |
+| `verify_bundle` | Verify a sealed bundle: chain + seal head + optional signature |
+| `list_bundles` | Bundles under `~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/` |
+
+### Write / artifact (3 — no external mutation)
+
+| Tool | Risk | Purpose |
+|------|:---:|---------|
+| `generate_evidence_bundle` | low | One call: coverage + approval trail + exceptions + sealed records → a bundle `.json` |
+| `export_bundle` | low | Render a bundle to markdown / csv / json |
+| `sign_bundle` | medium | HMAC over the seal using the stored signing key |
+
+The CLI exposes a convenience subset; the full 15-tool surface is available over MCP.
+
+## Frameworks & controls
+
+| Framework | Sample controls (strength) |
+|-----------|----------------------------|
+| **HIPAA** (§164.312) | 164.312(b) Audit controls (strong), 164.312(a)(1) Access control (strong), 164.312(c)(1) Integrity (strong) |
+| **PCI-DSS v4.0** | 10.2 Audit log content (strong), 10.3 Protect audit logs (strong), 7-8 Least privilege / authn (partial) |
+| **SOC 2 TSC** | CC6.1 Logical access (strong), CC7.2 Monitoring (strong), CC8.1 Change management (strong) |
+| **GDPR** | Art.30 Records of processing (partial), Art.32 Security of processing (strong) |
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+uv tool install compliance-aiops      # or: pipx install compliance-aiops
+```
+
+## Quick start
+
+```bash
+compliance-aiops init                 # discover sibling ~/.*-aiops/audit.db, set org name, optional signing key
+compliance-aiops doctor               # which sibling audit DBs are present/readable
+compliance-aiops overview             # audit sources + per-framework covered/total
+compliance-aiops report coverage soc2 # per-control SOC 2 coverage
+compliance-aiops bundle generate soc2 # sealed evidence bundle → ~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/
+compliance-aiops bundle verify <path> # re-verify the chain + seal (+ signature)
+```
+
+Run as an MCP server (stdio):
+
+```bash
+export COMPLIANCE_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD=...   # only needed to unlock a signing key
+compliance-aiops mcp                          # or: compliance-aiops-mcp
+```
+
+## Integrity & honest limits
+
+- **Tamper-EVIDENT, not tamper-PROOF.** The hash chain and optional signature
+  let an auditor *detect* alteration; they do not prevent it. The source
+  `audit.db` files remain the system of record — record the `chainHead`
+  out-of-band if you need an independent anchor.
+- **Operating effectiveness vs. design.** An audit trail strongly evidences that
+  a control *ran* (samples, approvals, denials) but only partially evidences that
+  a control is *designed / configured* correctly (e.g. MFA required,
+  least-privilege roles). Every control carries a `strong` / `partial` label and
+  `gap_analysis` surfaces the caveat rather than overclaiming.
+
+## Supported scope & limitations (preview)
+
+- **Evidence, not certification.** This produces auditor-ready evidence bundles;
+  it does not issue attestations, opinions, or certifications.
+- **In scope:** the four frameworks above, over the `audit_log` trails written by
+  governed AIops tools discovered via `~/.*-aiops/audit.db`.
+- **Not in scope:** it does **not** scan infrastructure, connect to any platform,
+  or replace a GRC platform. For platform operations use the other AIops-tools.
+- **OSCAL export is v0.2.** v0.1 emits JSON + Markdown + CSV.
+- **Preview:** interfaces may change before v1.0.
+
+## Missing a capability?
+
+Want another framework, control mapping, export format (OSCAL, CSV shape), or a
+verification you don't see here? **Open an issue or a PR — contributions
+welcome.**

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+<!-- mcp-name: io.github.AIops-tools/compliance-aiops -->
+
+# Compliance AIops (preview)
+
+> **Disclaimer**: Community-maintained open-source project. **Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by any framework body or GRC vendor.** HIPAA, PCI-DSS, SOC 2, GDPR and OSCAL are referenced descriptively; the frameworks and trademarks belong to their owners. MIT licensed.
+
+Governed **compliance-evidence** tooling for AI-agent infrastructure ops. It
+**reads the audit trails your governed AIops agents already write** — the local
+`~/.<tool>-aiops/audit.db` SQLite trails, all sharing one `audit_log` schema —
+and turns that activity into **framework-mapped, hash-chain-sealed compliance
+evidence**. It **never scans your infrastructure and never replaces a GRC
+platform**: it converts the trails you already produce into auditor-ready,
+tamper-evident evidence bundles.
+
+Unlike the other tools in the AIops-tools line it is **not a platform wrapper**:
+**no external API, no network, no platform credentials**. Its only inputs are
+those on-disk audit databases, read **read-only**. That also makes it the
+easiest-to-self-test tool in the line — fully offline and deterministic.
+
+> **Preview.** Evidence, not certification. Fully offline; the source `audit.db`
+> files remain the system of record. OSCAL export is a documented v0.2 roadmap
+> item (v0.1 emits JSON + Markdown + CSV shaped to ease a future OSCAL
+> Assessment-Results adapter).
+
+## Key features
+
+- **Framework mapping with honest evidence-strength** — audit events map to
+  **HIPAA §164.312 / PCI-DSS v4.0 / SOC 2 TSC / GDPR** controls. Audit trails
+  prove *operating effectiveness* strongly but *control design / configuration*
+  only partially, and each control is labelled `strong` or `partial`.
+  `gap_analysis` says so per control, with the caveat and a remediation hint.
+- **Hash-chain-sealed evidence bundles** — SHA-256 over ordered records
+  (`hash = SHA-256(prev_hash ‖ canonical_json(record))`, genesis prev = 64
+  zeros). The `chainHead` is **reproducible** for the same (framework, period,
+  sources). `verify_bundle` catches tampering; `verify_source_chain` detects
+  row-id gaps / deletions in a source trail. An optional HMAC signature seals a
+  bundle under a stored signing key.
+- **Zero-network, read-only** — no credentials, no outbound calls, no mutation
+  of the source trails. Bundles are the only thing written, under
+  `~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/`.
+- **Deterministic, test-verified integrity** — the integrity claims are
+  themselves covered by tests: synthetic audit DBs are built through the real
+  governance-harness `AuditEngine`, a golden reproducible `chainHead` is
+  asserted, and tamper tests confirm detection. No live infrastructure needed.
+
+## Tools (15 MCP tools)
+
+### Read / analysis (12)
+
+| Tool | Purpose |
+|------|---------|
+| `list_audit_sources` | Discovered sibling audit DBs (path, tool, readable, row count) |
+| `query_audit_events` | Cross-tool event query — filter by tool/skill/status/risk/approved/selector/since/until |
+| `activity_timeline` | Event counts bucketed by hour or day |
+| `list_frameworks` | Supported frameworks + control counts |
+| `coverage_summary` | Per-control covered/weak/uncovered for ONE framework |
+| `control_evidence` | Evidence rows + population + a reproducible query for ONE control |
+| `gap_analysis` | Controls with no/weak evidence + honest caveat + remediation |
+| `approval_report` | High-risk write ops + who approved + rationale (the CC8.1 / PCI 7-8 / HIPAA §312(a) artifact) |
+| `exceptions_report` | Denied / error / budget_exceeded ops — enforcement + anomaly evidence |
+| `verify_source_chain` | Chain head + row-id gap detection for one source |
+| `verify_bundle` | Verify a sealed bundle: chain + seal head + optional signature |
+| `list_bundles` | Bundles under `~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/` |
+
+### Write / artifact (3 — no external mutation)
+
+| Tool | Risk | Purpose |
+|------|:---:|---------|
+| `generate_evidence_bundle` | low | One call: coverage + approval trail + exceptions + sealed records → a bundle `.json` |
+| `export_bundle` | low | Render a bundle to markdown / csv / json |
+| `sign_bundle` | medium | HMAC over the seal using the stored signing key |
+
+The CLI exposes a convenience subset; the full 15-tool surface is available over MCP.
+
+## Frameworks & controls
+
+| Framework | Sample controls (strength) |
+|-----------|----------------------------|
+| **HIPAA** (§164.312) | 164.312(b) Audit controls (strong), 164.312(a)(1) Access control (strong), 164.312(c)(1) Integrity (strong) |
+| **PCI-DSS v4.0** | 10.2 Audit log content (strong), 10.3 Protect audit logs (strong), 7-8 Least privilege / authn (partial) |
+| **SOC 2 TSC** | CC6.1 Logical access (strong), CC7.2 Monitoring (strong), CC8.1 Change management (strong) |
+| **GDPR** | Art.30 Records of processing (partial), Art.32 Security of processing (strong) |
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+uv tool install compliance-aiops      # or: pipx install compliance-aiops
+```
+
+## Quick start
+
+```bash
+compliance-aiops init                 # discover sibling ~/.*-aiops/audit.db, set org name, optional signing key
+compliance-aiops doctor               # which sibling audit DBs are present/readable
+compliance-aiops overview             # audit sources + per-framework covered/total
+compliance-aiops report coverage soc2 # per-control SOC 2 coverage
+compliance-aiops bundle generate soc2 # sealed evidence bundle → ~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/
+compliance-aiops bundle verify <path> # re-verify the chain + seal (+ signature)
+```
+
+Run as an MCP server (stdio):
+
+```bash
+export COMPLIANCE_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD=...   # only needed to unlock a signing key
+compliance-aiops mcp                          # or: compliance-aiops-mcp
+```
+
+## Integrity & honest limits
+
+- **Tamper-EVIDENT, not tamper-PROOF.** The hash chain and optional signature
+  let an auditor *detect* alteration; they do not prevent it. The source
+  `audit.db` files remain the system of record — record the `chainHead`
+  out-of-band if you need an independent anchor.
+- **Operating effectiveness vs. design.** An audit trail strongly evidences that
+  a control *ran* (samples, approvals, denials) but only partially evidences that
+  a control is *designed / configured* correctly (e.g. MFA required,
+  least-privilege roles). Every control carries a `strong` / `partial` label and
+  `gap_analysis` surfaces the caveat rather than overclaiming.
+
+## Supported scope & limitations (preview)
+
+- **Evidence, not certification.** This produces auditor-ready evidence bundles;
+  it does not issue attestations, opinions, or certifications.
+- **In scope:** the four frameworks above, over the `audit_log` trails written by
+  governed AIops tools discovered via `~/.*-aiops/audit.db`.
+- **Not in scope:** it does **not** scan infrastructure, connect to any platform,
+  or replace a GRC platform. For platform operations use the other AIops-tools.
+- **OSCAL export is v0.2.** v0.1 emits JSON + Markdown + CSV.
+- **Preview:** interfaces may change before v1.0.
+
+## Missing a capability?
+
+Want another framework, control mapping, export format (OSCAL, CSV shape), or a
+verification you don't see here? **Open an issue or a PR — contributions
+welcome.**

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/RELEASE_NOTES.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Compliance AIops v0.1.0 — preview
+
+Governed **compliance-evidence** tooling for AI-agent infrastructure ops. It
+**reads the local audit trails your governed AIops agents already write**
+(`~/.<tool>-aiops/audit.db`, one shared `audit_log` schema, discovered via
+`~/.*-aiops/audit.db`) **read-only**, and turns that activity into
+**framework-mapped, hash-chain-sealed compliance evidence**. It does **not** scan
+infrastructure and does **not** replace a GRC platform.
+
+Unlike the other tools in the AIops-tools line it is **not a platform wrapper** —
+**no external API, no network, no platform credentials**. Standalone: the
+governance harness is bundled in the package.
+
+> **Preview.** Evidence, not certification. Fully offline; the source `audit.db`
+> files remain the system of record. The integrity claims are themselves
+> test-verified (see below).
+
+## Highlights
+
+- **15 MCP tools** — 12 read/analysis, 3 write/artifact (no external mutation).
+  - Read: `list_audit_sources`, `query_audit_events`, `activity_timeline`,
+    `list_frameworks`, `coverage_summary`, `control_evidence`, `gap_analysis`,
+    `approval_report`, `exceptions_report`, `verify_source_chain`,
+    `verify_bundle`, `list_bundles`.
+  - Write: `generate_evidence_bundle` (low), `export_bundle` (low),
+    `sign_bundle` (medium).
+- **Framework mapping with honest evidence-strength** — HIPAA §164.312 /
+  PCI-DSS v4.0 / SOC 2 TSC / GDPR. Audit trails prove *operating effectiveness*
+  strongly and *design / configuration* only partially; each control is labelled
+  `strong` / `partial` and `gap_analysis` surfaces the caveat.
+- **Hash-chain-sealed bundles** — SHA-256 over ordered records, reproducible
+  `chainHead`, optional HMAC signature. `verify_bundle` catches tampering;
+  `verify_source_chain` detects row-id gaps / deletions.
+- **Zero-network, read-only** — no credentials, no outbound calls, no mutation of
+  the source trails. Bundles written to `~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/`.
+- **Deterministic offline tests** — synthetic audit DBs built through the real
+  harness `AuditEngine`, a golden reproducible `chainHead`, and tamper tests.
+  No live infrastructure dependency.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+uv tool install compliance-aiops
+compliance-aiops init        # discover sibling audit DBs, set org name, optional signing key
+compliance-aiops doctor      # which sibling audit DBs are present/readable
+```
+
+## Caveats
+
+- **Tamper-EVIDENT, not tamper-PROOF** — the source `audit.db` remains the system
+  of record; record the `chainHead` out-of-band for an independent anchor.
+- **Evidence, not certification.** OSCAL export is a documented v0.2 roadmap item
+  (v0.1 emits JSON + Markdown + CSV).
+- **Preview:** interfaces may change before v1.0.

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+## Disclaimer
+
+Community-maintained open-source project. Not a substitute for a GRC program or
+legal advice — it produces **evidence from audit trails**, it does not certify
+compliance. Framework names (HIPAA, PCI-DSS, SOC 2, GDPR) belong to their
+respective bodies. Source is publicly auditable under the MIT license.
+
+## Reporting Vulnerabilities
+
+Report privately via a GitHub Security Advisory on
+[github.com/AIops-tools/Compliance-AIops](https://github.com/AIops-tools/Compliance-AIops/security/advisories)
+or email zhouwei008@gmail.com. Please do not open public issues for security
+reports.
+
+## Security Design
+
+### Data Sources — read-only, no credentials
+- compliance-aiops has **no external API and no platform credentials**. Its data
+  sources are the sibling AIops tools' audit databases (`~/.<tool>-aiops/audit.db`),
+  opened strictly **read-only** (SQLite `mode=ro`). It never writes to a source DB
+  — evidence is derived, the originals are untouched.
+- The **only** secret it can hold is an **optional bundle-signing key**, stored
+  **encrypted** in `~/.compliance-aiops/secrets.enc` (Fernet/AES-128 +
+  scrypt-derived key; chmod 600). Evidence bundles are always hash-chain-sealed;
+  the signing key only adds a signature. With no key configured the tool works
+  fully (chain-only integrity).
+
+### Tamper-evident integrity (and its honest limits)
+- Evidence bundles are sealed with a **SHA-256 hash chain** over the ordered
+  evidence records (`hash_i = SHA-256(prev_hash || canonical_json(record))`); the
+  `chainHead` commits to the whole set. `verify_bundle` / `verify_source_chain`
+  recompute the chain and localise the first broken link, plus detect **row-id
+  gaps** (possible deletions). An optional HMAC signature over the seal adds
+  provenance.
+- **A hash chain is tamper-*evident*, not tamper-*proof*.** It detects casual /
+  single-row edits against a previously recorded `chainHead` and proves a held
+  bundle is unaltered since sealing; it cannot stop an attacker with write access
+  to the source DB *and* the ability to re-seal. The source `audit.db` remains the
+  source of truth — record the `chainHead` out-of-band.
+
+### Governed Operations
+Every MCP tool runs through the bundled `@governed_tool` harness
+(`compliance_aiops.governance`):
+- **Audit** — every call logged to a local SQLite DB under `~/.compliance-aiops/`
+  (relocatable via `COMPLIANCE_AIOPS_HOME`), agent-attributed, secret-redacted.
+- **Token/runaway budget** — hard ceilings (`COMPLIANCE_MAX_TOOL_CALLS` /
+  `COMPLIANCE_MAX_TOOL_SECONDS`) plus an on-by-default guard that trips a tight
+  poll/retry loop, preventing unbounded API consumption (e.g. polling a slow
+  session).
+- **Graduated risk tiers** — `~/.compliance-aiops/rules.yaml` `risk_tiers` gate
+  writes by environment/tag; the highest tiers require a recorded approver.
+- **Recursive self-audit** — compliance-aiops runs through the harness like every
+  other tool, so its own evidence-generation activity is itself audited (and is
+  evidence-eligible).
+
+### State-Changing Operations
+There are **none against external systems**. The only "writes" are local
+artifacts: `generate_evidence_bundle` / `export_bundle` write a bundle file under
+`~/.compliance-aiops/bundles/` (risk=low), and `sign_bundle` reads the encrypted
+signing key (risk=medium). No dry-run/double-confirm is needed because nothing
+external is mutated.
+
+### Prompt-Injection Protection
+The audit trail is data produced by other tools, so it is treated as untrusted:
+all audit-sourced text (tool names, rationale, approver, event fields) passes
+through a `sanitize()` truncate + control-character strip before reaching the
+agent or a bundle.
+
+### Network Scope
+**Zero network.** No webhooks, no telemetry, no outbound calls of any kind — the
+tool only reads local SQLite files and writes local artifacts. No post-install
+scripts or background services.
+
+## Static Analysis
+
+```bash
+uvx bandit -r compliance_aiops/ mcp_server/
+uv run ruff check .
+```
+
+## Supported Versions
+
+The latest released version receives security fixes. This is a preview (0.x);
+pin a version in production.

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/compliance_aiops/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+"""compliance-aiops — governed Compliance SCALE operations for AI agents.
+
+Standalone and self-contained: the governance harness (audit, token budget,
+undo-token recording, graduated risk tiers, prompt-injection sanitize) is
+bundled under ``compliance_aiops.governance`` — this package has no external
+skill-family dependency. Preview: not yet full-coverage.
+"""
+
+__version__ = "0.1.0"

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/compliance_aiops/cli/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+"""CLI package for compliance-aiops.
+
+Re-exports ``app`` so the pyproject entry point
+``compliance-aiops = "compliance_aiops.cli:app"`` works unchanged.
+"""
+
+from compliance_aiops.cli._root import app
+
+__all__ = ["app"]

compliance_aiops-0.1.0/compliance_aiops/cli/_common.py

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+"""Shared helpers for compliance-aiops CLI sub-modules."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import functools
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Annotated, Any
+
+import typer
+from rich.console import Console
+
+console = Console()
+
+# ─── Shared Option types ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+TargetOption = Annotated[
+    str | None, typer.Option("--target", "-t", help="Target name from config")
+]
+DryRunOption = Annotated[
+    bool, typer.Option("--dry-run", help="Print the API call without executing")
+]
+
+
+def _cli_error_types() -> tuple[type[BaseException], ...]:
+    """Exceptions translated to a one-line teaching error instead of a traceback."""
+    from compliance_aiops.connection import ComplianceError
+
+    return (ComplianceError, KeyError, OSError, ValueError)
+
+
+def cli_errors(fn: Callable) -> Callable:
+    """Translate known exceptions into one red line + exit code 1."""
+
+    @functools.wraps(fn)
+    def wrapper(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+        try:
+            return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+        except (typer.Exit, typer.Abort):
+            raise
+        except _cli_error_types() as e:
+            message = str(e)
+            if isinstance(e, KeyError):
+                message = f"Missing required key or environment variable: {message}"
+            console.print(f"[red]Error: {message}[/]")
+            raise typer.Exit(1) from e
+
+    return wrapper
+
+
+def get_reader(config_path: Path | None = None):
+    """Return an (AuditReader, config) tuple over the configured audit sources."""
+    from compliance_aiops.config import load_config
+    from compliance_aiops.connection import get_reader as _build
+
+    cfg = load_config(config_path)
+    return _build(cfg), cfg
+
+
+def dry_run_print(*, operation: str, api_call: str, parameters: dict | None = None) -> None:
+    """Print a dry-run preview of the API call that would be made."""
+    console.print("\n[bold magenta][DRY-RUN] No changes will be made.[/]")
+    console.print(f"[magenta]  Operation: {operation}[/]")
+    console.print(f"[magenta]  API Call:  {api_call}[/]")
+    for k, v in (parameters or {}).items():
+        console.print(f"[magenta]  Param:     {k} = {v}[/]")
+    console.print("[magenta]  Run without --dry-run to execute.[/]\n")
+
+
+def double_confirm(action: str, resource: str) -> None:
+    """Require two confirmations for a destructive operation."""
+    console.print(f"[bold yellow]⚠️  About to: {action} '{resource}'[/]")
+    typer.confirm(f"Confirm 1/2: {action} '{resource}'?", abort=True)
+    typer.confirm(
+        f"Confirm 2/2: really {action} '{resource}'? This may be irreversible.",
+        abort=True,
+    )