attackmap 0.3.0__tar.gz → 0.3.1__tar.gz

{attackmap-0.3.0/src/attackmap.egg-info → attackmap-0.3.1}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: attackmap
-Version: 0.3.0
+Version: 0.3.1
 Summary: AI-assisted defensive security analyzer for codebases — scans a repository, models assets and controls, finds cross-cutting weaknesses, and generates an evidence-grounded review with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and detection-engineering hints.
 Author: AttackMap Contributors
 Author-email: Matthew Davis <matthewd@matthewd.xyz>
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ managers who need to triage an unfamiliar codebase.
 [![Python: 3.11+](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11%2B-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org/)
 [![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/attackmap.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/attackmap/)
 
-> **Status: beta (v0.3.0).** Core engine and 14 analyzer plugins are published
+> **Status: beta (v0.3.1).** Core engine and 14 analyzer plugins are published
 > to PyPI, Homebrew, and GHCR and validated against real-world codebases.
 > AttackMap is heuristic by design — findings are confidence-tiered evidence,
 > not proof. See [Project status](#project-status) for what's solid and what's
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ introduces a new HIGH finding.
 
 ## Project status
 
-AttackMap is **beta** (v0.3.0) — published and validated on real codebases, but
+AttackMap is **beta** (v0.3.1) — published and validated on real codebases, but
 pre-1.0 and heuristic.
 
 **Solid today:**

{attackmap-0.3.0 → attackmap-0.3.1}/README.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ managers who need to triage an unfamiliar codebase.
 [![Python: 3.11+](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11%2B-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org/)
 [![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/attackmap.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/attackmap/)
 
-> **Status: beta (v0.3.0).** Core engine and 14 analyzer plugins are published
+> **Status: beta (v0.3.1).** Core engine and 14 analyzer plugins are published
 > to PyPI, Homebrew, and GHCR and validated against real-world codebases.
 > AttackMap is heuristic by design — findings are confidence-tiered evidence,
 > not proof. See [Project status](#project-status) for what's solid and what's
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ introduces a new HIGH finding.
 
 ## Project status
 
-AttackMap is **beta** (v0.3.0) — published and validated on real codebases, but
+AttackMap is **beta** (v0.3.1) — published and validated on real codebases, but
 pre-1.0 and heuristic.
 
 **Solid today:**

{attackmap-0.3.0 → attackmap-0.3.1}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "attackmap"
-version = "0.3.0"
+version = "0.3.1"
 description = "AI-assisted defensive security analyzer for codebases — scans a repository, models assets and controls, finds cross-cutting weaknesses, and generates an evidence-grounded review with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and detection-engineering hints."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"

{attackmap-0.3.0 → attackmap-0.3.1}/src/attackmap/__init__.py

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 __all__ = ["__version__"]
-__version__ = "0.3.0"
+__version__ = "0.3.1"

{attackmap-0.3.0 → attackmap-0.3.1}/src/attackmap/taint.py

@@ -391,6 +391,59 @@ def _resolve_js_target(target: Path, files: dict[str, Path], root: Path) -> str
     return None
 
 
+# Sink families that fire on reachability alone (no request-token gate),
+# because the operation is dangerous regardless of the argument's shape.
+# But that over-fires when the argument is provably STATIC/local — e.g.
+# `yaml.load(fs.readFileSync('./swagger.yml'))` loads a shipped config at
+# boot, not attacker bytes. Left ungated, one such call in a hub module
+# fans out to a chain from every route (observed: 113/123 chains on a real
+# app collapsing to one benign `yaml.load` of a static file). We suppress
+# these kinds when the call argument is a bare string literal or a
+# literal-path file read with no dynamic/attacker component.
+_STATIC_GATED_KINDS = frozenset({"unsafe_deserialization", "eval", "exec"})
+
+# A quoted string literal appears in the argument.
+_ARG_STRING_LITERAL = re.compile(r"""['"][^'"]*['"]""")
+# Signals the argument is (or may be) dynamic / attacker-influenced:
+# string concatenation, template/f-string interpolation, or a request /
+# runtime-input container. If any appears, we do NOT treat the arg as static.
+_ARG_DYNAMIC = re.compile(
+    r"\+|\$\{|`|\b(?:req|request|body|query|params|payload|argv|input|stdin)\b|process\."
+)
+
+
+def _extract_call_arg(content: str, open_paren: int, cap: int = 400) -> str:
+    """Return the text inside the balanced parens starting at ``open_paren``
+    (the index of the ``(``), bounded to ``cap`` chars."""
+    depth = 0
+    end = min(len(content), open_paren + cap)
+    for i in range(open_paren, end):
+        ch = content[i]
+        if ch == "(":
+            depth += 1
+        elif ch == ")":
+            depth -= 1
+            if depth == 0:
+                return content[open_paren + 1 : i]
+    return content[open_paren + 1 : end]
+
+
+def _is_static_local_arg(content: str, match: re.Match[str]) -> bool:
+    """True if the sink call's argument is provably static/local — a string
+    literal or a literal-path file read — with no dynamic/attacker component."""
+    paren = content.find("(", match.start())
+    if paren == -1:
+        return False
+    arg = _extract_call_arg(content, paren)
+    if not _ARG_STRING_LITERAL.search(arg):
+        return False  # no literal → provenance unknown → keep flagging
+    # Strip quoted spans before the dynamic check so a `+`/`${`/token that is
+    # DATA inside a literal (e.g. `eval('1 + 1')`, `yaml.load('a: b+c')`)
+    # doesn't read as concatenation/interpolation of the argument.
+    residual = _ARG_STRING_LITERAL.sub("", arg)
+    return _ARG_DYNAMIC.search(residual) is None
+
+
 def _find_sinks(
     files: dict[str, Path], root: Path
 ) -> dict[str, list[tuple[str, int, str]]]:
@@ -404,6 +457,10 @@ def _find_sinks(
         hits: list[tuple[str, int, str]] = []
         for kind, pattern in _SINK_PATTERNS:
             for match in pattern.finditer(content):
+                # Suppress ungated "dangerous-regardless" sinks whose argument
+                # is a static literal / local-file read (#88 follow-up).
+                if kind in _STATIC_GATED_KINDS and _is_static_local_arg(content, match):
+                    continue
                 line = content.count("\n", 0, match.start()) + 1
                 snippet = _line_snippet(content, match.start())
                 hits.append((kind, line, snippet))

{attackmap-0.3.0 → attackmap-0.3.1/src/attackmap.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: attackmap
-Version: 0.3.0
+Version: 0.3.1
 Summary: AI-assisted defensive security analyzer for codebases — scans a repository, models assets and controls, finds cross-cutting weaknesses, and generates an evidence-grounded review with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and detection-engineering hints.
 Author: AttackMap Contributors
 Author-email: Matthew Davis <matthewd@matthewd.xyz>
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ managers who need to triage an unfamiliar codebase.
 [![Python: 3.11+](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11%2B-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org/)
 [![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/attackmap.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/attackmap/)
 
-> **Status: beta (v0.3.0).** Core engine and 14 analyzer plugins are published
+> **Status: beta (v0.3.1).** Core engine and 14 analyzer plugins are published
 > to PyPI, Homebrew, and GHCR and validated against real-world codebases.
 > AttackMap is heuristic by design — findings are confidence-tiered evidence,
 > not proof. See [Project status](#project-status) for what's solid and what's
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ introduces a new HIGH finding.
 
 ## Project status
 
-AttackMap is **beta** (v0.3.0) — published and validated on real codebases, but
+AttackMap is **beta** (v0.3.1) — published and validated on real codebases, but
 pre-1.0 and heuristic.
 
 **Solid today:**

{attackmap-0.3.0 → attackmap-0.3.1}/tests/test_taint.py

@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ def test_analyze_taint_uses_scan_routes_directly(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
         "import worker\ndef h(): return worker.run()\n", encoding="utf-8"
     )
     (tmp_path / "worker.py").write_text(
-        "def run(): eval('1+1')\n", encoding="utf-8"
+        "def run(x): eval(x)\n", encoding="utf-8"
     )
     scan = ScanResult(
         root=str(tmp_path),
@@ -228,6 +228,77 @@ def test_analyze_taint_uses_scan_routes_directly(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
     assert chains[0].route_path == "/synthetic"
 
 
+def test_static_local_deserialization_not_flagged(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    """`yaml.load` of a static local file (shipped config at boot) is not an
+    unsafe deserialization of untrusted data — must not seed a chain. This is
+    the juice-shop `yaml.load(readFileSync('./swagger.yml'))` fan-out FP."""
+    (tmp_path / "server.js").write_text(
+        "const fs = require('fs')\n"
+        "const yaml = require('js-yaml')\n"
+        "const express = require('express')\n"
+        "const app = express()\n"
+        "const swaggerDocument = yaml.load(fs.readFileSync('./swagger.yml', 'utf8'))\n"
+        "app.get('/status', (req, res) => res.json(swaggerDocument))\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    scan = scan_repo(tmp_path)
+    assert not [c for c in scan.taint_chains if c.sink_kind == "unsafe_deserialization"]
+
+
+def test_dynamic_deserialization_still_flagged(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # request-derived bytes into yaml.load → real, still flagged.
+    (tmp_path / "app.py").write_text(
+        "from flask import Flask, request\n"
+        "import yaml\n"
+        "app = Flask(__name__)\n"
+        "@app.route('/load', methods=['POST'])\n"
+        "def load():\n"
+        "    return yaml.load(request.data)\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    scan = scan_repo(tmp_path)
+    assert any(c.sink_kind == "unsafe_deserialization" for c in scan.taint_chains)
+
+
+def test_concatenated_path_deserialization_still_flagged(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # literal path + a variable (potential traversal) is NOT purely static.
+    (tmp_path / "app.py").write_text(
+        "from flask import Flask, request\n"
+        "import yaml\n"
+        "app = Flask(__name__)\n"
+        "@app.route('/hint/<key>')\n"
+        "def hint(key):\n"
+        "    return yaml.load(open('./data/' + key + '.yml').read())\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    scan = scan_repo(tmp_path)
+    assert any(c.sink_kind == "unsafe_deserialization" for c in scan.taint_chains)
+
+
+def test_constant_eval_not_flagged_but_variable_eval_is(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+    # Separate files so hop-0 file-locality doesn't cross-link the routes.
+    (tmp_path / "constant.py").write_text(
+        "from flask import Flask\n"
+        "app = Flask(__name__)\n"
+        "@app.route('/const')\n"
+        "def c():\n"
+        "    return eval('1 + 1')\n",  # constant → benign, suppressed
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    (tmp_path / "dynamic.py").write_text(
+        "from flask import Flask, request\n"
+        "app = Flask(__name__)\n"
+        "@app.route('/dyn')\n"
+        "def d():\n"
+        "    return eval(request.args['x'])\n",  # variable → dangerous
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+    scan = scan_repo(tmp_path)
+    eval_routes = {c.route_path for c in scan.taint_chains if c.sink_kind == "eval"}
+    assert "/dyn" in eval_routes
+    assert "/const" not in eval_routes
+
+
 @pytest.mark.parametrize("sink_kind", ["eval", "exec", "subprocess_shell", "dynamic_open"])
 def test_all_sink_kinds_are_detectable(tmp_path: Path, sink_kind: str) -> None:
     (tmp_path / "route.py").write_text(
@@ -236,8 +307,10 @@ def test_all_sink_kinds_are_detectable(tmp_path: Path, sink_kind: str) -> None:
         encoding="utf-8",
     )
     bodies = {
-        "eval": "def go(): eval('1+1')\n",
-        "exec": "def go(): exec('a=1')\n",
+        # eval/exec use a variable arg (not a constant) — a constant eval is
+        # benign and is now suppressed by the static-arg gate (see below).
+        "eval": "def go(x): eval(x)\n",
+        "exec": "def go(x): exec(x)\n",
         "subprocess_shell": "import subprocess\ndef go(): subprocess.run('ls', shell=True)\n",
         "dynamic_open": "def go(req): return open(req.path)\n",
     }