coder-eval 0.12.8__tar.gz → 0.12.9__tar.gz

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/.github/workflows/pr-checks.yml

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ jobs:
 
       # PHASE 3: Security scanning
       - name: Security - Dependency vulnerabilities (pip-audit)
-        run: .venv/bin/pip-audit --desc --skip-editable --ignore-vuln CVE-2026-4539 --ignore-vuln CVE-2026-3219 --ignore-vuln PYSEC-2025-183 # pygments 2.19.2 ReDoS + pip 26.0.1 tar/ZIP ambiguity + pyjwt 2.12.1 weak-encryption (disputed by supplier; key length is application-chosen); no fixes available on PyPI yet — revisit quarterly
+        run: .venv/bin/pip-audit --desc --skip-editable --ignore-vuln CVE-2026-4539 --ignore-vuln CVE-2026-3219 --ignore-vuln CVE-2026-49265 --ignore-vuln CVE-2026-49264 # pygments 2.19.2 ReDoS + pip 26.0.1 tar/ZIP ambiguity; no fixes available on PyPI yet — revisit quarterly. oauthlib 3.3.1 PKCE timing side channel + RevocationEndpoint JSONP callback injection: both server-side OAuth endpoints, unused here (transitive via azure-monitor exporter -> msrest); fix 4.0.0 is a major bump still inside the safe-chain minimum package age — revisit next month
 
       - name: Security - OSV vulnerability scan (osv-scanner)
         # Complements pip-audit: pip-audit queries the PyPI advisory DB;

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,35 @@
 
 <!-- version list -->
 
+## v0.12.9 (2026-09-29)
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+- **docker**: Mount plugins at /coder_eval/plugins/<i> and point the staged task there
+  ([#206](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/pull/206),
+  [`03808c0`](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/commit/03808c084cb28d72e5723a2e9fc30c714f398d14))
+
+- **docker**: Mount plugins at /work/plugins/<i> and point the staged task there
+  ([#206](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/pull/206),
+  [`03808c0`](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/commit/03808c084cb28d72e5723a2e9fc30c714f398d14))
+
+### Chores
+
+- **deps**: Bump pyjwt to 2.15.1 and ignore oauthlib CVE-2026-49265
+  ([#206](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/pull/206),
+  [`03808c0`](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/commit/03808c084cb28d72e5723a2e9fc30c714f398d14))
+
+- **deps**: Ignore oauthlib CVE-2026-49264 and drop the stale pyjwt ignore
+  ([#206](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/pull/206),
+  [`03808c0`](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/commit/03808c084cb28d72e5723a2e9fc30c714f398d14))
+
+### Refactoring
+
+- **docker**: Mount plugins under /work/plugins, not /coder_eval/plugins
+  ([#206](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/pull/206),
+  [`03808c0`](https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval/commit/03808c084cb28d72e5723a2e9fc30c714f398d14))
+
+
 ## v0.12.8 (2026-09-29)
 
 ### Bug Fixes

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: coder-eval
-Version: 0.12.8
+Version: 0.12.9
 Summary: Evaluate, benchmark, and A/B-test AI coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini/Antigravity, OpenCode, Pi, Delegate) with sandboxed, reproducible YAML task suites.
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://coder-eval.com
 Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/action.yml

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ inputs:
   version:
     description: coder-eval version to install from PyPI, or "local" to install from the action checkout
     required: false
-    default: "0.12.8"   # <-- kept in sync with releases by release.yml
+    default: "0.12.9"   # <-- kept in sync with releases by release.yml
   extras:
     description: >-
       Comma-separated coder-eval extras (`codex`, `antigravity,litellm`), composed

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/docs/DOCKER_ISOLATION.md

@@ -361,9 +361,20 @@ reference window's posture above; neither contains an adversarial agent.
   read-write (a `:ro` mount rejects `rm` with EROFS). `prior.json` is kept: it is
   read later on the regrade path, and a regrade runs no agent so it is not a leak.
 
+- **Plugins mount at a fixed container path.** The `i`-th `agent.plugins[]` entry
+  is resolved on the host (a relative path against the task YAML's directory, `$VAR`
+  and `~` expanded) and mounted `:ro` at `/work/plugins/<i>`. The task YAML
+  staged into the container is rewritten to point at that path, so the in-container
+  agent loads the directory the host mounted, whatever form the authored path took
+  and whatever the container's cwd. (Before, the staged YAML kept the authored string:
+  a relative or `$VAR` path the container could not resolve loaded no skill, with only
+  a warning.) An entry that does not resolve to a host directory is neither mounted
+  nor rewritten. It sits under `/work`, so a `sandbox.docker.extra_mounts` destination
+  cannot shadow it (those are refused anywhere under `/work/`).
+
 - **Auto-mounted plugin trees are default-deny masked.** An `agent.plugins[].path`
-  (or a `TemplateDirSource.path` that is itself a plugin root) is auto-mounted at
-  its host path `:ro` so the plugin loads. Eval material colocated under that tree
+  (at `/work/plugins/<i>`) or a `TemplateDirSource.path` that is itself a plugin
+  root (at its host path) is auto-mounted `:ro` so the plugin loads. Eval material colocated under that tree
   as siblings of the skills dir — sibling task YAMLs, reference solutions, test
   fixtures — would otherwise be readable. So the runner keeps the whole root
   mounted but layers an empty `--tmpfs` over every child dir OUTSIDE the keep-set

coder_eval-0.12.9/osv-scanner.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# osv-scanner suppressions for advisories without an available fix.
+#
+# Mirrors the inline --ignore-vuln list passed to pip-audit in
+# .github/workflows/pr-checks.yml so both scanners stay in sync. pip-audit
+# accepts ignores as CLI flags; osv-scanner only reads them from this TOML.
+# When an advisory is fixed upstream, drop the entry here AND remove the
+# matching pip-audit flag in the same PR.
+
+[[IgnoredVulns]]
+id = "CVE-2026-49265"
+reason = "oauthlib 3.3.1 PKCE timing side channel in the server-side code_challenge check, which coder-eval never runs (oauthlib is transitive via azure-monitor-opentelemetry-exporter -> msrest -> requests-oauthlib). The fix, 4.0.0, is a major bump still inside the safe-chain minimum package age; revisit next month."
+
+[[IgnoredVulns]]
+id = "GHSA-hj66-6f7g-4r5v"
+reason = "CVE-2026-49264: oauthlib 3.3.1 RevocationEndpoint JSONP callback injection (only with enable_jsonp=True), a server-side OAuth endpoint coder-eval never runs (oauthlib is transitive via azure-monitor-opentelemetry-exporter -> msrest -> requests-oauthlib). The fix, 4.0.0, is a major bump still inside the safe-chain minimum package age; revisit next month."

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/plugins/coder-eval/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-plugin-manifest.json",
   "name": "coder-eval",
   "displayName": "Coder Eval",
-  "version": "0.12.8",
+  "version": "0.12.9",
   "description": "Test whether your Claude Code skills actually trigger, and benchmark any coding agent — author, run, and analyze the eval suite that proves it, locally or as a CI gate.",
   "author": { "name": "UiPath", "email": "coder-eval@uipath.com", "url": "https://github.com/UiPath/coder_eval" },
   "homepage": "https://coder-eval.com",

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "coder-eval"
-version = "0.12.8"
+version = "0.12.9"
 description = "Evaluate, benchmark, and A/B-test AI coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini/Antigravity, OpenCode, Pi, Delegate) with sandboxed, reproducible YAML task suites."
 readme = "README.md"
 license = "Apache-2.0"
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ constraint-dependencies = [
     "langgraph>=1.0.10",
     "langsmith>=0.6.3",
     "orjson>=3.11.6",
-    "pyjwt>=2.13.0",
+    "pyjwt>=2.14.0",
     "python-multipart>=0.0.31",
     "requests>=2.33.0",
     "starlette>=1.3.1",

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/src/coder_eval/__init__.py

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 """coder_eval - A framework for evaluating AI coding agents."""
 
-__version__ = "0.12.8"
+__version__ = "0.12.9"

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/src/coder_eval/isolation/docker_runner.py

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ from coder_eval.models import (
     CONTAINER_GRADE_WORKSPACE,
     CONTAINER_INPUT_DIR,
     CONTAINER_OUTPUT_DIR,
+    CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR,
     CONTAINER_REFERENCE_DIR,
     CONTAINER_TASK_DIR,
     CONTAINER_WORK_DIR,
@@ -724,6 +725,17 @@ class DockerRunner:
         # Rationale: .claude/notes/orchestration.md § The host-side driver rewrite
         execution_sandbox = SandboxConfig.model_validate({**self.rt.task.sandbox.model_dump(), "driver": "tempdir"})  # noqa: CE051
         execution_task = self.rt.task.model_copy(update={"sandbox": execution_sandbox})
+        # Point each mounted plugin at its container path; the host path (relative,
+        # $VAR, or absolute) need not exist inside the container.
+        plugin_mounts = self._plugin_mounts()
+        if plugin_mounts and execution_task.agent is not None:
+            plugins = [
+                {**plugin, "path": plugin_mounts[i][1]} if i in plugin_mounts else plugin
+                for i, plugin in enumerate(execution_task.agent.plugins or [])
+            ]
+            execution_task = execution_task.model_copy(
+                update={"agent": execution_task.agent.model_copy(update={"plugins": plugins})}
+            )
 
         def _dump_task_yaml() -> str:
             return yaml.safe_dump(execution_task.model_dump(mode="json"), sort_keys=False)
@@ -1236,13 +1248,34 @@ class DockerRunner:
             expanded = self.rt.task_file.parent / expanded
         return expanded.resolve()
 
+    def _plugin_mounts(self) -> dict[int, tuple[Path, str]]:
+        """``agent.plugins`` index -> (host dir, container path) for every plugin whose path resolves to a dir.
+
+        Shared by ``_stage_inputs`` (rewrites the staged task.yaml) and
+        ``_append_auto_mounts`` (emits the binds), so the two cannot disagree.
+        """
+        plugins = (self.rt.task.agent.plugins if self.rt.task.agent else None) or []
+        mounts: dict[int, tuple[Path, str]] = {}
+        for i, plugin in enumerate(plugins):
+            raw_path = plugin.get("path") if isinstance(plugin, dict) else None
+            if not raw_path:
+                continue
+            resolved = self._resolve_mount_path(raw_path)
+            if resolved.is_dir():
+                mounts[i] = (resolved, f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/{i}")
+        return mounts
+
     def _append_auto_mounts(self, argv: list[str]) -> None:
-        """Bind-mount the plugin, template and system-prompt paths a task references, ``:ro`` at their host path.
+        """Bind-mount the plugin, template and system-prompt paths a task references, ``:ro``.
 
-        A plugin root also gets every non-skill child dir masked with an empty tmpfs. The
-        reference is deliberately NOT here: it has its own mount (``_reference_mount_args``).
+        Plugin ``i`` goes to ``CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR/i`` (see ``_plugin_mounts``); the
+        rest mount at their host path. A plugin root also gets every non-skill child dir
+        masked with an empty tmpfs. The reference is deliberately NOT here: it has its
+        own mount (``_reference_mount_args``).
         """
+        # Host sources bound at their host path (dedupe), and every container dest bound.
         mounted: set[Path] = set()
+        dests: set[str] = set()
         # Warned, not refused: `plugin.path` / `reference.directory` /
         # `template_sources` are user-controlled strings, and legitimate uses exist.
         # Rationale: .claude/notes/isolation.md § Extra mounts and reserved destinations
@@ -1251,19 +1284,11 @@ class DockerRunner:
         # Lazy: eval_material imports agents._skills, whose package imports this module.
         from coder_eval.isolation.eval_material import mask_dirs
 
-        # Masked dir -> its plugin root. Emitted only once every bind is known, so a
-        # nested plugin root's bind can win over its parent's mask of the same path.
-        mask_targets: dict[Path, Path] = {}
+        # Masked container dir -> its host plugin root. Emitted only once every bind is
+        # known, so a nested plugin root's bind can win over its parent's mask of the same path.
+        mask_targets: dict[str, Path] = {}
 
-        def _auto_mount(raw_path: str | None, *, dir_only: bool = True) -> None:
-            if not raw_path:
-                return
-            resolved = self._resolve_mount_path(raw_path)
-            # File paths get mounted as the parent dir so a single -v covers
-            # the file; container-side reads still resolve at the same path.
-            target = resolved if (dir_only or resolved.is_dir()) else resolved.parent
-            if target in mounted or not target.is_dir():
-                return
+        def _bind(target: Path, dest: str) -> None:
             for sensitive in sensitive_sources:
                 if target == sensitive or sensitive in target.parents:
                     logger.warning(
@@ -1271,17 +1296,28 @@ class DockerRunner:
                         target,
                     )
                     break
-            mounted.add(target)
-            argv.extend(["-v", f"{target}:{target}:ro"])
+            dests.add(dest)
+            argv.extend(["-v", f"{target}:{dest}:ro"])
             masks = mask_dirs(target)
             if not masks and (target / ".claude-plugin" / "plugin.json").is_file():
                 logger.warning(_MASK_STANDDOWN_WARNING, target)
             for masked_dir in masks:
-                mask_targets.setdefault(masked_dir, target)
+                mask_targets.setdefault(str(Path(dest) / masked_dir.relative_to(target)), target)
 
-        plugins = (self.rt.task.agent.plugins if self.rt.task.agent else None) or []
-        for plugin in plugins:
-            _auto_mount(plugin.get("path") if isinstance(plugin, dict) else None)
+        def _auto_mount(raw_path: str | None, *, dir_only: bool = True) -> None:
+            if not raw_path:
+                return
+            resolved = self._resolve_mount_path(raw_path)
+            # File paths get mounted as the parent dir so a single -v covers
+            # the file; container-side reads still resolve at the same path.
+            target = resolved if (dir_only or resolved.is_dir()) else resolved.parent
+            if target in mounted or not target.is_dir():
+                return
+            mounted.add(target)
+            _bind(target, str(target))
+
+        for host_dir, dest in self._plugin_mounts().values():
+            _bind(host_dir, dest)
 
         from coder_eval.models import TemplateDirSource
 
@@ -1299,9 +1335,9 @@ class DockerRunner:
         # A deeper --tmpfs wins over the enclosing :ro bind regardless of argv order;
         # a mask that is also a bind would be a duplicate mount point, so the bind wins.
         for masked_dir, root in sorted(mask_targets.items()):
-            if masked_dir in mounted:
+            if masked_dir in dests:
                 continue
-            argv.extend(["--tmpfs", str(masked_dir)])
+            argv.extend(["--tmpfs", masked_dir])
             logger.warning(_MASK_WARNING, masked_dir, root)
 
     def _build_argv(

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/src/coder_eval/models/__init__.py

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ from coder_eval.models.container_paths import (
     CONTAINER_GRADE_WORKSPACE,
     CONTAINER_INPUT_DIR,
     CONTAINER_OUTPUT_DIR,
+    CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR,
     CONTAINER_REFERENCE_DIR,
     CONTAINER_TASK_DIR,
     CONTAINER_WORK_DIR,
@@ -324,6 +325,7 @@ __all__ = [  # noqa: RUF022 - Keep grouped by category for readability
     "CONTAINER_INPUT_DIR",
     "CONTAINER_OUTPUT_DIR",
     "CONTAINER_GRADE_WORKSPACE",
+    "CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR",
     "CONTAINER_REFERENCE_DIR",
     "IN_CONTAINER_ENV",
     "CONTAINER_TASK_DIR",

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/src/coder_eval/models/container_paths.py

@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ CONTAINER_REFERENCE_DIR = "/work/references"
 # Rationale: .claude/notes/isolation.md § Why the grading container gets a private scratch directory
 CONTAINER_GRADE_WORKSPACE = "/work/workspace"
 
+CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR = "/work/plugins"  # agent.plugins[i] mounts :ro at <dir>/<i>; see DOCKER_ISOLATION.md
+
 # Paths a task's WORKDIR must never collide with. Consumed by SandboxConfig's
 # working_dir validator and re-asserted host-side in docker_runner.
 RESERVED_CONTAINER_DIRS = frozenset(
@@ -102,5 +104,6 @@ RESERVED_CONTAINER_DIRS = frozenset(
         CONTAINER_TASK_DIR,
         CONTAINER_REFERENCE_DIR,
         CONTAINER_GRADE_WORKSPACE,
+        CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR,
     }
 )

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/tests/test_container_context.py

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ from coder_eval import models
 from coder_eval.cli import app, run_task_internal_command
 from coder_eval.isolation.docker_runner import DockerRunner
 from coder_eval.models import (
+    CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR,
     AgentKind,
     ConfigLineageEntry,
     ContainerContext,
@@ -293,6 +294,36 @@ async def test_the_staged_task_yaml_says_tempdir(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
     assert staged.sandbox.driver == "tempdir"
 
 
+async def test_the_staged_task_yaml_points_plugins_at_their_container_mounts(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # A relative plugin path resolves against the task-file dir on the host; the
+    # container gets the fixed mount path instead, since that host path (or its
+    # $VAR) need not exist inside. An unresolvable plugin is left as authored.
+    (tmp_path / "plugin" / "skills" / "demo").mkdir(parents=True)
+    plugins = [{"type": "local", "path": "plugin"}, {"type": "local", "path": "does/not/exist"}]
+    task = TaskDefinition.model_validate(
+        {
+            **_authored_docker_task().model_dump(),
+            "initial_prompt": "go",
+            "agent": {"type": "claude-code", "plugins": plugins},
+        }
+    )
+    rt = ResolvedTask(
+        task=task,
+        task_file=tmp_path / "t.yaml",
+        run_dir=tmp_path / "run",
+        variant_id="default",
+        original_task_id="staged",
+    )
+    input_dir = tmp_path / "input"
+    input_dir.mkdir()
+    await DockerRunner(rt)._stage_inputs(input_dir)
+
+    staged, _ = load_task(input_dir / "task.yaml")
+    assert [p["path"] for p in staged.agent.plugins] == [f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0", "does/not/exist"]
+    # The host-side task is untouched: argv rendering still needs the host path.
+    assert rt.task.agent.plugins[0]["path"] == "plugin"
+
+
 async def test_the_contract_carries_the_authored_sandbox(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
     rt, _, ctx = await _stage(tmp_path)
 

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/tests/test_docker_runner_mounts.py

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ from coder_eval.isolation.docker_runner import (
     CLAUDE_COPY_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
     CONTAINER_ENTRYPOINT,
     CONTAINER_OUTPUT_DIR,
+    CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR,
     CONTAINER_REFERENCE_DIR,
     CONTAINER_TASK_DIR,
     DockerRunError,
@@ -790,18 +791,18 @@ class TestAutoMountAllowlistMask:
         argv = self._argv(runner, tmp_path)
 
         tmpfs = self._tmpfs(argv)
-        # The whole root is :ro-mounted so the plugin loads.
-        assert f"{root.resolve()}:{root.resolve()}:ro" in self._mounts(argv)
+        # The whole root is :ro-mounted at plugin 0's container path so the plugin loads.
+        assert f"{root.resolve()}:{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0:ro" in self._mounts(argv)
         # Non-skill children masked; skill surface + manifest not.
-        assert str((root / "tests").resolve()) in tmpfs
-        assert str((root / "reference").resolve()) in tmpfs
-        assert str((root / "node_modules").resolve()) in tmpfs
-        assert str((root / "skills").resolve()) not in tmpfs
-        assert str((root / ".claude-plugin").resolve()) not in tmpfs
-
-    def test_tmpfs_targets_are_under_mounted_host_root(self, tmp_path: Path):
-        # Codex symlinks / Antigravity search paths dereference the ORIGINAL
-        # mounted host path, so the mask must sit on that path, not a copy.
+        assert f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0/tests" in tmpfs
+        assert f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0/reference" in tmpfs
+        assert f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0/node_modules" in tmpfs
+        assert f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0/skills" not in tmpfs
+        assert f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0/.claude-plugin" not in tmpfs
+
+    def test_tmpfs_targets_are_under_mounted_container_root(self, tmp_path: Path):
+        # Codex symlinks / Antigravity search paths dereference the container path
+        # the staged task.yaml names, so the mask must sit under that path.
         root = self._plugin_root(tmp_path / "plugin")
         (root / "skills" / "demo").mkdir(parents=True)
         (root / "tests").mkdir()
@@ -810,7 +811,7 @@ class TestAutoMountAllowlistMask:
         argv = self._argv(runner, tmp_path)
 
         for masked in self._tmpfs(argv):
-            assert Path(masked).is_relative_to(root.resolve())
+            assert Path(masked).is_relative_to(f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0")
 
     def test_template_source_plugin_root_is_masked(self, tmp_path: Path):
         from coder_eval.models import TemplateDirSource
@@ -860,12 +861,14 @@ class TestAutoMountAllowlistMask:
         argv = self._argv(runner, tmp_path)
         mounts, tmpfs = self._mounts(argv), self._tmpfs(argv)
 
-        # B is bind-mounted (so it loads) and NOT tmpfs-masked (no duplicate dest).
-        assert f"{b.resolve()}:{b.resolve()}:ro" in mounts
-        assert str(b.resolve()) not in tmpfs
-        # A's own non-skill child is still masked; B masks its own.
-        assert str((a / "tests").resolve()) in tmpfs
-        assert str((b / "tests").resolve()) in tmpfs
+        # B is bind-mounted at its own container path (so it loads) and NOT
+        # tmpfs-masked there (no duplicate dest).
+        assert f"{b.resolve()}:{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/1:ro" in mounts
+        assert f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/1" not in tmpfs
+        # A's own non-skill children (B included) are masked in A's view; B masks its own.
+        assert f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0/tests" in tmpfs
+        assert f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/0/nested_b" in tmpfs
+        assert f"{CONTAINER_PLUGINS_DIR}/1/tests" in tmpfs
         # No --tmpfs target collides with a bind destination (the M2 crash).
         bind_dests = {m.split(":")[1] for m in mounts if m.count(":") >= 2}
         assert not (set(tmpfs) & bind_dests)

{coder_eval-0.12.8 → coder_eval-0.12.9}/uv.lock

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ constraints = [
     { name = "langgraph", specifier = ">=1.0.10" },
     { name = "langsmith", specifier = ">=0.6.3" },
     { name = "orjson", specifier = ">=3.11.6" },
-    { name = "pyjwt", specifier = ">=2.13.0" },
+    { name = "pyjwt", specifier = ">=2.14.0" },
     { name = "python-multipart", specifier = ">=0.0.31" },
     { name = "requests", specifier = ">=2.33.0" },
     { name = "starlette", specifier = ">=1.3.1" },
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ wheels = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "coder-eval"
-version = "0.12.8"
+version = "0.12.9"
 source = { editable = "." }
 dependencies = [
     { name = "anthropic" },
@@ -2265,11 +2265,11 @@ wheels = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "pyjwt"
-version = "2.13.0"
+version = "2.15.1"
 source = { registry = "https://pypi.org/simple" }
-sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3b/81/58d0ac84e1ef3a3843791d6954d94c0b33d526c75eeb1efbce9d0a4c4077/pyjwt-2.13.0.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:41571c89ca91598c79e8ef18a2d07367d4810fbbd6f637794879baf1b7703423", size = 107515, upload-time = "2026-05-21T19:54:36.618Z" }
+sdist = { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/43/ea/5194e52748b0da83d71e082d75496eaec6e58f419f5e184786ded517e6a9/pyjwt-2.15.1.tar.gz", hash = "sha256:4f259e80cdfb6b3fc18a7de51fd1ef9ec79652f25019bae68975ca2468a34df8", size = 121252, upload-time = "2026-09-28T18:40:42.598Z" }
 wheels = [
-    { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/a3/5e/ecf12fdb62546d64385c158514e9b2b671f7832108ef2ecd2020ce0af2d1/pyjwt-2.13.0-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:66adcc2aff09b3f1bbd95fc1e1577df8ac8723c978552fd43304c8a290ac5728", size = 31274, upload-time = "2026-05-21T19:54:35.362Z" },
+    { url = "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/50/ca/44de4e75f8aadc457f0634be3b542815078ded46dca30efb960edeecad6e/pyjwt-2.15.1-py3-none-any.whl", hash = "sha256:42d59d631f7768a1028a64c7ff581a9bf7519804daf91fc5b6c56e30eec5e193", size = 33860, upload-time = "2026-09-28T18:40:41.429Z" },
 ]
 
 [package.optional-dependencies]

coder_eval-0.12.8/osv-scanner.toml

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# osv-scanner suppressions for advisories without an available fix.
-#
-# Mirrors the inline --ignore-vuln list passed to pip-audit in
-# .github/workflows/pr-checks.yml so both scanners stay in sync. pip-audit
-# accepts ignores as CLI flags; osv-scanner only reads them from this TOML.
-# When an advisory is fixed upstream, drop the entry here AND remove the
-# matching pip-audit flag in the same PR.
-
-[[IgnoredVulns]]
-id = "PYSEC-2025-183"
-reason = "pyjwt 2.12.1 weak-encryption — disputed by supplier (key length is application-chosen). No fix available on PyPI; revisit quarterly."