auth 3.5.2__tar.gz → 3.6.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/PKG-INFO +4 -4
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/README.md +3 -3
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/keycheck.py +20 -3
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrate.py +61 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01KYTMDEYFVH43HKR0MQWW1EMP_add_auth_api_key.sql +41 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01KYTQN79R1ZBNDPA3ND9AAA73_drop_alembic_version.sql +21 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01KYTRKMWNBDDZPN1H0AXRTT5G_add_auth_tenant_settings.sql +26 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01KYTX0MKVZ775P62CJ87631Z1_grandfather_strict_users.sql +85 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01KZJWHG32K9X1AFBPPB4YJC6A_partition_audit_log.sql +279 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01M2Y4SMRCS9PW29AA0TFCVXKR_add_creator_fp_and_rotate_key.sql +108 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01M2Y4YA6RY6DZWT235CDV9H5W_enable_row_level_security.sql +180 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01M2Y8WEM8SYB1SG8QD35S3T6M_add_encryption_canary.sql +40 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01M2Y9AYF2B7WM3AHMGX14AWWJ_rls_on_new_audit_partitions.sql +108 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01M2Y9FNKBJ513W0XVCYFYPDR9_drop_stale_public_tables.sql +104 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01M2Y9WFEY32ZWDP161SHR1B2M_add_apply_tenant_rls_function.sql +166 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/01M2Z040JTSGF3V0AQMP583BDA_create_audit_log_partitioned_if_absent.sql +117 -0
- auth-3.6.0/auth/migrations/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/static_docs/api_reference.md +33 -10
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/static_docs/claude_guide.md +5 -4
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/static_docs/landing.md +2 -2
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth.egg-info/PKG-INFO +4 -4
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +16 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth.egg-info/entry_points.txt +1 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/pyproject.toml +3 -1
- auth-3.6.0/tests/test_migrate_cli.py +104 -0
- auth-3.6.0/tests/test_served_docs_host.py +49 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/LICENSE +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/api_keys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/audit.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/circuit_breaker.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/client/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/client/_transport.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/client/base.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/client/keys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/client/rbac.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/client/workflow.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/cmd/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/cmd/server.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/config.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/core/REST/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/core/REST/client.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/core/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/core/models/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/database.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/decorators.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/docs_page.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/encryption.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/logging_config.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/main.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/models/sql.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/response_format.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/rls.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/routes/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/routes/_common.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/routes/apikeys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/routes/membership.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/routes/permissions.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/routes/public.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/routes/roles.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/routes/tenant.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/routes/workflow.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/sanitizer.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/schema_check.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/schema_reconcile.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/server.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/services/base.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/services/keys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/services/queries.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/services/rbac.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/services/recovery.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/services/rotation.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/services/service.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/services/tenant.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/static_docs/__init__.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/static_docs/page.html +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/validation.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth/workflow_checker.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth.egg-info/requires.txt +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/auth.egg-info/top_level.txt +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/setup.cfg +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_api_keys.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_api_keys_encryption.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_audit_integrity.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_client.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_client_exceptions_do_not_render_payload.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_client_rest.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_cmd_server.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_config.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_correctness_hardening.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_database_pool_settings.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_database_sslmode.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_degraded_response_is_a_contract.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_deploy_lock.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_docs_page.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_encryption.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_encryption_integration.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_flask.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_gunicorn_config_invariants.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_import_footprint.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_key_rotation.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_log_redaction.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_no_bundled_libpq.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_phase_a_hardening.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_provision_script_no_dsn_leak.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_reencryption.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_routes_errors.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_schema_check.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_self_service_audit.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_server.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_service_lifecycle.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_settings_do_not_echo_secrets.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_strict_default.py +0 -0
- {auth-3.5.2 → auth-3.6.0}/tests/test_strict_users.py +0 -0
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Metadata-Version: 2.4
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Name: auth
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Version: 3.
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Version: 3.6.0
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Summary: Authorization for humans
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Author-email: Farshid Ashouri <farsheed.ashouri@gmail.com>
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License-Expression: MIT
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@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ before you add members or permissions to it.
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```bash
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KEY=$(python3 -c "import uuid; print(uuid.uuid4())")
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BASE=https://auth.rodmena.
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BASE=https://auth.rodmena.com
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curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" $BASE/api/role/engineers
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curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" $BASE/api/permission/engineers/deploy
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```python
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from auth import Client
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with Client(api_key=KEY, service_url="https://auth.rodmena.
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with Client(api_key=KEY, service_url="https://auth.rodmena.com") as c:
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c.create_role("engineers")
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c.add_permission("engineers", "deploy")
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c.create_api_key("alice") # strict default since 3.0.0
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|---|---|
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| **Live API reference** — [`/docs`](https://auth.rodmena.
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| **Live API reference** — [`/docs`](https://auth.rodmena.com/docs) · [`/llms.txt`](https://auth.rodmena.com/llms.txt) | Every endpoint and exact response shape, served by the app (agent-friendly). |
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| [docs/ARCHITECTURE.md](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) | Design, components, request lifecycle, data model, permission-check and key-rotation flows, diagrams. |
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| [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) | Security model (tenant isolation, encryption, audit, rotation), threat notes, reporting. |
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| [MIGRATIONS.md](MIGRATIONS.md) | Schema creation vs migrations, upgrade/rollback runbook. |
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```bash
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| [docs/ARCHITECTURE.md](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) | Design, components, request lifecycle, data model, permission-check and key-rotation flows, diagrams. |
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| [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) | Security model (tenant isolation, encryption, audit, rotation), threat notes, reporting. |
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| [MIGRATIONS.md](MIGRATIONS.md) | Schema creation vs migrations, upgrade/rollback runbook. |
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return _set(OK, "encryption key verified against the deployment canary")
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return ""
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return (
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f" (AUTH_DATABASE_SCHEMA is {schema!r}; auth's migrations and row level"
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f" security are defined in schema {RLS_SCHEMA!r})"
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)
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UNVERIFIED,
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)
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# A table that is absent is not a table that is safe. The junction tables
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# are created by the ORM rather than by a migration, so on a fresh database
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import importlib.util
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import os
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import subprocess
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import sys
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COMMANDS = ("apply", "status", "verify", "head", "list")
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URL_VARIABLES = ("MG_DATABASE_URL", "AUTH_DATABASE_URL", "AUTH_POSTGRESQL_URL")
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DRIVER_PREFIXES = ("postgresql+psycopg://", "postgres+psycopg://")
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USAGE = (
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"usage: auth-migrate {apply,status,verify,head,list} [migretti options]\n"
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"Runs the migrations shipped with this auth release against the database "
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"named by the first of MG_DATABASE_URL, AUTH_DATABASE_URL or "
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"AUTH_POSTGRESQL_URL that is set."
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)
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def migrations_root() -> Path:
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return Path(__file__).resolve().parent
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def database_url(environ: Mapping[str, str]) -> Optional[str]:
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for name in URL_VARIABLES:
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value = environ.get(name, "").strip()
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continue
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for prefix in DRIVER_PREFIXES:
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return "postgresql://" + value[len(prefix) :]
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return value
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return None
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def _refuse(message: str) -> int:
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|
36
|
+
print(f"auth-migrate: {message}", file=sys.stderr)
|
|
37
|
+
return 2
|
|
38
|
+
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
def main(argv: Optional[List[str]] = None) -> int:
|
|
41
|
+
args = list(sys.argv[1:] if argv is None else argv)
|
|
42
|
+
if not args or args[0] not in COMMANDS:
|
|
43
|
+
print(USAGE, file=sys.stderr)
|
|
44
|
+
return 2
|
|
45
|
+
if importlib.util.find_spec("migretti") is None:
|
|
46
|
+
return _refuse('migretti is not installed; install "auth[migrations]"')
|
|
47
|
+
url = database_url(os.environ)
|
|
48
|
+
if url is None:
|
|
49
|
+
return _refuse("set MG_DATABASE_URL, AUTH_DATABASE_URL or AUTH_POSTGRESQL_URL")
|
|
50
|
+
if not url.startswith(("postgresql://", "postgres://")):
|
|
51
|
+
return _refuse("the shipped migrations target PostgreSQL only")
|
|
52
|
+
environment = dict(os.environ, MG_DATABASE_URL=url)
|
|
53
|
+
return subprocess.call(
|
|
54
|
+
[sys.executable, "-m", "migretti", *args],
|
|
55
|
+
cwd=migrations_root(),
|
|
56
|
+
env=environment,
|
|
57
|
+
)
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
61
|
+
sys.exit(main())
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
-- migration: add_auth_api_key
|
|
2
|
+
-- id: 01KYTMDEYFVH43HKR0MQWW1EMP
|
|
3
|
+
--
|
|
4
|
+
-- Per-user API-key registry (SPEC 0004, issuedb #9). Mirrors the SQLAlchemy
|
|
5
|
+
-- model auth.models.sql.AuthApiKey exactly — the app's boot-time
|
|
6
|
+
-- create_all(checkfirst=True) may legally create this table first on a fresh
|
|
7
|
+
-- install, so every statement is IF NOT EXISTS and the two DDL paths converge
|
|
8
|
+
-- in either order. Schema is the production/CI deployment schema (auth_rbac,
|
|
9
|
+
-- AUTH_DATABASE_SCHEMA); schemaless SQLite/dev installs are covered by
|
|
10
|
+
-- create_all and never run migretti.
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
-- migrate: up
|
|
13
|
+
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac;
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac.auth_api_key (
|
|
16
|
+
id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
|
|
17
|
+
key_id VARCHAR(36) NOT NULL,
|
|
18
|
+
creator VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
|
|
19
|
+
"user" TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
20
|
+
key_hash VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
|
|
21
|
+
key_prefix VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL,
|
|
22
|
+
label TEXT,
|
|
23
|
+
is_active BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
|
|
24
|
+
date_created TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
25
|
+
modified TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
26
|
+
revoked_at TIMESTAMP,
|
|
27
|
+
expires_at TIMESTAMP,
|
|
28
|
+
last_used_at TIMESTAMP,
|
|
29
|
+
CONSTRAINT uq_auth_api_key_key_hash UNIQUE (key_hash),
|
|
30
|
+
CONSTRAINT uq_auth_api_key_key_id UNIQUE (key_id)
|
|
31
|
+
);
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_api_key_id
|
|
34
|
+
ON auth_rbac.auth_api_key (id);
|
|
35
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_api_key_creator
|
|
36
|
+
ON auth_rbac.auth_api_key (creator);
|
|
37
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_api_key_creator_user
|
|
38
|
+
ON auth_rbac.auth_api_key (creator, "user");
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
-- migrate: down
|
|
41
|
+
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS auth_rbac.auth_api_key;
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
-- migration: drop_alembic_version
|
|
2
|
+
-- id: 01KYTQN79R1ZBNDPA3ND9AAA73
|
|
3
|
+
--
|
|
4
|
+
-- Alembic is fully purged (issuedb #14, SPEC 0009): migretti owns all
|
|
5
|
+
-- tracking, so the legacy alembic_version table goes. Its single recorded
|
|
6
|
+
-- revision was 0001_widen_text (varchar->TEXT widening, applied 2026-07);
|
|
7
|
+
-- the revision source now lives in git history only. The down section
|
|
8
|
+
-- faithfully restores the table and its one row. On databases that never ran
|
|
9
|
+
-- Alembic (fresh installs, CI) the up is a no-op.
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
-- migrate: up
|
|
12
|
+
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS auth_rbac.alembic_version;
|
|
13
|
+
|
|
14
|
+
-- migrate: down
|
|
15
|
+
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac.alembic_version (
|
|
16
|
+
version_num VARCHAR(32) NOT NULL,
|
|
17
|
+
CONSTRAINT alembic_version_pkc PRIMARY KEY (version_num)
|
|
18
|
+
);
|
|
19
|
+
INSERT INTO auth_rbac.alembic_version (version_num)
|
|
20
|
+
VALUES ('0001_widen_text')
|
|
21
|
+
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING;
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
-- migration: add_auth_tenant_settings
|
|
2
|
+
-- id: 01KYTRKMWNBDDZPN1H0AXRTT5G
|
|
3
|
+
--
|
|
4
|
+
-- Per-tenant settings (SPEC 0010, issuedb #15) — one row per creator, absence
|
|
5
|
+
-- means defaults. strict_users gates SPEC 0008 strict user identity (opt-in
|
|
6
|
+
-- in 2.5.0; default flip is 3.0.0, gated on client confirmations). Mirrors
|
|
7
|
+
-- auth.models.sql.AuthTenantSettings; IF NOT EXISTS so create_all(checkfirst)
|
|
8
|
+
-- and mg apply converge in either order.
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
-- migrate: up
|
|
11
|
+
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac;
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac.auth_tenant_settings (
|
|
14
|
+
id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
|
|
15
|
+
creator VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
|
|
16
|
+
strict_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
|
17
|
+
date_created TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
18
|
+
modified TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
19
|
+
CONSTRAINT uq_auth_tenant_settings_creator UNIQUE (creator)
|
|
20
|
+
);
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_tenant_settings_id
|
|
23
|
+
ON auth_rbac.auth_tenant_settings (id);
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
-- migrate: down
|
|
26
|
+
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS auth_rbac.auth_tenant_settings;
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
-- migration: grandfather_strict_users
|
|
2
|
+
-- id: 01KYTX0MKVZ775P62CJ87631Z1
|
|
3
|
+
--
|
|
4
|
+
-- 3.0.0 flip protection (SPEC 0012, issuedb #18): every creator existing on
|
|
5
|
+
-- this database gets an explicit strict_users=false row, so the 3.0.0
|
|
6
|
+
-- no-row-means-strict default reaches ONLY tenants created afterwards. A
|
|
7
|
+
-- marker row ('__meta:grandfathered-3.0__', reserved) records that the pass
|
|
8
|
+
-- ran; the identical marker-guarded pass in auth.database.create_tables()
|
|
9
|
+
-- composes idempotently with this migration in either order.
|
|
10
|
+
--
|
|
11
|
+
-- The three base RBAC tables are created here IF NOT EXISTS (exact
|
|
12
|
+
-- create_all parity, like add_auth_api_key did for its table): on a fresh
|
|
13
|
+
-- database migrations must be self-sufficient — production already has
|
|
14
|
+
-- them, so these are no-ops there.
|
|
15
|
+
--
|
|
16
|
+
-- down removes the marker only: the grandfather rows are deliberate,
|
|
17
|
+
-- auditable tenant state and are kept on rollback.
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
-- migrate: up
|
|
20
|
+
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac;
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac.auth_group (
|
|
23
|
+
id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
|
|
24
|
+
creator VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
|
|
25
|
+
role TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
26
|
+
description TEXT,
|
|
27
|
+
is_active BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
|
|
28
|
+
date_created TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
29
|
+
modified TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
30
|
+
CONSTRAINT uq_auth_group_creator_role UNIQUE (creator, role)
|
|
31
|
+
);
|
|
32
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_group_id ON auth_rbac.auth_group (id);
|
|
33
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_group_creator ON auth_rbac.auth_group (creator);
|
|
34
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_group_role ON auth_rbac.auth_group (role);
|
|
35
|
+
|
|
36
|
+
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac.auth_membership (
|
|
37
|
+
id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
|
|
38
|
+
"user" TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
39
|
+
creator VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
|
|
40
|
+
is_active BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
|
|
41
|
+
date_created TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
42
|
+
modified TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
43
|
+
CONSTRAINT uq_auth_membership_creator_user UNIQUE (creator, "user")
|
|
44
|
+
);
|
|
45
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_membership_id ON auth_rbac.auth_membership (id);
|
|
46
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_membership_creator ON auth_rbac.auth_membership (creator);
|
|
47
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_membership_user ON auth_rbac.auth_membership ("user");
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac.auth_permission (
|
|
50
|
+
id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
|
|
51
|
+
name TEXT NOT NULL,
|
|
52
|
+
creator VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
|
|
53
|
+
is_active BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
|
|
54
|
+
date_created TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
55
|
+
modified TIMESTAMP DEFAULT now(),
|
|
56
|
+
CONSTRAINT uq_auth_permission_creator_name UNIQUE (creator, name)
|
|
57
|
+
);
|
|
58
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_permission_id ON auth_rbac.auth_permission (id);
|
|
59
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_permission_creator ON auth_rbac.auth_permission (creator);
|
|
60
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_auth_permission_name ON auth_rbac.auth_permission (name);
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
INSERT INTO auth_rbac.auth_tenant_settings (creator, strict_users)
|
|
63
|
+
SELECT c.creator, FALSE
|
|
64
|
+
FROM (
|
|
65
|
+
SELECT creator FROM auth_rbac.auth_group
|
|
66
|
+
UNION SELECT creator FROM auth_rbac.auth_membership
|
|
67
|
+
UNION SELECT creator FROM auth_rbac.auth_permission
|
|
68
|
+
UNION SELECT creator FROM auth_rbac.auth_api_key
|
|
69
|
+
) c
|
|
70
|
+
WHERE NOT EXISTS (
|
|
71
|
+
SELECT 1 FROM auth_rbac.auth_tenant_settings
|
|
72
|
+
WHERE creator = '__meta:grandfathered-3.0__'
|
|
73
|
+
)
|
|
74
|
+
AND c.creator NOT IN (SELECT creator FROM auth_rbac.auth_tenant_settings);
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
76
|
+
INSERT INTO auth_rbac.auth_tenant_settings (creator, strict_users)
|
|
77
|
+
SELECT '__meta:grandfathered-3.0__', FALSE
|
|
78
|
+
WHERE NOT EXISTS (
|
|
79
|
+
SELECT 1 FROM auth_rbac.auth_tenant_settings
|
|
80
|
+
WHERE creator = '__meta:grandfathered-3.0__'
|
|
81
|
+
);
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
-- migrate: down
|
|
84
|
+
DELETE FROM auth_rbac.auth_tenant_settings
|
|
85
|
+
WHERE creator = '__meta:grandfathered-3.0__';
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
-- migration: partition_audit_log
|
|
2
|
+
-- id: 01KZJWHG32K9X1AFBPPB4YJC6A
|
|
3
|
+
--
|
|
4
|
+
-- audit_log was the whole growth problem: 175k rows / 52 MB, ~79% of the entire
|
|
5
|
+
-- database, growing ~4.8k rows/day on average and ~10.7k/day in the most recent
|
|
6
|
+
-- month, with no retention or partitioning of any kind. Pruning it by DELETE
|
|
7
|
+
-- would bloat the heap and demand a VACUUM FULL (an exclusive lock on the audit
|
|
8
|
+
-- trail); pruning it by DROP PARTITION is O(1) and takes no lock on live data.
|
|
9
|
+
--
|
|
10
|
+
-- This converts auth_rbac.audit_log to a RANGE partitioned table on "timestamp",
|
|
11
|
+
-- one partition per month, preserving every row, the sequence position and the
|
|
12
|
+
-- query indexes.
|
|
13
|
+
--
|
|
14
|
+
-- Shape follows the DATABASE, not auth/audit.py: the model declares
|
|
15
|
+
-- user = Column(String(64)) but production carries TEXT (the pre-2.x varchar→TEXT
|
|
16
|
+
-- reconciliation noted in the 3.0.1 release). Matching the live column keeps
|
|
17
|
+
-- create_all(checkfirst=True) and mg apply convergent, which MIGRATIONS.md requires.
|
|
18
|
+
--
|
|
19
|
+
-- PRIMARY KEY becomes (id, "timestamp") because PostgreSQL requires the partition
|
|
20
|
+
-- key to be part of every unique constraint. id remains unique in practice — it is
|
|
21
|
+
-- still fed by the single audit_log_id_seq sequence.
|
|
22
|
+
--
|
|
23
|
+
-- RETENTION IS NOT AUTOMATED HERE ON PURPOSE. Dropping audit history is a
|
|
24
|
+
-- compliance decision, not a housekeeping default. This migration ships the
|
|
25
|
+
-- mechanism (drop_audit_log_partitions_before) and leaves the policy to an
|
|
26
|
+
-- operator who has decided how long auth history must be kept.
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
-- migrate: up
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS auth_rbac;
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------- provisioning
|
|
33
|
+
-- Create one monthly partition if it does not already exist. Idempotent, so it
|
|
34
|
+
-- is safe from cron, from a migration, or by hand.
|
|
35
|
+
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION auth_rbac.provision_audit_log_partition(p_month date)
|
|
36
|
+
RETURNS text
|
|
37
|
+
LANGUAGE plpgsql
|
|
38
|
+
AS $$
|
|
39
|
+
DECLARE
|
|
40
|
+
v_start date := date_trunc('month', p_month)::date;
|
|
41
|
+
v_end date := (date_trunc('month', p_month) + interval '1 month')::date;
|
|
42
|
+
v_name text := format('audit_log_%s', to_char(v_start, 'YYYY_MM'));
|
|
43
|
+
BEGIN
|
|
44
|
+
IF EXISTS (
|
|
45
|
+
SELECT 1 FROM pg_class c
|
|
46
|
+
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
|
|
47
|
+
WHERE n.nspname = 'auth_rbac' AND c.relname = v_name
|
|
48
|
+
) THEN
|
|
49
|
+
RETURN format('auth_rbac.%s already exists', v_name);
|
|
50
|
+
END IF;
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
EXECUTE format(
|
|
53
|
+
'CREATE TABLE auth_rbac.%I PARTITION OF auth_rbac.audit_log '
|
|
54
|
+
'FOR VALUES FROM (%L) TO (%L)', v_name, v_start, v_end);
|
|
55
|
+
RETURN format('created auth_rbac.%s [%s, %s)', v_name, v_start, v_end);
|
|
56
|
+
END;
|
|
57
|
+
$$;
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
COMMENT ON FUNCTION auth_rbac.provision_audit_log_partition(date) IS
|
|
60
|
+
'Create the monthly audit_log partition covering p_month, if absent. Idempotent.';
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------- retention
|
|
63
|
+
-- Drop whole partitions strictly older than the cutoff. Returns what it dropped
|
|
64
|
+
-- so the caller can log it. Never touches the DEFAULT partition.
|
|
65
|
+
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION auth_rbac.drop_audit_log_partitions_before(p_cutoff date)
|
|
66
|
+
RETURNS SETOF text
|
|
67
|
+
LANGUAGE plpgsql
|
|
68
|
+
AS $$
|
|
69
|
+
DECLARE
|
|
70
|
+
r record;
|
|
71
|
+
v_upper timestamp;
|
|
72
|
+
BEGIN
|
|
73
|
+
FOR r IN
|
|
74
|
+
SELECT c.relname,
|
|
75
|
+
pg_get_expr(c.relpartbound, c.oid) AS bound
|
|
76
|
+
FROM pg_class c
|
|
77
|
+
JOIN pg_inherits i ON i.inhrelid = c.oid
|
|
78
|
+
JOIN pg_class p ON p.oid = i.inhparent
|
|
79
|
+
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.relnamespace
|
|
80
|
+
WHERE n.nspname = 'auth_rbac'
|
|
81
|
+
AND p.relname = 'audit_log'
|
|
82
|
+
AND pg_get_expr(c.relpartbound, c.oid) NOT LIKE '%DEFAULT%'
|
|
83
|
+
LOOP
|
|
84
|
+
-- The bound reads: FOR VALUES FROM ('2026-07-01 00:00:00') TO ('2026-08-01 00:00:00')
|
|
85
|
+
-- Capture the WHOLE quoted upper bound. An earlier version matched only
|
|
86
|
+
-- [0-9-]+ and so stopped at the space before the time, yielding NULL —
|
|
87
|
+
-- the IF was then NULL, nothing was dropped, and the function still
|
|
88
|
+
-- reported success. A retention job that silently retains everything is
|
|
89
|
+
-- worse than none, so a parse failure now raises instead of skipping.
|
|
90
|
+
v_upper := substring(r.bound from 'TO \(''([^'']+)''\)')::timestamp;
|
|
91
|
+
IF v_upper IS NULL THEN
|
|
92
|
+
RAISE EXCEPTION 'cannot parse partition bound for auth_rbac.%: %', r.relname, r.bound;
|
|
93
|
+
END IF;
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
IF v_upper <= p_cutoff::timestamp THEN
|
|
96
|
+
EXECUTE format('DROP TABLE auth_rbac.%I', r.relname);
|
|
97
|
+
RETURN NEXT format('dropped auth_rbac.%s %s', r.relname, r.bound);
|
|
98
|
+
END IF;
|
|
99
|
+
END LOOP;
|
|
100
|
+
END;
|
|
101
|
+
$$;
|
|
102
|
+
|
|
103
|
+
COMMENT ON FUNCTION auth_rbac.drop_audit_log_partitions_before(date) IS
|
|
104
|
+
'Drop audit_log partitions entirely older than p_cutoff. Invoke deliberately: '
|
|
105
|
+
'audit retention is a compliance decision, not a scheduled default.';
|
|
106
|
+
|
|
107
|
+
-- --------------------------------------------------------------- the conversion
|
|
108
|
+
DO $$
|
|
109
|
+
DECLARE
|
|
110
|
+
v_is_partitioned boolean;
|
|
111
|
+
v_month date;
|
|
112
|
+
v_max date;
|
|
113
|
+
v_owner text;
|
|
114
|
+
r record;
|
|
115
|
+
BEGIN
|
|
116
|
+
SELECT c.relkind = 'p', pg_get_userbyid(c.relowner)
|
|
117
|
+
INTO v_is_partitioned, v_owner
|
|
118
|
+
FROM pg_class c JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
|
|
119
|
+
WHERE n.nspname = 'auth_rbac' AND c.relname = 'audit_log';
|
|
120
|
+
|
|
121
|
+
IF v_is_partitioned IS NULL THEN
|
|
122
|
+
RAISE NOTICE 'auth_rbac.audit_log absent; nothing to convert';
|
|
123
|
+
RETURN;
|
|
124
|
+
END IF;
|
|
125
|
+
IF v_is_partitioned THEN
|
|
126
|
+
RAISE NOTICE 'auth_rbac.audit_log already partitioned; nothing to do';
|
|
127
|
+
RETURN;
|
|
128
|
+
END IF;
|
|
129
|
+
|
|
130
|
+
-- 1. the new partitioned parent, shaped exactly like the live table
|
|
131
|
+
CREATE TABLE auth_rbac.audit_log__partitioned (
|
|
132
|
+
id integer NOT NULL DEFAULT nextval('auth_rbac.audit_log_id_seq'),
|
|
133
|
+
"timestamp" timestamp without time zone NOT NULL,
|
|
134
|
+
client_id text NOT NULL,
|
|
135
|
+
"user" text,
|
|
136
|
+
action character varying(50) NOT NULL,
|
|
137
|
+
resource text,
|
|
138
|
+
details text,
|
|
139
|
+
ip_address character varying(45),
|
|
140
|
+
user_agent text,
|
|
141
|
+
success integer,
|
|
142
|
+
PRIMARY KEY (id, "timestamp")
|
|
143
|
+
) PARTITION BY RANGE ("timestamp");
|
|
144
|
+
|
|
145
|
+
-- 2. a DEFAULT partition: a trap, not a home. Rows landing here mean the
|
|
146
|
+
-- provisioner fell behind; monitor it rather than rely on it.
|
|
147
|
+
CREATE TABLE auth_rbac.audit_log_default
|
|
148
|
+
PARTITION OF auth_rbac.audit_log__partitioned DEFAULT;
|
|
149
|
+
|
|
150
|
+
-- 3. monthly partitions covering all existing data plus 12 months ahead
|
|
151
|
+
SELECT COALESCE(date_trunc('month', min("timestamp"))::date, date_trunc('month', now())::date)
|
|
152
|
+
INTO v_month FROM auth_rbac.audit_log;
|
|
153
|
+
v_max := (date_trunc('month', now()) + interval '12 months')::date;
|
|
154
|
+
WHILE v_month <= v_max LOOP
|
|
155
|
+
EXECUTE format(
|
|
156
|
+
'CREATE TABLE auth_rbac.%I PARTITION OF auth_rbac.audit_log__partitioned '
|
|
157
|
+
'FOR VALUES FROM (%L) TO (%L)',
|
|
158
|
+
'audit_log_' || to_char(v_month, 'YYYY_MM'),
|
|
159
|
+
v_month,
|
|
160
|
+
(v_month + interval '1 month')::date);
|
|
161
|
+
v_month := (v_month + interval '1 month')::date;
|
|
162
|
+
END LOOP;
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
-- 4. move the data
|
|
165
|
+
INSERT INTO auth_rbac.audit_log__partitioned
|
|
166
|
+
(id, "timestamp", client_id, "user", action, resource, details, ip_address, user_agent, success)
|
|
167
|
+
SELECT id, "timestamp", client_id, "user", action, resource, details, ip_address, user_agent, success
|
|
168
|
+
FROM auth_rbac.audit_log;
|
|
169
|
+
|
|
170
|
+
-- 5. detach the sequence before dropping its old owner, or the DROP cascades
|
|
171
|
+
-- to the sequence and the id counter restarts at 1.
|
|
172
|
+
ALTER SEQUENCE auth_rbac.audit_log_id_seq OWNED BY NONE;
|
|
173
|
+
|
|
174
|
+
DROP TABLE auth_rbac.audit_log;
|
|
175
|
+
ALTER TABLE auth_rbac.audit_log__partitioned RENAME TO audit_log;
|
|
176
|
+
|
|
177
|
+
-- 6. restore the ORIGINAL owner. The migration runner is a DDL-capable role
|
|
178
|
+
-- (pgadmin in production) which is not necessarily the table owner, and
|
|
179
|
+
-- PostgreSQL refuses "ALTER SEQUENCE ... OWNED BY" when the sequence and
|
|
180
|
+
-- its table have different owners. ALTER TABLE ... OWNER TO does not
|
|
181
|
+
-- cascade to partitions, so each one is set explicitly.
|
|
182
|
+
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE auth_rbac.audit_log OWNER TO %I', v_owner);
|
|
183
|
+
FOR r IN
|
|
184
|
+
SELECT c.relname
|
|
185
|
+
FROM pg_inherits i
|
|
186
|
+
JOIN pg_class c ON c.oid = i.inhrelid
|
|
187
|
+
WHERE i.inhparent = 'auth_rbac.audit_log'::regclass
|
|
188
|
+
LOOP
|
|
189
|
+
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE auth_rbac.%I OWNER TO %I', r.relname, v_owner);
|
|
190
|
+
END LOOP;
|
|
191
|
+
|
|
192
|
+
ALTER SEQUENCE auth_rbac.audit_log_id_seq OWNED BY auth_rbac.audit_log.id;
|
|
193
|
+
END;
|
|
194
|
+
$$;
|
|
195
|
+
|
|
196
|
+
-- 6. indexes, recreated on the parent so every partition inherits them.
|
|
197
|
+
-- ix_..._id mirrors the model's index=True on the primary key column.
|
|
198
|
+
-- IF NOT EXISTS guards the index NAME, not the table, so these must sit behind
|
|
199
|
+
-- the same absent-table guard the conversion block uses: to_regclass returns
|
|
200
|
+
-- NULL instead of raising. On a fresh database auth_rbac.audit_log has not
|
|
201
|
+
-- been created yet (SQLAlchemy create_all does that at app boot), and an
|
|
202
|
+
-- unguarded CREATE INDEX errors there rather than no-opping.
|
|
203
|
+
DO $guard$
|
|
204
|
+
BEGIN
|
|
205
|
+
IF to_regclass('auth_rbac.audit_log') IS NULL THEN
|
|
206
|
+
RAISE NOTICE 'auth_rbac.audit_log absent; skipping index creation';
|
|
207
|
+
RETURN;
|
|
208
|
+
END IF;
|
|
209
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_audit_log_id
|
|
210
|
+
ON auth_rbac.audit_log (id);
|
|
211
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_audit_log_client_id
|
|
212
|
+
ON auth_rbac.audit_log (client_id);
|
|
213
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_audit_log_user
|
|
214
|
+
ON auth_rbac.audit_log ("user");
|
|
215
|
+
-- new: retention and time-range queries scan by timestamp; the old table had
|
|
216
|
+
-- no index on it at all.
|
|
217
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_audit_log_timestamp
|
|
218
|
+
ON auth_rbac.audit_log ("timestamp");
|
|
219
|
+
END;
|
|
220
|
+
$guard$;
|
|
221
|
+
|
|
222
|
+
-- migrate: down
|
|
223
|
+
-- Collapse back to a single unpartitioned table, preserving rows and the sequence.
|
|
224
|
+
DO $$
|
|
225
|
+
DECLARE
|
|
226
|
+
v_is_partitioned boolean;
|
|
227
|
+
v_owner text;
|
|
228
|
+
BEGIN
|
|
229
|
+
SELECT c.relkind = 'p', pg_get_userbyid(c.relowner)
|
|
230
|
+
INTO v_is_partitioned, v_owner
|
|
231
|
+
FROM pg_class c JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
|
|
232
|
+
WHERE n.nspname = 'auth_rbac' AND c.relname = 'audit_log';
|
|
233
|
+
|
|
234
|
+
IF v_is_partitioned IS NOT TRUE THEN
|
|
235
|
+
RAISE NOTICE 'auth_rbac.audit_log is not partitioned; nothing to revert';
|
|
236
|
+
RETURN;
|
|
237
|
+
END IF;
|
|
238
|
+
|
|
239
|
+
CREATE TABLE auth_rbac.audit_log__plain (
|
|
240
|
+
id integer NOT NULL DEFAULT nextval('auth_rbac.audit_log_id_seq'),
|
|
241
|
+
"timestamp" timestamp without time zone NOT NULL,
|
|
242
|
+
client_id text NOT NULL,
|
|
243
|
+
"user" text,
|
|
244
|
+
action character varying(50) NOT NULL,
|
|
245
|
+
resource text,
|
|
246
|
+
details text,
|
|
247
|
+
ip_address character varying(45),
|
|
248
|
+
user_agent text,
|
|
249
|
+
success integer,
|
|
250
|
+
PRIMARY KEY (id)
|
|
251
|
+
);
|
|
252
|
+
|
|
253
|
+
INSERT INTO auth_rbac.audit_log__plain
|
|
254
|
+
(id, "timestamp", client_id, "user", action, resource, details, ip_address, user_agent, success)
|
|
255
|
+
SELECT id, "timestamp", client_id, "user", action, resource, details, ip_address, user_agent, success
|
|
256
|
+
FROM auth_rbac.audit_log;
|
|
257
|
+
|
|
258
|
+
ALTER SEQUENCE auth_rbac.audit_log_id_seq OWNED BY NONE;
|
|
259
|
+
DROP TABLE auth_rbac.audit_log;
|
|
260
|
+
ALTER TABLE auth_rbac.audit_log__plain RENAME TO audit_log;
|
|
261
|
+
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE auth_rbac.audit_log OWNER TO %I', v_owner);
|
|
262
|
+
ALTER SEQUENCE auth_rbac.audit_log_id_seq OWNED BY auth_rbac.audit_log.id;
|
|
263
|
+
END;
|
|
264
|
+
$$;
|
|
265
|
+
|
|
266
|
+
DO $guard$
|
|
267
|
+
BEGIN
|
|
268
|
+
IF to_regclass('auth_rbac.audit_log') IS NULL THEN
|
|
269
|
+
RAISE NOTICE 'auth_rbac.audit_log absent; skipping index creation';
|
|
270
|
+
RETURN;
|
|
271
|
+
END IF;
|
|
272
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_audit_log_id ON auth_rbac.audit_log (id);
|
|
273
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_audit_log_client_id ON auth_rbac.audit_log (client_id);
|
|
274
|
+
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_auth_rbac_audit_log_user ON auth_rbac.audit_log ("user");
|
|
275
|
+
END;
|
|
276
|
+
$guard$;
|
|
277
|
+
|
|
278
|
+
DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS auth_rbac.drop_audit_log_partitions_before(date);
|
|
279
|
+
DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS auth_rbac.provision_audit_log_partition(date);
|