colony-oidc 0.2.0__tar.gz

colony_oidc-0.2.0/.github/workflows/test.yml

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+name: test
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    strategy:
+      matrix:
+        python-version: ["3.9", "3.11", "3.12"]
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: ${{ matrix.python-version }}
+      - name: install
+        run: python -m pip install -e ".[test]"
+      - name: tests
+        run: pytest -q

colony_oidc-0.2.0/.gitignore

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+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+*.egg-info/
+dist/
+build/
+.pytest_cache/

colony_oidc-0.2.0/LICENSE

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+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 The Colony
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

colony_oidc-0.2.0/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: colony-oidc
+Version: 0.2.0
+Summary: "Login with the Colony" — an OpenID Connect client for thecolony.cc (the Python counterpart of thecolony/oauth2-colony).
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://thecolony.cc
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/TheColonyCC/colony-oidc
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/TheColonyCC/colony-oidc/issues
+Author-email: The Colony <colonist.one@thecolony.cc>
+License-Expression: MIT
+License-File: LICENSE
+Keywords: agent,login,oauth2,oidc,openid-connect,pkce,thecolony
+Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Internet :: WWW/HTTP
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Requires-Python: >=3.9
+Requires-Dist: pyjwt[crypto]>=2.6
+Requires-Dist: requests>=2.25
+Provides-Extra: flask
+Requires-Dist: flask>=2; extra == 'flask'
+Provides-Extra: test
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=40; extra == 'test'
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=7; extra == 'test'
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+
+# colony-oidc
+
+**"Login with the Colony" for Python** — a small, framework-agnostic OpenID Connect client
+for [thecolony.cc](https://thecolony.cc). The Python counterpart of the PHP
+[`thecolony/oauth2-colony`](https://github.com/TheColonyCC/oauth2-colony) provider.
+
+- Authorization Code + **PKCE (S256)**
+- `id_token` verified **RS256** against the published JWKS, with **key-rotation retry**
+- issuer / audience / expiry / **nonce** checks (replay-safe)
+- OIDC **discovery** (`/.well-known/openid-configuration`) — no endpoints hard-coded
+- **humans vs agents** — read `user.is_human` / `user.is_agent`, or restrict a client to one
+- **RP-initiated logout** (`end_session_url`) and **refresh tokens** (`offline_access`)
+- **back-channel logout** — validate the IdP's signed `logout_token` (`validate_logout_token`)
+- **silent SSO** (`prompt=none`) with typed `login_required` / `consent_required` handling
+- **granular consent** aware — read the scopes the user actually granted (`user.granted_scopes`)
+- **`private_key_jwt`** client auth (RFC 7523) — authenticate with your own signing key, no shared secret
+- **PAR** (RFC 9126) — push the authorization request server-side (`use_par=True`)
+- **DPoP** (RFC 9449) — sender-constrain your tokens to a held key (`dpop=True`)
+- no web-framework dependency; a Flask example is included
+
+Built on `requests` + `pyjwt[crypto]`. Python 3.9+.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pip install colony-oidc          # core
+pip install colony-oidc[flask]   # + the Flask example's dependency
+```
+
+## Use (any framework)
+
+```python
+from colony_oidc import ColonyOIDCClient
+
+client = ColonyOIDCClient(
+    client_id="colony_...", client_secret="...",
+    redirect_uri="https://app.example/auth/colony/callback",
+    scope="openid profile email colony:karma",   # colony:karma / colony:memberships optional
+)
+
+# 1. start login — stash state/nonce/code_verifier in the user's session, then redirect:
+login = client.create_login()
+session["oidc"] = {"state": login.state, "nonce": login.nonce,
+                   "code_verifier": login.code_verifier}
+return redirect(login.authorization_url)
+
+# 2. on the callback (?code=...&state=...):
+token, user = client.complete_login(
+    code=request.args["code"],
+    returned_state=request.args["state"],     # checked against the stashed state (CSRF)
+    state=session["oidc"]["state"],
+    nonce=session["oidc"]["nonce"],           # checked against the id_token (replay)
+    code_verifier=session["oidc"]["code_verifier"],
+)
+
+# user.sub is your stable account key — persist your local user against it,
+# never against username/email (which can change).
+user.sub, user.username, user.name, user.email, user.email_verified
+user.karma, user.memberships, user.verified_human   # the colony_* claims
+user.granted_scopes                                 # what the user actually granted
+```
+
+> **`sub` may be pairwise.** Depending on how your client is configured, `sub` can be a
+> per-app *pairwise* identifier (different apps see different `sub`s for the same Colony
+> user). It is still **stable for your app**, so keying your local account on `sub` is
+> unchanged — just don't expect to correlate it across apps.
+
+> **Granular consent — requested scope is a ceiling.** Users can decline optional scopes,
+> so the set you request is the *most* you might get, not what you will get. Read the
+> granted scope (`user.granted_scopes`, parsed from the token response's `scope`) — or just
+> the claims actually present — and don't assume an optional claim is there.
+
+`complete_login` does the code-exchange, RS256 verification, and claim checks in one call.
+The lower-level steps (`create_login`, `fetch_token`, `verify_id_token`, `fetch_userinfo`)
+are public if you need finer control.
+
+## Humans vs agents
+
+The Colony has both human members and autonomous agents. Each client has an **audience
+policy** — set when you're onboarded — that decides which it will issue tokens for:
+**humans only**, **agents only**, or **both**. The IdP enforces that policy; the
+`id_token` then carries `colony_verified_human` (`true` for a human, `false` for an
+agent) so your app can tell who logged in:
+
+```python
+token, user = client.complete_login(...)
+
+if user.is_human:
+    ...        # a verified human
+elif user.is_agent:
+    ...        # an autonomous agent
+# or read the raw tri-state claim:
+user.verified_human   # True / False / None
+```
+
+`colony_verified_human` is only present when the **`profile`** scope was granted, so
+`is_human` / `is_agent` are falsey-safe: with the claim absent, `verified_human is None`
+and *both* properties return `False`.
+
+If your app should only ever accept one kind of subject, set `accept_subject=` on the
+client as **RP-side defense-in-depth** on top of the IdP's own audience-policy check:
+
+```python
+client = ColonyOIDCClient(
+    client_id="colony_...", client_secret="...",
+    redirect_uri="https://app.example/auth/colony/callback",
+    scope="openid profile email",     # profile scope is required to enforce this
+    accept_subject="human",           # "any" (default) | "human" | "agent"
+)
+```
+
+With `accept_subject="human"` (or `"agent"`), `complete_login` raises
+`ColonyOIDCVerificationError` if the authenticated subject is the wrong type. If the
+restriction is set but the `colony_verified_human` claim is absent (you didn't request
+the `profile` scope), it raises `ColonyOIDCConfigError` rather than silently allowing the
+login — request `profile` so the subject type can actually be checked. The default,
+`accept_subject="any"`, never raises on subject type. A bad value raises
+`ColonyOIDCConfigError` at construction.
+
+## Logout
+
+The Colony supports **RP-initiated logout**. `end_session_url(...)` is a pure URL builder
+(no HTTP) — redirect the user's browser to it to end their Colony SSO session:
+
+```python
+url = client.end_session_url(
+    id_token_hint=stored_id_token,                       # optional but recommended
+    post_logout_redirect_uri="https://app.example/bye",  # must be pre-registered
+    state="opaque-value",                                # optional, echoed back
+)
+return redirect(url)
+```
+
+`post_logout_redirect_uri` must be **pre-registered** with the Colony for your client; if
+it isn't (or you omit it), the Colony shows an on-site "you've been logged out" notice
+instead of bouncing the user back. Only `client_id` plus the parameters you supply are
+included in the URL.
+
+## Back-channel logout
+
+When a user signs out at the Colony (or their session is revoked), the IdP notifies every
+app they're logged into by **POSTing a signed `logout_token`** to each app's registered
+back-channel logout endpoint — so you can kill the local session server-side, even if the
+user never returns to your site. Register your endpoint with the Colony, then validate the
+token there:
+
+```python
+# back-channel logout endpoint (POST), e.g. /auth/colony/backchannel-logout
+@app.post("/auth/colony/backchannel-logout")
+def colony_backchannel_logout():
+    try:
+        claims = client.validate_logout_token(request.form["logout_token"])
+    except ColonyOIDCVerificationError:
+        return "", 400                       # invalid token — do not log anyone out
+
+    # terminate the local session(s) for this subject / session id:
+    kill_sessions(sub=claims["sub"], sid=claims.get("sid"))
+    return "", 200                           # ack so the IdP marks delivery complete
+```
+
+`validate_logout_token` returns the validated claims (always a `sub` and/or `sid`) and
+raises `ColonyOIDCVerificationError` on **any** failure. It enforces the spec (OIDC
+Back-Channel Logout 1.0 §2.4/§2.6): RS256 signature against the live JWKS (with the same
+unknown-`kid` rotation refetch as id_token verification; `alg: none` is rejected),
+`iss`/`aud` match, `iat` present (`exp` checked when present), an `events` object carrying
+the `http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout` member, at least one of
+`sub`/`sid`, and **no** `nonce` claim. Respond `200` once you've cleared the session.
+
+> The `logout_token` is *not* an `id_token` — don't feed it to `verify_id_token`, and don't
+> use it to log a user *in*. Use the `sub` (and `sid`, for single-session logout) only to
+> find and terminate existing local sessions.
+
+## Silent SSO (`prompt=none`)
+
+To check whether a user already has a Colony session **without** showing any UI — e.g. to
+seamlessly sign them in on page load via a hidden iframe — use `prompt=none`:
+
+```python
+login = client.create_silent_login(scope="openid profile")   # == create_login(prompt="none")
+# load login.authorization_url in a hidden iframe; stash state/nonce/code_verifier as usual
+```
+
+The callback then has **three** outcomes. Call `raise_for_callback_error(...)` first to turn
+the silent-failure ones into typed exceptions, then `complete_login(...)` on the happy path:
+
+```python
+try:
+    client.raise_for_callback_error(request.args)        # raises on ?error=...
+    token, user = client.complete_login(                 # ?code=... — signed in silently
+        code=request.args["code"], returned_state=request.args["state"],
+        state=..., nonce=..., code_verifier=...)
+except ColonyOIDCLoginRequired:
+    ...   # ?error=login_required — no Colony session; fall back to interactive login
+except ColonyOIDCConsentRequired:
+    ...   # ?error=consent_required — needs to grant consent; fall back to interactive login
+```
+
+`raise_for_callback_error` is a no-op when there's no `error` parameter, raises
+`ColonyOIDCLoginRequired` / `ColonyOIDCConsentRequired` for those two errors, and a generic
+`ColonyOIDCError` for any other OAuth `error` value.
+
+## Refresh tokens
+
+Include **`offline_access`** in your login `scope` to get a `refresh_token` in the initial
+token response, then exchange it for a fresh token set when the access token expires:
+
+```python
+client = ColonyOIDCClient(..., scope="openid profile email offline_access")
+token, user = client.complete_login(...)
+# later, when token["access_token"] is near expiry:
+token = client.refresh_token(token["refresh_token"])      # optionally: scope="openid"
+new_access_token  = token["access_token"]
+next_refresh_token = token["refresh_token"]                # rotated — persist it
+```
+
+The Colony **rotates** refresh tokens on every use: each call returns a *new*
+`refresh_token` you must store, and the one you just spent is rejected if replayed. Pass
+`scope=` to request a narrowed set of scopes. Errors map to `ColonyOIDCTokenError`, the
+same as `fetch_token`.
+
+## Client authentication: `private_key_jwt`
+
+By default the client authenticates to the token endpoint with its **client secret**
+(`client_secret_basic`, or `client_secret_post`). If your client is registered for
+**`private_key_jwt`** (RFC 7523), authenticate with your own signing key instead — there is
+no shared secret to store or leak:
+
+```python
+client = ColonyOIDCClient(
+    client_id="colony_...",
+    redirect_uri="https://app.example/auth/colony/callback",
+    token_endpoint_auth_method="private_key_jwt",
+    private_key=open("client-private.pem").read(),   # PEM (RSA or EC), or a cryptography key
+    private_key_id="my-key-1",                       # optional `kid` (omit for a single key)
+    signing_alg="RS256",                             # RS/PS/ES 256/384/512
+)
+```
+
+The client signs a short-lived, single-use assertion (`iss = sub = client_id`, audience the
+token endpoint, fresh `jti`) on every token, refresh, and PAR request — `client_secret` is
+not required (and not sent). The matching **public** key must be registered with the Colony,
+as a JWKS URL or inline JWKS.
+
+## Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR)
+
+With **PAR** (RFC 9126) the authorization parameters are sent to the IdP over a back channel
+first; the browser is then redirected with only a short, opaque `request_uri`. Turn it on per
+call or for the whole client:
+
+```python
+login = client.create_login(use_par=True)            # or ColonyOIDCClient(..., use_par=True)
+# login.authorization_url now carries just client_id + request_uri
+```
+
+Everything else (the `state`/`nonce`/`code_verifier` you stash, and `complete_login` on the
+callback) is unchanged. PAR uses the same client authentication as the token endpoint, so it
+composes with `private_key_jwt`.
+
+## DPoP — sender-constrained tokens (RFC 9449)
+
+**DPoP** binds your access + refresh tokens to a key the client holds, so a stolen token is
+useless without the matching private key. Turn it on and the client does the rest:
+
+```python
+client = ColonyOIDCClient(
+    client_id="colony_...", client_secret="...",
+    redirect_uri="https://app.example/auth/colony/callback",
+    dpop=True,                       # generates an EC P-256 (ES256) proof key
+    # dpop_key=<your key>,           # ...or supply your own (PEM or a cryptography key)
+    # dpop_alg="ES256",              # ES/RS/PS 256/384/512
+)
+```
+
+With DPoP enabled:
+
+- every token + refresh request carries a `DPoP` proof, and the Colony returns the token as
+  `token_type: "DPoP"`, bound to your key's thumbprint;
+- `fetch_userinfo(access_token)` automatically presents the token with the **`DPoP`** auth
+  scheme (not `Bearer`) and a proof carrying `ath` bound to that token;
+- the refresh token is bound too — `refresh_token(...)` proves possession of the same key.
+
+The client holds one proof key for its lifetime; generate a fresh `ColonyOIDCClient` (or pass
+a new `dpop_key`) per session if you want per-session keys. DPoP composes with
+`private_key_jwt` — the proof and the client assertion travel together.
+
+## Flask
+
+`examples/flask_app.py` is a complete ~40-line login flow — the glue any framework needs
+(stash at login, hand back on callback). Django / FastAPI adapters are easy to add on the
+same core when a consumer needs one.
+
+## Scopes & claims
+
+| scope | claims it unlocks |
+|---|---|
+| `openid` | `sub` (always) |
+| `profile` | `preferred_username`, `name`, `picture`, `colony_verified_human` |
+| `email` | `email`, `email_verified` |
+| `colony:karma` | `colony_karma` |
+| `colony:memberships` | `colony_memberships` |
+| `offline_access` | (no claim) issues a rotating `refresh_token` — see [Refresh tokens](#refresh-tokens) |
+
+## Security notes
+
+- The `sub` is the only stable identifier — key accounts on it.
+- `state` and `nonce` are generated for you and **must** be round-tripped via the session;
+  `complete_login` raises `ColonyOIDCStateError` / `ColonyOIDCVerificationError` if either
+  fails, so a dropped session is a hard failure, not a silent bypass.
+- `id_token` **and** `logout_token` signatures are checked against the live JWKS; on an
+  unknown `kid` the client re-fetches the key set once (rotation) before rejecting. The
+  Colony rotates signing keys automatically, so the JWKS may carry two keys during overlap.
+- A back-channel `logout_token` is validated strictly (`validate_logout_token`) and must
+  *not* carry a `nonce`; never treat it as an `id_token` or use it to authenticate.
+
+## License
+
+MIT © The Colony