bindable 0.1.0__tar.gz → 0.1.2__tar.gz

{bindable-0.1.0 → bindable-0.1.2}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: bindable
-Version: 0.1.0
+Version: 0.1.2
 Summary: Python client for the hosted Bindable Action Gate, with offline Receipt verification
 Author: Bindable AI LLC
 License-Expression: Apache-2.0

{bindable-0.1.0 → bindable-0.1.2}/bindable/_canonical_record.py

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ verified_at handling (de-pydantic departure, behaviour-preserving):
   In the engine, ``Receipt.verified_at`` is a ``datetime`` and the
   builder calls ``_serialize_wire_datetime`` to produce the wire
   string (YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.sssZ). In the thin client the receipt
-  arrives from /v1/decide as JSON, so ``verified_at`` is ALREADY the
+  arrives from /v1/review as JSON, so ``verified_at`` is ALREADY the
   wire string. It is used verbatim — passing it back through a
   datetime serializer would be a double-serialization bug. No
   ``datetime`` object can reach this path, so ``_serialize_wire_datetime``
@@ -38,20 +38,20 @@ def _canonical_hash_input(receipt: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Return the canonical hash input dict per MVP spec §12.3.
 
     Included fields (canonical_json sorts alphabetically):
-      action_type, claim_payload, contract_id, contract_version,
+      action_type, proposal_payload, contract_id, contract_version,
       counterparty_identity, failed_rule, nonce,
       persistent_agent_id, previous_hash, proposed_action_id,
       referenced_evidence, sponsor_identity,
-      sponsor_identity_context, verification_outcome, verified_at.
+      sponsor_identity_context, verdict, verified_at.
 
     Excluded per §12.3:
       receipt_id, signature, signing_key_id, signed_at,
-      chain_hash (self-reference), reason_detail, claim_digest
-      (derivable from canonical claim_payload).
+      chain_hash (self-reference), reason_detail, proposal_digest
+      (derivable from canonical proposal_payload).
 
     Args:
         receipt: A receipt as a plain mapping (e.g. parsed JSON from
-            /v1/decide). All 15 included fields must be present;
+            /v1/review). All 15 included fields must be present;
             nullable fields carry ``None``. ``verified_at`` must be
             the wire-format string already.
 
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ def _canonical_hash_input(receipt: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """
     return {
         "action_type": receipt["action_type"],
-        "claim_payload": receipt["claim_payload"],
+        "proposal_payload": receipt["proposal_payload"],
         "contract_id": receipt["contract_id"],
         "contract_version": receipt["contract_version"],
         "counterparty_identity": receipt["counterparty_identity"],
@@ -73,6 +73,6 @@ def _canonical_hash_input(receipt: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
         "referenced_evidence": receipt["referenced_evidence"],
         "sponsor_identity": receipt["sponsor_identity"],
         "sponsor_identity_context": receipt["sponsor_identity_context"],
-        "verification_outcome": receipt["verification_outcome"],
+        "verdict": receipt["verdict"],
         "verified_at": receipt["verified_at"],
     }

bindable-0.1.2/bindable/_version.py

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+__version__ = "0.1.2"

{bindable-0.1.0 → bindable-0.1.2}/bindable/client.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 """Transport client for the hosted Bindable Action Gate.
 
-``ActionGate.decide()`` submits a Proposal to ``POST /v1/decide`` and returns
+``ActionGate.decide()`` submits a Proposal to ``POST /v1/review`` and returns
 the hosted Decision (the Outcome dict) verbatim. The client is pure transport:
 it does NOT evaluate, canonicalize, or decide anything locally — all
 proof-rule evaluation happens on the hosted gate. To verify the returned
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ from bindable.errors import BindableAPIError
 class ActionGate:
     """Thin, token-authenticated httpx client for the hosted Bindable Action Gate.
 
-    Transports a Proposal to the hosted ``/v1/decide`` endpoint and returns the
+    Transports a Proposal to the hosted ``/v1/review`` endpoint and returns the
     Decision verbatim as a dict. The client performs no local evaluation,
     canonicalization, or decision-making; offline receipt verification is a
     separate concern handled by ``bindable.verify_receipt``.
@@ -55,13 +55,18 @@ class ActionGate:
         proposed_action_id: str,
         nonce: str | None = None,
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        """Submit a Proposal to ``/v1/decide`` and return the hosted Outcome dict.
+        """Submit a Proposal to ``/v1/review`` and return the hosted Outcome dict.
 
         Sends exactly the five wire fields (persistent_agent_id, action_type,
         payload, proposed_action_id, nonce) with bearer-token auth. The Outcome
         is returned verbatim; its ``receipt`` field (when present) can be passed
         to ``verify_receipt`` for offline verification.
 
+        The endpoint moved from ``/v1/decide`` to ``/v1/review`` in 0.1.2. The
+        platform keeps BOTH paths live for a deprecation window, so an older
+        client pinned to ``/v1/decide`` keeps working; new callers get
+        ``/v1/review``.
+
         Args:
             persistent_agent_id: The stable agent identity.
             action_type: The action being proposed.
@@ -87,7 +92,7 @@ class ActionGate:
             "nonce": nonce,
         }
         response = self._client.post(
-            f"{self._base_url}/v1/decide",
+            f"{self._base_url}/v1/review",
             json=body,
             headers={
                 "Authorization": f"Bearer {self._token}",

{bindable-0.1.0 → bindable-0.1.2}/pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "bindable"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.2"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
 description = "Python client for the hosted Bindable Action Gate, with offline Receipt verification"
 readme = "README.md"

{bindable-0.1.0 → bindable-0.1.2}/tests/crypto/vectors.json

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
   },
   {
     "name": "production_shape_receipt",
-    "description": "Approximates the receipt record shape from Interlock MVP Spec v0.1.2 §6.2.",
+    "description": "LEGACY SHAPE (pre-rc3 claim_* wire). Approximates the receipt record shape from Interlock MVP Spec v0.1.2 §6.2. Pins canonicalization math only; the rc3 wire uses proposal_* vocabulary.",
     "record": {
       "claim_payload": {
         "po_number": "PO-44821",

bindable-0.1.2/tests/fixtures/KEY_PROVENANCE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Key provenance: `bindable-test-rc4-2026-08.pem` is the public half of a keypair generated by the engine (0.1.0rc4) when the two receipts in this directory were minted through its own decide path, for the verdict-form cutover. The private half was never written anywhere and is not needed to verify.
+
+These fixtures replace the retired `*_rc3.json` pair, which were real Public-landscape production receipts signed by `bindable-public-2026-07` under the pre-cutover `verification_outcome` canonical form. That form no longer exists, so those receipts could not be carried forward: hand-editing them would invalidate their `chain_hash` and signature, and re-signing them with the production key is impossible here — its private half is Key-Vault-injected and never leaves the platform. `bindable-public-2026-07.pem` (recovered previously via ECDSA public-key recovery from those receipts) was retired with them.
+
+What the fixtures prove is unchanged: a receipt minted by the engine under the current signed canonical form verifies offline through this client's hand-maintained port, chain hash and signature both. Only the signing key's provenance changed — production-minted to engine-minted-with-a-test-key.
+
+Worth doing once the Public landscape runs rc4: re-mint this pair from real production output and restore end-to-end production provenance. Authoritative distribution of landscape verification keys will move to a read-only platform endpoint.

bindable-0.1.2/tests/fixtures/bindable-test-rc4-2026-08.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAENYh+RQNDS48qBicGl9FfgStbcPNk
+2ElW2e4VUjnFHokPHj8eXL82eCzw+jwEGwEoDZmP9OdcUTkI8xsdPeWyzQ==
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

bindable-0.1.2/tests/fixtures/receipt_public_blocked_rc4.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"receipt_id": "1d8ef197c63c4a4fbb4f9523d25f4e88", "proposal_digest": "01d3430e4b046b20fb7f2e0de22d3bab5febaae1832601020109c55b81d73b64", "proposal_payload": {"matter_id": "MER-2026-014", "call_cost_usd": 126, "records_requested": 400, "purpose": "full-market data sweep"}, "contract_id": "demo-diligence-spend-public-founding", "contract_version": "1.0.0", "sponsor_identity": "did:web:bindbl.ai:sponsor:b4047dfe7c4244dda32a3c8b4a02fc8e", "sponsor_identity_context": "ctx:public", "counterparty_identity": null, "persistent_agent_id": "did:web:bindbl.ai:agent:9dd08b5846564a1fbe674b1834fb887d", "action_type": "paid_data_call", "proposed_action_id": "pf-blocked-public-founding", "verdict": "failed", "failed_rule": "r-2", "reason_detail": "126 lte 58 not satisfied", "referenced_evidence": ["demo-budget-public-founding"], "verified_at": "2026-08-21T14:52:16.607Z", "nonce": "d61480f760d63f14d1350c21573d1a8b", "chain_hash": "485d281c0590813d2fd943114004280cbadf95c56bb9f2c8caba22f26c8ac1a2", "previous_hash": null, "signature": "3045022022f79c8897615256b53d3364db8f743eb524541a766329674e25b0ca1eba3d83022100b057d504c0cdb43474b091aa03f72a0bf18f8d11e24f05fab40baa2e497d40c1", "signing_key_id": "bindable-test-rc4-2026-08", "signed_at": "2026-08-21T14:52:16.607Z", "intervention_artifacts": null}

bindable-0.1.2/tests/fixtures/receipt_public_released_rc4.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"receipt_id": "ac2c3b3e7a6c4d59b972fa297a9f4821", "proposal_digest": "f35eb78be1073174427cf7884bccecbf7a2c8b776ecb932939a2219fa5d17c16", "proposal_payload": {"matter_id": "MER-2026-014", "call_cost_usd": 12, "records_requested": 40, "purpose": "comparable-transactions pull"}, "contract_id": "demo-diligence-spend-public-founding", "contract_version": "1.0.0", "sponsor_identity": "did:web:bindbl.ai:sponsor:b4047dfe7c4244dda32a3c8b4a02fc8e", "sponsor_identity_context": "ctx:public", "counterparty_identity": null, "persistent_agent_id": "did:web:bindbl.ai:agent:9dd08b5846564a1fbe674b1834fb887d", "action_type": "paid_data_call", "proposed_action_id": "pf-released-public-founding", "verdict": "passed", "failed_rule": null, "reason_detail": null, "referenced_evidence": ["demo-budget-public-founding"], "verified_at": "2026-08-21T14:52:16.604Z", "nonce": "b38265567729c89b020e6afe8a420f70", "chain_hash": "d7449f9b6874f2774ab4902dbe18ae2093de6a4cd223ab53802d39aace2a38e4", "previous_hash": null, "signature": "3045022014974d1ae715e5f16fdc2307d82cff116414ca4ac176d5566e2f72d7385cf580022100e56c5a09184c0fe57c32e5a400c55ac59d18c35d34ffd1b95c8bf2e3f4e7c86d", "signing_key_id": "bindable-test-rc4-2026-08", "signed_at": "2026-08-21T14:52:16.607Z", "intervention_artifacts": null}

{bindable-0.1.0 → bindable-0.1.2}/tests/test_canonical_vectors.py

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ def test_canonical_json_rejects_nested_float() -> None:
 _FULL_RECEIPT: dict[str, Any] = {
     # 15 included fields
     "action_type": "release_payment",
-    "claim_payload": {"po_number": "PO-44821", "invoice_amount_cents": 12500000},
+    "proposal_payload": {"po_number": "PO-44821", "invoice_amount_cents": 12500000},
     "contract_id": "contract-acme-xyz-invoice",
     "contract_version": "1.0.0",
     "counterparty_identity": "acme-vendor",
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ _FULL_RECEIPT: dict[str, Any] = {
     "referenced_evidence": ["audit-001", "audit-002"],
     "sponsor_identity": "sponsor-001",
     "sponsor_identity_context": "treasury",
-    "verification_outcome": "passed",
+    "verdict": "passed",
     "verified_at": "2026-05-19T14:00:00.000Z",
     # excluded fields that must NOT leak into the canonical input
     "receipt_id": "receipt-zzz",
@@ -76,12 +76,12 @@ _FULL_RECEIPT: dict[str, Any] = {
     "signed_at": "2026-05-19T14:00:01.000Z",
     "chain_hash": "0" * 64,
     "reason_detail": "all good",
-    "claim_digest": "f" * 64,
+    "proposal_digest": "f" * 64,
 }
 
 _EXPECTED_KEYS = {
     "action_type",
-    "claim_payload",
+    "proposal_payload",
     "contract_id",
     "contract_version",
     "counterparty_identity",
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ _EXPECTED_KEYS = {
     "referenced_evidence",
     "sponsor_identity",
     "sponsor_identity_context",
-    "verification_outcome",
+    "verdict",
     "verified_at",
 }
 
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ def test_canonical_hash_input_excludes_signature_and_chain_fields() -> None:
         "signed_at",
         "chain_hash",
         "reason_detail",
-        "claim_digest",
+        "proposal_digest",
     ):
         assert excluded not in result
 

{bindable-0.1.0 → bindable-0.1.2}/tests/test_client.py

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ _TOKEN = "test-token"
 
 _OUTCOME_RELEASED: dict[str, Any] = {
     "status": "released",
-    "verification_outcome": "passed",
+    "verdict": "passed",
     "reason": None,
     "reason_code": None,
     "receipt": None,
@@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ _OUTCOME_RELEASED: dict[str, Any] = {
 }
 
 _FIXTURE_RECEIPT: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(
-    (Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" / "receipt_released.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    (Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures" / "receipt_public_released_rc4.json").read_text(
+        encoding="utf-8"
+    )
 )
 
 
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ def test_decide_posts_five_field_body_with_bearer() -> None:
         )
 
     assert captured["method"] == "POST"
-    assert captured["url"] == "https://gate.example.com/v1/decide"
+    assert captured["url"] == "https://gate.example.com/v1/review"
     assert captured["auth"] == "Bearer test-token"
     assert captured["content_type"] == "application/json"
     # EXACTLY the 5 frozen wire fields, nothing more.
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ def test_base_url_trailing_slash_stripped() -> None:
             proposed_action_id="p",
         )
 
-    assert captured["url"] == "https://gate.example.com/v1/decide"
+    assert captured["url"] == "https://gate.example.com/v1/review"
 
 
 def test_nonce_auto_generated_when_omitted() -> None:

bindable-0.1.2/tests/test_verify_receipt.py

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+"""verify_receipt — end-to-end gate against real engine-minted receipts.
+
+The fixtures (tests/fixtures/receipt_public_released_rc4.json and
+receipt_public_blocked_rc4.json) are REAL receipts minted and ECDSA-signed
+by the engine @ 0.1.0rc4 through its own decide path, under the verdict
+canonical form (public half at tests/fixtures/bindable-test-rc4-2026-08.pem).
+The chain-hash gates below prove the de-pydantic thin-client builder
+reproduces the engine's chain_hash byte-for-byte. If one fails, the hand
+port has drifted from the engine's signed form — that failure is the desync
+alarm: STOP and report; never edit the fixtures.
+
+They are minted with a test signing key rather than the production
+bindable-public-2026-07 key, whose private half lives in Key Vault. What
+they prove is unchanged: the ported canonical form and the engine's agree
+byte-for-byte.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import copy
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+
+from bindable import ReceiptVerification, load_public_key, verify_receipt
+from bindable._canonical_record import _canonical_hash_input
+from bindable.crypto import canonical_sha256
+
+_FIX = Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures"
+_RELEASED: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(
+    (_FIX / "receipt_public_released_rc4.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+)
+_BLOCKED: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(
+    (_FIX / "receipt_public_blocked_rc4.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+)
+_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_BYTES = (_FIX / "bindable-test-rc4-2026-08.pem").read_bytes()
+_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR = _PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_BYTES.decode("utf-8")
+
+# A valid P-256 key that did NOT sign these receipts (from the sign vectors).
+_WRONG_KEY_PEM = json.loads(
+    (Path(__file__).parent / "crypto" / "sign_vectors.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+)[0]["public_key_pem"]
+
+_BOTH = pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "fixture", [_RELEASED, _BLOCKED], ids=["released", "blocked"]
+)
+
+
+def _receipt(fixture: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return copy.deepcopy(fixture)
+
+
+# ─── GATE: builder reproduces the engine chain_hash ────────────────────
+
+
+@_BOTH
+def test_chain_hash_gate_builder_matches_fixture(fixture: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    """canonical_sha256(_canonical_hash_input(receipt)) == receipt['chain_hash']."""
+    recomputed = canonical_sha256(_canonical_hash_input(_receipt(fixture)))
+    assert recomputed == fixture["chain_hash"], (
+        f"Builder diverged from the engine: recomputed {recomputed!r} != pinned "
+        f"{fixture['chain_hash']!r}. STOP — do NOT edit the fixture."
+    )
+
+
+# ─── Happy path (key as PEM str and as loaded object) ──────────────────
+
+
+@_BOTH
+def test_valid_with_pem_string(fixture: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    result = verify_receipt(_receipt(fixture), public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
+    assert result.valid is True
+    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
+    assert result.signature_valid is True
+    assert result.reason is None
+
+
+@_BOTH
+def test_valid_with_loaded_public_key_object(fixture: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    pub = load_public_key(_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_BYTES)
+    result = verify_receipt(_receipt(fixture), public_key=pub)
+    assert result.valid is True
+    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
+    assert result.signature_valid is True
+    assert result.reason is None
+
+
+# ─── Tamper and wrong-key paths ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+@_BOTH
+def test_tampered_canonical_field_breaks_chain(fixture: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    r = _receipt(fixture)
+    r["proposal_payload"] = {"matter_id": "MER-EVIL", "call_cost_usd": 999_999}
+    result = verify_receipt(r, public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
+    assert result.valid is False
+    assert result.chain_hash_valid is False
+    assert result.reason == "chain_hash mismatch"
+
+
+def test_tampered_signature_fails_signature_check() -> None:
+    r = _receipt(_RELEASED)
+    # Flip the last hex digit of the DER signature.
+    last = r["signature"][-1]
+    r["signature"] = r["signature"][:-1] + ("0" if last != "0" else "1")
+    result = verify_receipt(r, public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
+    assert result.valid is False
+    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
+    assert result.signature_valid is False
+
+
+def test_wrong_key_fails_signature_check() -> None:
+    result = verify_receipt(_receipt(_RELEASED), public_key=_WRONG_KEY_PEM)
+    assert result.valid is False
+    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
+    assert result.signature_valid is False
+    assert result.reason == "signature invalid"
+
+
+# ─── Signature-optional matrix ─────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+@_BOTH
+def test_no_key_skips_signature(fixture: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    result = verify_receipt(_receipt(fixture))  # public_key=None
+    assert result.valid is True
+    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
+    assert result.signature_valid is None
+    assert result.reason is None
+
+
+def test_key_set_but_no_signature_field() -> None:
+    r = _receipt(_RELEASED)
+    r["signature"] = None
+    result = verify_receipt(r, public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
+    assert result.valid is False
+    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
+    assert result.signature_valid is False
+
+
+def test_invalid_hex_signature_is_handled() -> None:
+    r = _receipt(_RELEASED)
+    r["signature"] = "zz-not-hex"
+    result = verify_receipt(r, public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
+    assert result.valid is False
+    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
+    assert result.signature_valid is False
+    assert "error" in (result.reason or "").lower()
+
+
+# ─── Robustness: verify_receipt never raises ───────────────────────────
+
+
+def test_empty_dict_never_raises() -> None:
+    result = verify_receipt({})
+    assert isinstance(result, ReceiptVerification)
+    assert result.valid is False
+    assert result.reason is not None
+
+
+def test_garbage_dict_never_raises() -> None:
+    result = verify_receipt({"chain_hash": 123, "proposal_payload": object()})  # type: ignore[dict-item]
+    assert isinstance(result, ReceiptVerification)
+    assert result.valid is False
+    assert result.reason is not None
+
+
+def test_missing_chain_hash_never_raises() -> None:
+    r = _receipt(_RELEASED)
+    r.pop("chain_hash")
+    result = verify_receipt(r)
+    assert result.valid is False
+    assert result.chain_hash_valid is False
+    assert result.reason is not None
+
+
+def test_receipt_verification_is_frozen() -> None:
+    rv = verify_receipt(_receipt(_RELEASED))
+    import dataclasses
+
+    with pytest.raises(dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError):
+        rv.valid = False  # type: ignore[misc]

{bindable-0.1.0 → bindable-0.1.2}/tests/test_version.py

@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ import bindable
 
 
 def test_version() -> None:
-    assert bindable.__version__ == "0.1.0"
+    assert bindable.__version__ == "0.1.2"

bindable-0.1.0/bindable/_version.py

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-__version__ = "0.1.0"

bindable-0.1.0/tests/fixtures/receipt_public_key.pem

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
-MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEa5xwHbysJvcU00yrqTfM7jGYk/87
-cypa/O3b/j6Iy6n+rpJRwDT2VTrbli1n4xoWZ3fXszM/pUzWRVIQt56fTg==
------END PUBLIC KEY-----

bindable-0.1.0/tests/fixtures/receipt_released.json

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "receipt_id": "rcpt_test_001",
-  "claim_digest": "sha256:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
-  "claim_payload": {
-    "po_number": "PO-001",
-    "amount": 1000
-  },
-  "contract_id": "ctr_001",
-  "contract_version": "1.0.0",
-  "sponsor_identity": "testco",
-  "sponsor_identity_context": "ctx:testco:procurement",
-  "counterparty_identity": "supplier-a",
-  "persistent_agent_id": "agent_testco",
-  "action_type": "send_invoice",
-  "proposed_action_id": "claim_001",
-  "verification_outcome": "passed",
-  "failed_rule": null,
-  "reason_detail": null,
-  "referenced_evidence": [
-    "evidence-001"
-  ],
-  "verified_at": "2026-05-25T14:22:05.123Z",
-  "nonce": "abc123def456",
-  "chain_hash": "fa37feb6c264ae089c44a2667eddfa91492712b425c2e5c60091797051e90ca6",
-  "previous_hash": null,
-  "signature": "304502202ff0c4527fa3be3208732971e75ac939edb486da248107ffab6f10faa7ef0baa02210096dec776e158633c9e1f88dd5f7e184d0461a7574d6772a8eae89661ea1921d2",
-  "signing_key_id": "test_signer",
-  "signed_at": null,
-  "intervention_artifacts": null
-}

bindable-0.1.0/tests/test_verify_receipt.py

@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-"""verify_receipt — end-to-end gate against a real engine-minted receipt.
-
-The fixture (tests/fixtures/receipt_released.json + receipt_public_key.pem) was
-minted FROM the engine @ 5f129a6 via its own Interlock construction path. The
-chain-hash gate below proves the de-pydantic thin-client builder reproduces the
-engine's chain_hash byte-for-byte. If it fails, the builder diverged — STOP and
-report; never edit the fixture.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import copy
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any
-
-from bindable import ReceiptVerification, load_public_key, verify_receipt
-from bindable._canonical_record import _canonical_hash_input
-from bindable.crypto import canonical_sha256
-
-_FIX = Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures"
-_RECEIPT: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(
-    (_FIX / "receipt_released.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-)
-_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_BYTES = (_FIX / "receipt_public_key.pem").read_bytes()
-_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR = _PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_BYTES.decode("utf-8")
-
-# A valid P-256 key that did NOT sign this receipt (from the sign vectors).
-_WRONG_KEY_PEM = json.loads(
-    (Path(__file__).parent / "crypto" / "sign_vectors.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-)[0]["public_key_pem"]
-
-
-def _receipt() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return copy.deepcopy(_RECEIPT)
-
-
-# ─── GATE: builder reproduces the engine chain_hash ────────────────────
-
-
-def test_chain_hash_gate_builder_matches_fixture() -> None:
-    """canonical_sha256(_canonical_hash_input(receipt)) == receipt['chain_hash']."""
-    recomputed = canonical_sha256(_canonical_hash_input(_receipt()))
-    assert recomputed == _RECEIPT["chain_hash"], (
-        f"Builder diverged from the engine: recomputed {recomputed!r} != pinned "
-        f"{_RECEIPT['chain_hash']!r}. STOP — do NOT edit the fixture."
-    )
-
-
-# ─── Happy path (key as PEM str and as loaded object) ──────────────────
-
-
-def test_valid_with_pem_string() -> None:
-    result = verify_receipt(_receipt(), public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
-    assert isinstance(result, ReceiptVerification)
-    assert result.valid is True
-    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
-    assert result.signature_valid is True
-    assert result.reason is None
-
-
-def test_valid_with_loaded_public_key_object() -> None:
-    pub = load_public_key(_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_BYTES)
-    result = verify_receipt(_receipt(), public_key=pub)
-    assert result.valid is True
-    assert result.signature_valid is True
-
-
-# ─── Tamper detection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def test_tampered_canonical_field_breaks_chain() -> None:
-    r = _receipt()
-    r["claim_payload"] = {"po_number": "PO-EVIL", "amount": 999_999}
-    result = verify_receipt(r, public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
-    assert result.chain_hash_valid is False
-    assert result.valid is False
-    assert "chain_hash" in (result.reason or "")
-
-
-def test_tampered_signature_fails_signature_check() -> None:
-    r = _receipt()
-    sig = bytearray(bytes.fromhex(r["signature"]))
-    sig[-1] ^= 0x01
-    r["signature"] = bytes(sig).hex()
-    result = verify_receipt(r, public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
-    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
-    assert result.signature_valid is False
-    assert result.valid is False
-
-
-def test_wrong_key_fails_signature_check() -> None:
-    result = verify_receipt(_receipt(), public_key=_WRONG_KEY_PEM)
-    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
-    assert result.signature_valid is False
-    assert result.valid is False
-    assert result.reason == "signature invalid"
-
-
-# ─── 4-state matrix corners ────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def test_no_key_skips_signature() -> None:
-    result = verify_receipt(_receipt())  # public_key=None
-    assert result.signature_valid is None
-    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
-    assert result.valid is True
-    assert result.reason is None
-
-
-def test_key_set_but_no_signature_field() -> None:
-    r = _receipt()
-    r.pop("signature")
-    result = verify_receipt(r, public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
-    assert result.signature_valid is False
-    assert result.chain_hash_valid is True
-    assert result.valid is False
-    assert result.reason == "receipt has no signature to verify"
-
-
-def test_invalid_hex_signature_is_handled() -> None:
-    r = _receipt()
-    r["signature"] = "zzz_not_hex_garbage_zzz"
-    result = verify_receipt(r, public_key=_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_STR)
-    assert result.valid is False
-    assert result.signature_valid is False
-    assert "error" in (result.reason or "").lower()
-
-
-# ─── Never-raises contract ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def test_empty_dict_never_raises() -> None:
-    result = verify_receipt({})
-    assert isinstance(result, ReceiptVerification)
-    assert result.valid is False
-    assert result.reason is not None
-
-
-def test_garbage_dict_never_raises() -> None:
-    result = verify_receipt({"chain_hash": 123, "claim_payload": object()})  # type: ignore[dict-item]
-    assert isinstance(result, ReceiptVerification)
-    assert result.valid is False
-    assert result.reason is not None
-
-
-def test_missing_chain_hash_never_raises() -> None:
-    r = _receipt()
-    r.pop("chain_hash")
-    result = verify_receipt(r)
-    assert result.valid is False
-    assert result.chain_hash_valid is False
-    assert result.reason is not None
-
-
-def test_receipt_verification_is_frozen() -> None:
-    rv = verify_receipt(_receipt())
-    import dataclasses
-
-    try:
-        rv.valid = False  # type: ignore[misc]
-    except dataclasses.FrozenInstanceError:
-        pass
-    else:  # pragma: no cover - frozen dataclass must reject assignment
-        raise AssertionError("ReceiptVerification must be frozen")