ciphergate-cli 0.16.0__tar.gz → 0.17.0__tar.gz

{ciphergate_cli-0.16.0 → ciphergate_cli-0.17.0}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,43 @@ versioning: [PEP 440](https://peps.python.org/pep-0440/) with SemVer meaning (pr
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [0.17.0] - 2026-11-02
+
+Policies can now be built in layers. A shipped baseline pack, a jurisdiction pack (US, EU or
+India) and your own small file merge into one policy, and a later layer cannot quietly weaken
+an earlier one. The packs are templates requiring review, not legal or compliance advice.
+
+### Added
+
+- Policy layering: `extends: [pack, ...]` builds one effective policy from shipped packs plus
+  your own file. Layers merge so that a later layer can never quietly weaken an earlier one.
+  Conflicting context pins, weaker settings or requirements, disabled detectors, and rules or
+  defaults that would override an earlier block, review or transform with something weaker
+  fail validation. A rule may weaken an earlier rule or default only by naming it in the new
+  `relaxes` field; this is reported as a warning. Earlier `hard` and `guardrail` rules can
+  never be relaxed.
+- Shipped packs (templates requiring review): `healthcare_baseline`, a strict global healthcare
+  default, and `us_hipaa`, field classifications modelled on the HIPAA Safe Harbor identifier
+  list, with ages over 89 shown as `90+`. `us_hipaa` is not Safe Harbor or Expert Determination
+  by itself.
+- New template `hospital_us_override`, an example hospital layer on top of `us_hipaa`.
+- Packs `eu_gdpr` and `india_dpdp` (templates requiring review, not legal advice). `eu_gdpr`
+  blocks GDPR Art. 9 special-category fields toward external destinations and reviews them
+  elsewhere, and finds member-state identifier fields plus Italian codice fiscale values.
+  `india_dpdp` finds grouped Aadhaar numbers, ABHA numbers and addresses, PAN and Indian
+  identifier fields, and blocks SPDI-style sensitive fields toward external destinations. One
+  policy can extend several jurisdiction packs.
+
+### Changed
+
+- When equally protective findings overlap in one value, the more confident one now names the
+  redaction marker (for example a grouped Aadhaar number is marked `pii.government_id`, not
+  `pii.phone`). What gets removed is unchanged.
+- Reports list the policy's layers (name, kind, source, file digest), and each decision names
+  the layer that made it. `policy.digest` now covers every layer. `validate-policy` prints the
+  layer chain and adds `layers` to its JSON output. The terminal summary and the review page
+  show the layer next to the rule id.
+
 ## [0.16.0] - 2026-11-02
 
 `ciphergate review` writes a local HTML page that shows, as a trace, what sanitize would change
@@ -416,7 +453,8 @@ Pre-release (alpha). Licensed under Apache-2.0. Not a final release: the securit
 See `docs/limitations.md`. Deferred: optional NER/Presidio detectors, stdin/stdout streaming,
 directory processing, structured log parsers, key files, reversible token vault, lossy decoding.
 
-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/aashishkumar-tech/ciphergate/compare/v0.16.0...HEAD
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/aashishkumar-tech/ciphergate/compare/v0.17.0...HEAD
+[0.17.0]: https://github.com/aashishkumar-tech/ciphergate/compare/v0.16.0...v0.17.0
 [0.16.0]: https://github.com/aashishkumar-tech/ciphergate/compare/v0.15.0...v0.16.0
 [0.15.0]: https://github.com/aashishkumar-tech/ciphergate/compare/v0.14.0...v0.15.0
 [0.14.0]: https://github.com/aashishkumar-tech/ciphergate/compare/v0.13.0...v0.14.0

{ciphergate_cli-0.16.0 → ciphergate_cli-0.17.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: ciphergate-cli
-Version: 0.16.0
+Version: 0.17.0
 Summary: Local-first, environment- and destination-aware inspection and sanitization of logs and test datasets.
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/aashishkumar-tech/ciphergate
 Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/aashishkumar-tech/ciphergate
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ vendor ticket. CipherGate replaces that with a local, explainable, scriptable ga
 inspect  ->  plan  ->  sanitize --apply  ->  rescan
 ```
 
-> **Status: 0.16.0 (alpha).** No detector finds every sensitive value. A passing run means the
+> **Status: 0.17.0 (alpha).** No detector finds every sensitive value. A passing run means the
 > configured processing completed under the selected policy; it is **not** proof that the output
 > contains no sensitive information, and it is not a compliance (GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS, ...) or
 > anonymization guarantee. Policy templates must be reviewed before use.
@@ -232,10 +232,35 @@ controlled pipeline configuration.
 ## Shipped policy templates (review before use)
 
 `dev_local`, `stg_test`, `prd_external_ai`, `developer_logs`, `test_dataset`, `external_ai`,
-`healthcare_template`, `financial_template`, `local_debug`, and `multi_environment` (one policy
+`healthcare_template`, `financial_template`, `local_debug`, `hospital_us_override` (a layered example, see below), and `multi_environment` (one policy
 whose outcomes vary by environment *and* destination). All validate in CI. Templates named for
 healthcare or finance are starting points, **not** HIPAA/PCI controls.
 
+### Policy layering
+
+A policy can `extends:` shipped packs, so a team keeps only its own differences in a small file:
+
+```text
+healthcare_baseline  (global strict default)  ->  us_hipaa  (US identifier list)  ->  your file
+```
+
+```bash
+ciphergate init --template hospital_us_override --output my-hospital.yml
+ciphergate validate-policy my-hospital.yml
+#   layers: healthcare_baseline -> us_hipaa -> hospital-us-override
+```
+
+A later layer can add context, detectors, classifications and stricter rules. It cannot quietly
+weaken an earlier one: a weaker setting, a disabled detector or a rule that would override a
+block, review or redaction with something weaker fails validation unless the rule names what it
+relaxes (`relaxes: [rule-id]`), which is then reported as a warning. Hard and guardrail rules
+can never be relaxed. Reports list every layer with its digest and show which layer decided
+each value. Jurisdiction packs: `us_hipaa` (modelled on the HIPAA Safe Harbor identifier list
+but **not** Safe Harbor or Expert Determination by itself), `eu_gdpr` (GDPR special categories
+and member-state identifiers) and `india_dpdp` (Aadhaar, ABHA, PAN and sensitive fields). None
+of them is legal advice or makes processing lawful. A policy can extend several. See
+[docs/policy-schema.md](docs/policy-schema.md#layering-extends).
+
 ## Commands and exit codes
 
 `init`, `validate-policy`, `inspect`, `plan`, `sanitize` (needs `--apply`), `rescan`, `review`

{ciphergate_cli-0.16.0 → ciphergate_cli-0.17.0}/README.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ vendor ticket. CipherGate replaces that with a local, explainable, scriptable ga
 inspect  ->  plan  ->  sanitize --apply  ->  rescan
 ```
 
-> **Status: 0.16.0 (alpha).** No detector finds every sensitive value. A passing run means the
+> **Status: 0.17.0 (alpha).** No detector finds every sensitive value. A passing run means the
 > configured processing completed under the selected policy; it is **not** proof that the output
 > contains no sensitive information, and it is not a compliance (GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS, ...) or
 > anonymization guarantee. Policy templates must be reviewed before use.
@@ -193,10 +193,35 @@ controlled pipeline configuration.
 ## Shipped policy templates (review before use)
 
 `dev_local`, `stg_test`, `prd_external_ai`, `developer_logs`, `test_dataset`, `external_ai`,
-`healthcare_template`, `financial_template`, `local_debug`, and `multi_environment` (one policy
+`healthcare_template`, `financial_template`, `local_debug`, `hospital_us_override` (a layered example, see below), and `multi_environment` (one policy
 whose outcomes vary by environment *and* destination). All validate in CI. Templates named for
 healthcare or finance are starting points, **not** HIPAA/PCI controls.
 
+### Policy layering
+
+A policy can `extends:` shipped packs, so a team keeps only its own differences in a small file:
+
+```text
+healthcare_baseline  (global strict default)  ->  us_hipaa  (US identifier list)  ->  your file
+```
+
+```bash
+ciphergate init --template hospital_us_override --output my-hospital.yml
+ciphergate validate-policy my-hospital.yml
+#   layers: healthcare_baseline -> us_hipaa -> hospital-us-override
+```
+
+A later layer can add context, detectors, classifications and stricter rules. It cannot quietly
+weaken an earlier one: a weaker setting, a disabled detector or a rule that would override a
+block, review or redaction with something weaker fails validation unless the rule names what it
+relaxes (`relaxes: [rule-id]`), which is then reported as a warning. Hard and guardrail rules
+can never be relaxed. Reports list every layer with its digest and show which layer decided
+each value. Jurisdiction packs: `us_hipaa` (modelled on the HIPAA Safe Harbor identifier list
+but **not** Safe Harbor or Expert Determination by itself), `eu_gdpr` (GDPR special categories
+and member-state identifiers) and `india_dpdp` (Aadhaar, ABHA, PAN and sensitive fields). None
+of them is legal advice or makes processing lawful. A policy can extend several. See
+[docs/policy-schema.md](docs/policy-schema.md#layering-extends).
+
 ## Commands and exit codes
 
 `init`, `validate-policy`, `inspect`, `plan`, `sanitize` (needs `--apply`), `rescan`, `review`

{ciphergate_cli-0.16.0 → ciphergate_cli-0.17.0}/docs/architecture.md

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ Report (reporting/)            privacy-safe JSON / text summary
 | `readers/` | Parse and write each format; limits; encodings; JSON Pointer paths | decide actions |
 | `detectors/` | Produce candidate findings; per-run `DetectorSet` (no global registry) | decide actions |
 | `policy/loader.py` | Safe YAML (no tags, no aliases, no duplicate keys, size limit) | execute code |
+| `policy/layers.py` | Resolve `extends` (shipped packs by name), merge layers, reject weakening | read local files by name |
 | `policy/validator.py` | Schema + semantic checks, compile into immutable `Policy` | — |
 | `policy/precedence.py` | Computed precedence levels and static overlap analysis | — |
 | `policy/context.py` | Pinned vs caller context, run-level gates | infer one context dimension from another |

{ciphergate_cli-0.16.0 → ciphergate_cli-0.17.0}/docs/limitations.md

@@ -17,6 +17,23 @@
 - Environment, target environment and destination are declared by the caller or policy and are
   not verified. CipherGate does not inspect cloud identity or control deployments.
 
+## Policy layering
+
+- `extends` names shipped packs only; a policy cannot extend a local file in this release.
+- The weakening check compares rule selectors statically and conservatively: it can reject a
+  rule that would never actually override the earlier one (narrow the selectors or use
+  `relaxes`), and it cannot see differences that depend on detector behaviour.
+- The `us_hipaa` pack does not implement the 3-digit ZIP allowance (whole ZIP codes are
+  redacted), cannot check the Safe Harbor "no actual knowledge" condition, does not parse
+  photos or biometric data, and cannot know every "other unique identifying number". It is
+  not Safe Harbor or Expert Determination by itself.
+- The `eu_gdpr` pack finds most national identifiers by field name only (the Italian codice
+  fiscale also by value). It cannot decide a lawful basis, an Art. 9(2) condition or whether a
+  destination is outside the EEA.
+- The `india_dpdp` pack finds Aadhaar numbers by value only when written in groups and does not
+  verify the Verhoeff checksum; voter ID, passport and licence numbers are found by field name
+  only. It cannot check consent, purpose limitation, retention or cross-border rules.
+
 ## Formats and processing
 
 - JSON is parsed as a whole document (default limit 32 MiB). CSV/JSONL/text are streamed with

{ciphergate_cli-0.16.0 → ciphergate_cli-0.17.0}/docs/policy-schema.md

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Validate with `ciphergate validate-policy FILE` (never reads data).
 |---|---|---|---|
 | `policy_version` | `1` | required | other versions rejected |
 | `name` | slug `[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_.-]{0,63}` | required | also the default pseudonym namespace |
+| `extends` | list of shipped pack names (max 4) | `[]` | build on [policy packs](#layering-extends) |
 | `metadata` | mapping | `{}` | free-form extension namespace; not interpreted |
 | `context` | [Context](#context) | all unset | pinned context |
 | `requirements` | `{environment, target_environment, destination}` booleans | `true, false, true` | which context must be present (a run without a destination is still treated as untrusted; turning the requirement off warns) |
@@ -181,6 +182,77 @@ future. Requires `strict: true` and the rescan gate; validation always warns, an
 expire automatically — review them. No shipped policy contains an
 approval. Rules still apply — an approval does not allow raw data through.
 
+## Layering (`extends`)
+
+A policy can build on shipped **packs** instead of repeating them:
+
+```yaml
+policy_version: 1
+name: my-hospital
+extends: [us_hipaa]          # us_hipaa itself extends healthcare_baseline
+context: {environment: prd, target_environment: external, destination: external_ai}
+classifications:
+  - {id: local-ids, field_names: [visit_number], category: pii.customer_identifier}
+```
+
+Shipped packs (`policies/packs/`, all **templates requiring review**):
+
+| Pack | Extends | What it adds |
+|---|---|---|
+| `healthcare_baseline` | — | Strict default for healthcare-style data anywhere: credentials hard-blocked; clinical values blocked toward external/unknown destinations and sent to review elsewhere; identifiers redacted; DOB and clinical dates cut to the year; internal infrastructure redacted; everything else review. Needs no key. |
+| `us_hipaa` | `healthcare_baseline` | Field classifications modelled on the 18 HIPAA Safe Harbor identifier types (geography, dates, ages, record/plan/account numbers, licenses, vehicles, devices, URLs, biometrics, photos); ages banded with 90 and over as `90+`. It is **not** Safe Harbor or Expert Determination by itself: the 3-digit ZIP allowance and the "no actual knowledge" condition are not implemented, binary photos/biometrics are not parsed, and free-text detection is incomplete. |
+| `eu_gdpr` | `healthcare_baseline` | GDPR Art. 9 special-category fields (genetic, biometric, ethnic origin, religion, political opinion, trade union, sex life/orientation) blocked toward external/unknown destinations and reviewed elsewhere; national and health-insurance id fields from several member states plus an Italian codice fiscale value pattern; ages banded. It cannot decide a lawful basis or Chapter V transfers, and pseudonymised data is still personal data, so it redacts by default. |
+| `india_dpdp` | `healthcare_baseline` | Aadhaar (field name, and value when grouped as `1234 5678 9012`; no Verhoeff check; unseparated 12 digits by field name only), ABHA numbers and `@abdm`/`@sbx` addresses, PAN (value and field), EPIC/passport/licence/ration card/UHID fields, PIN codes as address; SPDI-style sensitive fields blocked toward external/unknown destinations and reviewed elsewhere; ages banded. It cannot decide consent, purpose, retention or cross-border rules. |
+
+`policies/hospital_us_override.yml` is an example third layer (`ciphergate init --template
+hospital_us_override`). A policy may extend several jurisdiction packs at once (for example
+`extends: [us_hipaa, eu_gdpr, india_dpdp]` for a hospital group); the strictest combination
+applies.
+
+**Resolution.** Names are compared to the shipped packs and never used as paths; local files
+cannot be extended in this release. Packs may extend packs (at most 4 levels, 8 layers; cycles
+are rejected). Layers are ordered base first, your policy last; a pack reached twice is used once.
+Every check in this document then runs on the merged policy.
+
+**Merge rules — a later layer can never quietly weaken an earlier one:**
+
+| Part | Merge | Rejected (validation error) |
+|---|---|---|
+| `context` | later layers may pin unset fields | pinning a different value (`layer_context_conflict`); `allow_cli_override` for a field an earlier layer pinned without allowing overrides (`layer_weakens_context`) |
+| `requirements` | any layer requiring a field requires it | setting `false` where an earlier layer has `true` (`layer_weakens_setting`) |
+| `settings` | stricter value kept: `strict`, `fail_on_parse_error`, `scan_json_keys`, `rescan.enabled` (true), `unknown_sensitive_behavior` (`block` > `review`), `csv_duplicate_headers` (`reject`), `malformed_record_action` (unset); `rescan.fail_on_categories` lists are combined (an unset value contributes every high-risk category) | a weaker value (`layer_weakens_setting`) |
+| `detectors` | custom detectors and internal host suffixes are added; enabling Presidio is allowed | disabling a detector or Presidio that an earlier layer runs, or turning off `reject_risky_regex` (`layer_weakens_detectors` / `layer_weakens_setting`) |
+| `custom_categories`, `transfers` | combined | — |
+| `classifications`, `rules` | combined | reusing an id from an earlier layer (`duplicate_id`) |
+| `defaults` | a later default replaces an earlier one for the same selector | a later default that would take over a category from an earlier default with a weaker action (`layer_weakens_default`) |
+| `name`, `metadata` | the last layer's | — |
+
+**Rules.** Actions are ranked `block` > `review` > any transform > `allow`. A later rule that
+[outranks](#precedence-deterministic) an earlier rule it may overlap with and picks a lower-ranked
+action fails with `layer_weakens_rule`. To do it on purpose, name the earlier rule in
+`relaxes`:
+
+```yaml
+rules:
+  - id: hospital-keep-state
+    priority: 300
+    match: {categories: [location.coarse], field_names: [state]}
+    action: allow
+    relaxes: ["defaults:location.*"]    # or an earlier rule id
+```
+
+Each relaxation is printed as a validation warning and appears in every run report's warnings.
+`hard` and `guardrail` rules from an earlier layer can **never** be relaxed. A later `allow` rule
+over categories an earlier non-allow default handles needs `relaxes: ["defaults:<selector>"]`.
+Swapping one transform for another (for example `pseudonymize` instead of `redact`) needs no
+`relaxes`. `relaxes` is rejected in a policy without `extends`, and must name a rule or default
+from an earlier layer.
+
+**Provenance.** `validate-policy` prints the layer chain. Reports add `policy.layers` (each
+layer's name, kind, source and file digest) and each decision's `layer`; `policy.digest` covers
+every layer in order, so editing any pack changes it. With `--path-display redacted` your own
+policy file name is hidden; shipped pack names are kept.
+
 ## Invalid examples
 
 ```yaml

ciphergate_cli-0.17.0/policies/hospital_us_override.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# TEMPLATE REQUIRING REVIEW. Example of the third policy layer: one hospital's own small file on
+# top of the shipped packs (healthcare_baseline -> us_hipaa -> this file). Replace the synthetic
+# formats and field names below with your own. Using it does NOT perform HIPAA Safe Harbor or
+# Expert Determination and is not legal or compliance advice.
+#
+# A layer like this can add context, detectors, classifications and stricter rules. It cannot
+# quietly weaken the packs: a weaker setting or a rule that would override a pack's block,
+# review or redaction with something weaker fails validation unless it names that rule (or
+# default) in `relaxes`, which is then printed as a warning and recorded in every report.
+policy_version: 1
+name: hospital-us-override
+extends: [us_hipaa]
+metadata:
+  description: "Example hospital layer for PRD logs going to an external AI assistant. Template requiring review."
+context:
+  environment: prd
+  target_environment: external
+  destination: external_ai
+  use_case: debugging
+requirements:
+  target_environment: true
+detectors:
+  custom:
+    # Synthetic local record-number format; replace with the hospital's real format.
+    - id: hospital-record-number
+      category: pii.customer_identifier
+      pattern: '\bHRN-[0-9]{8}\b'
+      confidence: 0.9
+classifications:
+  - id: hospital-local-ids
+    field_names: [visit_number, encounter_id, bed_assignment, wristband_id]
+    category: pii.customer_identifier
+  - id: hospital-state
+    field_names: [state, state_code]
+    category: location.coarse
+rules:
+  # Safe Harbor keeps the state; the baseline redacts all locations by default, so keeping it
+  # is a deliberate, recorded relaxation.
+  - id: hospital-keep-state
+    priority: 300
+    match:
+      categories: [location.coarse]
+      field_names: [state, state_code]
+    action: allow
+    relaxes: ["defaults:location.*"]
+    reason: state_is_kept_for_regional_debugging

ciphergate_cli-0.17.0/policies/packs/eu_gdpr.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# TEMPLATE REQUIRING REVIEW. Layering pack for EU healthcare-style data, built on
+# healthcare_baseline. It is modelled on GDPR concepts but using it does NOT make processing
+# lawful and is not legal or compliance advice. GDPR has no fixed identifier list like HIPAA
+# Safe Harbor: whether data is personal depends on whether a person is identifiable by any
+# means reasonably likely to be used (Recital 26). Detection is incomplete, especially in free
+# text and in languages other than English.
+#
+# What this pack adds on top of the baseline:
+#  * Art. 9 special categories (health is already covered by the baseline; this adds genetic,
+#    biometric, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
+#    beliefs, trade union membership, sex life and sexual orientation fields): blocked toward
+#    external/unknown destinations, human review everywhere else;
+#  * national and health-insurance identifier fields from several member states, plus a value
+#    pattern for the Italian codice fiscale; other national numbers are found by field name only;
+#  * ages banded by 10 (90 and over as "90+"), like the other jurisdiction packs.
+#
+# Things this pack cannot decide for you:
+#  * a lawful basis and an Art. 9(2) condition for the processing;
+#  * Chapter V international transfers: an `external_ai` or `external_vendor` destination may
+#    be outside the EEA, and CipherGate does not know where a destination is;
+#  * whether a keyed pseudonym is acceptable: pseudonymised data is still personal data
+#    (Art. 4(5), Recital 26), so this pack redacts rather than pseudonymizes by default.
+policy_version: 1
+name: eu-gdpr
+extends: [healthcare_baseline]
+metadata:
+  description: "EU healthcare pack modelled on GDPR special categories and member-state identifiers. Template requiring review; not legal advice."
+  pack_version: 1
+custom_categories:
+  - pii.age
+  - pii.special_category
+  - pii.biometric_identifier
+detectors:
+  custom:
+    # Italian codice fiscale: 6 letters, 2 digits, month letter, 2 digits, letter, 3 digits, letter.
+    - id: eu-it-codice-fiscale
+      category: pii.government_id
+      pattern: '\b[A-Z]{6}[0-9]{2}[ABCDEHLMPRST][0-9]{2}[A-Z][0-9]{3}[A-Z]\b'
+      confidence: 0.85
+classifications:
+  - id: eu-special-categories
+    field_names: [ethnicity, ethnic_origin, race, racial_origin, religion, religious_belief, philosophical_belief, political_opinion, political_party, party_affiliation, trade_union, union_membership, sexual_orientation, sex_life, gender_identity, genetic_data, genotype, dna_sequence, genetic_test_result]
+    category: pii.special_category
+  - id: eu-biometrics
+    field_names: [fingerprint, face_template, facial_image, iris_scan, retina_scan, voiceprint, biometric_template]
+    category: pii.biometric_identifier
+  - id: eu-national-ids
+    field_names: [codice_fiscale, steuer_id, steueridentifikationsnummer, bsn, burgerservicenummer, nir, numero_securite_sociale, dni, nie, nif, pesel, personnummer, henkilotunnus, cpr_number, rodne_cislo, ppsn, ehic_number, health_insurance_number, krankenversicherungsnummer, carte_vitale_number]
+    category: pii.government_id
+  - id: eu-age
+    field_names: [age, patient_age, age_years, alter, edad, eta]
+    category: pii.age
+rules:
+  - id: eu-block-special-categories-external
+    priority: 800
+    match:
+      destinations: [external_vendor, external_ai, public_repository, unknown]
+      categories: [pii.special_category, pii.biometric_identifier]
+    action: block
+    reason: special_category_data_needs_review_before_external_release
+
+  - id: eu-review-special-categories
+    priority: 400
+    match:
+      categories: [pii.special_category, pii.biometric_identifier]
+    action: review
+    reason: special_category_data_requires_human_decision
+
+  - id: eu-age-band
+    priority: 300
+    match:
+      categories: [pii.age]
+    action: generalize
+    params:
+      strategy: age_band
+      band_size: 10
+      max_age: 90
+    reason: ages_banded

ciphergate_cli-0.17.0/policies/packs/healthcare_baseline.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# TEMPLATE REQUIRING REVIEW. Layering pack: a strict starting point for healthcare-style data
+# in any country. Name it in `extends:` (or extend a jurisdiction pack such as us_hipaa) and add
+# your own file on top. It is NOT legal or compliance advice and NOT a de-identification method:
+# clinical free text, rare conditions, small geographies and combinations of quasi-identifiers
+# can remain identifying, and detection can miss values. Expert review is still needed.
+#
+# What it does, for every destination:
+#   * credential findings are hard-blocked (no later layer can weaken that);
+#   * clinical values (diagnosis, medication, ...): blocked toward external/unknown destinations,
+#     human review everywhere else;
+#   * direct identifiers (pii.*, patient ids, health/financial/employment fields): redacted;
+#   * dates of birth and clinical dates: reduced to the year;
+#   * internal infrastructure (hostnames, internal URLs/IPs, trace ids): redacted;
+#   * anything else that looks sensitive: review.
+# No key is needed. Later layers may swap a transform for another (for example keyed
+# pseudonyms), but weakening a block/review or allowing a value needs an explicit `relaxes`.
+policy_version: 1
+name: healthcare-baseline
+metadata:
+  description: "Strict global healthcare baseline for policy layering. Template requiring review; not a compliance claim."
+  pack_version: 1
+context:
+  domain_profile: healthcare
+requirements:
+  environment: true
+  destination: true
+settings:
+  strict: true
+  scan_json_keys: true
+  fail_on_parse_error: true
+  unknown_sensitive_behavior: review
+custom_categories:
+  - health.clinical_date
+classifications:
+  - id: baseline-clinical-dates
+    field_names: [admission_date, discharge_date, visit_date, procedure_date, encounter_date, death_date, date_of_death]
+    category: health.clinical_date
+    confidence: 0.9
+  - id: baseline-clinical-values
+    field_names: [diagnoses, problem_list, lab_result, test_result, symptoms, treatment, chief_complaint]
+    category: health.phi
+    confidence: 0.8
+rules:
+  - id: baseline-block-credentials
+    hard: true
+    priority: 1000
+    match:
+      categories: [credential.secret]
+    action: block
+    reason: credentials_never_in_health_data
+
+  - id: baseline-block-clinical-values-external
+    priority: 800
+    match:
+      destinations: [external_vendor, external_ai, public_repository, unknown]
+      categories: [health.phi]
+      field_names: [diagnosis, diagnoses, medication, medications, condition, allergies, prescription, clinical_notes, icd_code, procedure_code, problem_list, lab_result, test_result, symptoms, treatment, chief_complaint]
+    action: block
+    reason: clinical_values_need_expert_review_before_external_release
+
+  - id: baseline-review-clinical-values
+    priority: 400
+    match:
+      categories: [health.phi]
+      field_names: [diagnosis, diagnoses, medication, medications, condition, allergies, prescription, clinical_notes, icd_code, procedure_code, problem_list, lab_result, test_result, symptoms, treatment, chief_complaint]
+    action: review
+    reason: clinical_values_require_human_decision
+
+  - id: baseline-dob-year
+    priority: 300
+    match:
+      categories: [pii.date_of_birth]
+    action: generalize
+    params:
+      strategy: year
+    reason: keep_birth_year_only
+
+  - id: baseline-clinical-dates-year
+    priority: 300
+    match:
+      categories: [health.clinical_date]
+    action: generalize
+    params:
+      strategy: year
+    reason: keep_clinical_year_only
+
+  - id: baseline-redact-identifiers
+    priority: 200
+    match:
+      categories: [pii.*, health.phi, financial.sensitive, employment.sensitive]
+    action: redact
+    reason: remove_identifier
+
+  - id: baseline-redact-infrastructure
+    priority: 200
+    match:
+      categories: [network.telemetry, security.internal]
+    action: redact
+    reason: remove_internal_infrastructure_detail
+
+defaults:
+  location.*:
+    action: redact
+  identifier.*:
+    action: redact
+  proprietary.*:
+    action: review
+  "*":
+    action: review

ciphergate_cli-0.17.0/policies/packs/india_dpdp.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# TEMPLATE REQUIRING REVIEW. Layering pack for Indian healthcare-style data, built on
+# healthcare_baseline. Its field list draws on the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023,
+# the sensitive personal data list in the IT (SPDI) Rules, 2011 and identifiers used by the
+# Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission (ABDM). Using it does NOT establish that processing meets the
+# DPDP Act, its rules, the Aadhaar Act or ABDM policies, and it is not legal or compliance
+# advice. Detection is incomplete, especially in free text and in Indian languages.
+#
+# What this pack adds on top of the baseline:
+#  * Aadhaar numbers: by field name, and by value when written in groups ("1234 5678 9012" or
+#    with hyphens). An unseparated 12-digit Aadhaar is found by field name only (too many log
+#    values are 12-digit numbers), and the Verhoeff checksum is not checked. Aadhaar is fully
+#    redacted, not masked to the last 4 digits;
+#  * ABHA (health account) numbers ("12-3456-7890-1234") and ABHA addresses ("name@abdm",
+#    "name@sbx") by value and field name;
+#  * PAN by value (the 4th letter must be a valid holder type) and field name;
+#  * voter ID (EPIC), passport, driving licence, ration card, UHID/IP/OP numbers by field name;
+#  * PIN codes treated as address; SPDI-style sensitive fields (sexual orientation, biometric
+#    data) blocked toward external/unknown destinations and reviewed elsewhere;
+#  * ages banded by 10 (90 and over as "90+"), like the other jurisdiction packs.
+#
+# Things this pack cannot decide for you: notice and consent (or another legitimate use),
+# purpose limitation, retention, rules on processing children's data, and cross-border
+# transfer restrictions for the destination you name.
+policy_version: 1
+name: india-dpdp
+extends: [healthcare_baseline]
+metadata:
+  description: "India healthcare pack (Aadhaar, ABHA, PAN and SPDI-style sensitive fields). Template requiring review; not legal advice."
+  pack_version: 1
+custom_categories:
+  - pii.age
+  - pii.special_category
+  - pii.biometric_identifier
+detectors:
+  custom:
+    - id: in-aadhaar-grouped
+      category: pii.government_id
+      pattern: '\b[2-9][0-9]{3}[ -][0-9]{4}[ -][0-9]{4}\b'
+      confidence: 0.75
+    - id: in-abha-number
+      category: health.phi
+      pattern: '\b[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{4}\b'
+      confidence: 0.85
+    - id: in-abha-address
+      category: health.phi
+      pattern: '\b[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._]{2,31}@(abdm|sbx)\b'
+      confidence: 0.85
+      ignore_case: true
+    - id: in-pan
+      category: pii.government_id
+      pattern: '\b[A-Z]{3}[ABCFGHJLPT][A-Z][0-9]{4}[A-Z]\b'
+      confidence: 0.8
+classifications:
+  - id: in-government-ids
+    field_names: [aadhaar, aadhaar_number, aadhaar_no, uid, uidai_number, pan, pan_number, pan_no, epic_number, voter_id, passport_no, driving_licence, driving_licence_number, dl_number, ration_card_number]
+    category: pii.government_id
+  - id: in-health-ids
+    field_names: [abha, abha_number, abha_id, abha_address, health_id, uhid, ip_number, op_number, opd_number, ipd_number, ayushman_card_number, pmjay_id]
+    category: health.phi
+  - id: in-pin-code
+    field_names: [pincode, pin_code, postal_pin]
+    category: pii.address
+  - id: in-sensitive
+    field_names: [sexual_orientation, caste, religion, gender_identity]
+    category: pii.special_category
+  - id: in-biometrics
+    field_names: [fingerprint, iris_scan, face_template, biometric_template]
+    category: pii.biometric_identifier
+  - id: in-age
+    field_names: [age, patient_age, age_years, umar]
+    category: pii.age
+rules:
+  - id: in-block-sensitive-external
+    priority: 800
+    match:
+      destinations: [external_vendor, external_ai, public_repository, unknown]
+      categories: [pii.special_category, pii.biometric_identifier]
+    action: block
+    reason: sensitive_personal_data_needs_review_before_external_release
+
+  - id: in-review-sensitive
+    priority: 400
+    match:
+      categories: [pii.special_category, pii.biometric_identifier]
+    action: review
+    reason: sensitive_personal_data_requires_human_decision
+
+  - id: in-age-band
+    priority: 300
+    match:
+      categories: [pii.age]
+    action: generalize
+    params:
+      strategy: age_band
+      band_size: 10
+      max_age: 90
+    reason: ages_banded