bindable 0.0.1__tar.gz → 0.1.0__tar.gz

bindable-0.1.0/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+.venv/
+__pycache__/
+*.egg-info/
+dist/
+build/
+.mypy_cache/
+.ruff_cache/
+.pytest_cache/

{bindable-0.0.1 → bindable-0.1.0}/LICENSE

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-Apache License
+                                 Apache License
                            Version 2.0, January 2004
                         http://www.apache.org/licenses/
 
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ Apache License
       same "printed page" as the copyright notice for easier
       identification within third-party archives.
 
-   Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
+   Copyright 2026 Bindable AI LLC
 
    Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
    you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.

bindable-0.1.0/NOTICE

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bindable
+Copyright 2026 Bindable AI LLC
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0.

bindable-0.1.0/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: bindable
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: Python client for the hosted Bindable Action Gate, with offline Receipt verification
+Author: Bindable AI LLC
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+License-File: LICENSE
+License-File: NOTICE
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42
+Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.27
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: build>=1.2; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: mypy>=1.10; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=8; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: ruff>=0.5; extra == 'dev'
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+
+# bindable
+
+Bindable Python client — propose, decide, and verify accountable agent actions against the hosted Bindable Action Gate. Offline receipt verification included.
+
+## Install
+
+```
+pip install bindable
+```
+
+## Usage
+
+```python
+import bindable
+
+# Submit a Proposal to the Bindable Action Gate, receive a Decision,
+# record the Outcome, then verify the returned Receipt offline.
+```
+
+Status: pre-release (0.1.0.dev0)

bindable-0.1.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# bindable
+
+Bindable Python client — propose, decide, and verify accountable agent actions against the hosted Bindable Action Gate. Offline receipt verification included.
+
+## Install
+
+```
+pip install bindable
+```
+
+## Usage
+
+```python
+import bindable
+
+# Submit a Proposal to the Bindable Action Gate, receive a Decision,
+# record the Outcome, then verify the returned Receipt offline.
+```
+
+Status: pre-release (0.1.0.dev0)

bindable-0.1.0/bindable/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+"""Bindable — Python client for the hosted Bindable Action Gate.
+
+Submit a Proposal to the Bindable Action Gate via ``ActionGate.decide()``,
+receive a Decision (the Outcome), and verify the returned Receipt offline with
+``verify_receipt``. The client is pure transport; all proof-rule evaluation
+happens on the hosted gate, and receipt verification is fully offline.
+"""
+
+from ._version import __version__
+from .client import ActionGate
+from .crypto import load_public_key
+from .errors import BindableAPIError
+from .verify import ReceiptVerification, verify_receipt
+
+__all__ = [
+    "ActionGate",
+    "BindableAPIError",
+    "ReceiptVerification",
+    "__version__",
+    "load_public_key",
+    "verify_receipt",
+]

bindable-0.1.0/bindable/_canonical_record.py

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"""Canonical hash-input serialization for receipts (thin client).
+
+Byte-faithful port of the engine's ``_canonical_hash_input``
+(bindable-interlock-engine @ 5f129a6), adapted to read a receipt
+delivered as a plain JSON dict from the hosted Bindable Action Gate
+rather than as a pydantic ``Receipt``. The 15 included fields, the
+§12.3 exclusions, and the field set match the engine EXACTLY so that
+``canonical_sha256`` of this output is byte-identical across the
+hosted gate and any offline verifier.
+
+This module is NOT part of the public API.
+
+verified_at handling (de-pydantic departure, behaviour-preserving):
+  In the engine, ``Receipt.verified_at`` is a ``datetime`` and the
+  builder calls ``_serialize_wire_datetime`` to produce the wire
+  string (YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.sssZ). In the thin client the receipt
+  arrives from /v1/decide as JSON, so ``verified_at`` is ALREADY the
+  wire string. It is used verbatim — passing it back through a
+  datetime serializer would be a double-serialization bug. No
+  ``datetime`` object can reach this path, so ``_serialize_wire_datetime``
+  is not ported here. The vectors.json production-shape record
+  (verified_at = "2026-05-19T14:00:00.000Z" hashed verbatim) confirms
+  the wire string is what the hash commits to.
+
+Pure and deterministic: given a receipt mapping, returns a new dict
+of wire-form fields with no I/O and no mutation. Canonical ordering
+is applied downstream by ``canonical_json`` (alphabetical key sort),
+so the literal order here is illustrative only.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Mapping
+from typing import Any
+
+
+def _canonical_hash_input(receipt: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return the canonical hash input dict per MVP spec §12.3.
+
+    Included fields (canonical_json sorts alphabetically):
+      action_type, claim_payload, contract_id, contract_version,
+      counterparty_identity, failed_rule, nonce,
+      persistent_agent_id, previous_hash, proposed_action_id,
+      referenced_evidence, sponsor_identity,
+      sponsor_identity_context, verification_outcome, verified_at.
+
+    Excluded per §12.3:
+      receipt_id, signature, signing_key_id, signed_at,
+      chain_hash (self-reference), reason_detail, claim_digest
+      (derivable from canonical claim_payload).
+
+    Args:
+        receipt: A receipt as a plain mapping (e.g. parsed JSON from
+            /v1/decide). All 15 included fields must be present;
+            nullable fields carry ``None``. ``verified_at`` must be
+            the wire-format string already.
+
+    Returns:
+        A dict of exactly the 15 canonical-hash-input fields, ready
+        to feed into ``canonical_sha256``.
+    """
+    return {
+        "action_type": receipt["action_type"],
+        "claim_payload": receipt["claim_payload"],
+        "contract_id": receipt["contract_id"],
+        "contract_version": receipt["contract_version"],
+        "counterparty_identity": receipt["counterparty_identity"],
+        "failed_rule": receipt["failed_rule"],
+        "nonce": receipt["nonce"],
+        "persistent_agent_id": receipt["persistent_agent_id"],
+        "previous_hash": receipt["previous_hash"],
+        "proposed_action_id": receipt["proposed_action_id"],
+        "referenced_evidence": receipt["referenced_evidence"],
+        "sponsor_identity": receipt["sponsor_identity"],
+        "sponsor_identity_context": receipt["sponsor_identity_context"],
+        "verification_outcome": receipt["verification_outcome"],
+        "verified_at": receipt["verified_at"],
+    }

bindable-0.1.0/bindable/_version.py

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+__version__ = "0.1.0"

bindable-0.1.0/bindable/client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+"""Transport client for the hosted Bindable Action Gate.
+
+``ActionGate.decide()`` submits a Proposal to ``POST /v1/decide`` and returns
+the hosted Decision (the Outcome dict) verbatim. The client is pure transport:
+it does NOT evaluate, canonicalize, or decide anything locally — all
+proof-rule evaluation happens on the hosted gate. To verify the returned
+receipt offline, hand ``outcome["receipt"]`` to ``bindable.verify_receipt``.
+
+Runtime dependency: httpx only (plus cryptography via the verify path).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import secrets
+from collections.abc import Mapping
+from types import TracebackType
+from typing import Any
+
+import httpx
+
+from bindable.errors import BindableAPIError
+
+
+class ActionGate:
+    """Thin, token-authenticated httpx client for the hosted Bindable Action Gate.
+
+    Transports a Proposal to the hosted ``/v1/decide`` endpoint and returns the
+    Decision verbatim as a dict. The client performs no local evaluation,
+    canonicalization, or decision-making; offline receipt verification is a
+    separate concern handled by ``bindable.verify_receipt``.
+
+    Usage:
+        with ActionGate(base_url="https://gate.example.com", token="...") as gate:
+            outcome = gate.decide(
+                persistent_agent_id="agent_1",
+                action_type="send_invoice",
+                payload={"po_number": "PO-001", "amount": 1000},
+                proposed_action_id="claim_1",
+            )
+        # Offline verification of the returned receipt:
+        result = verify_receipt(outcome["receipt"])
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, *, base_url: str, token: str, timeout: float = 30.0) -> None:
+        self._base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
+        self._token = token
+        self._client = httpx.Client(timeout=timeout)
+
+    def decide(
+        self,
+        *,
+        persistent_agent_id: str,
+        action_type: str,
+        payload: Mapping[str, Any],
+        proposed_action_id: str,
+        nonce: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """Submit a Proposal to ``/v1/decide`` and return the hosted Outcome dict.
+
+        Sends exactly the five wire fields (persistent_agent_id, action_type,
+        payload, proposed_action_id, nonce) with bearer-token auth. The Outcome
+        is returned verbatim; its ``receipt`` field (when present) can be passed
+        to ``verify_receipt`` for offline verification.
+
+        Args:
+            persistent_agent_id: The stable agent identity.
+            action_type: The action being proposed.
+            payload: The action payload (sent as the ``payload`` field).
+            proposed_action_id: The caller's id for this proposed action.
+            nonce: Replay-protection nonce; a fresh ``secrets.token_hex(16)``
+                is generated when omitted.
+
+        Returns:
+            The parsed Outcome JSON object as a dict.
+
+        Raises:
+            BindableAPIError: If the gate returns a non-2xx response. The
+                error carries ``.status`` and the ``detail`` from the JSON body.
+        """
+        if nonce is None:
+            nonce = secrets.token_hex(16)
+        body = {
+            "persistent_agent_id": persistent_agent_id,
+            "action_type": action_type,
+            "payload": dict(payload),
+            "proposed_action_id": proposed_action_id,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+        }
+        response = self._client.post(
+            f"{self._base_url}/v1/decide",
+            json=body,
+            headers={
+                "Authorization": f"Bearer {self._token}",
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            },
+        )
+        if not response.is_success:
+            raise BindableAPIError(response.status_code, _extract_detail(response))
+        result: dict[str, Any] = response.json()
+        return result
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        """Close the underlying httpx.Client."""
+        self._client.close()
+
+    def __enter__(self) -> ActionGate:
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(
+        self,
+        exc_type: type[BaseException] | None,
+        exc: BaseException | None,
+        tb: TracebackType | None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.close()
+
+
+def _extract_detail(response: httpx.Response) -> str:
+    """Pull the ``detail`` from an error JSON body, falling back to text.
+
+    The gate returns errors as ``{"detail": ...}``. ``detail`` may be a string
+    (401/403) or a structured value (422); it is stringified either way.
+    """
+    try:
+        body = response.json()
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - non-JSON error body; fall back to text
+        return response.text or response.reason_phrase
+    if isinstance(body, dict) and "detail" in body:
+        return str(body["detail"])
+    return str(body)

bindable-0.1.0/bindable/crypto/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+"""Cryptographic primitives for the Bindable thin client.
+
+This subpackage provides the deterministic, offline-verifiable
+primitives used to recompute a receipt's chain_hash and to verify its
+ECDSA P-256 signature. Per D6 these live under ``bindable.crypto`` and
+are NOT re-exported at the top-level ``bindable`` namespace (except the
+high-level ``verify_receipt`` / ``ReceiptVerification`` / ``load_public_key``
+surface exposed by ``bindable`` directly).
+
+Surface (stdlib + cryptography — no pydantic):
+
+    Type aliases:
+        PublicKey  # alias for cryptography EllipticCurvePublicKey
+
+    Hashing (pure, stdlib only):
+        sha256_hex(data: bytes) -> str
+        canonicalize(value: Any) -> Any
+        canonical_json(record: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bytes
+        canonical_sha256(record: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str
+
+    Key loading (cryptography library):
+        load_public_key(pem_bytes: bytes) -> PublicKey
+
+    Signature verification (cryptography library):
+        verify(public_key, record, signature) -> bool
+
+This is a VERIFY-ONLY surface: there is no signing, key generation, or
+private-key handling client-side.
+
+PATENT-CRITICAL: these primitives produce the canonical bytes a
+receipt's chain_hash commits to and verify the signature over them.
+The hashing primitives use only the Python standard library; key
+loading and signature verification depend on the cryptography library,
+which is pinned in [project] dependencies. All primitives operate
+without network access.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from bindable.crypto.canonical import (
+    canonical_json,
+    canonical_sha256,
+    canonicalize,
+)
+from bindable.crypto.hash import sha256_hex
+from bindable.crypto.keys import PublicKey, load_public_key
+from bindable.crypto.sign import verify
+
+__all__ = [
+    "PublicKey",
+    "canonical_json",
+    "canonical_sha256",
+    "canonicalize",
+    "load_public_key",
+    "sha256_hex",
+    "verify",
+]

bindable-0.1.0/bindable/crypto/canonical.py

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+"""Canonical JSON serialization and hashing per RFC 8785 (JCS).
+
+RFC 8785 (JSON Canonicalization Scheme) defines a deterministic
+byte-level representation of a JSON value. Two equivalent JSON
+values always serialize to identical bytes, which makes them
+suitable for cryptographic hashing.
+
+This module implements the subset of RFC 8785 that the Bindable
+SDK requires for v0.1.0 receipts:
+
+  * Object keys are sorted lexicographically by UTF-16 code units.
+  * No whitespace between tokens.
+  * Strings are UTF-8 encoded with the RFC 8785 escape rules.
+  * Booleans and null serialize as ``true``, ``false``, ``null``.
+  * Integers (including booleans coerced via int subclassing) serialize
+    as their decimal representation.
+
+DEPARTURE FROM RFC 8785 — by design, locked decision D3:
+  * Python floats are REJECTED with TypeError. RFC 8785 specifies
+    IEEE-754 shortest-form serialization for non-integer numbers;
+    we forbid them entirely at the canonicalization boundary
+    because float drift across implementations is the dominant
+    source of cross-language hash divergence in financial systems.
+    Callers MUST convert decimal quantities to integers (e.g.,
+    dollars * 100 = cents) or strings before hashing.
+
+PATENT-CRITICAL: this module produces the canonical bytes that feed
+into every sponsor-scoped verification receipt's chain_hash. Any
+change to canonicalization behavior is a wire-format break and
+MUST be accompanied by a major version bump.
+
+Per Interlock MVP Spec v0.1.2 §6.2, canonical_sha256(record) is the
+function used to derive a receipt's chain_hash.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Mapping
+from typing import Any
+
+from bindable.crypto.hash import sha256_hex
+
+# Characters that must be escaped in JSON strings per RFC 8259 §7
+# and RFC 8785 §3.2.2.2. Control characters (U+0000 through U+001F)
+# are escaped as \uXXXX. Quote and backslash get short-form escapes.
+_SHORT_ESCAPES = {
+    0x08: "\\b",
+    0x09: "\\t",
+    0x0A: "\\n",
+    0x0C: "\\f",
+    0x0D: "\\r",
+    0x22: '\\"',
+    0x5C: "\\\\",
+}
+
+
+def canonicalize(value: Any) -> Any:
+    """Return a structurally-canonical copy of ``value``.
+
+    Recursively sorts object (dict) keys. Leaves arrays in their
+    original order (RFC 8785 §3.2.3 — array element order is
+    semantically significant in JSON and is preserved).
+
+    This is a structural pass only. The byte-level canonicalization
+    happens in ``canonical_json``.
+
+    Args:
+        value: Any JSON-serializable value (dict, list, str, int,
+            bool, None). Float values raise in canonical_json, not here.
+
+    Returns:
+        A structurally-canonical copy of ``value`` with all
+        dict keys sorted lexicographically (by UTF-16 code units,
+        which for ASCII keys is the same as Python's default
+        string sort).
+
+    Example:
+        >>> canonicalize({"b": 1, "a": 2})
+        {'a': 2, 'b': 1}
+
+        >>> canonicalize({"z": {"y": 1, "x": 2}})
+        {'z': {'x': 2, 'y': 1}}
+    """
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        # Validate keys before sorting. _utf16_sort_key encodes via UTF-16-BE,
+        # which requires string keys. Validation is duplicated in _encode as
+        # defense-in-depth for direct internal callers.
+        for key in value:
+            if not isinstance(key, str):
+                raise TypeError(
+                    f"Object keys must be strings in canonical JSON, "
+                    f"got {type(key).__name__} (value: {key!r})."
+                )
+        # Sort keys per RFC 8785 §3.2.3: UTF-16 code-unit order.
+        # For pure ASCII keys this matches Python's default string
+        # ordering. For non-ASCII keys, see _utf16_sort_key.
+        return {k: canonicalize(value[k]) for k in sorted(value, key=_utf16_sort_key)}
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [canonicalize(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
+def canonical_json(record: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bytes:
+    """Return the canonical JSON bytes of ``record`` per RFC 8785.
+
+    Args:
+        record: A JSON-serializable mapping. Nested dicts, lists,
+            strings, integers, booleans, and None are supported.
+            Floats are rejected (see TypeError below).
+
+    Returns:
+        The UTF-8 encoded canonical JSON bytes. Suitable for hashing
+        with ``sha256_hex`` or for comparing two records for byte
+        equality.
+
+    Raises:
+        TypeError: If the record (or any nested value) contains a
+            float, a non-string dict key, or an unsupported type.
+
+    Example:
+        >>> canonical_json({"b": 1, "a": 2})
+        b'{"a":2,"b":1}'
+
+        >>> canonical_json({"hello": "world"})
+        b'{"hello":"world"}'
+    """
+    return _encode(canonicalize(record)).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def canonical_sha256(record: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """Return the SHA-256 hex digest of the canonical JSON form of ``record``.
+
+    This is the primary function used by the Interlock to derive a
+    receipt's chain_hash. Two records that are semantically equal
+    (same keys, same values, regardless of input ordering) always
+    produce the same hash.
+
+    Args:
+        record: A JSON-serializable mapping (same constraints as
+            ``canonical_json``).
+
+    Returns:
+        The 64-character lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 digest of
+        the canonical JSON bytes.
+
+    Raises:
+        TypeError: If the record contains a disallowed value
+            (see ``canonical_json``).
+
+    Example:
+        >>> canonical_sha256({"b": 1, "a": 2})
+        '43258cff783fe7036d8a43033f830adfc60ec037382473548ac742b888292777'
+
+        >>> # Key order does not affect the hash:
+        >>> canonical_sha256({"a": 2, "b": 1}) == canonical_sha256({"b": 1, "a": 2})
+        True
+    """
+    return sha256_hex(canonical_json(record))
+
+
+# ─── Internal helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _utf16_sort_key(s: str) -> bytes:
+    """Return a sort key approximating UTF-16 code-unit order for ``s``.
+
+    RFC 8785 §3.2.3 mandates sorting object keys by their UTF-16
+    code-unit sequences. For ASCII keys this is identical to Python's
+    default Unicode codepoint order. For non-BMP characters (above
+    U+FFFF), Python's codepoint order and UTF-16 code-unit order
+    diverge because non-BMP characters are represented in UTF-16 as
+    surrogate pairs.
+
+    Encoding the string to UTF-16-BE and treating the bytes as the
+    sort key gives RFC-8785-correct ordering for both BMP and non-BMP
+    characters.
+    """
+    return s.encode("utf-16-be")
+
+
+def _encode(value: Any) -> str:
+    """Serialize a canonical value to a JSON string per RFC 8785.
+
+    Pre-condition: ``value`` has already been through ``canonicalize``,
+    so dicts have sorted keys.
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return "null"
+    if value is True:
+        return "true"
+    if value is False:
+        return "false"
+    if isinstance(value, bool):
+        # Defensive: covered by the True/False checks above, but
+        # guard against bool subclasses.
+        return "true" if value else "false"
+    if isinstance(value, int):
+        # bool is a subclass of int in Python; the bool checks above
+        # short-circuit before we reach this branch.
+        return str(value)
+    if isinstance(value, float):
+        raise TypeError(
+            "Float values are not allowed in canonical JSON. "
+            "RFC 8785 specifies IEEE-754 shortest-form serialization, "
+            "but float drift across implementations is the dominant "
+            "source of cross-language hash divergence. Convert decimal "
+            "quantities to integers (e.g., dollars * 100 = cents) or "
+            "to strings before hashing. See docs/VOCABULARY.md §8 and "
+            "the canonical.py module docstring for rationale."
+        )
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return _encode_string(value)
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return "[" + ",".join(_encode(item) for item in value) + "]"
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        parts = []
+        for key in value:
+            if not isinstance(key, str):
+                raise TypeError(
+                    f"Object keys must be strings in canonical JSON, "
+                    f"got {type(key).__name__} (value: {key!r})."
+                )
+            parts.append(_encode_string(key) + ":" + _encode(value[key]))
+        return "{" + ",".join(parts) + "}"
+    raise TypeError(
+        f"Unsupported type in canonical JSON: {type(value).__name__}. "
+        f"Allowed: dict (str keys), list, str, int, bool, None."
+    )
+
+
+def _encode_string(s: str) -> str:
+    """Encode a string per RFC 8785 §3.2.2.2.
+
+    Wraps the string in double quotes and escapes characters per the
+    JSON serialization rules. Non-ASCII characters are passed through
+    as UTF-8 (no \\uXXXX escapes for codepoints above 0x1F).
+    """
+    out = ['"']
+    for ch in s:
+        cp = ord(ch)
+        if cp in _SHORT_ESCAPES:
+            out.append(_SHORT_ESCAPES[cp])
+        elif cp < 0x20:
+            # Control characters not in _SHORT_ESCAPES → \uXXXX.
+            out.append(f"\\u{cp:04x}")
+        else:
+            # Printable characters (including non-ASCII) pass through.
+            out.append(ch)
+    out.append('"')
+    return "".join(out)

bindable-0.1.0/bindable/crypto/hash.py

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+"""SHA-256 hashing primitive.
+
+Thin wrapper over hashlib.sha256 that returns a lowercase hexadecimal
+digest string. Used as the terminal step of canonical_sha256 and as
+a building block for receipt verification.
+
+PATENT-CRITICAL: this function is part of the offline-verifiable
+receipt path. Per Interlock MVP Spec v0.1.2 §5.2 invariant I7,
+verify_receipt(...) must work offline using only stdlib hashlib.
+This module satisfies that requirement.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+
+
+def sha256_hex(data: bytes) -> str:
+    """Return the SHA-256 digest of ``data`` as a lowercase hex string.
+
+    Args:
+        data: The bytes to hash. Must be of type ``bytes``.
+
+    Returns:
+        The 64-character lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 digest.
+
+    Raises:
+        TypeError: If ``data`` is not of type ``bytes``.
+
+    Example:
+        >>> sha256_hex(b"hello")
+        '2cf24dba5fb0a30e26e83b2ac5b9e29e1b161e5c1fa7425e73043362938b9824'
+
+        >>> sha256_hex(b"")
+        'e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855'
+    """
+    if not isinstance(data, bytes):
+        raise TypeError(
+            f"sha256_hex requires bytes input, got {type(data).__name__}. "
+            f"Encode strings to bytes (e.g., text.encode('utf-8')) before hashing."
+        )
+    return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()