boost-skill-cli 1.2.76__tar.gz → 1.2.78__tar.gz

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76/boost_skill_cli.egg-info → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: boost-skill-cli
-Version: 1.2.76
+Version: 1.2.78
 Summary: boost — Homebrew for AI coding skills
 Author: Jonathan Reyes
 License-Expression: Apache-2.0

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/boost_cli/_version.py

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ version_tuple: tuple[int | str, ...]
 commit_id: str | None
 __commit_id__: str | None
 
-__version__ = version = '1.2.76'
-__version_tuple__ = version_tuple = (1, 2, 76)
+__version__ = version = '1.2.78'
+__version_tuple__ = version_tuple = (1, 2, 78)
 
 __commit_id__ = commit_id = None

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/boost_cli/commands/configuration.py

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ from ..core import (
 )
 from ..core import output as out
 from ..errors import BoostError
+from ._common import _s
 
 _tilde = paths.tilde
 
@@ -482,9 +483,9 @@ def cmd_policy(argv) -> int:
     # The breakdown appears exactly when it carries information (same
     # convention as `boost count`): a skills-only environment keeps the exact
     # summary line it always had.
-    summary = ("%d skills" % counts["skill"]
+    summary = ("%d skill%s" % (counts["skill"], _s(counts["skill"]))
                if not counts["rule"] and not counts["workflow"]
-               else ", ".join("%d %s%s" % (n, kind, "s" if n != 1 else "")
+               else ", ".join("%d %s%s" % (n, kind, _s(n))
                               for kind, n in counts.items()))
 
     if args.json:

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/boost_cli/commands/discovery.py

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ from ..core import (
 from ..core import output as out
 from ..core.stackprobe import detect_stack  # re-exported: shared with Quality
 from ..errors import BoostError
+from ._common import _s
 
 __all__ = ["detect_stack"]
 
@@ -1909,8 +1910,10 @@ def cmd_count(argv):
     # The breakdown appears exactly when it carries information: with only
     # skills installed, "installed 2" already means two skills.
     detail = ("" if not (by_kind["rule"] or by_kind["workflow"])
-              else " (%d skills · %d rules · %d workflows)"
-              % (by_kind["skill"], by_kind["rule"], by_kind["workflow"]))
+              else " (%d skill%s · %d rule%s · %d workflow%s)"
+              % (by_kind["skill"], _s(by_kind["skill"]),
+                 by_kind["rule"], _s(by_kind["rule"]),
+                 by_kind["workflow"], _s(by_kind["workflow"])))
     summary = ("installed %d%s · available %d (across %d tap%s) · discovery index %s"
                % (installed_n, detail, available_n, taps_n,
                   "" if taps_n == 1 else "s",

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/boost_cli/commands/intelligence.py

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ from ..core import (
 )
 from ..core import output as out
 from ..errors import BoostError
+from ._common import _s
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------- helpers
 
@@ -1036,7 +1037,7 @@ def cmd_focus(argv: list[str]) -> int:
     journal.log("focus", ",".join(names))
     out.info("⌁ focus: %s %s"
              % (", ".join(names),
-                out.role("(other %d skills sidelined)" % sidelined, "muted")))
+                out.role("(other %d skill%s sidelined)" % (sidelined, _s(sidelined)), "muted")))
     return 0
 
 

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/boost_cli/commands/quality.py

@@ -818,8 +818,9 @@ def cmd_lint(argv):
         out.warn("%d of %d skill%s below %d or with errors"
                  % (len(failed), len(results), _s(len(results)), args.min_score))
         return 1
-    out.ok("%d skill%s pass lint (min %d)" % (len(results), _s(len(results)),
-                                              args.min_score))
+    out.ok("%d skill%s %s lint (min %d)"
+           % (len(results), _s(len(results)),
+              "passes" if len(results) == 1 else "pass", args.min_score))
     return 0
 
 

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/boost_cli/commands/team.py

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ from ..core import (
 )
 from ..core import output as out
 from ..errors import BoostError
+from ._common import _s
 
 _tilde = paths.tilde
 
@@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ def cmd_cohort(argv) -> int:
         _save_cohorts(cohorts)
         journal.log("cohort", args.name, op="create", percent=args.percent)
         member = _is_member(user, args.name, args.percent)
-        out.ok("created cohort %s (%d%% rollout, %d skills) — you are %s"
-               % (args.name, args.percent, len(skills),
+        out.ok("created cohort %s (%d%% rollout, %d skill%s) — you are %s"
+               % (args.name, args.percent, len(skills), _s(len(skills)),
                   "IN" if member else "OUT"))
         return 0
 
@@ -274,12 +275,14 @@ def cmd_profile(argv) -> int:
         paths.ensure_dirs()
         _profile_path(args.name).write_text(json.dumps(profile, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
         journal.log("profile", args.name, op="save", skills=len(installed))
-        out.ok("saved profile %s (%d skills)" % (args.name, len(installed)))
+        out.ok("saved profile %s (%d skill%s)"
+               % (args.name, len(installed), _s(len(installed))))
         n_rules = len(lockfile.installed_rules())
         n_workflows = len(lockfile.installed_workflows())
         if n_rules or n_workflows:
-            out.warn("%d rule(s) and %d workflow(s) not captured — profiles "
-                     "carry skills only" % (n_rules, n_workflows))
+            out.warn("%d rule%s and %d workflow%s not captured — profiles "
+                     "carry skills only"
+                     % (n_rules, _s(n_rules), n_workflows, _s(n_workflows)))
         return 0
 
     if args.action == "show":
@@ -351,8 +354,8 @@ def cmd_profile(argv) -> int:
             store.link_agents(n)
     if extras:
         if args.prune:
-            if out.confirm("uninstall %d skill(s) not in the profile (%s)?"
-                           % (len(extras), ", ".join(extras))):
+            if out.confirm("uninstall %d skill%s not in the profile (%s)?"
+                           % (len(extras), _s(len(extras)), ", ".join(extras))):
                 for n in extras:
                     store.uninstall(n)
                     out.ok("uninstalled %s" % n)
@@ -361,8 +364,8 @@ def cmd_profile(argv) -> int:
         else:
             for n in extras:
                 store.unlink_agents(n)
-            out.info("sidelined %d skill(s) not in the profile (unlinked, still installed): %s"
-                     % (len(extras), ", ".join(extras)))
+            out.info("sidelined %d skill%s not in the profile (unlinked, still installed): %s"
+                     % (len(extras), _s(len(extras)), ", ".join(extras)))
     journal.log("profile", args.name, op="use")
     out.ok("switched to profile %s" % args.name)
     return 0

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/boost_cli/core/provenance.py

@@ -158,6 +158,18 @@ def verify_dir(clone: Path) -> Result:
             return Result(VERIFIED, key_name=name,
                           fingerprint=minisign.key_id_hex(pk.key_id),
                           trusted_comment=sig.trusted_comment)
+    # A signature carrying a *trusted* key's id that still fails to verify is
+    # not a merely-unknown signer — it is the tampering this module exists to
+    # catch (the manifest was edited after a trusted key signed it). Report it
+    # as INVALID, not UNTRUSTED, so callers that only alarm on INVALID (the
+    # `trust verify` sweep) don't wave a modified manifest through.
+    for name, pk in _public_keys():
+        if sig.key_id == pk.key_id:
+            return Result(INVALID, key_name=name,
+                          fingerprint=minisign.key_id_hex(pk.key_id),
+                          trusted_comment=sig.trusted_comment,
+                          detail="signature by trusted key %s does not verify"
+                                 " — manifest modified?" % name)
     return Result(UNTRUSTED, fingerprint=minisign.key_id_hex(sig.key_id),
                   trusted_comment=sig.trusted_comment,
                   detail="no trusted key verifies this signature")

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78/boost_skill_cli.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: boost-skill-cli
-Version: 1.2.76
+Version: 1.2.78
 Summary: boost — Homebrew for AI coding skills
 Author: Jonathan Reyes
 License-Expression: Apache-2.0

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/docs/roadmap/items/audit-singular-plural-misses-1-skills-1-issue-need-1-skill-pass-ac.md

@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@
 id: audit-singular-plural-misses-1-skills-1-issue-need-1-skill-pass-ac
 board: code
 section: dx
-status: planned
+status: shipped
 category: CLI · Polish
 complexity: S
 impact: Low
 wow: 1
-note: a shared _s helper exists at _common.py:15 and six commands hand-roll around it
+note: fixed via the shared _s helper across seven sites; doctor's verb agreement was already correct
 order: 242
-owner:
-pr:
+owner: loop/plural-agreement
+pr: 678
 title: "Singular/plural misses (“1 skills”, “1 issue need”, “1 skill pass”) across six commands"
 ---
 Six commands hand-roll plurals and get the singular wrong. Reproduced verbatim on a fresh HOME with one
@@ -36,3 +36,14 @@ Fix as one sweep PR: reuse <code>_s</code> at <code>configuration.py:475</code>
 (<em>needs/need</em>, <em>passes/pass</em>) &mdash; <code>_s</code> alone cannot fix verb agreement. Add a small
 unit test asserting the <code>n == 1</code> strings. No docs change &mdash; these are runtime messages only.
 Found by the 2026-08 CLI audit (cluster pluralisation-sweep); repro in the audit log.
+
+<b>Shipped.</b> <code>lint</code> now agrees noun and verb (<em>&ldquo;1 skill passes lint&rdquo;</em> vs
+<em>&ldquo;2 skills pass lint&rdquo;</em>); doctor's verb already agreed on re-verification and needed no
+change. <code>policy check</code>'s skills-only summary, <code>cohort create</code>'s rollout line,
+<code>count</code>'s kind breakdown, and <code>focus</code>'s sidelined-count line all switched from a
+hardcoded plural to <code>_s</code>. <code>profile save</code> and <code>profile use</code> lost their
+<code>skill(s)</code>/<code>rule(s)</code>/<code>workflow(s)</code> hedges in favor of the same helper.
+Functional tests updated at every site (<code>test_cli_configuration.py</code>,
+<code>test_cli_team.py</code>, <code>test_cli_intelligence.py</code>, <code>test_cli_discovery.py</code>,
+<code>test_cli_quality.py</code>, <code>test_kind_conformance.py</code>), plus a new singular-count case
+for <code>cohort create</code>.

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/docs/roadmap/items/audit-trust-verify-labels-a-manifest-tampered-after-signing-by-a-t.md

@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@
 id: audit-trust-verify-labels-a-manifest-tampered-after-signing-by-a-t
 board: code
 section: trust
-status: planned
+status: inflight
 category: Safety · Bug
 complexity: S
 impact: High
 wow: 2
 note: the tampering case the feature exists for reads as "key unknown", and the sweep exits 0
 order: 221
-owner:
-pr:
+owner: loop/trust-verify-tamper
+pr: 675
 title: "<code>trust verify</code> labels a manifest tampered after signing by a TRUSTED key 'untrusted'; sweep exits 0"
 ---
 Sign a tap's manifest with a trusted key, then edit the manifest &mdash; the exact tampering <code>trust verify</code> exists to catch. The sweep reports <code>iktakahiro/python-fastapi-ddd-sk&hellip;&nbsp; untrusted&nbsp; no trusted key verifies this sig&hellip;</code> and <b>exits 0</b>; <code>--json</code> says <code>{"status": "untrusted", "key_name": null, "fingerprint": "1122334455667788"}</code> &mdash; and that fingerprint is the trusted <code>acme</code> key's own. So a modified manifest is indistinguishable from a merely unknown signer, and a scripted sweep sails past it. One narrowing from verification: the named-tap path (<code>trust verify TAP</code>) does exit 1; the exit-0 hole is the sweep, whose alarm at <code>boost_cli/commands/quality.py:1329</code> fires only on INVALID. The 'untrusted / key unknown' mislabel affects both paths.

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/docs/roadmap/items/audit-verify-drift-say-nothing-installed-exit-0-and-doctor-says-lo.md

@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
 id: audit-verify-drift-say-nothing-installed-exit-0-and-doctor-says-lo
 board: code
 section: health
-status: inflight
+status: shipped
 category: CLI · Bug
 complexity: S
 impact: High
 wow: 2
-note: rm the lock, verify exits 0 'nothing installed'; doctor still prints 'lock parses (v3)'
+note: fixed — verify/drift fail loudly on a missing/corrupt lock; doctor's lines match reality
 order: 214
 owner: loop/lock-integrity-reporting
 pr: 674
@@ -40,3 +40,12 @@ dirs unrecorded, run `boost sync`&rdquo;</em>). Docs: <code>docs/security-design
 integrity contract) and <code>docs/DEBUGGING.md</code> (doctor's lock lines); no flag change, so
 <code>docs/commands.html</code> needs no regeneration. Found by the 2026-08 CLI audit (cluster
 <code>missing-lock-reported-healthy</code>); repro in the audit log.
+
+<br><br><b>Shipped.</b> <code>lockfile.check()</code> reports the lock file's raw state (<code>ok</code> /
+<code>missing</code> / <code>corrupt</code> / <code>schema</code>) instead of the empty skeleton
+<code>read()</code> collapses it to, and <code>store.has_content()</code> tells a genuinely empty
+install apart from one whose record vanished out from under real skills. <code>cmd_verify</code> and
+<code>cmd_drift</code> now call a shared <code>_require_lock_integrity()</code> before iterating, and
+<code>cmd_doctor</code>'s lock section is rewritten on the same two primitives, so all three commands
+agree and &ldquo;parses&rdquo;/&ldquo;integrity OK&rdquo; are only ever claimed for a lock file that
+really is. See PR #674.

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/docs/roadmap.html

@@ -6447,8 +6447,9 @@ Found by the 2026-08 CLI audit (cluster <code>import-all-parity</code>); repro i
       </article>
 
       <article class="cap rcard" id="audit-verify-drift-say-nothing-installed-exit-0-and-doctor-says-lo">
-        <div class="head"><span class="pill inflight">In flight</span><span class="cat">CLI · Bug</span></div>
+        <div class="head"><span class="pill shipped">Shipped</span><span class="cat">CLI · Bug</span></div>
         <h3><code>verify</code>/<code>drift</code> say 'nothing installed' (exit 0) when the lock file is missing or corrupt</h3>
+        <details class="cardbody"><summary>Write-up</summary>
         <p>Delete <code>.skill-lock.json</code> after an install (store and four agent links still present) and
 <code>verify</code> — whose one-line summary is <em>lock-file integrity</em> — prints
 <em>&ldquo;&nbsp;&nbsp;nothing installed&rdquo;</em> and exits 0. Truncate the lock to
@@ -6475,12 +6476,21 @@ absent while the store dir has entries, unparseable, or <code>version != SCHEMA_
 dirs unrecorded, run `boost sync`&rdquo;</em>). Docs: <code>docs/security-design.md</code> (verify's
 integrity contract) and <code>docs/DEBUGGING.md</code> (doctor's lock lines); no flag change, so
 <code>docs/commands.html</code> needs no regeneration. Found by the 2026-08 CLI audit (cluster
-<code>missing-lock-reported-healthy</code>); repro in the audit log.</p>
+<code>missing-lock-reported-healthy</code>); repro in the audit log.
+
+<br><br><b>Shipped.</b> <code>lockfile.check()</code> reports the lock file's raw state (<code>ok</code> /
+<code>missing</code> / <code>corrupt</code> / <code>schema</code>) instead of the empty skeleton
+<code>read()</code> collapses it to, and <code>store.has_content()</code> tells a genuinely empty
+install apart from one whose record vanished out from under real skills. <code>cmd_verify</code> and
+<code>cmd_drift</code> now call a shared <code>_require_lock_integrity()</code> before iterating, and
+<code>cmd_doctor</code>'s lock section is rewritten on the same two primitives, so all three commands
+agree and &ldquo;parses&rdquo;/&ldquo;integrity OK&rdquo; are only ever claimed for a lock file that
+really is. See PR #674.</p></details>
         <div class="meta">
           <span class="m">Complexity <b>S</b></span>
           <span class="m hi">Impact <b>High</b></span>
           <span class="m">Wow <b class="wow">★★</b></span>
-          <span class="m">rm the lock, verify exits 0 'nothing installed'; doctor still prints 'lock parses (v3)'</span>
+          <span class="m">fixed — verify/drift fail loudly on a missing/corrupt lock; doctor's lines match reality</span>
         </div>
       </article>
 
@@ -12693,8 +12703,9 @@ Found by the 2026-08 CLI audit (cluster help-examples-sweep); repro in the audit
       </article>
 
       <article class="cap rcard" id="audit-singular-plural-misses-1-skills-1-issue-need-1-skill-pass-ac">
-        <div class="head"><span class="pill planned">Planned</span><span class="cat">CLI · Polish</span></div>
+        <div class="head"><span class="pill shipped">Shipped</span><span class="cat">CLI · Polish</span></div>
         <h3>Singular/plural misses (&ldquo;1 skills&rdquo;, &ldquo;1 issue need&rdquo;, &ldquo;1 skill pass&rdquo;) across six commands</h3>
+        <details class="cardbody"><summary>Write-up</summary>
         <p>Six commands hand-roll plurals and get the singular wrong. Reproduced verbatim on a fresh HOME with one
 installed skill: <b>doctor</b> &mdash; <code>&#9679; 1 issue need attention &mdash; see the suggestions
 above</code>; <b>lint</b> &mdash; <code>&#10003; 1 skill pass lint (min 40)</code>; <b>policy check</b> &mdash;
@@ -12717,12 +12728,23 @@ Fix as one sweep PR: reuse <code>_s</code> at <code>configuration.py:475</code>
 <code>quality.py:637/777</code> need a word pair chosen on <code>n == 1</code>
 (<em>needs/need</em>, <em>passes/pass</em>) &mdash; <code>_s</code> alone cannot fix verb agreement. Add a small
 unit test asserting the <code>n == 1</code> strings. No docs change &mdash; these are runtime messages only.
-Found by the 2026-08 CLI audit (cluster pluralisation-sweep); repro in the audit log.</p>
+Found by the 2026-08 CLI audit (cluster pluralisation-sweep); repro in the audit log.
+
+<b>Shipped.</b> <code>lint</code> now agrees noun and verb (<em>&ldquo;1 skill passes lint&rdquo;</em> vs
+<em>&ldquo;2 skills pass lint&rdquo;</em>); doctor's verb already agreed on re-verification and needed no
+change. <code>policy check</code>'s skills-only summary, <code>cohort create</code>'s rollout line,
+<code>count</code>'s kind breakdown, and <code>focus</code>'s sidelined-count line all switched from a
+hardcoded plural to <code>_s</code>. <code>profile save</code> and <code>profile use</code> lost their
+<code>skill(s)</code>/<code>rule(s)</code>/<code>workflow(s)</code> hedges in favor of the same helper.
+Functional tests updated at every site (<code>test_cli_configuration.py</code>,
+<code>test_cli_team.py</code>, <code>test_cli_intelligence.py</code>, <code>test_cli_discovery.py</code>,
+<code>test_cli_quality.py</code>, <code>test_kind_conformance.py</code>), plus a new singular-count case
+for <code>cohort create</code>.</p></details>
         <div class="meta">
           <span class="m">Complexity <b>S</b></span>
           <span class="m">Impact <b>Low</b></span>
           <span class="m">Wow <b class="wow">★</b></span>
-          <span class="m">a shared _s helper exists at _common.py:15 and six commands hand-roll around it</span>
+          <span class="m">fixed via the shared _s helper across seven sites; doctor's verb agreement was already correct</span>
         </div>
       </article>
 
@@ -16787,7 +16809,7 @@ end to end through <code>boost install</code> for a tapped rule and a tapped wor
       </article>
 
       <article class="cap rcard" id="audit-trust-verify-labels-a-manifest-tampered-after-signing-by-a-t">
-        <div class="head"><span class="pill planned">Planned</span><span class="cat">Safety · Bug</span></div>
+        <div class="head"><span class="pill inflight">In flight</span><span class="cat">Safety · Bug</span></div>
         <h3><code>trust verify</code> labels a manifest tampered after signing by a TRUSTED key 'untrusted'; sweep exits 0</h3>
         <p>Sign a tap's manifest with a trusted key, then edit the manifest &mdash; the exact tampering <code>trust verify</code> exists to catch. The sweep reports <code>iktakahiro/python-fastapi-ddd-sk&hellip;&nbsp; untrusted&nbsp; no trusted key verifies this sig&hellip;</code> and <b>exits 0</b>; <code>--json</code> says <code>{"status": "untrusted", "key_name": null, "fingerprint": "1122334455667788"}</code> &mdash; and that fingerprint is the trusted <code>acme</code> key's own. So a modified manifest is indistinguishable from a merely unknown signer, and a scripted sweep sails past it. One narrowing from verification: the named-tap path (<code>trust verify TAP</code>) does exit 1; the exit-0 hole is the sweep, whose alarm at <code>boost_cli/commands/quality.py:1329</code> fires only on INVALID. The 'untrusted / key unknown' mislabel affects both paths.
 

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/docs/security-design.md

@@ -103,6 +103,12 @@ posture is reachable without a surprise breakage first.
 minisign signatures over tap content against a trusted Ed25519 public key. Both
 are **verify-only** — boost holds no private key material and cannot sign.
 Correctness is pinned by the RFC 8032 §7.1 test vectors in the unit suite.
+`core/provenance.verify_dir` distinguishes a signature no trusted key accepts
+(`untrusted` — an unrecognised signer) from one whose key id names a *trusted*
+key but that no longer verifies (`invalid` — the tampering this feature exists
+to catch: a manifest edited after a trusted key signed it). `boost trust
+verify`'s sweep alarms — and exits non-zero — on `invalid`, so it must never be
+reported as the merely-unrecognised `untrusted` case.
 
 **Tamper evidence.** Every installed item records a sha256 of its content and
 the commit it came from in the v3 lock file. `core/integrity.py` promotes that

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/tests/functional/test_cli_configuration.py

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ class TestPolicy:
 
     def test_check_clean_vs_violations(self, boost, installed):
         r = boost("policy", "check")
-        assert "policy check passed (1 skills)" in r.out
+        assert "policy check passed (1 skill)" in r.out
         r = boost("policy", "check", "--json")
         assert json.loads(r.out) == {
             "skills": 1, "counts": {"skill": 1, "rule": 0, "workflow": 0},

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/tests/functional/test_cli_discovery.py

@@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ class TestCount:
                                           "tap": "rule-tap", "slot": "commands",
                                           "materializations": []})
         r = boost("count")
-        assert "installed 3 (1 skills · 1 rules · 1 workflows)" in r.out
+        assert "installed 3 (1 skill · 1 rule · 1 workflow)" in r.out
         data = json.loads(boost("count", "--json").out)
         assert data["installed"] == 3
         assert (data["skills"], data["rules"], data["workflows"]) == (1, 1, 1)

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/tests/functional/test_cli_intelligence.py

@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ class TestFocus:
         boost("install", "jira-integration", "--no-deps")
         r = boost("focus", "brainstorming")
         assert "focus: brainstorming" in r.out
-        assert "(other 1 skills sidelined)" in r.out
+        assert "(other 1 skill sidelined)" in r.out
         jira_link = paths.home() / ".claude" / "skills" / "jira-integration"
         assert not jira_link.exists()
         assert (paths.home() / ".claude" / "skills" / "brainstorming").is_symlink()

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/tests/functional/test_cli_quality.py

@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ class TestLint:
         assert "very large SKILL.md (>48KB) — consider splitting" in r.out
         assert "1 of 1 skill below 40 or with errors" in r.out
         r = boost("lint", "--min", "0")
-        assert "1 skill pass lint (min 0)" in r.out
+        assert "1 skill passes lint (min 0)" in r.out
 
     def test_missing_fields_error_rc1_and_json(self, boost, sandbox, tmp_path):
         d = tmp_path / "noname"
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ class TestLint:
         r = boost("lint", "--tap", "fixture-tap", "cowboy-coding")
         assert "cowboy-coding" in r.out
         assert "80/100" in r.out
-        assert "1 skill pass lint (min 40)" in r.out
+        assert "1 skill passes lint (min 40)" in r.out
 
 
     def test_tap_with_rules_lints_only_the_skills(self, boost, fixture_tap_src,
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ class TestLint:
             % ("d" * 45, "body text. " * 20), encoding="utf-8")
         r = boost("lint", str(d))
         assert "my-skill" in r.out
-        assert "1 skill pass lint (min 40)" in r.out
+        assert "1 skill passes lint (min 40)" in r.out
 
     def test_path_target_accepts_a_skill_md_file_directly(
             self, boost, sandbox, tmp_path):
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ class TestLint:
                       encoding="utf-8")
         r = boost("lint", str(md), "--min", "0")
         assert "my-skill" in r.out
-        assert "1 skill pass lint (min 0)" in r.out
+        assert "1 skill passes lint (min 0)" in r.out
 
     def test_path_target_missing_directory_errors(self, boost, sandbox, tmp_path):
         r = boost("lint", str(tmp_path / "nope"), expect=1)

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/tests/functional/test_cli_team.py

@@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ class TestCohort:
         assert ("created cohort pilot (100% rollout, 2 skills) — "
                 "you are IN") in r.out
 
+    def test_create_singular_skill_agrees(self, boost, tapped):
+        r = boost("cohort", "create", "solo",
+                 "--skills", "brainstorming", "--percent", "100")
+        assert ("created cohort solo (100% rollout, 1 skill) — "
+                "you are IN") in r.out
+
     def test_list_membership_column_and_json_determinism(self, boost, tapped):
         boost("cohort", "create", "pilot", "--skills", "brainstorming",
              "--percent", "100")
@@ -226,7 +232,7 @@ class TestProfile:
         assert "(installed, not in profile)" in r.out
 
         r = boost("profile", "use", "solo")
-        assert ("sidelined 1 skill(s) not in the profile (unlinked, still "
+        assert ("sidelined 1 skill not in the profile (unlinked, still "
                 "installed): cowboy-coding") in r.out
         link = paths.home() / ".claude" / "skills" / "cowboy-coding"
         assert not link.exists()
@@ -259,8 +265,8 @@ class TestProfile:
             "kind": "workflow", "version": "1.0.0", "tap": "rule-tap",
             "slot": "commands", "materializations": []})
         r = boost("profile", "save", "daily")
-        assert "saved profile daily (1 skills)" in r.out
-        assert ("1 rule(s) and 1 workflow(s) not captured — profiles carry "
+        assert "saved profile daily (1 skill)" in r.out
+        assert ("1 rule and 1 workflow not captured — profiles carry "
                 "skills only") in r.out
 
     def test_diff_and_use_see_a_name_installed_as_a_rule(self, boost, installed):

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/tests/functional/test_kind_conformance.py

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ NEVER_DENY = (
 ALL_CLEAR = (
     ("list", ("list",), (SKILL, RULE, WORKFLOW)),
     ("count", ("count",),
-     ("installed 3 (1 skills · 1 rules · 1 workflows)",)),
+     ("installed 3 (1 skill · 1 rule · 1 workflow)",)),
     ("policy", ("policy", "check"),
      ("policy check passed (1 skill, 1 rule, 1 workflow)",)),
     ("doctor", ("doctor",),

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/tests/functional/test_tap_signing.py

@@ -108,6 +108,41 @@ def test_unsigned_tap_shows_unsigned(boost, tapped):
     assert "unsigned" in boost("trust", "verify").out
 
 
+def test_tampered_manifest_from_trusted_key_reports_invalid_not_untrusted(
+        boost, fixture_tap_src, tmp_path, signer):
+    """Editing a manifest after a TRUSTED key signed it must not read as an
+    unknown signer.
+
+    A signature whose key id belongs to a trusted key but that no longer
+    verifies is exactly the tampering `trust verify` exists to catch — it must
+    not be indistinguishable from a merely-unrecognised signer.
+    """
+    from boost_cli.core import provenance, registry
+
+    tap = _signed_tap(fixture_tap_src, tmp_path, signer, name="tampered")
+    boost("tap", tap)
+    boost("trust", "add", "acme", signer.public_key_text())
+
+    # Tamper with the CLONE's manifest post-signing, without re-signing — the
+    # signature on disk now belongs to a trusted key id but fails to verify.
+    clone = registry.get("tampered").path
+    manifest = clone / provenance.SIGNED_FILE
+    manifest.write_bytes(manifest.read_bytes() + b"tampered\n")
+
+    r = boost("trust", "verify", "tampered", expect=1)
+    assert "invalid" in r.out
+    assert "untrusted" not in r.out
+
+    data = json.loads(boost("trust", "verify", "tampered", "--json", expect=1).out)
+    assert data[0]["status"] == "invalid"
+    assert data[0]["key_name"] == "acme"
+    assert data[0]["fingerprint"] == "1122334455667788"
+
+    # The sweep (no tap name) must alarm on this too, not exit 0.
+    sweep = boost("trust", "verify", expect=1)
+    assert "invalid" in sweep.out
+
+
 # ── enforcement: require_signed_taps ─────────────────────────────────────
 
 @pytest.fixture()

{boost_skill_cli-1.2.76 → boost_skill_cli-1.2.78}/tests/unit/test_provenance.py

@@ -103,13 +103,31 @@ def test_untrusted_when_key_not_registered(sandbox, signer, tmp_path):
     assert r.fingerprint == "1122334455667788"    # still reports whose key
 
 
-def test_untrusted_when_content_tampered(sandbox, signer, tmp_path):
+def test_invalid_when_trusted_keys_content_tampered(sandbox, signer, tmp_path):
+    """A manifest edited after a TRUSTED key signed it is INVALID, not merely
+    UNTRUSTED — the signature's key id still matches a trusted key, so this is
+    the tampering `trust verify` exists to catch, not an unknown signer."""
     provenance.add_trusted_key("acme", signer.public_key_text())
     clone = tmp_path / "clone"
     clone.mkdir()
     signer.write_signed(clone, manifest=b"original\n")
     (clone / provenance.SIGNED_FILE).write_bytes(b"tampered\n")
-    assert provenance.verify_dir(clone).status == provenance.UNTRUSTED
+    r = provenance.verify_dir(clone)
+    assert r.status == provenance.INVALID and not r.ok
+    assert r.key_name == "acme"
+    assert r.fingerprint == "1122334455667788"
+
+
+def test_untrusted_when_content_tampered_and_key_unknown(sandbox, signer, tmp_path):
+    """Tampering under a key that was never trusted stays UNTRUSTED — there is
+    no trusted key to blame, so it reads as an unrecognised signer."""
+    clone = tmp_path / "clone"
+    clone.mkdir()
+    signer.write_signed(clone, manifest=b"original\n")
+    (clone / provenance.SIGNED_FILE).write_bytes(b"tampered\n")
+    r = provenance.verify_dir(clone)
+    assert r.status == provenance.UNTRUSTED
+    assert r.fingerprint == "1122334455667788"
 
 
 def test_invalid_when_signature_present_but_manifest_missing(sandbox, signer, tmp_path):