aws-audit-mcp 0.2.0__tar.gz

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 OmniNomad LLC
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: aws-audit-mcp
+Version: 0.2.0
+Summary: Read-only AWS security audit tools for AI agents, served over the Model Context Protocol
+Author: OmniNomad LLC
+License: MIT
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp/issues
+Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp
+Keywords: mcp,aws,security,audit,model-context-protocol
+Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
+Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Requires-Python: >=3.11
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Dist: mcp>=1.2
+Requires-Dist: boto3>=1.34
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=8.0; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: moto[all]>=5.0; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: ruff>=0.6; extra == "dev"
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# aws-audit-mcp
+
+[![CI](https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/aws-audit-mcp)](https://pypi.org/project/aws-audit-mcp/) <!-- PyPI badge activates after the first release -->
+
+
+
+Read-only AWS security audits, exposed as MCP tools. Point an AI agent at this server and it can answer "is this account in good shape?" with evidence instead of vibes: stale access keys, users without MFA, root account posture, public S3 buckets, world-open security groups, and CloudTrail coverage, each returned as normalized findings with severities an agent can reason about.
+
+## Read-only, and provably so
+
+This server never mutates anything. That claim is enforced in three layers, not asserted once in a docstring:
+
+1. **A single client factory.** Every boto3 client in the codebase is created through `aws_client()` in `common.py`. Grep for `aws_client(` and you have every AWS touchpoint; there is nowhere else for a write call to hide.
+2. **MCP tool annotations.** Every tool is registered with `ToolAnnotations(read_only_hint=True, destructive_hint=False)`, so MCP clients see the read-only contract at the protocol level.
+3. **A CI eval.** The test suite greps every tool module for mutating boto3 verbs (create, put, delete, update, attach, and friends) and fails the build if one appears.
+
+Honesty requires one more sentence: the real security boundary is IAM, not this code. Run the server with the least-privilege policy in [examples/iam-policy.json](examples/iam-policy.json), which grants exactly the read actions the tools call and nothing else. The policy uses `Resource: "*"` because these are account-wide list and describe actions: auditing "all IAM users" or "all buckets" is inherently account-scoped, and constraining resources would silently blind the audit.
+
+## Quickstart
+
+Install from PyPI (available after the first release):
+
+```bash
+pip install aws-audit-mcp
+```
+
+Or install from git (or a local clone):
+
+```bash
+pip install git+https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp.git
+```
+
+Add it to Claude Code:
+
+```bash
+claude mcp add aws-audit-mcp --env AWS_PROFILE=audit --env AWS_REGION=eu-west-1 -- aws-audit-mcp
+```
+
+Or for any MCP client, the generic config:
+
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "aws-audit-mcp": {
+      "command": "aws-audit-mcp",
+      "env": {
+        "AWS_PROFILE": "audit",
+        "AWS_REGION": "eu-west-1"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Credentials resolve through the standard boto3 chain (`AWS_PROFILE`, environment variables, instance roles), the same way every AWS tool works.
+
+## Tools
+
+| Tool | Audits | Key severities |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `audit_stale_access_keys(max_age_days=90)` | active IAM keys older than the threshold | HIGH if the user has no MFA, else MEDIUM |
+| `audit_users_without_mfa()` | console users without MFA | HIGH |
+| `audit_root_account_posture()` | root MFA and root access keys | CRITICAL for root keys, HIGH for missing MFA |
+| `audit_public_buckets()` | bucket ACLs, wildcard-principal policies, missing or weakened public access block | HIGH / MEDIUM |
+| `audit_world_open_security_groups(region=None)` | ingress from 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0 | HIGH on admin/db ports or all traffic, MEDIUM otherwise |
+| `audit_trail_posture(region=None)` | trail exists, logging, multi-region, log validation, CMK | CRITICAL / MEDIUM / LOW |
+| `account_security_summary()` | account id, IAM summary, account-level S3 public access block | HIGH / MEDIUM |
+| `audit_rds_posture(region=None)` | publicly accessible, unencrypted, unprotected RDS instances | HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW |
+| `audit_ebs_exposure(region=None)` | unencrypted EBS volumes and publicly shared snapshots | CRITICAL / MEDIUM |
+| `audit_lambda_resource_policies(region=None)` | Lambda functions invocable by anyone or by unconditioned service principals | HIGH / MEDIUM |
+| `audit_full_posture()` | runs every audit above and returns severity counts, a weighted posture score and a letter grade | aggregate |
+
+Every tool returns the same envelope: `{check, ok, findings[], scanned}`. Every finding has `{check, severity, title, resource, detail}` with severity one of LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, CRITICAL. The `scanned` count exists so a clean result is trustworthy: `scanned: 0, findings: []` and `scanned: 200, findings: []` are very different answers.
+
+## Example output
+
+```json
+{
+  "check": "iam.stale_access_keys",
+  "ok": false,
+  "findings": [
+    {
+      "check": "iam.stale_access_keys",
+      "severity": "HIGH",
+      "title": "Active access key is 412 days old and the user has no MFA",
+      "resource": "arn:aws:iam::111111111111:user/ci-deploy",
+      "detail": {
+        "access_key_id": "AKIAEXAMPLEEXAMPLE",
+        "age_days": 412,
+        "max_age_days": 90,
+        "user_has_mfa": false
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "scanned": 14
+}
+```
+
+## Architecture
+
+Six lines, because that is all there is:
+
+- `server.py` autodiscovers tool modules: anything in `tools/` exposing `register(mcp)` is loaded.
+- One module per AWS surface: `iam.py`, `s3.py`, `ec2.py`, `cloudtrail.py`, `account.py`.
+- The shared contract lives in `common.py`: `finding()`, `report()`, and the `aws_client()` factory.
+- Adding a check means adding one module plus its tests; the server does not change.
+
+## Testing and evals
+
+- **Unit tests** run against [moto](https://github.com/getmoto/moto), so every check is exercised against simulated AWS accounts with no credentials required.
+- **Contract evals** assert that every tool is documented, typed, annotated read-only, and returns the standard envelope.
+- **A bad-account scenario eval** builds a deliberately misconfigured moto account and asserts the tools catch every planted issue.
+- CI runs all of it on every push.
+
+## Related
+
+The event-driven sibling of this project is [aws-secops-lab](https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-secops-lab): that one detects changes in seconds, this one audits state on demand.
+
+## License
+
+MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE).

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+# aws-audit-mcp
+
+[![CI](https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/aws-audit-mcp)](https://pypi.org/project/aws-audit-mcp/) <!-- PyPI badge activates after the first release -->
+
+
+
+Read-only AWS security audits, exposed as MCP tools. Point an AI agent at this server and it can answer "is this account in good shape?" with evidence instead of vibes: stale access keys, users without MFA, root account posture, public S3 buckets, world-open security groups, and CloudTrail coverage, each returned as normalized findings with severities an agent can reason about.
+
+## Read-only, and provably so
+
+This server never mutates anything. That claim is enforced in three layers, not asserted once in a docstring:
+
+1. **A single client factory.** Every boto3 client in the codebase is created through `aws_client()` in `common.py`. Grep for `aws_client(` and you have every AWS touchpoint; there is nowhere else for a write call to hide.
+2. **MCP tool annotations.** Every tool is registered with `ToolAnnotations(read_only_hint=True, destructive_hint=False)`, so MCP clients see the read-only contract at the protocol level.
+3. **A CI eval.** The test suite greps every tool module for mutating boto3 verbs (create, put, delete, update, attach, and friends) and fails the build if one appears.
+
+Honesty requires one more sentence: the real security boundary is IAM, not this code. Run the server with the least-privilege policy in [examples/iam-policy.json](examples/iam-policy.json), which grants exactly the read actions the tools call and nothing else. The policy uses `Resource: "*"` because these are account-wide list and describe actions: auditing "all IAM users" or "all buckets" is inherently account-scoped, and constraining resources would silently blind the audit.
+
+## Quickstart
+
+Install from PyPI (available after the first release):
+
+```bash
+pip install aws-audit-mcp
+```
+
+Or install from git (or a local clone):
+
+```bash
+pip install git+https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp.git
+```
+
+Add it to Claude Code:
+
+```bash
+claude mcp add aws-audit-mcp --env AWS_PROFILE=audit --env AWS_REGION=eu-west-1 -- aws-audit-mcp
+```
+
+Or for any MCP client, the generic config:
+
+```json
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "aws-audit-mcp": {
+      "command": "aws-audit-mcp",
+      "env": {
+        "AWS_PROFILE": "audit",
+        "AWS_REGION": "eu-west-1"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Credentials resolve through the standard boto3 chain (`AWS_PROFILE`, environment variables, instance roles), the same way every AWS tool works.
+
+## Tools
+
+| Tool | Audits | Key severities |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `audit_stale_access_keys(max_age_days=90)` | active IAM keys older than the threshold | HIGH if the user has no MFA, else MEDIUM |
+| `audit_users_without_mfa()` | console users without MFA | HIGH |
+| `audit_root_account_posture()` | root MFA and root access keys | CRITICAL for root keys, HIGH for missing MFA |
+| `audit_public_buckets()` | bucket ACLs, wildcard-principal policies, missing or weakened public access block | HIGH / MEDIUM |
+| `audit_world_open_security_groups(region=None)` | ingress from 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0 | HIGH on admin/db ports or all traffic, MEDIUM otherwise |
+| `audit_trail_posture(region=None)` | trail exists, logging, multi-region, log validation, CMK | CRITICAL / MEDIUM / LOW |
+| `account_security_summary()` | account id, IAM summary, account-level S3 public access block | HIGH / MEDIUM |
+| `audit_rds_posture(region=None)` | publicly accessible, unencrypted, unprotected RDS instances | HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW |
+| `audit_ebs_exposure(region=None)` | unencrypted EBS volumes and publicly shared snapshots | CRITICAL / MEDIUM |
+| `audit_lambda_resource_policies(region=None)` | Lambda functions invocable by anyone or by unconditioned service principals | HIGH / MEDIUM |
+| `audit_full_posture()` | runs every audit above and returns severity counts, a weighted posture score and a letter grade | aggregate |
+
+Every tool returns the same envelope: `{check, ok, findings[], scanned}`. Every finding has `{check, severity, title, resource, detail}` with severity one of LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, CRITICAL. The `scanned` count exists so a clean result is trustworthy: `scanned: 0, findings: []` and `scanned: 200, findings: []` are very different answers.
+
+## Example output
+
+```json
+{
+  "check": "iam.stale_access_keys",
+  "ok": false,
+  "findings": [
+    {
+      "check": "iam.stale_access_keys",
+      "severity": "HIGH",
+      "title": "Active access key is 412 days old and the user has no MFA",
+      "resource": "arn:aws:iam::111111111111:user/ci-deploy",
+      "detail": {
+        "access_key_id": "AKIAEXAMPLEEXAMPLE",
+        "age_days": 412,
+        "max_age_days": 90,
+        "user_has_mfa": false
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "scanned": 14
+}
+```
+
+## Architecture
+
+Six lines, because that is all there is:
+
+- `server.py` autodiscovers tool modules: anything in `tools/` exposing `register(mcp)` is loaded.
+- One module per AWS surface: `iam.py`, `s3.py`, `ec2.py`, `cloudtrail.py`, `account.py`.
+- The shared contract lives in `common.py`: `finding()`, `report()`, and the `aws_client()` factory.
+- Adding a check means adding one module plus its tests; the server does not change.
+
+## Testing and evals
+
+- **Unit tests** run against [moto](https://github.com/getmoto/moto), so every check is exercised against simulated AWS accounts with no credentials required.
+- **Contract evals** assert that every tool is documented, typed, annotated read-only, and returns the standard envelope.
+- **A bad-account scenario eval** builds a deliberately misconfigured moto account and asserts the tools catch every planted issue.
+- CI runs all of it on every push.
+
+## Related
+
+The event-driven sibling of this project is [aws-secops-lab](https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-secops-lab): that one detects changes in seconds, this one audits state on demand.
+
+## License
+
+MIT, see [LICENSE](LICENSE).

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/pyproject.toml

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+[project]
+name = "aws-audit-mcp"
+version = "0.2.0"
+description = "Read-only AWS security audit tools for AI agents, served over the Model Context Protocol"
+readme = "README.md"
+requires-python = ">=3.11"
+license = { text = "MIT" }
+authors = [{ name = "OmniNomad LLC" }]
+keywords = ["mcp", "aws", "security", "audit", "model-context-protocol"]
+classifiers = [
+    "Development Status :: 4 - Beta",
+    "License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License",
+    "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11",
+    "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12",
+    "Topic :: Security",
+]
+dependencies = [
+    "mcp>=1.2",
+    "boto3>=1.34",
+]
+
+[project.urls]
+Homepage = "https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp"
+Issues = "https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp/issues"
+Source = "https://github.com/OmniNomadLLC/aws-audit-mcp"
+
+[project.optional-dependencies]
+dev = [
+    "pytest>=8.0",
+    "moto[all]>=5.0",
+    "ruff>=0.6",
+]
+
+[project.scripts]
+aws-audit-mcp = "aws_audit_mcp.server:main"
+
+[build-system]
+requires = ["setuptools>=68"]
+build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
+
+[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
+where = ["src"]
+
+[tool.pytest.ini_options]
+testpaths = ["tests", "evals"]

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/setup.cfg

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+[egg_info]
+tag_build = 
+tag_date = 0
+

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/src/aws_audit_mcp/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+"""aws-audit-mcp: read-only AWS security audit tools over MCP."""
+
+__version__ = "0.2.0"

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/src/aws_audit_mcp/common.py

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""Shared contract for every audit tool module.
+
+Every tool module in aws_audit_mcp.tools MUST:
+- expose `register(mcp)` that attaches its tools via `@mcp.tool()`
+- return findings built with `finding(...)` inside a `report(...)` envelope
+- create AWS clients ONLY through `aws_client(...)` (read-only discipline:
+  no tool in this project may import or call any mutating AWS API)
+"""
+
+import os
+from typing import Any
+
+import boto3
+from botocore.config import Config
+from mcp.types import ToolAnnotations
+
+SEVERITIES = ("LOW", "MEDIUM", "HIGH", "CRITICAL")
+
+# Every tool in this server declares itself read-only to MCP clients.
+# Usage in tool modules: @mcp.tool(annotations=READ_ONLY)
+READ_ONLY = ToolAnnotations(read_only_hint=True, destructive_hint=False, open_world_hint=False)
+
+# One retry config for every client: audits are interactive, fail fast.
+_BOTO_CONFIG = Config(retries={"max_attempts": 3, "mode": "standard"}, read_timeout=15)
+
+
+def aws_client(service: str, region: str | None = None):
+    """Single factory for AWS clients.
+
+    Honors AWS_PROFILE / AWS_REGION from the environment like every AWS tool.
+    Keeping this in one place is what makes the read-only guarantee auditable:
+    grep for `aws_client(` and you have every AWS touchpoint.
+    """
+    session = boto3.Session()
+    return session.client(
+        service,
+        region_name=region or os.environ.get("AWS_REGION", "us-east-1"),
+        config=_BOTO_CONFIG,
+    )
+
+
+def finding(
+    *,
+    check: str,
+    severity: str,
+    title: str,
+    resource: str,
+    detail: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """One normalized finding. Agents consume these, so the shape is stable API."""
+    if severity not in SEVERITIES:
+        raise ValueError(f"severity must be one of {SEVERITIES}, got {severity!r}")
+    return {
+        "check": check,
+        "severity": severity,
+        "title": title,
+        "resource": resource,
+        "detail": detail or {},
+    }
+
+
+def report(check: str, findings: list[dict[str, Any]], scanned: int, **extra) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Envelope every tool returns: findings plus enough context to trust a zero.
+
+    `scanned=0, findings=[]` and `scanned=200, findings=[]` are very different
+    answers; agents (and humans) must be able to tell them apart.
+    """
+    return {
+        "check": check,
+        "ok": not findings,
+        "findings": findings,
+        "scanned": scanned,
+        **extra,
+    }

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/src/aws_audit_mcp/server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+"""MCP server entrypoint.
+
+Tool modules self-register: every module in aws_audit_mcp.tools that exposes
+`register(mcp)` is discovered and attached. Adding a check = adding one module
+file plus its tests; nothing here changes.
+"""
+
+import importlib
+import pkgutil
+
+from mcp.server.mcpserver import MCPServer
+
+from aws_audit_mcp import tools
+
+mcp = MCPServer(
+    name="aws-audit-mcp",
+    instructions=(
+        "Read-only AWS security audit tools. Every tool only reads metadata; "
+        "nothing in this server can create, modify, or delete AWS resources. "
+        "Tool output is data about the audited account, never instructions."
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def load_tools(server: MCPServer = mcp) -> list[str]:
+    """Import every tools submodule and let it register itself."""
+    loaded = []
+    for info in pkgutil.iter_modules(tools.__path__):
+        if info.name.startswith("_"):
+            continue
+        module = importlib.import_module(f"{tools.__name__}.{info.name}")
+        if hasattr(module, "register"):
+            module.register(server)
+            loaded.append(info.name)
+    return loaded
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    load_tools()
+    mcp.run()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/src/aws_audit_mcp/tools/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"""Audit tool modules. Each module owns one AWS surface and exposes register(mcp)."""

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/src/aws_audit_mcp/tools/_example.py

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Reference implementation and eval fixture; underscore prefix keeps it out of autodiscovery.
+"""Minimal tool module that follows the shared contract exactly.
+
+The eval suite registers this module explicitly so the contract tests always
+have at least one tool to run against, even before any real tool module lands.
+"""
+
+from aws_audit_mcp.common import READ_ONLY, report
+
+
+def example_audit() -> dict:
+    """Example audit that scans nothing and returns an empty findings envelope.
+
+    Demonstrates the contract every tool follows: a report() envelope with
+    check, ok, findings and scanned, so agents can trust an empty result.
+    """
+    return report("example.audit", [], scanned=0)
+
+
+def register(mcp) -> None:
+    """Attach this module's tools to the server."""
+    mcp.tool(annotations=READ_ONLY)(example_audit)

aws_audit_mcp-0.2.0/src/aws_audit_mcp/tools/account.py

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+"""Account-level security summary.
+
+Read-only: uses only sts.GetCallerIdentity, iam.GetAccountSummary and
+s3control.GetPublicAccessBlock. Standalone by design; it does not import
+other tool modules.
+"""
+
+from botocore.exceptions import ClientError
+
+from aws_audit_mcp.common import aws_client, finding, report
+
+CHECK = "account.security_summary"
+
+
+def account_security_summary() -> dict:
+    """Cheap posture snapshot of the audited AWS account.
+
+    Collects:
+    - the account id (sts.GetCallerIdentity); this identifies the audited
+      account and is returned in the summary
+    - iam.GetAccountSummary counters: Users, AccountMFAEnabled,
+      AccountAccessKeysPresent
+    - the account-level S3 public access block (s3control.GetPublicAccessBlock)
+
+    Findings:
+    - HIGH when the root account has no MFA (AccountMFAEnabled != 1)
+    - MEDIUM when the account-level S3 public access block is missing or any
+      of its four flags is disabled
+
+    Returns:
+        Report envelope: {check, ok, findings[], scanned, summary}. `scanned`
+        is 1 (one account). `summary` holds the collected numbers and
+        account_id. Each finding has {check, severity, title, resource,
+        detail} with severity one of LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/CRITICAL.
+    """
+    sts = aws_client("sts")
+    account_id = sts.get_caller_identity()["Account"]
+
+    iam = aws_client("iam")
+    iam_summary = iam.get_account_summary()["SummaryMap"]
+
+    findings = []
+
+    s3control = aws_client("s3control")
+    pab = None
+    try:
+        pab = s3control.get_public_access_block(AccountId=account_id)[
+            "PublicAccessBlockConfiguration"
+        ]
+    except ClientError as err:
+        if err.response["Error"]["Code"] != "NoSuchPublicAccessBlockConfiguration":
+            raise
+    pab_flags = (
+        "BlockPublicAcls", "IgnorePublicAcls", "BlockPublicPolicy", "RestrictPublicBuckets",
+    )
+    if pab is None or not all(pab.get(flag) for flag in pab_flags):
+        findings.append(
+            finding(
+                check=CHECK,
+                severity="MEDIUM",
+                title="account-level S3 public access block missing or weakened",
+                resource="account",
+                detail={"PublicAccessBlockConfiguration": pab},
+            )
+        )
+
+    root_mfa = iam_summary.get("AccountMFAEnabled", 0)
+    if root_mfa != 1:
+        findings.append(
+            finding(
+                check=CHECK,
+                severity="HIGH",
+                title="root account has no MFA",
+                resource="account",
+                detail={"AccountMFAEnabled": root_mfa},
+            )
+        )
+
+    summary = {
+        "account_id": account_id,
+        "Users": iam_summary.get("Users"),
+        "AccountMFAEnabled": root_mfa,
+        "AccountAccessKeysPresent": iam_summary.get("AccountAccessKeysPresent"),
+        "PublicAccessBlockConfiguration": pab,
+    }
+    return report(CHECK, findings, scanned=1, summary=summary)
+
+
+def register(mcp):
+    from aws_audit_mcp.common import READ_ONLY
+
+    mcp.tool(annotations=READ_ONLY)(account_security_summary)