authdrift-harness 0.1.0__tar.gz

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Changelog
+
+## 0.1.0 — 2026-09-17
+
+- Synchronous Scenario/factory/reset API and named checkpoint injection.
+- Positive, negative, and mid-flight controls with state confirmation.
+- Structured evidence, CLI, three controlled fixture families and corrected variants.
+- Documented authority-contract requirement and interpretation limitations.
+- Blocked external validation provenance, with no external security outcome.

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Contributing
+
+Use Python 3.10+ and `python -m pip install -e .` from a checkout.
+Run `python -m unittest discover -s tests -v` and `python benchmarks/run.py`.
+Tests use the standard library; no extra test dependencies are required.
+
+Keep changes small; include regression tests for correctness changes. Scenarios
+must specify the authority contract, independent confirmation, sink, checkpoint
+ordering, isolation, and positive/negative/mid-flight controls. Distinguish
+harness-supplied authority from upstream authorization semantics.
+
+Independent specimens must pin source and preserve its license and behavior.
+Record actual prerequisites and outcomes. Never commit credentials or real user
+data. Review deliberately retained release evidence before adding it.
+
+Read the [trusted-code and report-privacy boundaries](SECURITY.md#trusted-code-and-report-privacy).
+Keep raw validation and external-specimen evidence private.

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 AuthDrift contributors
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/MANIFEST.in

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+include LICENSE README.md CONTRIBUTING.md SECURITY.md CHANGELOG.md
+recursive-include examples *.py *.md
+recursive-include tests *.py
+include benchmarks/run.py
+include research/methodology.md research/threat-model.md research/related-work.md
+include research/external-validation.md research/implementation-status.md
+include release/validation.md
+prune external-specimens

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: authdrift-harness
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: A developer testing harness for confirmed authority changes in agent workflows
+License-Expression: MIT
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/cheerstopriya/authdrift
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/cheerstopriya/authdrift/issues
+Project-URL: Documentation, https://github.com/cheerstopriya/authdrift#readme
+Project-URL: Security, https://github.com/cheerstopriya/authdrift/security/advisories/new
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3 :: Only
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
+Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Testing
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# AuthDrift
+
+**Can your AI agent still act after you revoke its authority?**
+
+AuthDrift is a developer testing harness for injecting confirmed authority changes
+into running agent trajectories and observing whether consequential effects still
+commit. It reproduces the gap between an earlier approval and a later action.
+It does not enforce policy or protect a running agent.
+
+## A 30-second example
+
+An approval is checked, then withdrawn while the workflow is paused. Does the
+refund still happen?
+
+```python
+# Naive: reuse the earlier decision.
+approved = approval.valid()
+authdrift.checkpoint("authority_observed")
+prepare_refund()
+if approved:
+    issue_refund()
+```
+
+```python
+# Corrected for this synchronous fixture: consult current authority.
+approved = approval.valid()
+authdrift.checkpoint("authority_observed")
+prepare_refund()
+if approval.valid():
+    issue_refund()
+```
+
+These illustrative snippets assume revocation invalidates outstanding effects.
+The runnable fixtures below explicitly define that contract. In concurrent
+systems the final check and mutation must be atomic with respect to revocation;
+a separate recheck alone does not guarantee that.
+
+## Installation
+
+Python **3.10+**, **no runtime dependencies**. From a source checkout:
+
+```sh
+git clone https://github.com/cheerstopriya/authdrift.git
+cd authdrift
+python -m venv .venv
+# Windows PowerShell: .venv\Scripts\Activate.ps1
+# macOS/Linux: source .venv/bin/activate
+python -m pip install -e .
+authdrift --help
+```
+
+Version 0.1.0 is prepared for release. PyPI publication is pending;
+use the source installation above until publication is confirmed.
+The distribution name is `authdrift-harness`; the Python import and CLI remain
+`authdrift`. The existing PyPI package named `authdrift` is a different project.
+Source builds require setuptools >= 77, normally supplied by pip's isolated
+build environment. Examples are included in the repository/source distribution.
+The connected editable-install workflow passed on Windows and Ubuntu with Python
+3.10, 3.12, and 3.13; see [GitHub validation](release/validation.md).
+
+## Quick start
+
+```sh
+authdrift run examples/refund/scenario.py --repeats 20 --json vulnerable.json
+authdrift run examples/refund/safe.py --repeats 20 --json safe.json
+```
+
+The controlled vulnerable fixture reports `REVOCATION_ESCAPE` (exit **1**);
+the corrected fixture reports `CLOSED` (exit **0**).
+
+In AuthDrift's deliberately vulnerable controlled fixtures, all 20/20 runs
+produced `REVOCATION_ESCAPE`; the corresponding corrected fixtures produced
+20/20 `CLOSED`. These counts are fixture runs, not vulnerabilities discovered in
+independent agents. The scenario's declared authority contract gives the security
+classification its meaning; AuthDrift cannot infer that contract.
+
+Measured final summary lines for the refund commands:
+
+```text
+vulnerable: Escapes: 20/20 valid trials (100.0%); total trials: 20
+corrected:  Escapes: 0/20 valid trials (0.0%); total trials: 20
+```
+
+Run all three families and the tests:
+
+```sh
+python benchmarks/run.py
+python -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+```
+
+See [release validation](release/validation.md) for measured results and
+exact commands. The fixtures use in-memory effect records, not real payments,
+LLM calls, or durable external services.
+
+## How AuthDrift works
+
+```text
+Workflow observes authority
+          |
+Checkpoint pauses continuation
+          |
+Request authority change -> independently confirm state
+          |
+Verify effect is still absent
+          |
+Resume the same workflow -> inspect authoritative sink state
+```
+
+Each repetition uses fresh state for positive, pre-revoked negative, and
+mid-flight controls. Failed controls prevent that mid-flight trial from running.
+Confirmation reads the supplied authority predicate, not the revocation callback's
+return value or model narration.
+
+## Outcomes
+
+**Scenario contract required:** confirmed revocation must invalidate outstanding,
+uncommitted effects. A policy/configuration change alone does not establish this.
+The v0.1 API assumes this contract; it cannot discover or verify it automatically.
+Do not use its security classifications for unspecified upstream semantics.
+
+| Outcome | Meaning under the scenario contract | CLI exit |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `REVOCATION_ESCAPE` | Effect absent after confirmation, present after continuation | 1 |
+| `CLOSED` | Authority remains revoked; no effect observed after completion, scoped to this trial | 0 |
+| `BASELINE_FAILURE` | Pre-revoked control commits; temporal interpretation stops | 2 |
+| `INVALID_EXPERIMENT` | Failed positive control, bad predicates, missing checkpoint, callback error, or ambiguous ordering | 3 |
+
+JSON schema 1.0 contains controls, per-experiment IDs, ordered monotonic events,
+reasons, counts, and escape rate over valid mid-flight trials only (null if none).
+Mixed reports prioritize invalid experiments, baseline failures, escapes, then
+closed outcomes. CLI errors also exit 3. JSON does not yet separate observation
+from security interpretation; see [methodology](research/methodology.md).
+
+## Included scenarios
+
+| Family | Authority | Controlled effect | Implementations |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Refund | Approval | Refund record | [vulnerable](examples/refund/scenario.py), [corrected](examples/refund/safe.py) |
+| Delegation | Worker eligibility | Worker result | [vulnerable](examples/delegation/scenario.py), [corrected](examples/delegation/safe.py) |
+| Session | Session authorization | Protected-action record | [vulnerable](examples/session/scenario.py), [corrected](examples/session/safe.py) |
+
+Each directory documents its authority contract. Delegation is a synchronous
+worker fixture, not a distributed-agent integration.
+
+## Writing your own scenario
+
+```python
+import authdrift
+
+def build_scenario():
+    # Contract: revoked approval invalidates every outstanding refund.
+    state = {"approved": True, "refunds": []}
+
+    def workflow():
+        approved = state["approved"]
+        authdrift.checkpoint("authority_observed")
+        if approved:
+            state["refunds"].append("refund")
+
+    return authdrift.Scenario(
+        name="refund-revocation",
+        run=workflow,
+        revoke=lambda: state.update(approved=False),
+        revoked=lambda: not state["approved"],
+        committed=lambda: bool(state["refunds"]),
+        trigger="authority_observed",
+    )
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    authdrift.run(build_scenario)
+```
+
+CLI files export `build_scenario()` or `scenario`. Prefer a factory creating
+fresh authority and sink state for each experiment. A `Scenario` instance requires
+`reset=` restoring authorization and clearing the sink. Callbacks are synchronous;
+predicates return actual booleans. Optional `confirmation_timeout` and
+`poll_interval` default to 1 second and 0.001 seconds.
+
+## Methodology and validity
+
+Place the checkpoint after authority observation and before any effect. With
+truthful monotonic sink state, no independent writers, and synchronous continuation,
+absence after confirmation followed by presence establishes causal ordering:
+observation < confirmed revocation < commit. Exact commit time is not measured.
+`effect_observed` is an observation timestamp; **Post-Revocation Commit Delay
+(PRCD)** is not calculated from it.
+
+The workflow must join all consequential work before returning. Revocation must
+persist without regrant; effects must not be erased. Predicates independently
+read actual authority and sink state without side effects. Factory isolation is
+a caller obligation, not a sandbox. Read [methodology](research/methodology.md)
+and [threat model](research/threat-model.md) before interpreting results.
+
+## What AuthDrift does not do
+
+No enforcement, automatic interception, framework adapters, universal compatibility,
+async execution, or production validation. Threads/processes do not automatically
+inherit the checkpoint hook. Confirmation polling has a timeout, but the harness
+cannot safely preempt blocked callbacks. Scenario files execute Python: load only
+trusted code. CLOSED is not proof of general revocation closure.
+
+## External validation status
+
+| Specimen | Execution status | Security outcome |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| LangGraph airline | `BLOCKED_NOT_EXECUTED` | None |
+| Goose | `BLOCKED_NOT_EXECUTED`; `SEMANTICS_UNSPECIFIED` | None |
+
+These are validation-attempt provenance, not successful external validation or
+AuthDrift failures. No LangGraph or Goose vulnerability is claimed. Details and
+the failed Ollama memory preflight: [external validation](research/external-validation.md).
+
+## Related research
+
+The intended contribution is developer-facing testing, injection, and reproduction
+tooling. AuthDrift does not claim to invent stale authority, TOCTOU, commit-time
+authorization, or revocation closure. See [related work](research/related-work.md).
+
+## Contributing
+
+See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md). Independent specimens are welcome with
+honest execution provenance and explicit authority contracts. For suspected
+harness vulnerabilities, see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
+
+## License
+
+[MIT](LICENSE). Retained upstream specimen material keeps its own license.
+
+## Trusted code and report privacy
+
+AuthDrift executes user-supplied Python scenarios. Running a scenario is
+equivalent to executing trusted Python code. AuthDrift is not a sandbox.
+Only execute scenarios you trust.
+
+Exceptions and error messages may be included in generated result artifacts
+and console output. Users should review and sanitize reports before sharing
+or publishing them. AuthDrift does not automatically redact secrets or personal
+data. Keep raw reports private by default.

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+# AuthDrift
+
+**Can your AI agent still act after you revoke its authority?**
+
+AuthDrift is a developer testing harness for injecting confirmed authority changes
+into running agent trajectories and observing whether consequential effects still
+commit. It reproduces the gap between an earlier approval and a later action.
+It does not enforce policy or protect a running agent.
+
+## A 30-second example
+
+An approval is checked, then withdrawn while the workflow is paused. Does the
+refund still happen?
+
+```python
+# Naive: reuse the earlier decision.
+approved = approval.valid()
+authdrift.checkpoint("authority_observed")
+prepare_refund()
+if approved:
+    issue_refund()
+```
+
+```python
+# Corrected for this synchronous fixture: consult current authority.
+approved = approval.valid()
+authdrift.checkpoint("authority_observed")
+prepare_refund()
+if approval.valid():
+    issue_refund()
+```
+
+These illustrative snippets assume revocation invalidates outstanding effects.
+The runnable fixtures below explicitly define that contract. In concurrent
+systems the final check and mutation must be atomic with respect to revocation;
+a separate recheck alone does not guarantee that.
+
+## Installation
+
+Python **3.10+**, **no runtime dependencies**. From a source checkout:
+
+```sh
+git clone https://github.com/cheerstopriya/authdrift.git
+cd authdrift
+python -m venv .venv
+# Windows PowerShell: .venv\Scripts\Activate.ps1
+# macOS/Linux: source .venv/bin/activate
+python -m pip install -e .
+authdrift --help
+```
+
+Version 0.1.0 is prepared for release. PyPI publication is pending;
+use the source installation above until publication is confirmed.
+The distribution name is `authdrift-harness`; the Python import and CLI remain
+`authdrift`. The existing PyPI package named `authdrift` is a different project.
+Source builds require setuptools >= 77, normally supplied by pip's isolated
+build environment. Examples are included in the repository/source distribution.
+The connected editable-install workflow passed on Windows and Ubuntu with Python
+3.10, 3.12, and 3.13; see [GitHub validation](release/validation.md).
+
+## Quick start
+
+```sh
+authdrift run examples/refund/scenario.py --repeats 20 --json vulnerable.json
+authdrift run examples/refund/safe.py --repeats 20 --json safe.json
+```
+
+The controlled vulnerable fixture reports `REVOCATION_ESCAPE` (exit **1**);
+the corrected fixture reports `CLOSED` (exit **0**).
+
+In AuthDrift's deliberately vulnerable controlled fixtures, all 20/20 runs
+produced `REVOCATION_ESCAPE`; the corresponding corrected fixtures produced
+20/20 `CLOSED`. These counts are fixture runs, not vulnerabilities discovered in
+independent agents. The scenario's declared authority contract gives the security
+classification its meaning; AuthDrift cannot infer that contract.
+
+Measured final summary lines for the refund commands:
+
+```text
+vulnerable: Escapes: 20/20 valid trials (100.0%); total trials: 20
+corrected:  Escapes: 0/20 valid trials (0.0%); total trials: 20
+```
+
+Run all three families and the tests:
+
+```sh
+python benchmarks/run.py
+python -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+```
+
+See [release validation](release/validation.md) for measured results and
+exact commands. The fixtures use in-memory effect records, not real payments,
+LLM calls, or durable external services.
+
+## How AuthDrift works
+
+```text
+Workflow observes authority
+          |
+Checkpoint pauses continuation
+          |
+Request authority change -> independently confirm state
+          |
+Verify effect is still absent
+          |
+Resume the same workflow -> inspect authoritative sink state
+```
+
+Each repetition uses fresh state for positive, pre-revoked negative, and
+mid-flight controls. Failed controls prevent that mid-flight trial from running.
+Confirmation reads the supplied authority predicate, not the revocation callback's
+return value or model narration.
+
+## Outcomes
+
+**Scenario contract required:** confirmed revocation must invalidate outstanding,
+uncommitted effects. A policy/configuration change alone does not establish this.
+The v0.1 API assumes this contract; it cannot discover or verify it automatically.
+Do not use its security classifications for unspecified upstream semantics.
+
+| Outcome | Meaning under the scenario contract | CLI exit |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `REVOCATION_ESCAPE` | Effect absent after confirmation, present after continuation | 1 |
+| `CLOSED` | Authority remains revoked; no effect observed after completion, scoped to this trial | 0 |
+| `BASELINE_FAILURE` | Pre-revoked control commits; temporal interpretation stops | 2 |
+| `INVALID_EXPERIMENT` | Failed positive control, bad predicates, missing checkpoint, callback error, or ambiguous ordering | 3 |
+
+JSON schema 1.0 contains controls, per-experiment IDs, ordered monotonic events,
+reasons, counts, and escape rate over valid mid-flight trials only (null if none).
+Mixed reports prioritize invalid experiments, baseline failures, escapes, then
+closed outcomes. CLI errors also exit 3. JSON does not yet separate observation
+from security interpretation; see [methodology](research/methodology.md).
+
+## Included scenarios
+
+| Family | Authority | Controlled effect | Implementations |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Refund | Approval | Refund record | [vulnerable](examples/refund/scenario.py), [corrected](examples/refund/safe.py) |
+| Delegation | Worker eligibility | Worker result | [vulnerable](examples/delegation/scenario.py), [corrected](examples/delegation/safe.py) |
+| Session | Session authorization | Protected-action record | [vulnerable](examples/session/scenario.py), [corrected](examples/session/safe.py) |
+
+Each directory documents its authority contract. Delegation is a synchronous
+worker fixture, not a distributed-agent integration.
+
+## Writing your own scenario
+
+```python
+import authdrift
+
+def build_scenario():
+    # Contract: revoked approval invalidates every outstanding refund.
+    state = {"approved": True, "refunds": []}
+
+    def workflow():
+        approved = state["approved"]
+        authdrift.checkpoint("authority_observed")
+        if approved:
+            state["refunds"].append("refund")
+
+    return authdrift.Scenario(
+        name="refund-revocation",
+        run=workflow,
+        revoke=lambda: state.update(approved=False),
+        revoked=lambda: not state["approved"],
+        committed=lambda: bool(state["refunds"]),
+        trigger="authority_observed",
+    )
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    authdrift.run(build_scenario)
+```
+
+CLI files export `build_scenario()` or `scenario`. Prefer a factory creating
+fresh authority and sink state for each experiment. A `Scenario` instance requires
+`reset=` restoring authorization and clearing the sink. Callbacks are synchronous;
+predicates return actual booleans. Optional `confirmation_timeout` and
+`poll_interval` default to 1 second and 0.001 seconds.
+
+## Methodology and validity
+
+Place the checkpoint after authority observation and before any effect. With
+truthful monotonic sink state, no independent writers, and synchronous continuation,
+absence after confirmation followed by presence establishes causal ordering:
+observation < confirmed revocation < commit. Exact commit time is not measured.
+`effect_observed` is an observation timestamp; **Post-Revocation Commit Delay
+(PRCD)** is not calculated from it.
+
+The workflow must join all consequential work before returning. Revocation must
+persist without regrant; effects must not be erased. Predicates independently
+read actual authority and sink state without side effects. Factory isolation is
+a caller obligation, not a sandbox. Read [methodology](research/methodology.md)
+and [threat model](research/threat-model.md) before interpreting results.
+
+## What AuthDrift does not do
+
+No enforcement, automatic interception, framework adapters, universal compatibility,
+async execution, or production validation. Threads/processes do not automatically
+inherit the checkpoint hook. Confirmation polling has a timeout, but the harness
+cannot safely preempt blocked callbacks. Scenario files execute Python: load only
+trusted code. CLOSED is not proof of general revocation closure.
+
+## External validation status
+
+| Specimen | Execution status | Security outcome |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| LangGraph airline | `BLOCKED_NOT_EXECUTED` | None |
+| Goose | `BLOCKED_NOT_EXECUTED`; `SEMANTICS_UNSPECIFIED` | None |
+
+These are validation-attempt provenance, not successful external validation or
+AuthDrift failures. No LangGraph or Goose vulnerability is claimed. Details and
+the failed Ollama memory preflight: [external validation](research/external-validation.md).
+
+## Related research
+
+The intended contribution is developer-facing testing, injection, and reproduction
+tooling. AuthDrift does not claim to invent stale authority, TOCTOU, commit-time
+authorization, or revocation closure. See [related work](research/related-work.md).
+
+## Contributing
+
+See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md). Independent specimens are welcome with
+honest execution provenance and explicit authority contracts. For suspected
+harness vulnerabilities, see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
+
+## License
+
+[MIT](LICENSE). Retained upstream specimen material keeps its own license.
+
+## Trusted code and report privacy
+
+AuthDrift executes user-supplied Python scenarios. Running a scenario is
+equivalent to executing trusted Python code. AuthDrift is not a sandbox.
+Only execute scenarios you trust.
+
+Exceptions and error messages may be included in generated result artifacts
+and console output. Users should review and sanitize reports before sharing
+or publishing them. AuthDrift does not automatically redact secrets or personal
+data. Keep raw reports private by default.

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Security reporting
+
+AuthDrift executes trusted scenario Python; it is not a sandbox or enforcement
+system. An intentionally vulnerable fixture is not a harness vulnerability.
+
+GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting is enabled for
+[cheerstopriya/authdrift](https://github.com/cheerstopriya/authdrift).
+Use [Report a vulnerability](https://github.com/cheerstopriya/authdrift/security/advisories/new)
+to privately submit a suspected harness vulnerability. Include the version,
+impact, minimal reproduction, and sanitized evidence. Do not include credentials
+or open a public issue containing an unpatched exploit. No response-time or
+security-support guarantee is offered.
+
+## Trusted code and report privacy
+
+AuthDrift executes user-supplied Python scenarios. Running a scenario is
+equivalent to executing trusted Python code. AuthDrift is not a sandbox.
+Only execute scenarios you trust.
+
+Exceptions and error messages may be included in generated result artifacts
+and console output. Users should review and sanitize reports before sharing
+or publishing them. AuthDrift does not automatically redact secrets or personal
+data. Keep raw reports private by default.

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/authdrift/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+"""Explicit, synchronous revocation experiments."""
+from .core.scenario import Scenario
+from .core.runner import run
+from .hooks.lifecycle import checkpoint
+
+__all__ = ["Scenario", "run", "checkpoint"]

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/authdrift/__main__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+from .cli.main import main
+
+raise SystemExit(main())

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/authdrift/cli/main.py

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+import argparse
+import runpy
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from authdrift import run
+
+
+def main(argv=None):
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="authdrift")
+    commands = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+    command = commands.add_parser("run", help="execute a trusted local scenario file")
+    command.add_argument("scenario", type=Path)
+    command.add_argument("--repeats", type=int, default=1)
+    command.add_argument("--json", type=Path, default=Path("authdrift-results.json"))
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    try:
+        namespace = runpy.run_path(str(args.scenario.resolve()))
+        source = namespace.get("build_scenario", namespace.get("scenario"))
+        if source is None:
+            raise ValueError("scenario file must export build_scenario() or scenario")
+        report = run(source, repeats=args.repeats, json_path=args.json)
+        print(f"Evidence: {args.json}")
+        return {"CLOSED": 0, "REVOCATION_ESCAPE": 1,
+                "BASELINE_FAILURE": 2, "INVALID_EXPERIMENT": 3}[report["result"]]
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print(f"authdrift: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 3
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

authdrift_harness-0.1.0/authdrift/core/events.py

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+from time import monotonic_ns
+
+
+class Events:
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.start = monotonic_ns()
+        self.items = []
+
+    def add(self, event, **details):
+        self.items.append({"sequence": len(self.items), "event": event,
+                           "t_ms": (monotonic_ns() - self.start) / 1_000_000,
+                           **details})