agentdiscover 2.9.0__tar.gz → 2.9.2__tar.gz

{agentdiscover-2.9.0 → agentdiscover-2.9.2}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: agentdiscover
-Version: 2.9.0
+Version: 2.9.2
 Summary: Discover every AI agent in your infrastructure. 5-layer detection: static analysis, network monitoring, eBPF/Kubernetes runtime, endpoint, and cloud audit (CloudTrail). Company-level correlation. AIBOM export. MCP server detection.
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://defendai.ai
 Project-URL: Documentation, https://github.com/Defend-AI-Tech-Inc/agent-discover-scanner/blob/main/README.md
@@ -372,12 +372,20 @@ Passive observation of outbound connections to AI providers — OpenAI, Anthropi
 
 Real scan output:
 ```
-[DETECT] Google AI connection from Mail (PID: 776) → generativelanguage.googleapis.com:993
 [DETECT] OpenAI connection from Microsoft Edge Helper (PID: 4172) → api.openai.com:443
 [DETECT] Anthropic connection from Cursor Helper (PID: 61436) → api.anthropic.com:443
 [DETECT] OpenAI connection from OneDrive (PID: 96089) → api.openai.com:443
 ```
 
+**Forward-DNS correlation — reliable Bedrock detection without a CIDR list.**
+AWS Bedrock Runtime endpoints rotate across hundreds of generic EC2 IPs (e.g. `ec2-52-94-238-10.compute-1.amazonaws.com`). Reverse-DNS alone cannot recover the service name. At startup, Layer 2 proactively resolves all known LLM hostnames — including all regional Bedrock runtime and agent-runtime variants — and caches the resulting `IP → hostname` mappings with a short TTL. When psutil reports a connection to `52.94.238.10`, the forward-DNS cache immediately recovers `bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com` and classifies the connection correctly, even as the IP rotates.
+
+**Port filter — eliminates false positives from shared IP space.**
+External LLM APIs use HTTPS exclusively. Connections to provider-adjacent IPs on non-HTTPS ports (e.g. port 993 IMAP on a Google IP) are dropped before classification. Private IPs (Ollama, local inference servers, internal proxies) are exempt from this filter.
+
+**Process introspection — framework detection at runtime.**
+When Layer 2 observes a live connection, it resolves the process cmdline to its Python entry script and runs the same L1 detection rules (DAI001–DAI007) against that file in-process. If a framework is identified (LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen, etc.), the agent is immediately promoted to **CONFIRMED** — no prior static code scan and no CloudTrail required. Each finding carries a `framework_confidence` of `"high"` (signal in the entry script directly) or `"medium"` (signal in a sibling project file), and the resolved `entry_script` path for identity reconciliation with any parallel L1 scan.
+
 ### Layer 5 — Cloud Audit (v2.7.0+)
 
 **Why Layer 2 misses AWS Bedrock.** AWS Bedrock Runtime endpoints rotate across hundreds of generic EC2 IPs with no published CIDR ranges and no stable reverse-DNS pattern. Passive socket monitoring (psutil) can observe the TCP connection but cannot reliably identify it as Bedrock without a complete, continuously-updated IP allowlist — which does not exist publicly. On VPC endpoints, traffic stays inside the AWS network and never appears on the host's socket table at all.
@@ -549,7 +557,16 @@ Scans developer machines, CI/CD runners, and workstations via osquery. Finds ins
 
 After all layers run, the correlator builds a unified agent identity. An agent seen in code (Layer 1), confirmed running in K8s (Layer 3), and observed making network calls (Layer 2) is a single correlated identity — not three separate findings.
 
-Agents present at runtime with **no Layer 1 match** become GHOST agents.
+**CONFIRMED paths** (any of the following is sufficient):
+- Layer 1 (code) + Layer 2 (live network connection)
+- Layer 1 (code) + Layer 3 (K8s / eBPF runtime event)
+- Layer 1 (code) + Layer 4 (osquery endpoint) + Layer 2 (network)
+- Layer 1 (code) + Layer 5 (CloudTrail Bedrock invocation or SSE proxy event)
+- **Layer 2 alone** — when process introspection identifies a framework from the running process entry script, a live connection is sufficient for CONFIRMED without a prior static scan
+
+Agents present at runtime with **no Layer 1 match** and no framework identified by process introspection become GHOST agents.
+
+The `entry_script` field carries the resolved Python entry-script path from Layer 2 process introspection. When both a static Layer 1 finding and a Layer 2 runtime finding exist for the same file, the platform merges them into a single agent record rather than treating them as two separate orphans.
 
 ### SaaS blast radius detection (v2.3.0+)
 
@@ -713,13 +730,17 @@ When connected to the platform, each scan triggers the **correlation engine** wh
 - **Cross-machine intelligence** — agent seen on 3 machines and crossed from dev into prod? Automatic risk escalation.
 - **SaaS blast radius** — platform aggregates confirmed SaaS connections across all scans and computes blast radius score.
 
-**What the scanner sends (v2.8.1+):**
+**What the scanner sends (v2.9.0+):**
 
-The upload payload now includes full Layer 2 and Layer 5 telemetry, not just Layer 1 code findings:
+The upload payload includes full Layer 2 and Layer 5 telemetry, not just Layer 1 code findings:
 
 | Field | Source | Contents |
 |---|---|---|
 | `agents[]` | All layers | Per-agent metadata including classification, risk, SaaS connections |
+| `agents[].detected_hosts` | Layer 2 ForwardDNSCache | DNS-correlated LLM/provider hostnames (e.g. `bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com`) recovered before psutil classification — reliable even as provider IPs rotate |
+| `agents[].evidence` | Correlator | Ordered confirmation-source tags: `layer1_code_scan`, `layer2_network`, `layer2_process_introspection`, `layer2_dns_host`, `layer3_k8s_runtime`, `layer4_endpoint`, `layer5_cloudtrail`, `layer5_sse_proxy` |
+| `agents[].entry_script` | Layer 2 process introspection | Absolute path to the Python entry script resolved from the OS process cmdline — used to reconcile L1 `code_file` identity with the L2 runtime finding so the same agent is not reported as two orphans |
+| `agents[].framework_confidence` | Layer 2 process introspection | `"high"` = framework signal found in the entry script directly · `"medium"` = found in a sibling project file · `null` = not detected |
 | `agents[].metadata.bedrock_invocations` | Layer 5 CloudTrail | Number of Bedrock API calls attributed to this agent |
 | `agents[].metadata.models_called` | Layer 5 CloudTrail | Model IDs invoked (e.g. `anthropic.claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022-v2:0`) |
 | `agents[].metadata.iam_users` | Layer 5 CloudTrail | IAM principals observed making calls |
@@ -947,12 +968,12 @@ Full Kubernetes setup: `install.sh` handles Helm, runtime monitoring setup, and
 
 ## DefendAI platform
 
-AgentDiscover Scanner is the **discovery layer** of the DefendAI platform.
+agentscanner is the **discovery layer** of the DefendAI platform.
 
 | Component                 | Status         | Description                                                           |
 | ------------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| **AgentDiscover Scanner** | ✅ Open Source (v2.8.1) | Discover and classify AI agents across your environment  |
-| **defendai-agent**        | 🧪 Beta        | MITM proxy for real-time AI traffic inspection and policy enforcement |
+| **agentscanner**          | ✅ Open Source (v2.9.0) | Discover and classify AI agents across your environment  |
+| **defendai-sensor**       | 🧪 Beta        | MITM proxy for real-time AI traffic inspection and policy enforcement |
 | **Correlation Engine**    | ✅ Available    | Cross-machine identity resolution and behavioral drift detection      |
 | **Policy Engine**         | 🚧 Coming Soon | Define and enforce agent behavior rules                               |
 | **DefendAI Platform**     | 💼 Enterprise  | Full lifecycle governance for autonomous AI                           |

{agentdiscover-2.9.0 → agentdiscover-2.9.2}/README.md

@@ -329,12 +329,20 @@ Passive observation of outbound connections to AI providers — OpenAI, Anthropi
 
 Real scan output:
 ```
-[DETECT] Google AI connection from Mail (PID: 776) → generativelanguage.googleapis.com:993
 [DETECT] OpenAI connection from Microsoft Edge Helper (PID: 4172) → api.openai.com:443
 [DETECT] Anthropic connection from Cursor Helper (PID: 61436) → api.anthropic.com:443
 [DETECT] OpenAI connection from OneDrive (PID: 96089) → api.openai.com:443
 ```
 
+**Forward-DNS correlation — reliable Bedrock detection without a CIDR list.**
+AWS Bedrock Runtime endpoints rotate across hundreds of generic EC2 IPs (e.g. `ec2-52-94-238-10.compute-1.amazonaws.com`). Reverse-DNS alone cannot recover the service name. At startup, Layer 2 proactively resolves all known LLM hostnames — including all regional Bedrock runtime and agent-runtime variants — and caches the resulting `IP → hostname` mappings with a short TTL. When psutil reports a connection to `52.94.238.10`, the forward-DNS cache immediately recovers `bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com` and classifies the connection correctly, even as the IP rotates.
+
+**Port filter — eliminates false positives from shared IP space.**
+External LLM APIs use HTTPS exclusively. Connections to provider-adjacent IPs on non-HTTPS ports (e.g. port 993 IMAP on a Google IP) are dropped before classification. Private IPs (Ollama, local inference servers, internal proxies) are exempt from this filter.
+
+**Process introspection — framework detection at runtime.**
+When Layer 2 observes a live connection, it resolves the process cmdline to its Python entry script and runs the same L1 detection rules (DAI001–DAI007) against that file in-process. If a framework is identified (LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen, etc.), the agent is immediately promoted to **CONFIRMED** — no prior static code scan and no CloudTrail required. Each finding carries a `framework_confidence` of `"high"` (signal in the entry script directly) or `"medium"` (signal in a sibling project file), and the resolved `entry_script` path for identity reconciliation with any parallel L1 scan.
+
 ### Layer 5 — Cloud Audit (v2.7.0+)
 
 **Why Layer 2 misses AWS Bedrock.** AWS Bedrock Runtime endpoints rotate across hundreds of generic EC2 IPs with no published CIDR ranges and no stable reverse-DNS pattern. Passive socket monitoring (psutil) can observe the TCP connection but cannot reliably identify it as Bedrock without a complete, continuously-updated IP allowlist — which does not exist publicly. On VPC endpoints, traffic stays inside the AWS network and never appears on the host's socket table at all.
@@ -506,7 +514,16 @@ Scans developer machines, CI/CD runners, and workstations via osquery. Finds ins
 
 After all layers run, the correlator builds a unified agent identity. An agent seen in code (Layer 1), confirmed running in K8s (Layer 3), and observed making network calls (Layer 2) is a single correlated identity — not three separate findings.
 
-Agents present at runtime with **no Layer 1 match** become GHOST agents.
+**CONFIRMED paths** (any of the following is sufficient):
+- Layer 1 (code) + Layer 2 (live network connection)
+- Layer 1 (code) + Layer 3 (K8s / eBPF runtime event)
+- Layer 1 (code) + Layer 4 (osquery endpoint) + Layer 2 (network)
+- Layer 1 (code) + Layer 5 (CloudTrail Bedrock invocation or SSE proxy event)
+- **Layer 2 alone** — when process introspection identifies a framework from the running process entry script, a live connection is sufficient for CONFIRMED without a prior static scan
+
+Agents present at runtime with **no Layer 1 match** and no framework identified by process introspection become GHOST agents.
+
+The `entry_script` field carries the resolved Python entry-script path from Layer 2 process introspection. When both a static Layer 1 finding and a Layer 2 runtime finding exist for the same file, the platform merges them into a single agent record rather than treating them as two separate orphans.
 
 ### SaaS blast radius detection (v2.3.0+)
 
@@ -670,13 +687,17 @@ When connected to the platform, each scan triggers the **correlation engine** wh
 - **Cross-machine intelligence** — agent seen on 3 machines and crossed from dev into prod? Automatic risk escalation.
 - **SaaS blast radius** — platform aggregates confirmed SaaS connections across all scans and computes blast radius score.
 
-**What the scanner sends (v2.8.1+):**
+**What the scanner sends (v2.9.0+):**
 
-The upload payload now includes full Layer 2 and Layer 5 telemetry, not just Layer 1 code findings:
+The upload payload includes full Layer 2 and Layer 5 telemetry, not just Layer 1 code findings:
 
 | Field | Source | Contents |
 |---|---|---|
 | `agents[]` | All layers | Per-agent metadata including classification, risk, SaaS connections |
+| `agents[].detected_hosts` | Layer 2 ForwardDNSCache | DNS-correlated LLM/provider hostnames (e.g. `bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com`) recovered before psutil classification — reliable even as provider IPs rotate |
+| `agents[].evidence` | Correlator | Ordered confirmation-source tags: `layer1_code_scan`, `layer2_network`, `layer2_process_introspection`, `layer2_dns_host`, `layer3_k8s_runtime`, `layer4_endpoint`, `layer5_cloudtrail`, `layer5_sse_proxy` |
+| `agents[].entry_script` | Layer 2 process introspection | Absolute path to the Python entry script resolved from the OS process cmdline — used to reconcile L1 `code_file` identity with the L2 runtime finding so the same agent is not reported as two orphans |
+| `agents[].framework_confidence` | Layer 2 process introspection | `"high"` = framework signal found in the entry script directly · `"medium"` = found in a sibling project file · `null` = not detected |
 | `agents[].metadata.bedrock_invocations` | Layer 5 CloudTrail | Number of Bedrock API calls attributed to this agent |
 | `agents[].metadata.models_called` | Layer 5 CloudTrail | Model IDs invoked (e.g. `anthropic.claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022-v2:0`) |
 | `agents[].metadata.iam_users` | Layer 5 CloudTrail | IAM principals observed making calls |
@@ -904,12 +925,12 @@ Full Kubernetes setup: `install.sh` handles Helm, runtime monitoring setup, and
 
 ## DefendAI platform
 
-AgentDiscover Scanner is the **discovery layer** of the DefendAI platform.
+agentscanner is the **discovery layer** of the DefendAI platform.
 
 | Component                 | Status         | Description                                                           |
 | ------------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| **AgentDiscover Scanner** | ✅ Open Source (v2.8.1) | Discover and classify AI agents across your environment  |
-| **defendai-agent**        | 🧪 Beta        | MITM proxy for real-time AI traffic inspection and policy enforcement |
+| **agentscanner**          | ✅ Open Source (v2.9.0) | Discover and classify AI agents across your environment  |
+| **defendai-sensor**       | 🧪 Beta        | MITM proxy for real-time AI traffic inspection and policy enforcement |
 | **Correlation Engine**    | ✅ Available    | Cross-machine identity resolution and behavioral drift detection      |
 | **Policy Engine**         | 🚧 Coming Soon | Define and enforce agent behavior rules                               |
 | **DefendAI Platform**     | 💼 Enterprise  | Full lifecycle governance for autonomous AI                           |

{agentdiscover-2.9.0 → agentdiscover-2.9.2}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "agentdiscover"
-version = "2.9.0"
+version = "2.9.2"
 description = "Discover every AI agent in your infrastructure. 5-layer detection: static analysis, network monitoring, eBPF/Kubernetes runtime, endpoint, and cloud audit (CloudTrail). Company-level correlation. AIBOM export. MCP server detection."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"

{agentdiscover-2.9.0 → agentdiscover-2.9.2}/src/agent_discover_scanner/known_apps.py

@@ -123,13 +123,18 @@ def load_platform_known_apps(
             except Exception:
                 pass
         else:
-            # Urllib fallback when SDK not installed
+            # Urllib fallback when SDK not installed.
+            # Use the same auth scheme as /scanner/ingest: Authorization: Bearer {api_key}
+            # X-DefendAI-Tenant-Token is included only when a tenant token is available.
             try:
                 import urllib.request
 
+                _headers: dict = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}"}
+                if tenant_token:
+                    _headers["X-DefendAI-Tenant-Token"] = tenant_token
                 req = urllib.request.Request(
                     f"{wawsdb_url.rstrip('/')}/scanner/config/known-apps",
-                    headers={"X-API-Key": api_key},
+                    headers=_headers,
                 )
                 with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:
                     data = json.loads(resp.read().decode())

{agentdiscover-2.9.0 → agentdiscover-2.9.2}/src/agent_discover_scanner/platform.py

@@ -215,14 +215,17 @@ def load_credentials() -> Optional[Dict[str, str]]:
         tenant_token = data.get("tenant_token") or data.get("tenant-token")
         wawsdb_url = data.get("wawsdb_url") or data.get("wawsdb-url")
 
-        if not (api_key and tenant_token and wawsdb_url):
+        # Only api_key is required; tenant_token and wawsdb_url are optional.
+        # A config with just api_key (and optionally wawsdb_url) is valid.
+        if not api_key:
             return None
 
-        return {
-            "api_key": str(api_key),
-            "tenant_token": str(tenant_token),
-            "wawsdb_url": str(wawsdb_url),
-        }
+        result: dict[str, str] = {"api_key": str(api_key)}
+        if tenant_token:
+            result["tenant_token"] = str(tenant_token)
+        if wawsdb_url:
+            result["wawsdb_url"] = str(wawsdb_url)
+        return result
     except Exception:
         # Never propagate errors from credential loading
         return None
@@ -485,28 +488,39 @@ def upload_scan_results(
         print(f"⚠️ Platform upload failed: {reason} (scan still succeeded)")
         return False
 
-    # Resolve credentials
+    # Resolve credentials.
+    #
+    # tenant_token is OPTIONAL — the API key alone is sufficient to authenticate.
+    # When a tenant_token is also provided it is forwarded as X-DefendAI-Tenant-Token
+    # for backwards-compatibility with multi-tenant deployments, but it is never
+    # required.  This means free-tier users can pass just --api-key and have the
+    # upload work without a second credential.
+    #
+    # Resolution order:
+    #   1. CLI arguments (api_key / tenant_token)
+    #   2. ~/.defendai/config
+    #   3. Built-in sandbox defaults (only when no api_key is found at all)
     source = "sandbox"
     resolved_api_key = api_key
     resolved_tenant_token = tenant_token
     resolved_wawsdb_url = wawsdb_url or _DEFAULT_WAWSDB_URL
 
-    if resolved_api_key and resolved_tenant_token:
+    if resolved_api_key:
+        # api_key alone is enough; tenant_token is supplemental
         source = "cli"
     else:
         cfg = load_credentials()
         if cfg:
-            # Only override from config when CLI values are missing
             if not resolved_api_key:
                 resolved_api_key = cfg.get("api_key")
             if not resolved_tenant_token:
                 resolved_tenant_token = cfg.get("tenant_token")
             resolved_wawsdb_url = cfg.get("wawsdb_url") or resolved_wawsdb_url
-            if resolved_api_key and resolved_tenant_token:
+            if resolved_api_key:
                 source = "config"
 
-    if not resolved_api_key or not resolved_tenant_token:
-        # Fall back to sandbox defaults
+    if not resolved_api_key:
+        # No api_key found anywhere — fall back to sandbox for preview
         resolved_api_key = _SANDBOX_API_KEY
         resolved_tenant_token = _SANDBOX_TENANT_TOKEN
         resolved_wawsdb_url = resolved_wawsdb_url or _DEFAULT_WAWSDB_URL
@@ -518,7 +532,7 @@ def upload_scan_results(
     elif source == "config":
         print("✓ Uploading to DefendAI platform (from ~/.defendai/config)...")
     else:
-        print("💡 No credentials provided — uploading to DefendAI sandbox for preview")
+        print("💡 No API key provided — uploading to DefendAI sandbox for preview")
 
     if mcp_result is None:
         try:
@@ -622,10 +636,13 @@ def upload_scan_results(
         else:
             print("⚠️  Large scan result truncated for upload")
 
-    headers = {
-        "X-DefendAI-Tenant-Token": resolved_tenant_token,
+    # X-DefendAI-Tenant-Token is included only when a tenant token is available.
+    # The Authorization: Bearer header carries the api_key and is always present.
+    headers: dict[str, str] = {
         "Authorization": f"Bearer {resolved_api_key}",
     }
+    if resolved_tenant_token:
+        headers["X-DefendAI-Tenant-Token"] = resolved_tenant_token
 
     try:
         with httpx.Client(timeout=30.0, verify=certifi.where()) as client:  # type: ignore[call-arg]

{agentdiscover-2.9.0 → agentdiscover-2.9.2}/tests/test_platform_enrichment.py

@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ Tests for platform.py enrichment functions added in v2.8.0 / v2.9.0:
   - format_agents_for_upload  (L5 enrichment + credential_files_found + L2 enrichment)
 """
 
+import json
+import os
+import tempfile
+
 import pytest
 
 from agent_discover_scanner.platform import (
@@ -15,6 +19,7 @@ from agent_discover_scanner.platform import (
     build_cloud_audit_summary,
     build_network_summary,
     format_agents_for_upload,
+    load_credentials,
 )
 
 
@@ -558,3 +563,102 @@ class TestFormatAgentsL2Enrichment:
         agent = self._fmt(report)[0]
         assert "evidence" in agent
         assert isinstance(agent["evidence"], list)
+
+
+# ── TestLoadCredentials ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class TestLoadCredentials:
+    """
+    load_credentials() unit tests.
+
+    Verifies that:
+    - api_key alone (without tenant_token) is sufficient to return credentials
+    - tenant_token and wawsdb_url are optional fields
+    - Missing api_key always returns None
+    - Malformed / missing config file returns None cleanly
+    """
+
+    def _write_config(self, tmpdir: str, data: dict) -> str:
+        path = os.path.join(tmpdir, ".defendai", "config")
+        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
+        with open(path, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(data, f)
+        return path
+
+    def _load(self, config_path: str):
+        """Patch the expanduser path and call load_credentials()."""
+        import agent_discover_scanner.platform as plat
+        original = plat.os.path.expanduser
+        plat.os.path.expanduser = lambda p: config_path if "config" in p else original(p)
+        try:
+            return load_credentials()
+        finally:
+            plat.os.path.expanduser = original
+
+    def test_api_key_and_all_fields_returns_full_dict(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            cfg = self._write_config(tmp, {
+                "api_key": "key-abc",
+                "tenant_token": "tok-xyz",
+                "wawsdb_url": "https://custom.example.com",
+            })
+            result = self._load(cfg)
+            assert result is not None
+            assert result["api_key"] == "key-abc"
+            assert result["tenant_token"] == "tok-xyz"
+            assert result["wawsdb_url"] == "https://custom.example.com"
+
+    def test_api_key_only_returns_credentials(self):
+        """tenant_token absence must NOT prevent credential loading."""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            cfg = self._write_config(tmp, {"api_key": "key-abc"})
+            result = self._load(cfg)
+            assert result is not None
+            assert result["api_key"] == "key-abc"
+            assert "tenant_token" not in result
+
+    def test_api_key_and_url_no_tenant_token(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            cfg = self._write_config(tmp, {
+                "api_key": "key-abc",
+                "wawsdb_url": "https://custom.example.com",
+            })
+            result = self._load(cfg)
+            assert result is not None
+            assert result["api_key"] == "key-abc"
+            assert result["wawsdb_url"] == "https://custom.example.com"
+            assert "tenant_token" not in result
+
+    def test_missing_api_key_returns_none(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            cfg = self._write_config(tmp, {
+                "tenant_token": "tok-xyz",
+                "wawsdb_url": "https://custom.example.com",
+            })
+            result = self._load(cfg)
+            assert result is None
+
+    def test_empty_config_returns_none(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            cfg = self._write_config(tmp, {})
+            result = self._load(cfg)
+            assert result is None
+
+    def test_api_key_hyphen_variant_accepted(self):
+        """Both api_key and api-key spellings should work."""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            cfg = self._write_config(tmp, {"api-key": "key-hyphen"})
+            result = self._load(cfg)
+            assert result is not None
+            assert result["api_key"] == "key-hyphen"
+
+    def test_missing_config_file_returns_none(self):
+        """A path that doesn't exist must return None without raising."""
+        import agent_discover_scanner.platform as plat
+        original = plat.os.path.expanduser
+        plat.os.path.expanduser = lambda p: "/nonexistent/path/config"
+        try:
+            result = load_credentials()
+        finally:
+            plat.os.path.expanduser = original
+        assert result is None

{agentdiscover-2.9.0 → agentdiscover-2.9.2}/uv.lock

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ requires-python = ">=3.10"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "agentdiscover"
-version = "2.8.1"
+version = "2.9.2"
 source = { editable = "." }
 dependencies = [
     { name = "certifi" },