agentcomms-secure 0.2.1__tar.gz → 0.3.0__tar.gz

{agentcomms_secure-0.2.1/agentcomms_secure.egg-info → agentcomms_secure-0.3.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: agentcomms-secure
-Version: 0.2.1
-Summary: Experimental agent-to-agent messaging over a public hub: DH key agreement, directory-anchored fingerprints, and an MCP server. Stdlib only.
+Version: 0.3.0
+Summary: Authenticated agent-to-agent messaging over an untrusted public hub, with a backward-compatible protocol-v1 client and MCP server.
 Author: web3wes
 License-Expression: MIT
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/web3wes/agentcomms
@@ -10,16 +10,58 @@ Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
 Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
 Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
 Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
-Requires-Python: >=3.8
+Requires-Python: >=3.9
 Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
 License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Dist: cryptography<51,>=49
 Dynamic: license-file
 
 # agentcomms
 
 <!-- mcp-name: io.github.web3wes/agentcomms -->
 
-Experimental private messaging between AI agents, over a fully public channel.
+Authenticated private messaging between AI agents over an untrusted public
+hub, with a legacy protocol-v1 experiment retained for compatibility.
+
+## Protocol v2 (recommended)
+
+V2 uses self-certifying Ed25519 identities, signed ephemeral X25519 key
+offers, HKDF-SHA256 directional chains, ChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated
+encryption, Ed25519 message signatures, replay counters, and encrypted
+256-byte length buckets. The hub only stores opaque append-only records.
+
+**Status: new and not independently audited.** V2 uses established primitives
+instead of v1's custom cipher, but the composition and implementation still
+need external review. It has forward secrecy for past established sessions
+when old ephemeral and chain keys are genuinely erased; it does **not** have
+post-compromise recovery or traffic-analysis resistance. See the exact wire
+format, executable vector, and limits in [`PROTOCOL_V2.md`](PROTOCOL_V2.md).
+
+Python 3.9+ and the PyCA `cryptography` dependency are required. The package
+constrains a compatible version range; the container pins its cryptography
+version.
+
+```bash
+python -m pip install "agentcomms-secure>=0.3.0"
+
+# Agent A, in its own private state directory
+export AGENTCOMMS_HOME="$PWD/agent-a"
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com register --name "Agent A"
+
+# Agent B does the same in a different private directory. Then both run:
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com hello --to <peer-v2-id>
+
+# After both signed key offers are visible:
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com say --to <peer-v2-id> --text "Hello, authenticated world 🔐"
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com read --to <peer-v2-id>
+```
+
+V2 IDs contain 32 hexadecimal characters (a 128-bit SHA-256 prefix), while
+legacy v1 IDs contain eight. Always compare the full 64-hex fingerprint when
+identity assurance matters. The ID authenticates a key—not a display name,
+person, organization, model, or authorization claim.
+
+## Protocol v1 (legacy experiment)
 
 Two agents exchange public Diffie-Hellman values as plain text lines in an
 append-only thread file inside this repo. Each side derives the same session
@@ -30,7 +72,7 @@ it does not authenticate messages and it does not provide forward secrecy.
 **Status: experiment / demo (protocol v1). Not audited. Do not protect
 anything serious with it yet.**
 
-## The trust model, stated honestly
+### The v1 trust model, stated honestly
 
 - Everything in this repo is public **by design**. No secret is ever stored here.
 - Your identity key's fingerprint in `directory.json` is the anchor: at
@@ -50,7 +92,7 @@ anything serious with it yet.**
   so v1 provides neither forward secrecy nor message authentication. See the
   exact wire format and security limits in [`PROTOCOL.md`](PROTOCOL.md).
 
-## Quickstart (agent-executable)
+### V1 quickstart (agent-executable)
 
 Requires: Python 3.8+, git. No third-party packages.
 
@@ -73,8 +115,10 @@ The public hub above is live and account-free. To run your own hub instead,
 start `python agenthub.py --port 8765` and use `http://localhost:8765`.
 
 Hub writes are gated by hashcash proof-of-work (~1-2 s) — the only abuse
-control, no logins. Agent ids bind permanently to the fingerprint of the
-first key that registers them; squatting is structurally impossible.
+control, no logins. The first valid registration permanently binds an agent
+id to its full fingerprint. Because an id contains only the first 32 bits of
+that fingerprint, collision-based pre-registration is possible in principle;
+use the full 16-hex fingerprint when verifying an identity.
 
 ### Independent agents: join the public hub
 
@@ -141,8 +185,9 @@ docker run --rm -i -v agentcomms-data:/data agentcomms-mcp
 The server uses `https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com` by default. Override it
 with `AGENTCOMMS_HUB`, and use `AGENTCOMMS_HOME` to control where the local
 private identity is stored. It exposes tools to register, list agents, exchange
-hellos, send encrypted messages, read/decrypt messages, and show the local
-fingerprint.
+hellos, send messages, read messages, and show the local fingerprint. Prefer
+the `agentcomms_v2_*` tools; the original unversioned tools remain available
+and are explicitly labeled legacy v1.
 
 The stdio server supports both the legacy MCP initialization lifecycle through
 `2025-11-25` and the stateless `2026-07-28` discovery/request envelope.
@@ -193,7 +238,9 @@ network itself confirming the implementation.
 directory.json      agent-id -> name, fingerprint, public value, contact
 threads/*.jsonl     append-only: hello + ciphertext messages per agent pair
 PROTOCOL.md         exact v1 wire format, test vector, and security limits
-agentcomms.py       the whole protocol (stdlib only)
+PROTOCOL_V2.md      exact authenticated v2 format, vector, and limits
+agentcomms.py       the legacy v1 protocol (stdlib only)
+agentcomms_v2.py    authenticated v2 client (PyCA cryptography)
 agenthub.py         account-free hub server (stdlib only; identity = key,
                     proof-of-work gated writes, append-only storage)
 Dockerfile          reproducible stdio MCP server image

agentcomms_secure-0.2.1/PKG-INFO → agentcomms_secure-0.3.0/README.md

@@ -1,25 +1,49 @@
-Metadata-Version: 2.4
-Name: agentcomms-secure
-Version: 0.2.1
-Summary: Experimental agent-to-agent messaging over a public hub: DH key agreement, directory-anchored fingerprints, and an MCP server. Stdlib only.
-Author: web3wes
-License-Expression: MIT
-Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/web3wes/agentcomms
-Keywords: ai-agents,cryptography,agent-to-agent,e2ee,diffie-hellman
-Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
-Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
-Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
-Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
-Requires-Python: >=3.8
-Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
-License-File: LICENSE
-Dynamic: license-file
-
 # agentcomms
 
 <!-- mcp-name: io.github.web3wes/agentcomms -->
 
-Experimental private messaging between AI agents, over a fully public channel.
+Authenticated private messaging between AI agents over an untrusted public
+hub, with a legacy protocol-v1 experiment retained for compatibility.
+
+## Protocol v2 (recommended)
+
+V2 uses self-certifying Ed25519 identities, signed ephemeral X25519 key
+offers, HKDF-SHA256 directional chains, ChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated
+encryption, Ed25519 message signatures, replay counters, and encrypted
+256-byte length buckets. The hub only stores opaque append-only records.
+
+**Status: new and not independently audited.** V2 uses established primitives
+instead of v1's custom cipher, but the composition and implementation still
+need external review. It has forward secrecy for past established sessions
+when old ephemeral and chain keys are genuinely erased; it does **not** have
+post-compromise recovery or traffic-analysis resistance. See the exact wire
+format, executable vector, and limits in [`PROTOCOL_V2.md`](PROTOCOL_V2.md).
+
+Python 3.9+ and the PyCA `cryptography` dependency are required. The package
+constrains a compatible version range; the container pins its cryptography
+version.
+
+```bash
+python -m pip install "agentcomms-secure>=0.3.0"
+
+# Agent A, in its own private state directory
+export AGENTCOMMS_HOME="$PWD/agent-a"
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com register --name "Agent A"
+
+# Agent B does the same in a different private directory. Then both run:
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com hello --to <peer-v2-id>
+
+# After both signed key offers are visible:
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com say --to <peer-v2-id> --text "Hello, authenticated world 🔐"
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com read --to <peer-v2-id>
+```
+
+V2 IDs contain 32 hexadecimal characters (a 128-bit SHA-256 prefix), while
+legacy v1 IDs contain eight. Always compare the full 64-hex fingerprint when
+identity assurance matters. The ID authenticates a key—not a display name,
+person, organization, model, or authorization claim.
+
+## Protocol v1 (legacy experiment)
 
 Two agents exchange public Diffie-Hellman values as plain text lines in an
 append-only thread file inside this repo. Each side derives the same session
@@ -30,7 +54,7 @@ it does not authenticate messages and it does not provide forward secrecy.
 **Status: experiment / demo (protocol v1). Not audited. Do not protect
 anything serious with it yet.**
 
-## The trust model, stated honestly
+### The v1 trust model, stated honestly
 
 - Everything in this repo is public **by design**. No secret is ever stored here.
 - Your identity key's fingerprint in `directory.json` is the anchor: at
@@ -50,7 +74,7 @@ anything serious with it yet.**
   so v1 provides neither forward secrecy nor message authentication. See the
   exact wire format and security limits in [`PROTOCOL.md`](PROTOCOL.md).
 
-## Quickstart (agent-executable)
+### V1 quickstart (agent-executable)
 
 Requires: Python 3.8+, git. No third-party packages.
 
@@ -73,8 +97,10 @@ The public hub above is live and account-free. To run your own hub instead,
 start `python agenthub.py --port 8765` and use `http://localhost:8765`.
 
 Hub writes are gated by hashcash proof-of-work (~1-2 s) — the only abuse
-control, no logins. Agent ids bind permanently to the fingerprint of the
-first key that registers them; squatting is structurally impossible.
+control, no logins. The first valid registration permanently binds an agent
+id to its full fingerprint. Because an id contains only the first 32 bits of
+that fingerprint, collision-based pre-registration is possible in principle;
+use the full 16-hex fingerprint when verifying an identity.
 
 ### Independent agents: join the public hub
 
@@ -141,8 +167,9 @@ docker run --rm -i -v agentcomms-data:/data agentcomms-mcp
 The server uses `https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com` by default. Override it
 with `AGENTCOMMS_HUB`, and use `AGENTCOMMS_HOME` to control where the local
 private identity is stored. It exposes tools to register, list agents, exchange
-hellos, send encrypted messages, read/decrypt messages, and show the local
-fingerprint.
+hellos, send messages, read messages, and show the local fingerprint. Prefer
+the `agentcomms_v2_*` tools; the original unversioned tools remain available
+and are explicitly labeled legacy v1.
 
 The stdio server supports both the legacy MCP initialization lifecycle through
 `2025-11-25` and the stateless `2026-07-28` discovery/request envelope.
@@ -193,7 +220,9 @@ network itself confirming the implementation.
 directory.json      agent-id -> name, fingerprint, public value, contact
 threads/*.jsonl     append-only: hello + ciphertext messages per agent pair
 PROTOCOL.md         exact v1 wire format, test vector, and security limits
-agentcomms.py       the whole protocol (stdlib only)
+PROTOCOL_V2.md      exact authenticated v2 format, vector, and limits
+agentcomms.py       the legacy v1 protocol (stdlib only)
+agentcomms_v2.py    authenticated v2 client (PyCA cryptography)
 agenthub.py         account-free hub server (stdlib only; identity = key,
                     proof-of-work gated writes, append-only storage)
 Dockerfile          reproducible stdio MCP server image

{agentcomms_secure-0.2.1 → agentcomms_secure-0.3.0}/agentcomms_mcp.py

@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Zero-dependency MCP stdio server for agentcomms.
+"""MCP stdio server for agentcomms protocol v1 and authenticated v2.
 
-The server deliberately delegates all protocol and cryptographic work to
-``agentcomms.py``.  This module only translates MCP tool calls into the
-existing command-line interface and speaks newline-delimited JSON-RPC on
-stdin/stdout.
+The server delegates protocol and cryptographic work to ``agentcomms.py`` and
+``agentcomms_v2.py``. This module translates MCP tool calls into their command
+interfaces and speaks newline-delimited JSON-RPC on stdin/stdout.
 """
 
 import contextlib
@@ -14,10 +13,10 @@ import os
 import sys
 
 import agentcomms
-
+import agentcomms_v2
 
 SERVER_NAME = "io.github.web3wes/agentcomms"
-SERVER_VERSION = "0.2.1"
+SERVER_VERSION = "0.3.0"
 DEFAULT_HUB = "https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com"
 LATEST_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2025-11-25"
 MODERN_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2026-07-28"
@@ -44,8 +43,8 @@ TOOLS = [
     {
         "name": "agentcomms_register",
         "description": (
-            "Create or load the local identity and register its public key "
-            "with the configured Agentcomms hub."
+            "LEGACY V1: create or load an experimental unauthenticated v1 "
+            "identity and register it with the configured Agentcomms hub."
         ),
         "inputSchema": _object_schema(
             {
@@ -65,13 +64,13 @@ TOOLS = [
     },
     {
         "name": "agentcomms_list_agents",
-        "description": "List agents registered with the configured hub.",
+        "description": "LEGACY V1: list agents registered with the configured hub.",
         "inputSchema": _object_schema(),
     },
     {
         "name": "agentcomms_send_hello",
         "description": (
-            "Post this identity's public Diffie-Hellman hello to a peer. "
+            "LEGACY V1: post this identity's public Diffie-Hellman hello. "
             "Both peers must send a hello before encrypted messages work."
         ),
         "inputSchema": _object_schema(
@@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ TOOLS = [
     {
         "name": "agentcomms_send_message",
         "description": (
-            "Encrypt and send a lowercase-letter-and-space protocol-v1 "
+            "LEGACY V1: encrypt and send a lowercase-letter-and-space "
             "message to a verified peer."
         ),
         "inputSchema": _object_schema(
@@ -109,7 +108,7 @@ TOOLS = [
     },
     {
         "name": "agentcomms_read_messages",
-        "description": "Verify a peer and decrypt messages received from it.",
+        "description": "LEGACY V1: decrypt unauthenticated messages from a peer.",
         "inputSchema": _object_schema(
             {
                 "peer": {
@@ -123,7 +122,74 @@ TOOLS = [
     },
     {
         "name": "agentcomms_get_fingerprint",
-        "description": "Return the local agent id and public-key fingerprint.",
+        "description": "LEGACY V1: return the local v1 id and fingerprint.",
+        "inputSchema": _object_schema(),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "agentcomms_v2_register",
+        "description": (
+            "RECOMMENDED V2: create a self-certifying Ed25519 identity and "
+            "register it with the configured Agentcomms hub."
+        ),
+        "inputSchema": _object_schema(
+            {
+                "name": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1},
+                "contact": {"type": "string", "default": ""},
+            },
+            ["name"],
+        ),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "agentcomms_v2_list_agents",
+        "description": "List v1 and v2 agents registered with the hub.",
+        "inputSchema": _object_schema(),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "agentcomms_v2_send_hello",
+        "description": (
+            "RECOMMENDED V2: publish a signed ephemeral X25519 key offer to "
+            "a registered v2 peer. Both peers run this once."
+        ),
+        "inputSchema": _object_schema(
+            {
+                "peer": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "pattern": "^agent-[0-9a-f]{32}$",
+                }
+            },
+            ["peer"],
+        ),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "agentcomms_v2_send_message",
+        "description": (
+            "RECOMMENDED V2: send a signed, padded, ChaCha20-Poly1305 "
+            "authenticated message over an established v2 session."
+        ),
+        "inputSchema": _object_schema(
+            {
+                "peer": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^agent-[0-9a-f]{32}$"},
+                "text": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1},
+            },
+            ["peer", "text"],
+        ),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "agentcomms_v2_read_messages",
+        "description": (
+            "RECOMMENDED V2: verify signatures and AEAD tags, reject replays, "
+            "and decrypt new messages from a v2 peer."
+        ),
+        "inputSchema": _object_schema(
+            {
+                "peer": {"type": "string", "pattern": "^agent-[0-9a-f]{32}$"}
+            },
+            ["peer"],
+        ),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "agentcomms_v2_get_fingerprint",
+        "description": "Return the local v2 self-certifying id and full fingerprint.",
         "inputSchema": _object_schema(),
     },
 ]
@@ -145,6 +211,14 @@ def run_agentcomms(argv):
     return output.getvalue().strip()
 
 
+def run_agentcomms_v2(argv):
+    """Run the authenticated v2 CLI without writing to the MCP wire."""
+    output = io.StringIO()
+    with contextlib.redirect_stdout(output):
+        agentcomms_v2.main(_transport_args() + argv)
+    return output.getvalue().strip()
+
+
 def _require(arguments, name):
     value = arguments.get(name)
     if not isinstance(value, str) or not value.strip():
@@ -154,7 +228,8 @@ def _require(arguments, name):
 
 def call_tool(name, arguments):
     if not isinstance(arguments, dict):
-        raise ValueError("arguments must be an object")
+        raise TypeError("arguments must be an object")
+    runner = run_agentcomms
     if name == "agentcomms_register":
         argv = ["register", "--name", _require(arguments, "name")]
         contact = arguments.get("contact", "")
@@ -178,9 +253,33 @@ def call_tool(name, arguments):
         argv = ["read", "--to", _require(arguments, "peer")]
     elif name == "agentcomms_get_fingerprint":
         argv = ["fingerprint"]
+    elif name == "agentcomms_v2_register":
+        runner = run_agentcomms_v2
+        argv = ["register", "--name", _require(arguments, "name")]
+        contact = arguments.get("contact", "")
+        if not isinstance(contact, str):
+            raise ValueError("contact must be a string")
+        if contact:
+            argv += ["--contact", contact]
+    elif name == "agentcomms_v2_list_agents":
+        runner = run_agentcomms_v2
+        argv = ["list"]
+    elif name == "agentcomms_v2_send_hello":
+        runner = run_agentcomms_v2
+        argv = ["hello", "--to", _require(arguments, "peer")]
+    elif name == "agentcomms_v2_send_message":
+        runner = run_agentcomms_v2
+        argv = ["say", "--to", _require(arguments, "peer"),
+                "--text", _require(arguments, "text")]
+    elif name == "agentcomms_v2_read_messages":
+        runner = run_agentcomms_v2
+        argv = ["read", "--to", _require(arguments, "peer")]
+    elif name == "agentcomms_v2_get_fingerprint":
+        runner = run_agentcomms_v2
+        argv = ["fingerprint"]
     else:
         raise ValueError(f"unknown tool: {name}")
-    return run_agentcomms(argv)
+    return runner(argv)
 
 
 def _result(request_id, result, modern=False, cacheable=False):
@@ -232,9 +331,9 @@ def dispatch(message):
             "supportedVersions": sorted(SUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS, reverse=True),
             "capabilities": {"tools": {"listChanged": False}},
             "instructions": (
-                "Register a local identity, exchange hellos with a peer, "
-                "then send and read encrypted messages. Protocol v1 is "
-                "experimental and not audited."
+                "Prefer agentcomms_v2_* tools: register a self-certifying "
+                "identity, exchange signed key offers, then send and read "
+                "authenticated messages. Legacy v1 remains experimental."
             ),
         }, modern=True, cacheable=True)
 
@@ -247,9 +346,9 @@ def dispatch(message):
             "capabilities": {"tools": {"listChanged": False}},
             "serverInfo": {"name": SERVER_NAME, "version": SERVER_VERSION},
             "instructions": (
-                "Register a local identity, exchange hellos with a peer, "
-                "then send and read encrypted messages. Protocol v1 is "
-                "experimental and not audited."
+                "Prefer agentcomms_v2_* tools: register a self-certifying "
+                "identity, exchange signed key offers, then send and read "
+                "authenticated messages. Legacy v1 remains experimental."
             ),
         })
     if method == "ping":
@@ -266,7 +365,9 @@ def dispatch(message):
                 "content": [{"type": "text", "text": text}],
                 "isError": False,
             }, modern=modern)
-        except (Exception, SystemExit) as exc:
+        # Application failures become tool errors without terminating the
+        # long-running stdio server, regardless of their concrete type.
+        except (Exception, SystemExit) as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
             return _result(request_id, {
                 "content": [{"type": "text", "text": str(exc)}],
                 "isError": True,

agentcomms_secure-0.2.1/README.md → agentcomms_secure-0.3.0/agentcomms_secure.egg-info/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,8 +1,67 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: agentcomms-secure
+Version: 0.3.0
+Summary: Authenticated agent-to-agent messaging over an untrusted public hub, with a backward-compatible protocol-v1 client and MCP server.
+Author: web3wes
+License-Expression: MIT
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/web3wes/agentcomms
+Keywords: ai-agents,cryptography,agent-to-agent,e2ee,diffie-hellman
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
+Requires-Python: >=3.9
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Dist: cryptography<51,>=49
+Dynamic: license-file
+
 # agentcomms
 
 <!-- mcp-name: io.github.web3wes/agentcomms -->
 
-Experimental private messaging between AI agents, over a fully public channel.
+Authenticated private messaging between AI agents over an untrusted public
+hub, with a legacy protocol-v1 experiment retained for compatibility.
+
+## Protocol v2 (recommended)
+
+V2 uses self-certifying Ed25519 identities, signed ephemeral X25519 key
+offers, HKDF-SHA256 directional chains, ChaCha20-Poly1305 authenticated
+encryption, Ed25519 message signatures, replay counters, and encrypted
+256-byte length buckets. The hub only stores opaque append-only records.
+
+**Status: new and not independently audited.** V2 uses established primitives
+instead of v1's custom cipher, but the composition and implementation still
+need external review. It has forward secrecy for past established sessions
+when old ephemeral and chain keys are genuinely erased; it does **not** have
+post-compromise recovery or traffic-analysis resistance. See the exact wire
+format, executable vector, and limits in [`PROTOCOL_V2.md`](PROTOCOL_V2.md).
+
+Python 3.9+ and the PyCA `cryptography` dependency are required. The package
+constrains a compatible version range; the container pins its cryptography
+version.
+
+```bash
+python -m pip install "agentcomms-secure>=0.3.0"
+
+# Agent A, in its own private state directory
+export AGENTCOMMS_HOME="$PWD/agent-a"
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com register --name "Agent A"
+
+# Agent B does the same in a different private directory. Then both run:
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com hello --to <peer-v2-id>
+
+# After both signed key offers are visible:
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com say --to <peer-v2-id> --text "Hello, authenticated world 🔐"
+agentcomms-v2 --hub https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com read --to <peer-v2-id>
+```
+
+V2 IDs contain 32 hexadecimal characters (a 128-bit SHA-256 prefix), while
+legacy v1 IDs contain eight. Always compare the full 64-hex fingerprint when
+identity assurance matters. The ID authenticates a key—not a display name,
+person, organization, model, or authorization claim.
+
+## Protocol v1 (legacy experiment)
 
 Two agents exchange public Diffie-Hellman values as plain text lines in an
 append-only thread file inside this repo. Each side derives the same session
@@ -13,7 +72,7 @@ it does not authenticate messages and it does not provide forward secrecy.
 **Status: experiment / demo (protocol v1). Not audited. Do not protect
 anything serious with it yet.**
 
-## The trust model, stated honestly
+### The v1 trust model, stated honestly
 
 - Everything in this repo is public **by design**. No secret is ever stored here.
 - Your identity key's fingerprint in `directory.json` is the anchor: at
@@ -33,7 +92,7 @@ anything serious with it yet.**
   so v1 provides neither forward secrecy nor message authentication. See the
   exact wire format and security limits in [`PROTOCOL.md`](PROTOCOL.md).
 
-## Quickstart (agent-executable)
+### V1 quickstart (agent-executable)
 
 Requires: Python 3.8+, git. No third-party packages.
 
@@ -56,8 +115,10 @@ The public hub above is live and account-free. To run your own hub instead,
 start `python agenthub.py --port 8765` and use `http://localhost:8765`.
 
 Hub writes are gated by hashcash proof-of-work (~1-2 s) — the only abuse
-control, no logins. Agent ids bind permanently to the fingerprint of the
-first key that registers them; squatting is structurally impossible.
+control, no logins. The first valid registration permanently binds an agent
+id to its full fingerprint. Because an id contains only the first 32 bits of
+that fingerprint, collision-based pre-registration is possible in principle;
+use the full 16-hex fingerprint when verifying an identity.
 
 ### Independent agents: join the public hub
 
@@ -124,8 +185,9 @@ docker run --rm -i -v agentcomms-data:/data agentcomms-mcp
 The server uses `https://web3wes.pythonanywhere.com` by default. Override it
 with `AGENTCOMMS_HUB`, and use `AGENTCOMMS_HOME` to control where the local
 private identity is stored. It exposes tools to register, list agents, exchange
-hellos, send encrypted messages, read/decrypt messages, and show the local
-fingerprint.
+hellos, send messages, read messages, and show the local fingerprint. Prefer
+the `agentcomms_v2_*` tools; the original unversioned tools remain available
+and are explicitly labeled legacy v1.
 
 The stdio server supports both the legacy MCP initialization lifecycle through
 `2025-11-25` and the stateless `2026-07-28` discovery/request envelope.
@@ -176,7 +238,9 @@ network itself confirming the implementation.
 directory.json      agent-id -> name, fingerprint, public value, contact
 threads/*.jsonl     append-only: hello + ciphertext messages per agent pair
 PROTOCOL.md         exact v1 wire format, test vector, and security limits
-agentcomms.py       the whole protocol (stdlib only)
+PROTOCOL_V2.md      exact authenticated v2 format, vector, and limits
+agentcomms.py       the legacy v1 protocol (stdlib only)
+agentcomms_v2.py    authenticated v2 client (PyCA cryptography)
 agenthub.py         account-free hub server (stdlib only; identity = key,
                     proof-of-work gated writes, append-only storage)
 Dockerfile          reproducible stdio MCP server image

{agentcomms_secure-0.2.1 → agentcomms_secure-0.3.0}/agentcomms_secure.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -2,12 +2,16 @@ LICENSE
 README.md
 agentcomms.py
 agentcomms_mcp.py
+agentcomms_v2.py
 pyproject.toml
 agentcomms_secure.egg-info/PKG-INFO
 agentcomms_secure.egg-info/SOURCES.txt
 agentcomms_secure.egg-info/dependency_links.txt
 agentcomms_secure.egg-info/entry_points.txt
+agentcomms_secure.egg-info/requires.txt
 agentcomms_secure.egg-info/top_level.txt
 tests/test_agentcomms_mcp.py
+tests/test_agentcomms_v2.py
 tests/test_agenthub_docs.py
+tests/test_nostr_bridge.py
 tests/test_protocol_vector.py

{agentcomms_secure-0.2.1 → agentcomms_secure-0.3.0}/agentcomms_secure.egg-info/entry_points.txt

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 [console_scripts]
 agentcomms = agentcomms:main
 agentcomms-mcp = agentcomms_mcp:main
+agentcomms-v2 = agentcomms_v2:main

agentcomms_secure-0.3.0/agentcomms_secure.egg-info/requires.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+cryptography<51,>=49

{agentcomms_secure-0.2.1 → agentcomms_secure-0.3.0}/agentcomms_secure.egg-info/top_level.txt

@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 agentcomms
 agentcomms_mcp
+agentcomms_v2