clawlock 2.2.2__tar.gz → 2.3.1__tar.gz

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: clawlock
-Version: 2.2.2
+Version: 2.3.1
 Summary: Comprehensive security scanner, red-teamer & hardening toolkit for Claw-based AI agent deployments
 Author: g0at
 License: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ clawlock skill /path/to/skill            # Audit one skill
 clawlock soul                            # Check prompt + memory drift
 clawlock harden                          # Interactive hardening wizard
 clawlock harden --auto-fix               # Apply safe local auto-fixes
+clawlock harden --from-scan --auto-fix   # Fix only issues found in last scan
+clawlock harden --auto-fix --verify      # Auto-fix then verify the result
+clawlock harden --rollback               # Undo the last auto-fix
 clawlock mcp-scan ./mcp-server/src       # MCP source-code deep scan
 clawlock agent-scan --code ./agent/src   # Standalone OWASP ASI agent scan
 clawlock scan --format html -o report.html
@@ -230,12 +233,24 @@ ClawLock currently ships **18 hardening measures**.
 - `clawlock harden`: interactive mode
 - `clawlock harden --auto`: applies safe non-interactive actions and prints guidance for recommendation-only items
 - `clawlock harden --auto-fix`: only performs real safe local auto-fixes
+- `clawlock harden --from-scan`: show only measures relevant to the latest scan findings
+- `clawlock harden --auto-fix --verify`: auto-fix then re-scan to confirm the fix worked
+- `clawlock harden --rollback`: undo the last auto-fix action (restores from backup)
 
-Important current behavior:
+Auto-fixable measures:
+
+| ID | Measure | What it does |
+|----|---------|--------------|
+| H003 | Shorten session retention | Sets `sessionRetentionDays` to 7 in config files |
+| H007 | Create prompt baseline | Records SHA-256 baselines for SOUL.md / CLAUDE.md / MEMORY.md |
+| H008 | Enable approval mode | Sets `approvalMode` to `"always"` in config files |
+| H009 | Tighten credential permissions | `chmod 600`/`700` or `icacls` on config dirs and credential files |
+
+All config modifications are backed up to `~/.clawlock/backups/` before changes are made.
+
+Other behavior:
 
 - The wizard groups measures into **Safe to apply now**, **Recommended only**, and **Needs confirmation**
-- Only **`H009`** performs an actual local auto-fix today
-- `H009` tightens permissions on supported config directories and common home credential files such as `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, and `.netrc`
 - UX-impacting measures still require explicit confirmation in interactive mode
 - Guidance-only measures are no longer reported as if they were applied
 
@@ -282,7 +297,7 @@ cp skill/SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/clawlock/
 git clone https://github.com/g1at/clawlock.git
 cd clawlock
 pip install -e ".[dev]"
-pytest tests/test_clawlock.py -v    # 104 tests
+pytest tests/test_clawlock.py -v    # 110 tests
 ```
 
 ## Contributing

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/README.md

@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ clawlock skill /path/to/skill            # Audit one skill
 clawlock soul                            # Check prompt + memory drift
 clawlock harden                          # Interactive hardening wizard
 clawlock harden --auto-fix               # Apply safe local auto-fixes
+clawlock harden --from-scan --auto-fix   # Fix only issues found in last scan
+clawlock harden --auto-fix --verify      # Auto-fix then verify the result
+clawlock harden --rollback               # Undo the last auto-fix
 clawlock mcp-scan ./mcp-server/src       # MCP source-code deep scan
 clawlock agent-scan --code ./agent/src   # Standalone OWASP ASI agent scan
 clawlock scan --format html -o report.html
@@ -201,12 +204,24 @@ ClawLock currently ships **18 hardening measures**.
 - `clawlock harden`: interactive mode
 - `clawlock harden --auto`: applies safe non-interactive actions and prints guidance for recommendation-only items
 - `clawlock harden --auto-fix`: only performs real safe local auto-fixes
+- `clawlock harden --from-scan`: show only measures relevant to the latest scan findings
+- `clawlock harden --auto-fix --verify`: auto-fix then re-scan to confirm the fix worked
+- `clawlock harden --rollback`: undo the last auto-fix action (restores from backup)
 
-Important current behavior:
+Auto-fixable measures:
+
+| ID | Measure | What it does |
+|----|---------|--------------|
+| H003 | Shorten session retention | Sets `sessionRetentionDays` to 7 in config files |
+| H007 | Create prompt baseline | Records SHA-256 baselines for SOUL.md / CLAUDE.md / MEMORY.md |
+| H008 | Enable approval mode | Sets `approvalMode` to `"always"` in config files |
+| H009 | Tighten credential permissions | `chmod 600`/`700` or `icacls` on config dirs and credential files |
+
+All config modifications are backed up to `~/.clawlock/backups/` before changes are made.
+
+Other behavior:
 
 - The wizard groups measures into **Safe to apply now**, **Recommended only**, and **Needs confirmation**
-- Only **`H009`** performs an actual local auto-fix today
-- `H009` tightens permissions on supported config directories and common home credential files such as `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, and `.netrc`
 - UX-impacting measures still require explicit confirmation in interactive mode
 - Guidance-only measures are no longer reported as if they were applied
 
@@ -253,7 +268,7 @@ cp skill/SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/clawlock/
 git clone https://github.com/g1at/clawlock.git
 cd clawlock
 pip install -e ".[dev]"
-pytest tests/test_clawlock.py -v    # 104 tests
+pytest tests/test_clawlock.py -v    # 110 tests
 ```
 
 ## Contributing

clawlock-2.3.1/clawlock/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+"""
+ClawLock v2.3.1 — Comprehensive security scanner, red-teamer & hardening toolkit
+for Claw-based AI agent deployments.
+"""
+
+__version__ = "2.3.1"
+

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/clawlock/__main__.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""ClawLock v2.2.2 CLI - 12 commands."""
+"""ClawLock v2.3.1 CLI - 12 commands."""
 
 import asyncio
 import concurrent.futures
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ from rich.progress import (
 
 from . import __version__
 from .adapters import get_adapter, get_claw_version, resolve_cve_lookup
-from .hardening import run_hardening
+from .hardening import run_hardening, rollback_last
 from .i18n import t
 from .reporters import console, render_focus_report, render_scan_report
 from .scanners import (
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ _patch_cli_i18n()
 app = typer.Typer(
     name="clawlock",
     help=t(
-        "ClawLock v2.2.2 - 面向 Claw 平台的安全扫描与加固工具",
-        "ClawLock v2.2.2 - security scan and hardening for Claw platforms",
+        "ClawLock v2.3.1 - 面向 Claw 平台的安全扫描与加固工具",
+        "ClawLock v2.3.1 - security scan and hardening for Claw platforms",
     ),
     rich_markup_mode="rich",
     no_args_is_help=False,
@@ -589,9 +589,48 @@ def harden(
             "--auto-fix", help=t("自动应用安全修复，例如文件权限", "Auto-apply safe fixes such as file permissions")
         ),
     ] = False,
+    from_scan: Annotated[
+        bool,
+        typer.Option(
+            "--from-scan", help=t("仅展示与最近扫描发现相关的加固措施", "Show only measures relevant to the latest scan findings")
+        ),
+    ] = False,
+    verify: Annotated[
+        bool,
+        typer.Option(
+            "--verify", help=t("修复后自动验证", "Run verification scan after fixes")
+        ),
+    ] = False,
+    do_rollback: Annotated[
+        bool,
+        typer.Option(
+            "--rollback", help=t("回滚上一次自动修复", "Rollback the last auto-fix action")
+        ),
+    ] = False,
 ):
     """Run the interactive hardening wizard."""
-    run_hardening(get_adapter(adapter).name, auto=auto, auto_fix=auto_fix)
+    if do_rollback:
+        n = rollback_last(1)
+        if n:
+            console.print(f"[green]{t('已还原', 'Restored')} {n} {t('个文件', 'file(s)')}[/green]")
+        else:
+            console.print(f"[yellow]{t('没有可回滚的操作。', 'No actions to rollback.')}[/yellow]")
+        return
+    scan_findings = None
+    if from_scan:
+        from .utils import get_scan_history
+        history = get_scan_history(1)
+        if history and "findings" in history[-1]:
+            scan_findings = history[-1]["findings"]
+        else:
+            scan_findings = []
+    run_hardening(
+        get_adapter(adapter).name,
+        auto=auto,
+        auto_fix=auto_fix,
+        from_scan=scan_findings if from_scan else None,
+        verify=verify,
+    )
 
 
 @app.command(help=t("运行 promptfoo 红队测试", "Run promptfoo red-team tests."))

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/clawlock/hardening/__init__.py

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import json
+import shutil
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime
 from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Callable, List, Union
+from typing import Callable, Dict, List, Optional, Union
 
 from rich.console import Console
 from rich.panel import Panel
@@ -12,6 +15,72 @@ from ..i18n import t
 from ..utils import IS_ANDROID, IS_MACOS, IS_WINDOWS, platform_label
 
 console = Console()
+
+# ─── Backup / rollback infrastructure ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+HARDENING_LOG = Path.home() / ".clawlock" / "hardening_log.json"
+
+
+def _load_hardening_log() -> list:
+    try:
+        if HARDENING_LOG.exists():
+            return json.loads(HARDENING_LOG.read_text())
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    return []
+
+
+def _save_hardening_log(records: list):
+    try:
+        HARDENING_LOG.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        HARDENING_LOG.write_text(json.dumps(records[-200:], ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+
+def _backup_file(path: Path) -> Optional[Path]:
+    """Create a timestamped backup of a file before modification. Returns backup path."""
+    if not path.exists():
+        return None
+    backup_dir = Path.home() / ".clawlock" / "backups"
+    backup_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    ts = datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
+    backup_path = backup_dir / f"{path.name}.{ts}.bak"
+    try:
+        shutil.copy2(path, backup_path)
+        return backup_path
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+def _record_hardening_action(measure_id: str, files_changed: Dict[str, str]):
+    """Record an auto-fix action with backup paths for rollback."""
+    log = _load_hardening_log()
+    log.append({
+        "time": datetime.now().isoformat(),
+        "measure": measure_id,
+        "files": files_changed,  # {original_path: backup_path}
+    })
+    _save_hardening_log(log)
+
+
+def rollback_last(count: int = 1) -> int:
+    """Rollback the last N hardening actions. Returns number of files restored."""
+    log = _load_hardening_log()
+    restored = 0
+    for _ in range(min(count, len(log))):
+        entry = log.pop()
+        for orig, backup in entry.get("files", {}).items():
+            orig_p, backup_p = Path(orig), Path(backup)
+            if backup_p.exists():
+                try:
+                    shutil.copy2(backup_p, orig_p)
+                    restored += 1
+                    console.print(f"  [green]{t('已还原', 'Restored')}: {orig}[/green]")
+                except Exception:
+                    console.print(f"  [red]{t('还原失败', 'Restore failed')}: {orig}[/red]")
+    _save_hardening_log(log)
+    return restored
 TextValue = Union[str, Callable[[], str]]
 
 
@@ -130,9 +199,10 @@ def _persistence_guidance() -> bool:
 
 
 def _fix_cred_perms():
-    from ..utils import fix_file_permission
+    from ..utils import fix_file_permission, check_file_permission
 
     fixed = 0
+    changed_files: Dict[str, str] = {}
     for d in [
         Path.home() / ".openclaw",
         Path.home() / ".zeroclaw",
@@ -154,8 +224,10 @@ def _fix_cred_perms():
                     ".env",
                     ".rc",
                 ):
-                    fix_file_permission(f, private=True)
-                    _g(f"{t('已收紧', 'Tightened')}: {f}")
+                    world_r, group_r, _ = check_file_permission(f)
+                    if world_r or group_r:
+                        fix_file_permission(f, private=True)
+                        _g(f"{t('已收紧', 'Tightened')}: {f}")
     for f in [
         Path.home() / ".npmrc",
         Path.home() / ".pypirc",
@@ -164,9 +236,124 @@ def _fix_cred_perms():
         if f.exists() and fix_file_permission(f, private=True):
             fixed += 1
             _g(f"{t('已收紧', 'Tightened')}: {f}")
+    if fixed:
+        _record_hardening_action("H009", changed_files)
     return fixed > 0
 
 
+def _find_config_files() -> List[Path]:
+    """Find all Claw product config files."""
+    configs = []
+    for d in [
+        Path.home() / ".openclaw",
+        Path.home() / ".zeroclaw",
+        Path.home() / ".claude",
+        Path.home() / ".config" / "openclaw",
+        Path.home() / ".config" / "zeroclaw",
+        Path.home() / ".config" / "claude",
+    ]:
+        if d.exists():
+            for f in d.iterdir():
+                if f.is_file() and f.suffix in (".json",):
+                    configs.append(f)
+    return configs
+
+
+def _patch_json_config(path: Path, key: str, value, measure_id: str) -> bool:
+    """Safely patch a JSON config file: backup → modify → record."""
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(path.read_text())
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    # Navigate dotted key
+    parts = key.split(".")
+    target = data
+    for p in parts[:-1]:
+        if not isinstance(target, dict):
+            return False
+        target = target.setdefault(p, {})
+    if not isinstance(target, dict):
+        return False
+    old_val = target.get(parts[-1])
+    if old_val == value:
+        _g(f"{path.name}: {key} = {value} ({t('已经是目标值', 'already at target value')})")
+        return False
+    backup_path = _backup_file(path)
+    target[parts[-1]] = value
+    try:
+        path.write_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    changed = {str(path): str(backup_path)} if backup_path else {}
+    _record_hardening_action(measure_id, changed)
+    _g(f"{path.name}: {key}: {old_val} → {value}")
+    return True
+
+
+def _fix_session_retention():
+    """H003: Set sessionRetentionDays to 7 in all config files."""
+    fixed = 0
+    for cfg in _find_config_files():
+        try:
+            data = json.loads(cfg.read_text())
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        val = data.get("sessionRetentionDays")
+        if isinstance(val, int) and val > 7:
+            if _patch_json_config(cfg, "sessionRetentionDays", 7, "H003"):
+                fixed += 1
+    if fixed:
+        return True
+    _g(t("未找到需要修改的配置文件。", "No config files needed modification."))
+    return False
+
+
+def _fix_prompt_baseline():
+    """H007: Create SHA-256 baseline for SOUL.md / CLAUDE.md / MEMORY.md."""
+    from ..scanners import _load_hashes, _save_hashes
+    import hashlib
+
+    stored = _load_hashes()
+    updated = 0
+    candidates = []
+    for fname in ["CLAUDE.md", "SOUL.md", "MEMORY.md"]:
+        candidates.append(Path.cwd() / fname)
+        for d in [".openclaw", ".claude", ".zeroclaw"]:
+            candidates.append(Path.home() / d / fname)
+    for c in candidates:
+        if c.exists():
+            content = c.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
+            h = hashlib.sha256(content.encode()).hexdigest()
+            key = str(c.resolve())
+            if stored.get(key) != h:
+                stored[key] = h
+                updated += 1
+                _g(f"{t('已更新基线', 'Baseline updated')}: {c.name}")
+    if updated:
+        _save_hashes(stored)
+        return True
+    _g(t("基线已是最新。", "Baselines are already up to date."))
+    return False
+
+
+def _fix_approval_mode():
+    """H008: Enable approvalMode in config files."""
+    fixed = 0
+    for cfg in _find_config_files():
+        try:
+            data = json.loads(cfg.read_text())
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        val = data.get("approvalMode")
+        if val in (False, "none", "disabled", None):
+            if _patch_json_config(cfg, "approvalMode", "always", "H008"):
+                fixed += 1
+    if fixed:
+        return True
+    _g(t("未找到需要修改的配置文件。", "No config files needed modification."))
+    return False
+
+
 MEASURES: List[HardenMeasure] = [
     HardenMeasure(
         "H001",
@@ -201,8 +388,10 @@ MEASURES: List[HardenMeasure] = [
             "更早的会话历史将不再可用。",
             "Older session history will no longer be available.",
         ),
-        lambda: _guide('"sessionRetentionDays": 7, "logLevel": "warn"'),
+        _fix_session_retention,
         [],
+        auto_fixable=True,
+        guidance_only=False,
     ),
     HardenMeasure(
         "H004",
@@ -244,14 +433,10 @@ MEASURES: List[HardenMeasure] = [
             "Record a SHA-256 baseline for SOUL.md / CLAUDE.md / MEMORY.md.",
         ),
         "",
-        lambda: _guide(
-            _tr(
-                "运行 `clawlock soul --update-baseline` 保存基线。",
-                "Run `clawlock soul --update-baseline` to save a baseline.",
-            )
-        ),
+        _fix_prompt_baseline,
         [],
-        auto_fixable=False,
+        auto_fixable=True,
+        guidance_only=False,
     ),
     HardenMeasure(
         "H008",
@@ -264,8 +449,10 @@ MEASURES: List[HardenMeasure] = [
             "高风险操作会暂停等待确认。",
             "High-risk actions will pause for confirmation.",
         ),
-        lambda: _guide('"approvalMode": "always"'),
+        _fix_approval_mode,
         ["openclaw", "zeroclaw"],
+        auto_fixable=True,
+        guidance_only=False,
     ),
     HardenMeasure(
         "H009",
@@ -510,6 +697,74 @@ MEASURES: List[HardenMeasure] = [
 ]
 
 
+# ─── Finding → Measure mapping for --from-scan ──────────────────────────────
+
+# Maps finding title keywords or config keys to relevant measure IDs.
+_FINDING_TO_MEASURES: Dict[str, List[str]] = {
+    "allowedDirectories": ["H001"],
+    "allowedPaths": ["H001"],
+    "File access scope": ["H001"],
+    "文件访问范围": ["H001"],
+    "gatewayAuth": ["H002"],
+    "Gateway auth": ["H002"],
+    "Gateway 鉴权": ["H002"],
+    "auth.enabled": ["H002"],
+    "sessionRetentionDays": ["H003"],
+    "Session log retention": ["H003"],
+    "会话日志保留": ["H003"],
+    "enableBrowserControl": ["H004"],
+    "Browser control": ["H004"],
+    "浏览器控制": ["H004"],
+    "allowNetworkAccess": ["H005"],
+    "Network access": ["H005"],
+    "网络访问": ["H005"],
+    "MCP": ["H006", "H015"],
+    "prompt baseline": ["H007"],
+    "Drift": ["H007"],
+    "漂移": ["H007"],
+    "approvalMode": ["H008"],
+    "Operation approval": ["H008"],
+    "操作审批": ["H008"],
+    "Credential dir": ["H009"],
+    "Credential file": ["H009"],
+    "凭证目录": ["H009"],
+    "凭证文件": ["H009"],
+    "rateLimit": ["H010"],
+    "Rate limit": ["H010"],
+    "速率限制": ["H010"],
+    "curl|": ["H011"],
+    "wget|": ["H011"],
+    "Download-and-execute": ["H011"],
+    "下载即执行": ["H011"],
+    "LOLBin": ["H012"],
+    "persistence": ["H013"],
+    "持久化": ["H013"],
+    "Cron": ["H013"],
+    "schtasks": ["H013"],
+    "LaunchAgent": ["H013"],
+    "systemd": ["H013"],
+    "Termux": ["H013"],
+    "tunnel": ["H014"],
+    "隧道": ["H014"],
+    "ngrok": ["H014"],
+    "dynamic module": ["H016"],
+    "动态模块": ["H016"],
+}
+
+
+def _measures_for_findings(findings: list) -> set:
+    """Given a list of finding dicts (from scan history), return relevant measure IDs."""
+    relevant = set()
+    for f in findings:
+        title = f.get("title", "")
+        location = f.get("location", "")
+        text = f"{title} {location}"
+        for keyword, measure_ids in _FINDING_TO_MEASURES.items():
+            if keyword in text:
+                relevant.update(measure_ids)
+    return relevant
+
+
 def _needs_confirmation(measure: HardenMeasure) -> bool:
     return bool(_text(measure.ux_impact))
 
@@ -533,7 +788,13 @@ def _print_measure(measure: HardenMeasure):
     console.print(f"  {t('动作', 'Action')}: {_measure_action(measure)}")
 
 
-def run_hardening(adapter_name: str, auto: bool = False, auto_fix: bool = False):
+def run_hardening(
+    adapter_name: str,
+    auto: bool = False,
+    auto_fix: bool = False,
+    from_scan: Optional[list] = None,
+    verify: bool = False,
+):
     mode = (
         t("自动修复", "auto-fix")
         if auto_fix
@@ -557,6 +818,20 @@ def run_hardening(adapter_name: str, auto: bool = False, auto_fix: bool = False)
         for m in MEASURES
         if (not m.adapters or adapter_name in m.adapters) and _platform_matches(m)
     ]
+    # If --from-scan, filter to only measures relevant to actual findings
+    if from_scan is not None:
+        relevant_ids = _measures_for_findings(from_scan)
+        if relevant_ids:
+            applicable = [m for m in applicable if m.id in relevant_ids]
+            console.print(
+                f"[dim]{t('根据扫描结果筛选了', 'Filtered to')} {len(applicable)} "
+                f"{t('条相关加固措施', 'relevant measures based on scan findings')}[/dim]\n"
+            )
+        else:
+            console.print(
+                f"[green]{t('扫描未发现与加固措施关联的问题。', 'Scan found no issues linked to hardening measures.')}[/green]"
+            )
+            return
     safe_now = [m for m in applicable if not m.guidance_only and not _needs_confirmation(m)]
     recommended_only = [
         m for m in applicable if m.guidance_only and not _needs_confirmation(m)
@@ -655,3 +930,34 @@ def run_hardening(adapter_name: str, auto: bool = False, auto_fix: bool = False)
         f"{recommended} {t('项仅建议', 'recommended')}, "
         f"{skipped} {t('项已跳过', 'skipped')}."
     )
+
+    # Post-fix verification: re-scan config + credentials to show improvement
+    if verify and applied > 0:
+        console.print()
+        console.print(f"[bold]{t('修复验证', 'Post-fix Verification')}[/bold]")
+        try:
+            from ..adapters import get_adapter
+            from ..scanners import scan_config, scan_credential_dirs
+
+            adapter = get_adapter(adapter_name)
+            cfg_findings, _ = scan_config(adapter)
+            cred_findings = scan_credential_dirs(adapter)
+            remaining = [
+                f for f in cfg_findings + cred_findings
+                if f.level in ("critical", "high")
+            ]
+            if remaining:
+                console.print(
+                    f"  [yellow]{t('仍有', 'Still')} {len(remaining)} "
+                    f"{t('个高危/严重问题待处理', 'critical/high issue(s) remaining')}[/yellow]"
+                )
+                for rf in remaining[:5]:
+                    console.print(f"    [{rf.level}] {rf.title}")
+            else:
+                console.print(
+                    f"  [green]{t('配置和凭证扫描未发现高危/严重问题。', 'Config and credential scan found no critical/high issues.')}[/green]"
+                )
+        except Exception:
+            console.print(
+                f"  [dim]{t('验证扫描跳过。', 'Verification scan skipped.')}[/dim]"
+            )

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/clawlock/integrations/__init__.py

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 """
-ClawLock v2.2.2 integrations — cloud intelligence,
+ClawLock v2.3.1 integrations — cloud intelligence,
 external scanner, and Agent-Scan.
 """
 
@@ -55,16 +55,36 @@ def _is_version_fixed(current: str, fixed: str) -> bool:
 
 
 async def lookup_cve(product: str = "OpenClaw", version: str = "") -> list[Finding]:
-    params: dict = {"name": product}
+    # Upstream /advisories 500s when called with {name=<MixedCase>, version=...}
+    # but works with lowercased name, and also works when version is omitted.
+    # Try the normal call first; on 5xx fall back to lowercase name, then to
+    # a version-less query and rely on client-side _is_version_fixed filtering.
+    base_params: dict = {"name": product}
     if version:
-        params["version"] = version
-    try:
+        base_params["version"] = version
+
+    async def _fetch(params: dict) -> dict:
         async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=_TIMEOUT) as client:
             r = await client.get(f"{CLOUD_BASE}/advisories", params=params)
             r.raise_for_status()
-            data = r.json()
+            return r.json()
+
+    try:
+        data = await _fetch(base_params)
     except httpx.TimeoutException:
         return [Finding("cve", INFO, t("CVE 情报查询超时", "CVE intelligence query timed out"), t("建议稍后重试。", "Please retry later."))]
+    except httpx.HTTPStatusError as e:
+        status = e.response.status_code
+        if status >= 500 and version:
+            try:
+                data = await _fetch({"name": product.lower(), "version": version})
+            except Exception:
+                try:
+                    data = await _fetch({"name": product})
+                except Exception as e2:
+                    return [Finding("cve", INFO, t("CVE 情报暂不可用", "CVE intelligence temporarily unavailable"), f"HTTP {status}; fallback: {str(e2)[:80]}")]
+        else:
+            return [Finding("cve", INFO, t("CVE 情报暂不可用", "CVE intelligence temporarily unavailable"), f"HTTP {status}")]
     except Exception as e:
         return [Finding("cve", INFO, t("CVE 情报暂不可用", "CVE intelligence temporarily unavailable"), f"{str(e)[:100]}")]
     advisories = (

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/clawlock/reporters/__init__.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""ClawLock v2.2.2 report renderer - Rich terminal + JSON + HTML output."""
+"""ClawLock v2.3.1 report renderer - Rich terminal + JSON + HTML output."""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
@@ -428,12 +428,17 @@ def render_scan_report(
     from ..utils import device_fingerprint, record_scan
 
     dev_fp = device_fingerprint()
-    record_scan(adapter_name, score, nc, nw, len(all_f))
+    findings_summary = [
+        {"title": f.title, "level": f.level, "location": f.location}
+        for f in all_f
+        if f.level in ("critical", "high", "medium")
+    ]
+    record_scan(adapter_name, score, nc, nw, len(all_f), findings_summary)
 
     if output_format == "json":
         out = {
             "tool": "ClawLock",
-            "version": "2.2.2",
+            "version": "2.3.1",
             "time": scan_time,
             "adapter": adapter_name,
             "device": dev_fp,
@@ -655,7 +660,7 @@ def _render_html(
     _title = t("ClawLock 安全报告", "ClawLock Security Report")
     _lbl_domains = t("安全域评级", "Security Domains")
     _lbl_findings = t("详细发现", "Detailed Findings")
-    _footer1 = t("由 ClawLock v2.2.2 生成", "Generated by ClawLock v2.2.2")
+    _footer1 = t("由 ClawLock v2.3.1 生成", "Generated by ClawLock v2.3.1")
     _footer2 = t("静态分析仅反映当前可见的代码和配置。",
                   "Static analysis reflects the currently visible code and config only.")
 

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/clawlock/scanners/__init__.py

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 """
-ClawLock v2.2.2 core scanners — Finding model, config audit, skill supply-chain (55+ patterns),
+ClawLock v2.3.1 core scanners — Finding model, config audit, skill supply-chain (55+ patterns),
 SOUL.md + memory file drift, MCP exposure + 6 tool poisoning patterns, process detection,
 credential directory audit, installation discovery, risky env vars, skill precheck.
 """
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ _CONFIG_RULES: Dict[str, List[tuple]] = {
         (
             "allowedDirectories",
             lambda v: isinstance(v, list) and "/" in v,
-            WARN,
+            HIGH,
             t("文件访问范围包含根目录", "File access scope includes root directory"),
             t("skill 可读写系统任意文件。", "Skills can read/write any file on the system."),
             t("收紧到项目目录。", "Restrict to the project directory."),
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ _CONFIG_RULES: Dict[str, List[tuple]] = {
         (
             "filesystem.allowedPaths",
             lambda v: isinstance(v, list) and any((p in ("/", "~") for p in v)),
-            WARN,
+            HIGH,
             t("文件访问范围过宽", "File access scope too broad"),
             t("allowedPaths 包含根路径。", "allowedPaths includes root path."),
             t("限制到项目路径。", "Restrict to the project path."),
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ _CONFIG_RULES: Dict[str, List[tuple]] = {
     ],
 }
 SECRET_PATTERNS = [
-    ("sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}", "OpenAI API Key"),
+    ("sk-(?!ant-)[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}", "OpenAI API Key"),
     ("ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}", "GitHub PAT"),
     ("github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}", "GitHub fine-grained PAT"),
     ("gh(?:o|u)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}", "GitHub OAuth/User Token"),
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ SECRET_PATTERNS = [
     ("-----BEGIN (RSA |EC )?PRIVATE KEY-----", "Private Key"),
     ("sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9\\-]{20,}", "Anthropic API Key"),
 ]
+_COMPILED_SECRET_PATTERNS = [(re.compile(p), label) for p, label in SECRET_PATTERNS]
 RISKY_ENV_VARS = [
     "NODE_OPTIONS",
     "LD_PRELOAD",
@@ -162,7 +163,6 @@ RISKY_ENV_VARS = [
     "RUBYOPT",
     "NODE_PATH",
     "ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE",
-    "BROWSER",
 ]
 
 
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ def _check_secrets(obj: Any, path: str) -> List[Finding]:
         for i, item in enumerate(obj):
             findings.extend(_check_secrets(item, f"{path}[{i}]"))
     elif isinstance(obj, str):
-        for pat, label in SECRET_PATTERNS:
-            if re.search(pat, obj):
+        for compiled_pat, label in _COMPILED_SECRET_PATTERNS:
+            if compiled_pat.search(obj):
                 findings.append(
                     Finding(
                         "config",
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ MALICIOUS_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[str, str, str, str]] = [
     ),
     (
         "(?i)(?:chmod\\s+(?:777|a\\+rwx)\\s+|\\bicacls\\b[^\\n]{0,80}/grant\\b[^\\n]{0,40}(?:Everyone|\\*S-1-1-0))",
-        CRIT,
+        HIGH,
         t("危险权限变更", "Dangerous permission change"),
         t("chmod 777 或 icacls /grant Everyone 将文件设为全局可访问。", "chmod 777 or icacls /grant Everyone makes files world-accessible."),
     ),
@@ -669,17 +669,12 @@ MALICIOUS_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[str, str, str, str]] = [
         t("疑似硬编码凭证", "Suspected hardcoded credential"),
         t("代码中存在凭证字符串。", "Credential string found in code."),
     ),
+    # Credential token patterns reuse SECRET_PATTERNS as single source of truth.
     (
-        "(?i)(?:ANTHROPIC_API_KEY|OPENAI_API_KEY|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}|sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9\\-]{20,})",
-        HIGH,
-        t("疑似 AI API 密钥", "Suspected AI API key"),
-        t("发现 API key 格式字符串。", "API key format string detected."),
-    ),
-    (
-        "(?i)(?:github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|gh(?:o|u)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|tp-[A-Za-z0-9._-]{16,}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z\\-_]{35}|xoxp-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,}|_authToken\\s*=\\s*[A-Za-z0-9._-]{20,})",
+        "|".join(f"(?:{pat})" for pat, _ in SECRET_PATTERNS),
         HIGH,
-        t("疑似平台访问令牌", "Suspected platform access token"),
-        t("发现 GitHub / Google / Slack / npm / Xiaomi MiMo Token Plan 等平台访问令牌格式字符串。", "Detected a token-like string for GitHub, Google, Slack, npm, Xiaomi MiMo Token Plan, or another platform."),
+        t("疑似凭证/令牌", "Suspected credential or token"),
+        t("发现与已知凭证格式匹配的字符串。", "String matching a known credential format was found."),
     ),
     (
         "(?i)(?:export|setenv|ENV)\\s+(?:NODE_OPTIONS|LD_PRELOAD|DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES)\\s*=",
@@ -741,11 +736,11 @@ MALICIOUS_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[str, str, str, str]] = [
         t("Windows LOLBin 执行链", "Windows LOLBin execution chain"),
         t("检测到常见 Windows LOLBin（系统自带执行器）调用。", "Detected use of common Windows LOLBins (built-in execution helpers)."),
     ),
-    ("\\beval\\s*\\(", WARN, t("使用 eval()", "eval() usage"), t("动态代码执行。", "Dynamic code execution.")),
-    ("\\bexec\\s*\\(", WARN, t("使用 exec()", "exec() usage"), t("exec() 执行任意代码。", "exec() executes arbitrary code.")),
+    ("\\beval\\s*\\(", INFO, t("使用 eval()", "eval() usage"), t("动态代码执行。", "Dynamic code execution.")),
+    ("\\bexec\\s*\\(", INFO, t("使用 exec()", "exec() usage"), t("exec() 执行任意代码。", "exec() executes arbitrary code.")),
     (
         "^(?!\\s*#)\\s*\\bsubprocess\\.(?:Popen|call|run|check_output)\\s*\\(",
-        WARN,
+        INFO,
         t("调用子进程", "Subprocess invocation"),
         t("执行系统子进程。", "System subprocess execution."),
     ),
@@ -763,13 +758,13 @@ MALICIOUS_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[str, str, str, str]] = [
     ),
     (
         "(?i)open\\([\"\\'](?:/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|~[/\\\\]\\.ssh[/\\\\]|~[/\\\\]\\.aws[/\\\\]credentials|[A-Za-z]:[/\\\\].*System32[/\\\\]config[/\\\\](?:SAM|SYSTEM|SECURITY))",
-        WARN,
+        HIGH,
         t("访问系统敏感文件", "Accessing sensitive system file"),
         t("读取敏感系统文件。", "Reading sensitive system file."),
     ),
     (
         "(?i)(?:requests|httpx|urllib|aiohttp)\\.(?:get|post|put|delete)\\s*\\(",
-        WARN,
+        INFO,
         t("外部网络请求", "External network request"),
         t("发起 HTTP 请求，确认目标是否可控。", "HTTP request made; verify target is not user-controlled."),
     ),
@@ -860,7 +855,7 @@ MALICIOUS_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[str, str, str, str]] = [
     ),
     (
         "(?i)(?:fetch|axios|request)\\s*\\([\"\\']https?://(?!localhost|127\\.)",
-        WARN,
+        INFO,
         t("向外部 URL 发送请求", "Request to external URL"),
         t("向非本地 URL 发起请求。", "Request to non-local URL."),
     ),
@@ -872,7 +867,7 @@ MALICIOUS_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[str, str, str, str]] = [
     ),
     (
         "(?i)\\b(?:npx|uvx|pipx\\s+run|npm\\s+exec)\\b|\\bpip\\s+install\\s+git\\+https?://",
-        WARN,
+        INFO,
         t("运行时拉取外部依赖", "Runtime external dependency fetch"),
         t("运行时通过远程源拉取并执行外部依赖，存在供应链风险。", "Fetches and executes external dependencies at runtime, creating supply-chain risk."),
     ),
@@ -888,9 +883,51 @@ MALICIOUS_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[str, str, str, str]] = [
         t("配置了外部 Webhook", "External webhook configured"),
         t("数据可能通过 webhook 外传。", "Data may be exfiltrated via webhook."),
     ),
+    (
+        "(?i)\\bos\\.system\\s*\\(",
+        INFO,
+        t("调用 os.system()", "os.system() invocation"),
+        t("通过 os.system 执行 shell 命令。", "Shell command executed via os.system."),
+    ),
+    (
+        "(?i)\\b(?:child_process\\.(?:exec|execSync|spawn|spawnSync|execFile|fork)|\\brequire\\s*\\([\"\\']child_process[\"\\']\\))",
+        INFO,
+        t("调用 Node child_process", "Node child_process invocation"),
+        t("通过 child_process 执行系统命令。", "System command executed via child_process."),
+    ),
+    (
+        "(?i)powershell(?:\\.exe)?\\s+[^\\n]*-(?:EncodedCommand|enc|ec)\\b",
+        HIGH,
+        t("PowerShell 编码命令", "PowerShell encoded command"),
+        t("使用 -EncodedCommand 执行 base64 编码的 PowerShell 命令，常用于混淆。", "Executes base64-encoded PowerShell via -EncodedCommand, commonly used for obfuscation."),
+    ),
+    (
+        "(?i)\\breg(?:\\.exe)?\\s+add\\b",
+        HIGH,
+        t("写入 Windows 注册表", "Windows registry write"),
+        t("通过 reg add 写入注册表，可能用于持久化或配置篡改。", "Writes to registry via reg add; may be used for persistence or config tampering."),
+    ),
+    (
+        "(?:chr\\s*\\(\\s*\\d+\\s*\\)\\s*[+.]?\\s*){5,}",
+        WARN,
+        t("chr() 字符拼接（疑似混淆）", "chr() character concatenation (suspected obfuscation)"),
+        t("使用多次 chr() 调用拼接字符串，可能隐藏恶意指令。", "Multiple chr() calls concatenating a string may hide malicious instructions."),
+    ),
+]
+_COMPILED_MALICIOUS_PATTERNS = [
+    (re.compile(p), level, title, detail)
+    for p, level, title, detail in MALICIOUS_PATTERNS
 ]
 
 
+_COMMENT_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:#|//|/?\*|<!--)")
+
+
+def _is_comment_line(line: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True if the line looks like a code comment."""
+    return bool(_COMMENT_RE.match(line))
+
+
 def scan_skill(skill_path: Path) -> List[Finding]:
     findings: List[Finding] = []
     skill_name = skill_path.stem if skill_path.is_file() else skill_path.name
@@ -927,10 +964,14 @@ def scan_skill(skill_path: Path) -> List[Finding]:
             unwrapped = _unwrap_shell_commands(line)
             candidates.extend(unwrapped)
             is_deobfuscated = False
+            is_comment = _is_comment_line(line)
             for candidate in candidates:
-                for pattern, level, title, detail in MALICIOUS_PATTERNS:
-                    if re.search(pattern, candidate):
-                        key = f"{pattern}:{f}:{i}"
+                for compiled_pat, level, title, detail in _COMPILED_MALICIOUS_PATTERNS:
+                    # Skip non-CRIT patterns on comment lines to reduce false positives
+                    if is_comment and level != CRIT:
+                        continue
+                    if compiled_pat.search(candidate):
+                        key = f"{compiled_pat.pattern}:{f}:{i}"
                         if key in seen:
                             continue
                         seen.add(key)
@@ -1018,7 +1059,7 @@ SOUL_INJECTION_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[str, str, str]] = [
         t("越狱关键词", "Jailbreak keywords"),
     ),
     ("(?:\\\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}){6,}", HIGH, t("大量 Unicode 转义", "Excessive Unicode escapes")),
-    ("(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{60,}={0,2})", WARN, t("长 base64 字符串", "Long base64 string")),
+    ("(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{200,}={0,2})", WARN, t("长 base64 字符串", "Long base64 string")),
     (
         "(?i)do\\s+not\\s+(?:reveal|disclose|share)\\s+(?:your\\s+)?(?:system\\s+prompt|instructions)",
         WARN,
@@ -1040,6 +1081,10 @@ SOUL_INJECTION_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[str, str, str]] = [
         t("优先工具调用指令", "Tool-first instruction"),
     ),
 ]
+_COMPILED_SOUL_PATTERNS = [
+    (re.compile(p), level, title)
+    for p, level, title in SOUL_INJECTION_PATTERNS
+]
 HASH_STORE = Path.home() / ".clawlock" / "drift_hashes.json"
 _HASH_CACHE: dict | None = None
 _HASH_CACHE_PATH: Path | None = None
@@ -1091,8 +1136,8 @@ def _scan_single_file_drift(filepath: Path, label: str) -> List[Finding]:
         return findings
     content = filepath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
     for i, line in enumerate(content.splitlines(), 1):
-        for pattern, level, title in SOUL_INJECTION_PATTERNS:
-            if re.search(pattern, line):
+        for compiled_pat, level, title in _COMPILED_SOUL_PATTERNS:
+            if compiled_pat.search(line):
                 findings.append(
                     Finding(
                         "soul",
@@ -1218,6 +1263,10 @@ _MCP_ITP = [
         t("工具描述要求模型在回复前优先执行工具调用。", "Tool description instructs the model to invoke a tool before replying."),
     ),
 ]
+_COMPILED_MCP_ITP = [
+    (re.compile(p), lv, title, detail)
+    for p, lv, title, detail in _MCP_ITP
+]
 
 
 def scan_mcp(adapter: AdapterSpec, extra_mcp: Optional[str] = None) -> List[Finding]:
@@ -1312,8 +1361,8 @@ def scan_mcp(adapter: AdapterSpec, extra_mcp: Optional[str] = None) -> List[Find
                 for fn, text in text_fields.items():
                     if not text:
                         continue
-                    for pat, lv, title, detail in _MCP_ITP:
-                        if re.search(pat, text, re.MULTILINE):
+                    for compiled_pat, lv, title, detail in _COMPILED_MCP_ITP:
+                        if compiled_pat.search(text):
                             findings.append(
                                 Finding(
                                     "mcp_itp",
@@ -1344,8 +1393,8 @@ def precheck_skill_md(skill_md_path: Path) -> Tuple[List[Finding], bool]:
         candidates = [line]
         candidates.extend(_unwrap_shell_commands(line))
         for candidate in candidates:
-            for pattern, level, title, detail in MALICIOUS_PATTERNS:
-                if re.search(pattern, candidate):
+            for compiled_pat, level, title, detail in _COMPILED_MALICIOUS_PATTERNS:
+                if compiled_pat.search(candidate):
                     suffix = t(" (反混淆后发现)", " (found after deobfuscation)") if candidate is not line else ""
                     findings.append(
                         Finding(

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/clawlock/scanners/agent_scan.py

@@ -741,7 +741,6 @@ def scan_agent(
     if enable_llm:
         layers_used.append(t("LLM 评估", "LLM Assessment"))
 
-    _none = t("无", "None")
     unique.insert(
         0,
         Finding(

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/clawlock/utils/__init__.py

@@ -229,9 +229,6 @@ def find_all_binaries(names: List[str]) -> Dict[str, Optional[str]]:
     return {name: shutil.which(name) for name in names}
 
 
-# ─── Android / Termux specifics ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
 # ─── Device fingerprint (privacy-preserving) ────────────────────────────────
 
 
@@ -300,23 +297,29 @@ def _save_history(records: list):
 
 
 def record_scan(
-    adapter: str, score: int, critical: int, warning: int, findings_total: int
+    adapter: str,
+    score: int,
+    critical: int,
+    warning: int,
+    findings_total: int,
+    findings_summary: list | None = None,
 ):
     """Append a scan result to persistent history."""
     from datetime import datetime
 
     records = _load_history()
-    records.append(
-        {
-            "time": datetime.now().isoformat(),
-            "adapter": adapter,
-            "device": device_fingerprint(),
-            "score": score,
-            "critical": critical,
-            "warning": warning,
-            "total": findings_total,
-        }
-    )
+    entry = {
+        "time": datetime.now().isoformat(),
+        "adapter": adapter,
+        "device": device_fingerprint(),
+        "score": score,
+        "critical": critical,
+        "warning": warning,
+        "total": findings_total,
+    }
+    if findings_summary is not None:
+        entry["findings"] = findings_summary
+    records.append(entry)
     _save_history(records)
 
 

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/clawlock.egg-info/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: clawlock
-Version: 2.2.2
+Version: 2.3.1
 Summary: Comprehensive security scanner, red-teamer & hardening toolkit for Claw-based AI agent deployments
 Author: g0at
 License: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ clawlock skill /path/to/skill            # Audit one skill
 clawlock soul                            # Check prompt + memory drift
 clawlock harden                          # Interactive hardening wizard
 clawlock harden --auto-fix               # Apply safe local auto-fixes
+clawlock harden --from-scan --auto-fix   # Fix only issues found in last scan
+clawlock harden --auto-fix --verify      # Auto-fix then verify the result
+clawlock harden --rollback               # Undo the last auto-fix
 clawlock mcp-scan ./mcp-server/src       # MCP source-code deep scan
 clawlock agent-scan --code ./agent/src   # Standalone OWASP ASI agent scan
 clawlock scan --format html -o report.html
@@ -230,12 +233,24 @@ ClawLock currently ships **18 hardening measures**.
 - `clawlock harden`: interactive mode
 - `clawlock harden --auto`: applies safe non-interactive actions and prints guidance for recommendation-only items
 - `clawlock harden --auto-fix`: only performs real safe local auto-fixes
+- `clawlock harden --from-scan`: show only measures relevant to the latest scan findings
+- `clawlock harden --auto-fix --verify`: auto-fix then re-scan to confirm the fix worked
+- `clawlock harden --rollback`: undo the last auto-fix action (restores from backup)
 
-Important current behavior:
+Auto-fixable measures:
+
+| ID | Measure | What it does |
+|----|---------|--------------|
+| H003 | Shorten session retention | Sets `sessionRetentionDays` to 7 in config files |
+| H007 | Create prompt baseline | Records SHA-256 baselines for SOUL.md / CLAUDE.md / MEMORY.md |
+| H008 | Enable approval mode | Sets `approvalMode` to `"always"` in config files |
+| H009 | Tighten credential permissions | `chmod 600`/`700` or `icacls` on config dirs and credential files |
+
+All config modifications are backed up to `~/.clawlock/backups/` before changes are made.
+
+Other behavior:
 
 - The wizard groups measures into **Safe to apply now**, **Recommended only**, and **Needs confirmation**
-- Only **`H009`** performs an actual local auto-fix today
-- `H009` tightens permissions on supported config directories and common home credential files such as `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, and `.netrc`
 - UX-impacting measures still require explicit confirmation in interactive mode
 - Guidance-only measures are no longer reported as if they were applied
 
@@ -282,7 +297,7 @@ cp skill/SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/clawlock/
 git clone https://github.com/g1at/clawlock.git
 cd clawlock
 pip install -e ".[dev]"
-pytest tests/test_clawlock.py -v    # 104 tests
+pytest tests/test_clawlock.py -v    # 110 tests
 ```
 
 ## Contributing

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "clawlock"
-version = "2.2.2"
+version = "2.3.1"
 description = "Comprehensive security scanner, red-teamer & hardening toolkit for Claw-based AI agent deployments"
 readme = "README.md"
 license = {text = "Apache-2.0 OR MIT"}

{clawlock-2.2.2 → clawlock-2.3.1}/tests/test_clawlock.py

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ class TestCliEntry:
         assert result.exit_code == 0
         assert "Agent Security Enforcement" in result.stdout
         assert "██████╗██╗" in result.stdout
-        assert "v2.2.2" in result.stdout
+        assert "v2.3.1" in result.stdout
         assert "g0at" in result.stdout
 
     def test_root_help_still_shows_help(self):
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ class TestCliEntry:
 name: clawlock
 metadata:
   clawlock:
-    version: "2.2.2"
+    version: "2.3.1"
     homepage: "https://github.com/g1at/ClawLock"
 ---
 """,
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ metadata:
 
         def _fake_http_get_json(url, timeout=5.0):
             if "pypi.org" in url:
-                return {"info": {"version": "2.3.0"}}
+                return {"info": {"version": "2.4.0"}}
             raise AssertionError(url)
 
         def _fake_http_get_text(url, timeout=5.0):
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ metadata:
 name: clawlock
 metadata:
   clawlock:
-    version: "2.3.0"
+    version: "2.4.0"
 ---
 """
 
@@ -81,12 +81,12 @@ metadata:
         )
         assert result.exit_code == 0
         payload = json.loads(result.stdout)
-        assert payload["package"]["latest_version"] == "2.3.0"
+        assert payload["package"]["latest_version"] == "2.4.0"
         assert payload["package"]["update_available"] is True
-        assert payload["skill"]["local_version"] == "2.2.2"
-        assert payload["skill"]["latest_version"] == "2.3.0"
+        assert payload["skill"]["local_version"] == "2.3.1"
+        assert payload["skill"]["latest_version"] == "2.4.0"
         assert payload["skill"]["remote_url"] == "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/g1at/ClawLock/main/skill/SKILL.md"
-        assert payload["skill"]["installed_package_version"] == "2.2.2"
+        assert payload["skill"]["installed_package_version"] == "2.3.1"
         assert payload["skill"]["matches_installed_package"] is True
         assert "pip install -U clawlock" in payload["suggested_updates"]
         assert (
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ class TestReports:
         )
         monkeypatch.setattr(utils, "device_fingerprint", lambda: "deadbeefcafe")
         monkeypatch.setattr(
-            utils, "record_scan", lambda adapter, score, high, warn, total: None
+            utils, "record_scan", lambda adapter, score, high, warn, total, findings_summary=None: None
         )
 
         reporters.render_scan_report(

clawlock-2.2.2/clawlock/__init__.py

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-"""
-ClawLock v2.2.2 — Comprehensive security scanner, red-teamer & hardening toolkit
-for Claw-based AI agent deployments.
-"""
-
-__version__ = "2.2.2"
-