attackmap 0.4.25__tar.gz → 0.4.26__tar.gz

{attackmap-0.4.25/src/attackmap.egg-info → attackmap-0.4.26}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: attackmap
-Version: 0.4.25
+Version: 0.4.26
 Summary: AI-assisted defensive security analyzer for codebases — scans a repository, models assets and controls, finds cross-cutting weaknesses, and generates an evidence-grounded review with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and detection-engineering hints.
 Author: AttackMap Contributors
 Author-email: Matthew Davis <matthewd@matthewd.xyz>
@@ -790,10 +790,12 @@ scaffolding, testing, and publishing instructions is in
 
 ```bash
 attackmap analyze <path>                 # run a review on a repository
+attackmap analyze repoA repoB gateway    # multi-repo fleet scan (per-repo reports + fleet summary)
 attackmap analyze <path> --output dir    # write outputs to `dir/`
 attackmap analyze <path> --format json   # json | markdown | all (default)
 attackmap analyze <path> --module python --module rust   # only these analyzers
 attackmap analyze <path> --cve           # cross-reference SBOM against OSV.dev
+attackmap analyze <path> --recall        # widen taint discovery (deeper hops, capability-reach); extra reach marked SPECULATIVE
 attackmap analyze <path> --llm           # add LLM narrative (auto-resolve auth)
 attackmap analyze <path> --llm --llm-backend cli         # force Claude CLI
 attackmap analyze <path> --llm --llm-provider openai     # use OpenAI/Codex (OPENAI_API_KEY or `codex` CLI)
@@ -803,6 +805,8 @@ attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify # adjudicate each lead vs. source (conf
 attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --verify-votes 3   # majority vote of N independent skeptics (default 3; 1 = single pass)
 attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --hunt-lenses 4     # N lens-specialised generation passes, deduped, then verified
 attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --hunt-rounds 4     # loop-until-dry generation (completeness critic seeds each round)
+attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --hunt-budget 500000  # cap total hunt output tokens across rounds
+attackmap analyze <path> --recall --hunt --verify   # widen the net, then adjudicate the speculative reach
 attackmap analyze <path> --remediate     # LLM review-first fix suggestions (remediation.md)
 attackmap analyze <path> --triage        # cluster/dedupe/rank existing findings (triage.md; deterministic fallback)
 attackmap analyze <path> --pr-comment pr.md   # Markdown PR summary comment for CI
@@ -849,7 +853,7 @@ introduces a new HIGH finding.
 
 ## Project status
 
-AttackMap is **beta** (v0.4.18) — published and validated on real codebases, but
+AttackMap is **beta** (v0.4.25) — published and validated on real codebases, but
 pre-1.0 and heuristic.
 
 **Solid today:**
@@ -867,13 +871,27 @@ pre-1.0 and heuristic.
 - BOLA/IDOR authorization detection (with custom-middleware / guard-arg awareness).
 - Insecure-crypto / weak-randomness (Python/JS/Go/PHP) and web-hardening
   (CORS/CSRF/cookies/CSP/debug) detection.
-- Anomaly / outlier detection and **exploitability fusion** — a deterministic,
-  explainable 0–100 "exploitable now" score that ranks route→sink combinations
-  and folds in known-vulnerable dependencies on the path.
-- **`--hunt`** (LLM exploit-chain hypotheses) with **`--verify`** (adjudicate
-  each lead CONFIRMED/REFUTED/NEEDS-REVIEW against the actual source),
-  **`--remediate`** (review-first fix suggestions), and **`--triage`**
-  (cluster/dedupe/rank existing findings, with a deterministic fallback).
+- Anomaly / outlier detection — including **signature-free invariant mining**
+  (flag the handler that reaches a dangerous sink without the guard its peers
+  apply) — and **exploitability fusion**, a deterministic, explainable 0–100
+  "exploitable now" score that ranks route→sink combinations and folds in
+  known-vulnerable dependencies on the path.
+- **`--hunt`** (LLM exploit-chain hypotheses) with a **verify jury** —
+  **`--verify`** adjudicates each lead CONFIRMED/REFUTED/NEEDS-REVIEW against the
+  actual source; **`--verify-votes`** runs N independent skeptics, **`--hunt-lenses`**
+  fans generation across failure-mode specialists, **`--hunt-rounds`** loops
+  until dry with a completeness critic, **`--hunt-budget`** caps token spend —
+  plus **`--remediate`** (review-first fixes) and **`--triage`**
+  (cluster/dedupe/rank existing findings, deterministic fallback).
+- **`--recall`** — verifier-gated aggressive discovery: widens the taint walk
+  (deeper hops, capability-reach enumeration of every reach to exec/fs/net/
+  deserialize/template/SQL) and marks the extra reach SPECULATIVE, kept out of
+  `--fail-on-new-high` and left for `--hunt --verify` to adjudicate.
+- **Cross-repo / fleet analysis** — `attackmap analyze repoA repoB …` scans a
+  fleet, links one repo's outbound HTTP calls to another's routes, and surfaces
+  bugs that live in the seams: cross-boundary (confused-deputy) flows,
+  trust-assumption gaps, and the sibling service that omits a control its peers
+  enforce. All cross-repo findings are speculative until verified.
 - SBOM inventory (5 ecosystems) + OSV.dev CVE cross-reference (`--cve`).
 - Output: Markdown + JSON + **SARIF 2.1.0** + **Mermaid / Graphviz** diagrams;
   **diff/baseline** PR gating; a reusable **GitHub Action + PR bot**; optional

{attackmap-0.4.25 → attackmap-0.4.26}/README.md

@@ -729,10 +729,12 @@ scaffolding, testing, and publishing instructions is in
 
 ```bash
 attackmap analyze <path>                 # run a review on a repository
+attackmap analyze repoA repoB gateway    # multi-repo fleet scan (per-repo reports + fleet summary)
 attackmap analyze <path> --output dir    # write outputs to `dir/`
 attackmap analyze <path> --format json   # json | markdown | all (default)
 attackmap analyze <path> --module python --module rust   # only these analyzers
 attackmap analyze <path> --cve           # cross-reference SBOM against OSV.dev
+attackmap analyze <path> --recall        # widen taint discovery (deeper hops, capability-reach); extra reach marked SPECULATIVE
 attackmap analyze <path> --llm           # add LLM narrative (auto-resolve auth)
 attackmap analyze <path> --llm --llm-backend cli         # force Claude CLI
 attackmap analyze <path> --llm --llm-provider openai     # use OpenAI/Codex (OPENAI_API_KEY or `codex` CLI)
@@ -742,6 +744,8 @@ attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify # adjudicate each lead vs. source (conf
 attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --verify-votes 3   # majority vote of N independent skeptics (default 3; 1 = single pass)
 attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --hunt-lenses 4     # N lens-specialised generation passes, deduped, then verified
 attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --hunt-rounds 4     # loop-until-dry generation (completeness critic seeds each round)
+attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --hunt-budget 500000  # cap total hunt output tokens across rounds
+attackmap analyze <path> --recall --hunt --verify   # widen the net, then adjudicate the speculative reach
 attackmap analyze <path> --remediate     # LLM review-first fix suggestions (remediation.md)
 attackmap analyze <path> --triage        # cluster/dedupe/rank existing findings (triage.md; deterministic fallback)
 attackmap analyze <path> --pr-comment pr.md   # Markdown PR summary comment for CI
@@ -788,7 +792,7 @@ introduces a new HIGH finding.
 
 ## Project status
 
-AttackMap is **beta** (v0.4.18) — published and validated on real codebases, but
+AttackMap is **beta** (v0.4.25) — published and validated on real codebases, but
 pre-1.0 and heuristic.
 
 **Solid today:**
@@ -806,13 +810,27 @@ pre-1.0 and heuristic.
 - BOLA/IDOR authorization detection (with custom-middleware / guard-arg awareness).
 - Insecure-crypto / weak-randomness (Python/JS/Go/PHP) and web-hardening
   (CORS/CSRF/cookies/CSP/debug) detection.
-- Anomaly / outlier detection and **exploitability fusion** — a deterministic,
-  explainable 0–100 "exploitable now" score that ranks route→sink combinations
-  and folds in known-vulnerable dependencies on the path.
-- **`--hunt`** (LLM exploit-chain hypotheses) with **`--verify`** (adjudicate
-  each lead CONFIRMED/REFUTED/NEEDS-REVIEW against the actual source),
-  **`--remediate`** (review-first fix suggestions), and **`--triage`**
-  (cluster/dedupe/rank existing findings, with a deterministic fallback).
+- Anomaly / outlier detection — including **signature-free invariant mining**
+  (flag the handler that reaches a dangerous sink without the guard its peers
+  apply) — and **exploitability fusion**, a deterministic, explainable 0–100
+  "exploitable now" score that ranks route→sink combinations and folds in
+  known-vulnerable dependencies on the path.
+- **`--hunt`** (LLM exploit-chain hypotheses) with a **verify jury** —
+  **`--verify`** adjudicates each lead CONFIRMED/REFUTED/NEEDS-REVIEW against the
+  actual source; **`--verify-votes`** runs N independent skeptics, **`--hunt-lenses`**
+  fans generation across failure-mode specialists, **`--hunt-rounds`** loops
+  until dry with a completeness critic, **`--hunt-budget`** caps token spend —
+  plus **`--remediate`** (review-first fixes) and **`--triage`**
+  (cluster/dedupe/rank existing findings, deterministic fallback).
+- **`--recall`** — verifier-gated aggressive discovery: widens the taint walk
+  (deeper hops, capability-reach enumeration of every reach to exec/fs/net/
+  deserialize/template/SQL) and marks the extra reach SPECULATIVE, kept out of
+  `--fail-on-new-high` and left for `--hunt --verify` to adjudicate.
+- **Cross-repo / fleet analysis** — `attackmap analyze repoA repoB …` scans a
+  fleet, links one repo's outbound HTTP calls to another's routes, and surfaces
+  bugs that live in the seams: cross-boundary (confused-deputy) flows,
+  trust-assumption gaps, and the sibling service that omits a control its peers
+  enforce. All cross-repo findings are speculative until verified.
 - SBOM inventory (5 ecosystems) + OSV.dev CVE cross-reference (`--cve`).
 - Output: Markdown + JSON + **SARIF 2.1.0** + **Mermaid / Graphviz** diagrams;
   **diff/baseline** PR gating; a reusable **GitHub Action + PR bot**; optional

{attackmap-0.4.25 → attackmap-0.4.26}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "attackmap"
-version = "0.4.25"
+version = "0.4.26"
 description = "AI-assisted defensive security analyzer for codebases — scans a repository, models assets and controls, finds cross-cutting weaknesses, and generates an evidence-grounded review with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and detection-engineering hints."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"

{attackmap-0.4.25 → attackmap-0.4.26}/src/attackmap/lockfiles.py

@@ -263,11 +263,29 @@ def _parse_pnpm_lock(path: Path) -> _Graph | None:
         import yaml
     except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - PyYAML is a declared dependency
         return None
-    data = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    if not isinstance(data, dict):
+    # pnpm-lock is normally a single YAML document, but some files concatenate
+    # several with `---` separators (e.g. a merge artifact, or a tool that
+    # appends per-workspace lockfiles). Parse every document and merge them, and
+    # never let a malformed-YAML error abort the whole scan — a lockfile we can't
+    # read just yields no dependency hints.
+    try:
+        documents = [
+            doc
+            for doc in yaml.safe_load_all(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+            if isinstance(doc, dict)
+        ]
+    except yaml.YAMLError:
+        return None
+    if not documents:
         return None
     graph = _Graph(ecosystem="npm")
+    for data in documents:
+        _absorb_pnpm_document(data, graph)
+    return graph
 
+
+def _absorb_pnpm_document(data: dict, graph: _Graph) -> None:
+    """Fold one parsed pnpm-lock YAML document into ``graph`` (roots + packages)."""
     # Roots: importers.'.'.{dependencies,devDependencies} (v6+) or top-level.
     importers = data.get("importers")
     root_sections = []
@@ -285,7 +303,7 @@ def _parse_pnpm_lock(path: Path) -> _Graph | None:
 
     packages = data.get("packages")
     if not isinstance(packages, dict):
-        return graph
+        return
     for raw_key, meta in packages.items():
         m = _PNPM_PKG_KEY_RE.match(str(raw_key))
         if not m:
@@ -302,7 +320,6 @@ def _parse_pnpm_lock(path: Path) -> _Graph | None:
                     children.update(deps.keys())
             if children:
                 graph.edges.setdefault(name, set()).update(children)
-    return graph
 
 
 # --- pypi: poetry.lock / uv.lock; cargo: Cargo.lock (all TOML [[package]]) --

{attackmap-0.4.25 → attackmap-0.4.26/src/attackmap.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: attackmap
-Version: 0.4.25
+Version: 0.4.26
 Summary: AI-assisted defensive security analyzer for codebases — scans a repository, models assets and controls, finds cross-cutting weaknesses, and generates an evidence-grounded review with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and detection-engineering hints.
 Author: AttackMap Contributors
 Author-email: Matthew Davis <matthewd@matthewd.xyz>
@@ -790,10 +790,12 @@ scaffolding, testing, and publishing instructions is in
 
 ```bash
 attackmap analyze <path>                 # run a review on a repository
+attackmap analyze repoA repoB gateway    # multi-repo fleet scan (per-repo reports + fleet summary)
 attackmap analyze <path> --output dir    # write outputs to `dir/`
 attackmap analyze <path> --format json   # json | markdown | all (default)
 attackmap analyze <path> --module python --module rust   # only these analyzers
 attackmap analyze <path> --cve           # cross-reference SBOM against OSV.dev
+attackmap analyze <path> --recall        # widen taint discovery (deeper hops, capability-reach); extra reach marked SPECULATIVE
 attackmap analyze <path> --llm           # add LLM narrative (auto-resolve auth)
 attackmap analyze <path> --llm --llm-backend cli         # force Claude CLI
 attackmap analyze <path> --llm --llm-provider openai     # use OpenAI/Codex (OPENAI_API_KEY or `codex` CLI)
@@ -803,6 +805,8 @@ attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify # adjudicate each lead vs. source (conf
 attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --verify-votes 3   # majority vote of N independent skeptics (default 3; 1 = single pass)
 attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --hunt-lenses 4     # N lens-specialised generation passes, deduped, then verified
 attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --hunt-rounds 4     # loop-until-dry generation (completeness critic seeds each round)
+attackmap analyze <path> --hunt --verify --hunt-budget 500000  # cap total hunt output tokens across rounds
+attackmap analyze <path> --recall --hunt --verify   # widen the net, then adjudicate the speculative reach
 attackmap analyze <path> --remediate     # LLM review-first fix suggestions (remediation.md)
 attackmap analyze <path> --triage        # cluster/dedupe/rank existing findings (triage.md; deterministic fallback)
 attackmap analyze <path> --pr-comment pr.md   # Markdown PR summary comment for CI
@@ -849,7 +853,7 @@ introduces a new HIGH finding.
 
 ## Project status
 
-AttackMap is **beta** (v0.4.18) — published and validated on real codebases, but
+AttackMap is **beta** (v0.4.25) — published and validated on real codebases, but
 pre-1.0 and heuristic.
 
 **Solid today:**
@@ -867,13 +871,27 @@ pre-1.0 and heuristic.
 - BOLA/IDOR authorization detection (with custom-middleware / guard-arg awareness).
 - Insecure-crypto / weak-randomness (Python/JS/Go/PHP) and web-hardening
   (CORS/CSRF/cookies/CSP/debug) detection.
-- Anomaly / outlier detection and **exploitability fusion** — a deterministic,
-  explainable 0–100 "exploitable now" score that ranks route→sink combinations
-  and folds in known-vulnerable dependencies on the path.
-- **`--hunt`** (LLM exploit-chain hypotheses) with **`--verify`** (adjudicate
-  each lead CONFIRMED/REFUTED/NEEDS-REVIEW against the actual source),
-  **`--remediate`** (review-first fix suggestions), and **`--triage`**
-  (cluster/dedupe/rank existing findings, with a deterministic fallback).
+- Anomaly / outlier detection — including **signature-free invariant mining**
+  (flag the handler that reaches a dangerous sink without the guard its peers
+  apply) — and **exploitability fusion**, a deterministic, explainable 0–100
+  "exploitable now" score that ranks route→sink combinations and folds in
+  known-vulnerable dependencies on the path.
+- **`--hunt`** (LLM exploit-chain hypotheses) with a **verify jury** —
+  **`--verify`** adjudicates each lead CONFIRMED/REFUTED/NEEDS-REVIEW against the
+  actual source; **`--verify-votes`** runs N independent skeptics, **`--hunt-lenses`**
+  fans generation across failure-mode specialists, **`--hunt-rounds`** loops
+  until dry with a completeness critic, **`--hunt-budget`** caps token spend —
+  plus **`--remediate`** (review-first fixes) and **`--triage`**
+  (cluster/dedupe/rank existing findings, deterministic fallback).
+- **`--recall`** — verifier-gated aggressive discovery: widens the taint walk
+  (deeper hops, capability-reach enumeration of every reach to exec/fs/net/
+  deserialize/template/SQL) and marks the extra reach SPECULATIVE, kept out of
+  `--fail-on-new-high` and left for `--hunt --verify` to adjudicate.
+- **Cross-repo / fleet analysis** — `attackmap analyze repoA repoB …` scans a
+  fleet, links one repo's outbound HTTP calls to another's routes, and surfaces
+  bugs that live in the seams: cross-boundary (confused-deputy) flows,
+  trust-assumption gaps, and the sibling service that omits a control its peers
+  enforce. All cross-repo findings are speculative until verified.
 - SBOM inventory (5 ecosystems) + OSV.dev CVE cross-reference (`--cve`).
 - Output: Markdown + JSON + **SARIF 2.1.0** + **Mermaid / Graphviz** diagrams;
   **diff/baseline** PR gating; a reusable **GitHub Action + PR bot**; optional

{attackmap-0.4.25 → attackmap-0.4.26}/tests/test_lockfiles.py

@@ -211,6 +211,60 @@ packages:
     assert by_name["minimist"].version == "1.2.5"
 
 
+def test_pnpm_lock_multi_document_merges_all(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # Some pnpm-lock.yaml files concatenate several YAML documents with `---`
+    # separators (seen in the wild, e.g. bluesky-social/atproto). A single-doc
+    # load raises yaml.ComposerError and previously aborted the whole scan
+    # (regression). We must parse every document and merge them.
+    (tmp_path / "pnpm-lock.yaml").write_text(
+        """---
+lockfileVersion: '9.0'
+importers:
+  .:
+    dependencies:
+      lodash:
+        specifier: ^4.17.0
+        version: 4.17.21
+packages:
+  lodash@4.17.21:
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-abc}
+---
+lockfileVersion: '9.0'
+importers:
+  .:
+    dependencies:
+      express:
+        specifier: ^4.18.0
+        version: 4.18.2
+packages:
+  express@4.18.2:
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-def}
+""",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    hints, superseded = parse_lockfiles(tmp_path)
+    assert ("npm", ".") in superseded
+    by_name = _by_name(hints)
+    # Both documents contribute their packages and roots.
+    assert by_name["lodash"].version == "4.17.21"
+    assert by_name["express"].version == "4.18.2"
+    assert by_name["lodash"].direct is True
+    assert by_name["express"].direct is True
+
+
+def test_pnpm_lock_malformed_yaml_yields_no_hints_without_crashing(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # A lockfile we can't parse must never abort the scan — it just yields
+    # no dependency hints.
+    (tmp_path / "pnpm-lock.yaml").write_text(
+        "lockfileVersion: '9.0'\npackages:\n  - : : broken\n   bad indent\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    # The key property: the call returns (a list) instead of raising a
+    # yaml.YAMLError that would abort the scan.
+    hints, superseded = parse_lockfiles(tmp_path)
+    assert isinstance(hints, list)
+
+
 def test_uv_local_project_excluded_and_deps_direct(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
     # The project package (editable source) is not an SBOM entry; its deps
     # are the direct dependencies.