auth 3.8.0__tar.gz → 3.9.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/PKG-INFO +1 -1
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/audit.py +1 -1
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/config.py +1 -0
- auth-3.9.0/auth/http_hardening.py +54 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/main.py +7 -5
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/public.py +62 -20
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/tenant.py +60 -1
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/sanitizer.py +4 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/services/queries.py +9 -1
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/services/tenant.py +16 -12
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/static_docs/api_reference.md +37 -19
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/static_docs/claude_guide.md +3 -1
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/static_docs/landing.md +1 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/validation.py +26 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/workflow_checker.py +5 -1
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth.egg-info/PKG-INFO +1 -1
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +3 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_degraded_response_is_a_contract.py +3 -8
- auth-3.9.0/tests/test_pentest_v1_inputs.py +224 -0
- auth-3.9.0/tests/test_pentest_v1_readyz_listings.py +180 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/LICENSE +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/README.md +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/admin.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/api_keys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/circuit_breaker.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/client/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/client/_transport.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/client/base.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/client/keys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/client/rbac.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/client/workflow.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/cmd/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/cmd/server.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/core/REST/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/core/REST/client.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/core/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/core/models/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/database.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/decorators.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/docs_page.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/encryption.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/key_expiry.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/keycheck.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/logging_config.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrate.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01KYTMDEYFVH43HKR0MQWW1EMP_add_auth_api_key.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01KYTQN79R1ZBNDPA3ND9AAA73_drop_alembic_version.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01KYTRKMWNBDDZPN1H0AXRTT5G_add_auth_tenant_settings.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01KYTX0MKVZ775P62CJ87631Z1_grandfather_strict_users.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01KZJWHG32K9X1AFBPPB4YJC6A_partition_audit_log.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01M2Y4SMRCS9PW29AA0TFCVXKR_add_creator_fp_and_rotate_key.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01M2Y4YA6RY6DZWT235CDV9H5W_enable_row_level_security.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01M2Y8WEM8SYB1SG8QD35S3T6M_add_encryption_canary.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01M2Y9AYF2B7WM3AHMGX14AWWJ_rls_on_new_audit_partitions.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01M2Y9FNKBJ513W0XVCYFYPDR9_drop_stale_public_tables.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01M2Y9WFEY32ZWDP161SHR1B2M_add_apply_tenant_rls_function.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/01M2Z040JTSGF3V0AQMP583BDA_create_audit_log_partitioned_if_absent.sql +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/migrations/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/models/sql.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/response_format.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/rls.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/_common.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/apikeys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/membership.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/namespace.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/permissions.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/roles.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/routes/workflow.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/schema_check.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/schema_reconcile.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/server.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/services/base.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/services/keys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/services/purge.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/services/rbac.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/services/recovery.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/services/rotation.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/services/service.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/static_docs/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth/static_docs/page.html +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth.egg-info/entry_points.txt +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth.egg-info/requires.txt +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/auth.egg-info/top_level.txt +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/setup.cfg +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_admin_cli.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_api_keys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_api_keys_encryption.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_apikey_audit_outcome.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_apikey_cap_expiry.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_apikey_expiry.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_audit_integrity.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_client.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_client_exceptions_do_not_render_payload.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_client_rest.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_cmd_server.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_config.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_correctness_hardening.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_database_pool_settings.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_database_sslmode.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_deploy_lock.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_docs_page.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_encryption.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_encryption_integration.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_flask.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_gunicorn_config_invariants.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_import_footprint.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_key_rotation.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_log_redaction.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_migrate_cli.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_namespace_purge.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_no_bundled_libpq.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_phase_a_hardening.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_provision_script_no_dsn_leak.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_reencryption.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_rotate_key_preserves_strict.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_routes_errors.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_schema_check.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_self_service_audit.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_served_docs_host.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_server.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_service_lifecycle.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_settings_do_not_echo_secrets.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_strict_default.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.8.0 → auth-3.9.0}/tests/test_strict_users.py +0 -0
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@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ def _fit(value: Optional[str], column: str) -> Optional[str]:
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"""Clamp a value to its audit column width (no-op for None)."""
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return None
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return str(value)[: _AUDIT_MAXLEN[column]]
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return str(value).replace("\x00", "")[: _AUDIT_MAXLEN[column]]
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def client_fingerprint(token: Optional[str]) -> str:
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# Security settings
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allow_cors: bool = True
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cors_origins: str = "*"
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readyz_detail_cidrs: str = "127.0.0.1/32,::1/128"
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enable_audit_logging: bool = True
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# Pepper used to fingerprint the client key before it is written to audit
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# rows or logs. Falls back to jwt_secret_key when empty so the fingerprint
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import re
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from flask import request
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from werkzeug.exceptions import HTTPException
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from auth.docs_page import _HTML
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from auth.response_format import APIResponse
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API_PREFIX = "/api/"
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STYLE_BLOCK = re.compile(r"<style>(.*?)</style>", re.DOTALL)
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digest = hashlib.sha256(style_text.encode("utf-8")).digest()
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CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY = (
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f"style-src '{_style_hash(_HTML.format(body=''))}'; "
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"frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'"
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)
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def _http_error(error: HTTPException):
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return error
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# Import and register routes
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is_published_example_key,
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parse_bearer,
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try:
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peer = ipaddress.ip_address(request.remote_addr or "")
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return any(peer in network for network in networks)
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AUDIT_RUNWAY_MIN_MONTHS = 2
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79
|
+
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
def _audit_runway() -> str:
|
|
82
|
+
state = _audit_partitions()
|
|
83
|
+
if not state.get("checked"):
|
|
84
|
+
return "unchecked"
|
|
85
|
+
if state.get("stranded"):
|
|
86
|
+
return "attention"
|
|
87
|
+
newest = state.get("newest") or ""
|
|
88
|
+
try:
|
|
89
|
+
year, month = (int(part) for part in newest.rsplit("_", 2)[-2:])
|
|
90
|
+
except ValueError:
|
|
91
|
+
return "attention"
|
|
92
|
+
today = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
|
93
|
+
months_ahead = (year - today.year) * 12 + (month - today.month)
|
|
94
|
+
return "attention" if months_ahead < AUDIT_RUNWAY_MIN_MONTHS else "ok"
|
|
95
|
+
|
|
96
|
+
|
|
97
|
+
def _readyz_body(status: str, pool_depth, reason=None) -> dict:
|
|
98
|
+
body: dict = {"status": status, "audit_runway": _audit_runway()}
|
|
99
|
+
if reason is not None:
|
|
100
|
+
body["reason"] = reason
|
|
101
|
+
if _detail_allowed():
|
|
102
|
+
body["pool"] = pool_depth
|
|
103
|
+
body["audit_partitions"] = _audit_partitions()
|
|
104
|
+
return body
|
|
105
|
+
|
|
106
|
+
|
|
60
107
|
def register(app):
|
|
61
108
|
"""Register the public routes on ``app``."""
|
|
62
109
|
|
|
@@ -89,16 +136,23 @@ def register(app):
|
|
|
89
136
|
if not auth_header:
|
|
90
137
|
abort(401, description="Authorization header is missing.")
|
|
91
138
|
|
|
92
|
-
|
|
93
|
-
if
|
|
139
|
+
client_key = parse_bearer(auth_header)
|
|
140
|
+
if client_key is None:
|
|
94
141
|
abort(
|
|
95
142
|
401,
|
|
96
143
|
description="Invalid Authorization header format. Must be 'Bearer <token>'.",
|
|
97
144
|
)
|
|
98
145
|
|
|
99
|
-
client_key = parts[1]
|
|
100
146
|
if not validate_client_key(client_key):
|
|
101
147
|
abort(400, description="Invalid client key. Must be a valid UUID4.")
|
|
148
|
+
if is_published_example_key(client_key):
|
|
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|
+
abort(
|
|
150
|
+
400,
|
|
151
|
+
description=(
|
|
152
|
+
"This client key is the example published in the documentation. "
|
|
153
|
+
"Generate your own UUID4 and keep it secret."
|
|
154
|
+
),
|
|
155
|
+
)
|
|
102
156
|
|
|
103
157
|
# Canonicalize to lowercase: a UUID4 is case-insensitive, but the raw
|
|
104
158
|
# string is used verbatim as the tenant identifier AND the encryption KDF
|
|
@@ -162,12 +216,9 @@ def register(app):
|
|
|
162
216
|
# A probe is already in flight — almost certainly stalled. Report
|
|
163
217
|
# the previous verdict rather than adding another backend to the
|
|
164
218
|
# queue we are trying to measure.
|
|
165
|
-
body =
|
|
166
|
-
|
|
167
|
-
|
|
168
|
-
"pool": pool_depth,
|
|
169
|
-
"audit_partitions": _audit_partitions(),
|
|
170
|
-
}
|
|
219
|
+
body = _readyz_body(
|
|
220
|
+
_last_commit_verdict[0], pool_depth, "commit probe already in flight"
|
|
221
|
+
)
|
|
171
222
|
return jsonify(body), (200 if _last_commit_verdict[0] == "ready" else 503)
|
|
172
223
|
try:
|
|
173
224
|
with engine.begin() as conn:
|
|
@@ -181,16 +232,7 @@ def register(app):
|
|
|
181
232
|
except Exception:
|
|
182
233
|
logger.exception("readiness check failed: commit path unavailable")
|
|
183
234
|
_last_commit_verdict[0] = "unready"
|
|
184
|
-
return jsonify(
|
|
185
|
-
"status": "unready",
|
|
186
|
-
"reason": "commit path",
|
|
187
|
-
"pool": pool_depth,
|
|
188
|
-
"audit_partitions": _audit_partitions(),
|
|
189
|
-
}), 503
|
|
235
|
+
return jsonify(_readyz_body("unready", pool_depth, "commit path")), 503
|
|
190
236
|
finally:
|
|
191
237
|
_COMMIT_PROBE_LOCK.release()
|
|
192
|
-
return jsonify(
|
|
193
|
-
"status": "ready",
|
|
194
|
-
"pool": pool_depth,
|
|
195
|
-
"audit_partitions": _audit_partitions(),
|
|
196
|
-
})
|
|
238
|
+
return jsonify(_readyz_body("ready", pool_depth))
|
|
@@ -26,9 +26,41 @@ from auth.services.recovery import (
|
|
|
26
26
|
TargetNamespaceNotEmpty,
|
|
27
27
|
recover_namespace,
|
|
28
28
|
)
|
|
29
|
+
from auth.validation import (
|
|
30
|
+
AUDIT_OFFSET_MAX,
|
|
31
|
+
is_published_example_key,
|
|
32
|
+
validate_audit_action,
|
|
33
|
+
)
|
|
29
34
|
|
|
30
35
|
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
31
36
|
|
|
37
|
+
SETTINGS_FIELDS = frozenset({"strict_users"})
|
|
38
|
+
RECOVER_FIELDS = frozenset({"rotate_key", "new_client_key"})
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
def _unknown_fields(body, allowed):
|
|
42
|
+
return sorted(str(name) for name in set(body) - allowed)
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
|
|
45
|
+
ROTATE_NO_BODY = (
|
|
46
|
+
"rotate takes no body. The server mints the new key and returns it in data.new_key."
|
|
47
|
+
)
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
|
|
50
|
+
def _rotate_body_refusal():
|
|
51
|
+
raw = request.get_data(cache=True).strip()
|
|
52
|
+
if raw in (b"", b"null"):
|
|
53
|
+
return None
|
|
54
|
+
body = request.get_json(silent=True, force=True)
|
|
55
|
+
if body == {}:
|
|
56
|
+
return None
|
|
57
|
+
if isinstance(body, dict):
|
|
58
|
+
return APIResponse.bad_request(
|
|
59
|
+
f"Unknown field(s) {', '.join(_unknown_fields(body, frozenset()))}; "
|
|
60
|
+
+ ROTATE_NO_BODY
|
|
61
|
+
)
|
|
62
|
+
return APIResponse.bad_request(ROTATE_NO_BODY)
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
32
64
|
|
|
33
65
|
def register(app):
|
|
34
66
|
"""Register the tenant routes on ``app``."""
|
|
@@ -50,6 +82,9 @@ def register(app):
|
|
|
50
82
|
the decorator — seeing only ``g.client_key`` — cannot capture. Neither
|
|
51
83
|
raw key is ever written to the audit trail.
|
|
52
84
|
"""
|
|
85
|
+
refusal = _rotate_body_refusal()
|
|
86
|
+
if refusal is not None:
|
|
87
|
+
return refusal
|
|
53
88
|
old_key = g.client_key
|
|
54
89
|
new_key = str(uuid.uuid4())
|
|
55
90
|
audit_on = get_settings().enable_audit_logging
|
|
@@ -119,6 +154,12 @@ def register(app):
|
|
|
119
154
|
return APIResponse.bad_request(
|
|
120
155
|
'JSON body required: {"strict_users": true|false}'
|
|
121
156
|
)
|
|
157
|
+
unknown = _unknown_fields(body, SETTINGS_FIELDS)
|
|
158
|
+
if unknown:
|
|
159
|
+
return APIResponse.bad_request(
|
|
160
|
+
f"Unknown field(s) {', '.join(unknown)}; "
|
|
161
|
+
"settings accepts only strict_users."
|
|
162
|
+
)
|
|
122
163
|
|
|
123
164
|
auth_service = _get_auth_service(db)
|
|
124
165
|
result = auth_service.set_strict_users(body["strict_users"])
|
|
@@ -187,10 +228,21 @@ def register(app):
|
|
|
187
228
|
body = request.get_json(silent=True, force=True)
|
|
188
229
|
if not isinstance(body, dict) or not isinstance(body.get("rotate_key"), str):
|
|
189
230
|
return APIResponse.bad_request('JSON body required: {"rotate_key": "rrk_..."}')
|
|
231
|
+
unknown = _unknown_fields(body, RECOVER_FIELDS)
|
|
232
|
+
if unknown:
|
|
233
|
+
return APIResponse.bad_request(
|
|
234
|
+
f"Unknown field(s) {', '.join(unknown)}; "
|
|
235
|
+
"recover accepts only rotate_key and new_client_key."
|
|
236
|
+
)
|
|
190
237
|
|
|
191
238
|
new_key = body.get("new_client_key") or str(uuid.uuid4())
|
|
192
239
|
if not isinstance(new_key, str) or not validate_client_key(new_key):
|
|
193
240
|
return APIResponse.bad_request("new_client_key must be a valid UUID4")
|
|
241
|
+
if is_published_example_key(new_key):
|
|
242
|
+
return APIResponse.bad_request(
|
|
243
|
+
"new_client_key is the example published in the documentation; "
|
|
244
|
+
"generate your own UUID4"
|
|
245
|
+
)
|
|
194
246
|
|
|
195
247
|
try:
|
|
196
248
|
result = recover_namespace(db, body["rotate_key"], new_key)
|
|
@@ -252,12 +304,19 @@ def register(app):
|
|
|
252
304
|
return APIResponse.bad_request("limit must be between 1 and 500")
|
|
253
305
|
if offset < 0:
|
|
254
306
|
return APIResponse.bad_request("offset must be >= 0")
|
|
307
|
+
if offset > AUDIT_OFFSET_MAX:
|
|
308
|
+
return APIResponse.bad_request(f"offset must be <= {AUDIT_OFFSET_MAX}")
|
|
309
|
+
action = request.args.get("action") or None
|
|
310
|
+
if action is not None and not validate_audit_action(action):
|
|
311
|
+
return APIResponse.bad_request(
|
|
312
|
+
"action must be 1-50 letters or underscores, e.g. CREATE_ROLE"
|
|
313
|
+
)
|
|
255
314
|
|
|
256
315
|
auth_service = _get_auth_service(db)
|
|
257
316
|
entries, total = auth_service.get_audit(
|
|
258
317
|
limit=limit,
|
|
259
318
|
offset=offset,
|
|
260
|
-
action=
|
|
319
|
+
action=action,
|
|
261
320
|
)
|
|
262
321
|
return APIResponse.success(
|
|
263
322
|
data={
|
|
@@ -2,11 +2,15 @@
|
|
|
2
2
|
from functools import wraps
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
4
|
import bleach # type: ignore[import-untyped]
|
|
5
|
+
from flask import abort
|
|
5
6
|
|
|
6
7
|
|
|
7
8
|
def sanitize_input(func):
|
|
8
9
|
@wraps(func)
|
|
9
10
|
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
|
|
11
|
+
values = list(args) + list(kwargs.values())
|
|
12
|
+
if any(isinstance(value, str) and "\x00" in value for value in values):
|
|
13
|
+
abort(400, description="Path parameters must not contain NUL characters.")
|
|
10
14
|
sanitized_args = [bleach.clean(arg) if isinstance(arg, str) else arg for arg in args]
|
|
11
15
|
sanitized_kwargs = {key: bleach.clean(value) if isinstance(value, str) else value for key, value in kwargs.items()}
|
|
12
16
|
return func(*sanitized_args, **sanitized_kwargs)
|
|
@@ -109,7 +109,15 @@ class QueryMixin(TenantMixin):
|
|
|
109
109
|
if membership.is_active:
|
|
110
110
|
# Return membership format (user, role) for members endpoint
|
|
111
111
|
members.append({"user": membership.user, "role": group.role})
|
|
112
|
-
return members
|
|
112
|
+
return self._annotate_key_backed(members)
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
def _annotate_key_backed(self, entries: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
|
|
115
|
+
if not entries or not self.strict_users_enabled():
|
|
116
|
+
return entries
|
|
117
|
+
backed = self.key_backed_users([entry["user"] for entry in entries])
|
|
118
|
+
for entry in entries:
|
|
119
|
+
entry["key_backed"] = entry["user"] in backed
|
|
120
|
+
return entries
|
|
113
121
|
|
|
114
122
|
def which_roles_can(self, name: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
|
|
115
123
|
"""Get roles that have a specific permission"""
|
|
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
import json
|
|
4
4
|
from datetime import datetime
|
|
5
|
-
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple, cast
|
|
5
|
+
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple, cast
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
7
|
from sqlalchemy import desc, or_
|
|
8
8
|
|
|
@@ -144,18 +144,12 @@ class TenantMixin(ServiceBase):
|
|
|
144
144
|
]
|
|
145
145
|
return entries, total
|
|
146
146
|
|
|
147
|
-
def
|
|
148
|
-
|
|
149
|
-
|
|
150
|
-
self.db.query(AuthApiKey.id)
|
|
147
|
+
def _live_key_query(self, encrypted_users: List[Any]):
|
|
148
|
+
return (
|
|
149
|
+
self.db.query(AuthApiKey._user)
|
|
151
150
|
.filter(
|
|
152
151
|
AuthApiKey.creator == self.client,
|
|
153
|
-
AuthApiKey._user
|
|
154
|
-
# Core column rather than the mapped attribute. SQLAlchemy 2.1's
|
|
155
|
-
# stubs resolve a legacy `x = Column(...)` attribute to Never, so
|
|
156
|
-
# the bare `AuthApiKey.is_active` poisons the whole chain and every
|
|
157
|
-
# statement after it reads as unreachable. __table__.c types as a
|
|
158
|
-
# KeyedColumnElement and emits byte-identical SQL, verified.
|
|
152
|
+
AuthApiKey._user.in_(encrypted_users),
|
|
159
153
|
_api_key_table.c.is_active.is_(True),
|
|
160
154
|
)
|
|
161
155
|
.filter(
|
|
@@ -164,10 +158,20 @@ class TenantMixin(ServiceBase):
|
|
|
164
158
|
_api_key_table.c.expires_at > _utcnow(),
|
|
165
159
|
)
|
|
166
160
|
)
|
|
167
|
-
.first()
|
|
168
161
|
)
|
|
162
|
+
|
|
163
|
+
def user_is_key_backed(self, user: str) -> bool:
|
|
164
|
+
"""True when the user holds ≥1 active, unexpired API key here."""
|
|
165
|
+
row: Any = self._live_key_query([self._get_encrypted_user(user)]).first()
|
|
169
166
|
return row is not None
|
|
170
167
|
|
|
168
|
+
def key_backed_users(self, users: List[str]) -> Set[str]:
|
|
169
|
+
by_ciphertext = {self._get_encrypted_user(user): user for user in set(users)}
|
|
170
|
+
if not by_ciphertext:
|
|
171
|
+
return set()
|
|
172
|
+
rows = self._live_key_query(list(by_ciphertext)).distinct().all()
|
|
173
|
+
return {by_ciphertext[row[0]] for row in rows if row[0] in by_ciphertext}
|
|
174
|
+
|
|
171
175
|
def _strict_blocks(self, user: str) -> bool:
|
|
172
176
|
"""Strict mode on AND the user has no live key → decision is negative."""
|
|
173
177
|
return self.strict_users_enabled() and not self.user_is_key_backed(user)
|
|
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ roles/permissions tables — see section 8 for where it fits and where it doesn'
|
|
|
18
18
|
|
|
19
19
|
Every request needs a **client key** — any valid UUID4 — sent as a bearer token:
|
|
20
20
|
|
|
21
|
-
Authorization: Bearer
|
|
21
|
+
Authorization: Bearer <your-client-key>
|
|
22
22
|
|
|
23
23
|
The key is **not** checked against a stored secret. Any well-formed UUID4 is
|
|
24
24
|
accepted and opens its own isolated namespace: roles, users and permissions
|
|
@@ -31,8 +31,11 @@ created under one key are invisible to every other key. Practical consequences:
|
|
|
31
31
|
- Anyone holding your key has full read/write access to your namespace. Treat it
|
|
32
32
|
like a password: keep it out of source control, logs and URLs.
|
|
33
33
|
|
|
34
|
-
Bad keys fail fast: a missing
|
|
35
|
-
|
|
34
|
+
Bad keys fail fast: a missing header, a scheme other than `Bearer`, or anything
|
|
35
|
+
but single spaces between scheme and key gives **401**; a token that is not a
|
|
36
|
+
UUID4 gives **400**. The scheme is case-insensitive (RFC 9110 §11.1), so
|
|
37
|
+
`bearer <key>` is the same request as `Bearer <key>`. The example keys these
|
|
38
|
+
docs used to print are refused with 400: generate your own.
|
|
36
39
|
|
|
37
40
|
## 2. Quickstart — the order matters
|
|
38
41
|
|
|
@@ -101,11 +104,14 @@ wrapper. There is no way to guess which — use the table in section 4.
|
|
|
101
104
|
wrapped {{"success": true, "code": 200, "message": "...",
|
|
102
105
|
"data": ..., "timestamp": "2026-07-20T03:11:34.288114"}}
|
|
103
106
|
|
|
104
|
-
**
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**Errors from the application are JSON.** Since 3.9.0 every error auth itself
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raises under `/api/` — a bad header (401), a key that is not a UUID4 (400), an
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invalid name (400), an unknown route (404), a wrong method (405) — answers
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`{{"success": false, "code": N, "message": "...", "details": {{}}, "timestamp": "..."}}`.
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A 401 carries `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer` and a 405 keeps `Allow`. Names echoed in
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a message are HTML-escaped (`<`). The proxy in front of auth can still answer
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with an HTML page (413 body too large, 429 rate limited, 502/504, a duplicated
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`Authorization` header), so branch on the status code before parsing.
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**`has_permission` is also the membership answer.** The membership check reuses
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the permission payload, so `GET /api/membership/<user>/<role>` replies with
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platforms that authenticate their own callers. Gated decisions:
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has_permission, the membership check, user_permissions (answers `count: 0` +
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reason), workflow can_run. NOT gated: user_roles, members and every other
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listing.
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listing. Listings are configuration, not decisions: under strict_users each
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entry of `members`, `which_users_can` and `workflow/users` carries
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`key_backed`, so filter on it (or call `has_permission`) before treating a
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listing as "who may". Membership adds for key-less subjects answer **409**
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`{{"result": false, "reason": "user_not_key_backed"}}` — a refused grant must
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not look like success; check `result` on writes regardless. Create the key
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first, then grant roles: key creation committing before the grant is a
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## 4. Endpoints
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All paths need the `Authorization` header except
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All `/api/` paths need the `Authorization` header except `POST /api/keys/recover`
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(the rotate key in the body authenticates it). `/ping`, `/health`, `/readyz` and
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the documentation pages need none. `/readyz` answers `{{"status": "ready",
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"audit_runway": "ok"}}` publicly (`audit_runway` is `ok`, `attention` or
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`unchecked`); pool and partition detail are shown only on the host itself.
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Every `/api/` response carries `Cache-Control: no-store`, because bodies can hold
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a key shown only once. CORS answers `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` and never
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allows credentials.
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`<user>`, `<role>`/`<group>` and `<name>` go in the path, never in a body. The
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only endpoints that read a JSON body are the per-user API-key ones (create's
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optional `label`; validate's `api_key` — secrets never belong in URLs, which
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@@ -215,7 +231,7 @@ get logged).
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| DELETE | `/api/membership/<user>/<role>` | bare `{{"result": true}}` |
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| GET | `/api/membership/<user>/<role>` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"has_permission": true}}` |
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| GET | `/api/user_roles/<user>` | bare `{{"result": [{{"user": "alice", "role": "engineers"}}]}}` |
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| GET | `/api/members/<role>` | bare `{{"result": [{{"user": "alice", "role": "engineers"}}]}}` |
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| GET | `/api/members/<role>` | bare `{{"result": [{{"user": "alice", "role": "engineers"}}]}}`; under strict_users each entry adds `"key_backed": true\|false` |
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### Permissions (permission on role)
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| GET | `/api/has_permission/<user>/<name>` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"has_permission": true}}` |
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| GET | `/api/user_permissions/<user>` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"count": 1, "permissions": [{{"name": "deploy"}}]}}` |
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| GET | `/api/which_roles_can/<name>` | bare `{{"result": [{{"role": "engineers"}}]}}` |
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| GET | `/api/which_users_can/<name>` | bare `{{"result": [{{"user": "alice", "role": "engineers"}}]}}` |
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+
| GET | `/api/which_users_can/<name>` | bare `{{"result": [{{"user": "alice", "role": "engineers"}}]}}`; under strict_users each entry adds `"key_backed": true\|false` |
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`/api/has_permission/<user>/<name>` is the endpoint you want for an access
|
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|
check: it is true when the user belongs to any role holding that permission.
|
|
@@ -245,7 +261,7 @@ Thin aliases over the permission model — a workflow name is just a permission.
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| Method | Path | Returns |
|
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|
|---|---|---|
|
|
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|
| GET | `/api/workflow/user/<user>/can_run/<workflow>` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"has_permission": true}}` |
|
|
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|
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| GET | `/api/workflow/users/<workflow>` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"count": 2, "members": [{{"user": "alice", "role": "engineers"}}]}}` |
|
|
264
|
+
| GET | `/api/workflow/users/<workflow>` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"count": 2, "members": [{{"user": "alice", "role": "engineers"}}]}}`; under strict_users each entry adds `"key_backed": true\|false` |
|
|
249
265
|
|
|
250
266
|
### API keys (tenant key rotation)
|
|
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267
|
|
|
@@ -256,9 +272,9 @@ only copy — persist it. See section 3 for the full semantics and threat model.
|
|
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|
|
|
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|
| Method | Path | Returns |
|
|
258
274
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
259
|
-
| POST | `/api/keys/rotate` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"new_key": "<uuid4>", "migrated": {{"roles": 1, "memberships": 1, "permissions": 1, "api_keys": 0, "settings": 0}}}}` |
|
|
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|
+
| POST | `/api/keys/rotate` | no body (empty, `{{}}` or `null`; any field is a 400 and nothing moves); wrapped, `data` = `{{"new_key": "<uuid4>", "migrated": {{"roles": 1, "memberships": 1, "permissions": 1, "api_keys": 0, "settings": 0}}}}` |
|
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276
|
| POST | `/api/keys/get_rotate_key` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"rotate_key": "rrk_..."}}`; `409` with `reason: rotate_key_already_issued` if already issued |
|
|
261
|
-
| POST | `/api/keys/recover` | **no Authorization header**; body `{{"rotate_key": "rrk_...", "new_client_key": "<uuid4>"}}
|
|
277
|
+
| POST | `/api/keys/recover` | **no Authorization header**; body `{{"rotate_key": "rrk_...", "new_client_key": "<uuid4>"}}` (`new_client_key` optional; any other field is a 400); wrapped, `data` = `{{"client_key": "<uuid4>", "rotate_key": "rrk_..."}}` |
|
|
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278
|
|
|
263
279
|
### Per-user API keys
|
|
264
280
|
|
|
@@ -293,7 +309,7 @@ off is the audited opt-out for platforms that authenticate their own users.
|
|
|
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309
|
| Method | Path | Returns |
|
|
294
310
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
295
311
|
| GET | `/api/settings` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"strict_users": false}}` (defaults when never set) |
|
|
296
|
-
| PUT | `/api/settings` | body `{{"strict_users": true}}` → wrapped, `data` = `{{"strict_users": true}}` (idempotent, audited) |
|
|
312
|
+
| PUT | `/api/settings` | body `{{"strict_users": true}}` (any other field is a 400) → wrapped, `data` = `{{"strict_users": true}}` (idempotent, audited) |
|
|
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313
|
|
|
298
314
|
### Deleting a namespace
|
|
299
315
|
|
|
@@ -312,7 +328,7 @@ purge would delete, or compute it yourself:
|
|
|
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328
|
|
|
313
329
|
| Method | Path | Returns |
|
|
314
330
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
315
|
-
| GET | `/api/namespace` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"fingerprint": "
|
|
331
|
+
| GET | `/api/namespace` | wrapped, `data` = `{{"fingerprint": "9b2e4c7a1d05", "roles": 4, "permissions": 9, "memberships": 12, "api_keys": 3, "settings": true, "recovery_key": true}}` |
|
|
316
332
|
| DELETE | `/api/namespace` | body `{{"confirm": "<fingerprint>"}}` → wrapped, `data` = `{{"fingerprint": "...", "memberships": 12, "permissions": 9, "roles": 4, "api_keys": 3, "settings": true, "recovery_key": true, "role_links": 21}}`. 400 and nothing deleted when the body is missing, has other fields, or names another fingerprint |
|
|
317
333
|
|
|
318
334
|
### Audit (self-service diagnosis)
|
|
@@ -330,7 +346,7 @@ false`. Neither the secret nor its hash is ever recorded.
|
|
|
330
346
|
|
|
331
347
|
| Method | Path | Returns |
|
|
332
348
|
|---|---|---|
|
|
333
|
-
| GET | `/api/audit` | query `?limit=50&offset=0&action=ADD_PERMISSION` → wrapped, `data` = `{{"total": N, "limit": 50, "offset": 0, "entries": [{{"id", "timestamp", "action", "resource", "details", "success", "user", "ip_address", "user_agent"}}]}}` (newest first; `limit`
|
|
349
|
+
| GET | `/api/audit` | query `?limit=50&offset=0&action=ADD_PERMISSION` → wrapped, `data` = `{{"total": N, "limit": 50, "offset": 0, "entries": [{{"id", "timestamp", "action", "resource", "details", "success", "user", "ip_address", "user_agent"}}]}}` (newest first; `limit` 1–500; `offset` 0–9223372036854775807; `action` filters by action name, 1–50 letters or underscores, else 400) |
|
|
334
350
|
|
|
335
351
|
### Service
|
|
336
352
|
|
|
@@ -368,9 +384,11 @@ containing `/` changes which route matches and yields 404.
|
|
|
368
384
|
|
|
369
385
|
`pip install auth` ships a client with retries and connection pooling:
|
|
370
386
|
|
|
387
|
+
import os
|
|
388
|
+
|
|
371
389
|
from auth import Client
|
|
372
390
|
|
|
373
|
-
with Client(api_key="
|
|
391
|
+
with Client(api_key=os.environ["AUTH_CLIENT_KEY"],
|
|
374
392
|
service_url="https://auth.rodmena.com") as c:
|
|
375
393
|
c.create_role("engineers")
|
|
376
394
|
c.add_permission("engineers", "deploy")
|
|
@@ -14,9 +14,11 @@ here and at `/docs`.
|
|
|
14
14
|
|
|
15
15
|
`pip install auth`, then:
|
|
16
16
|
|
|
17
|
+
import os
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
17
19
|
from auth import Client # alias of EnhancedAuthClient: pooling, retries, circuit breaker
|
|
18
20
|
|
|
19
|
-
KEY = "
|
|
21
|
+
KEY = os.environ["AUTH_CLIENT_KEY"] # your app's own secret UUID4, from your secret store
|
|
20
22
|
with Client(api_key=KEY, service_url="https://auth.rodmena.com") as auth:
|
|
21
23
|
auth.create_role("engineers")
|
|
22
24
|
auth.add_permission("engineers", "deploy")
|
|
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ created implicitly, but a role must exist before you add members or permissions
|
|
|
15
15
|
to it.
|
|
16
16
|
|
|
17
17
|
KEY=$(python3 -c "import uuid; print(uuid.uuid4())")
|
|
18
|
+
echo "$KEY" # store it now: a lost key is a lost namespace
|
|
18
19
|
BASE=https://auth.rodmena.com
|
|
19
20
|
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" $BASE/api/role/engineers
|
|
20
21
|
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" $BASE/api/permission/engineers/deploy
|
|
@@ -149,3 +149,29 @@ def validate_user_role_combination(user: str, role: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
|
|
|
149
149
|
)
|
|
150
150
|
|
|
151
151
|
return True, ""
|
|
152
|
+
|
|
153
|
+
|
|
154
|
+
BEARER_HEADER_PATTERN = re.compile(r"([A-Za-z]+) +([^ ]+)")
|
|
155
|
+
AUDIT_ACTION_PATTERN = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z_]{1,50}")
|
|
156
|
+
AUDIT_OFFSET_MAX = 9223372036854775807
|
|
157
|
+
PUBLISHED_EXAMPLE_KEYS = frozenset(
|
|
158
|
+
{
|
|
159
|
+
"3f6b1c9e-6f1a-4a5e-9c2e-2b7a5d0e1f34",
|
|
160
|
+
"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
|
|
161
|
+
}
|
|
162
|
+
)
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
|
|
165
|
+
def parse_bearer(header: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
166
|
+
match = BEARER_HEADER_PATTERN.fullmatch(header.strip(" \t"))
|
|
167
|
+
if match is None or match.group(1).lower() != "bearer":
|
|
168
|
+
return None
|
|
169
|
+
return match.group(2)
|
|
170
|
+
|
|
171
|
+
|
|
172
|
+
def validate_audit_action(action: str) -> bool:
|
|
173
|
+
return AUDIT_ACTION_PATTERN.fullmatch(action) is not None
|
|
174
|
+
|
|
175
|
+
|
|
176
|
+
def is_published_example_key(client_key: str) -> bool:
|
|
177
|
+
return client_key.lower() in PUBLISHED_EXAMPLE_KEYS
|