agentsentinel-cli 0.7.3__tar.gz → 0.7.4__tar.gz

{agentsentinel_cli-0.7.3 → agentsentinel_cli-0.7.4}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: agentsentinel-cli
-Version: 0.7.3
+Version: 0.7.4
 Summary: Agentic security CLI — AI analyst with memory, supply chain audit, MCP audit, red-team probing, and agent discovery
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/jaydenaung/agentsentinel-cli
 Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/jaydenaung/agentsentinel-cli

{agentsentinel_cli-0.7.3 → agentsentinel_cli-0.7.4}/agentsentinel_cli/discover.py

@@ -379,6 +379,23 @@ def scan_subnet(
 
 # ── MCP protocol prober ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+def _auth_is_enforced(base: str, timeout: float) -> bool:
+    """Return True only if the server actively rejects unauthenticated requests.
+
+    Probes without credentials. McpAuthRequired (401/403) → enforced.
+    Successful handshake → not enforced (server accepts anyone).
+    Any other error → assume not enforced (conservative — don't hide risk).
+    """
+    from agentsentinel_cli.mcp_client import scan_http, McpAuthRequired, McpError
+    try:
+        scan_http(base, extra_headers=None, timeout=timeout)
+        return False
+    except McpAuthRequired:
+        return True
+    except (McpError, Exception):
+        return False
+
+
 def _probe_mcp(
     host: str,
     port: int,
@@ -423,28 +440,34 @@ def _probe_mcp(
     except Exception:
         return None
 
-    # Handshake succeeded — assess risk based on actual tool content
+    # Handshake succeeded — assess risk based on actual tool content and whether
+    # the server actually enforces authentication.
     tool_names = [t.name for t in server.tools]
     has_dangerous = any(t.is_dangerous for t in server.tools)
     has_write = any(t.scope == "write" for t in server.tools)
-    auth_present = bool(extra_headers)
 
-    if not auth_present:
+    # When credentials were provided, verify the server actually requires them.
+    # If it accepts a probe WITHOUT credentials too, auth is not enforced — the
+    # server is still open to anyone and the risk doesn't change.
+    auth_enforced = False
+    if extra_headers:
+        auth_enforced = _auth_is_enforced(base, timeout)
+
+    if not extra_headers or not auth_enforced:
         if has_dangerous or has_write:
             risk = "CRITICAL"
-            risk_reason = (
-                f"Unauthenticated MCP server with dangerous/write tools: "
-                f"{', '.join(t.name for t in server.tools if t.is_dangerous or t.scope == 'write')}"
-            )
+            bad = ", ".join(t.name for t in server.tools if t.is_dangerous or t.scope == "write")
+            risk_reason = f"Unauthenticated MCP server with dangerous/write tools: {bad}"
         else:
+            n = len(server.tools)
             risk = "HIGH"
             risk_reason = (
-                f"Unauthenticated MCP server — {len(server.tools)} tool"
-                f"{'s' if len(server.tools) != 1 else ''} publicly accessible"
+                f"Unauthenticated MCP server — {n} tool{'s' if n != 1 else ''} publicly accessible"
             )
     else:
+        n = len(server.tools)
         risk = "LOW"
-        risk_reason = f"MCP server (authenticated) — {len(server.tools)} tool{'s' if len(server.tools) != 1 else ''} enumerated"
+        risk_reason = f"MCP server (auth enforced) — {n} tool{'s' if n != 1 else ''} enumerated"
 
     scan_url = f"{base}/sse" if server.transport == "sse" else base
     auth_flag = (

{agentsentinel_cli-0.7.3 → agentsentinel_cli-0.7.4}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "agentsentinel-cli"
-version = "0.7.3"
+version = "0.7.4"
 description = "Agentic security CLI — AI analyst with memory, supply chain audit, MCP audit, red-team probing, and agent discovery"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"

agentsentinel_cli-0.7.4/tmp/note.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Notes
+
+python3.11 -m build 
+twine upload dist/agentsentinel_cli-0.7.3* --username __token__ --password $PYPI_TOKEN