agent-warrant 0.1.0__tar.gz

agent_warrant-0.1.0/LICENSE

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agent_warrant-0.1.0/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: agent-warrant
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: A portable, cryptographically-verifiable authority grant for AI agents -- cross-org, no shared infrastructure.
+Author: voltagebots
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/agent-rails/agent-warrant
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/agent-rails/agent-warrant
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/agent-rails/agent-warrant/issues
+Keywords: ai,agents,authorization,identity,verifiable-credentials,security
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries :: Python Modules
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=8; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: ruff>=0.6; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: hypothesis>=6.100; extra == "dev"
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# agent-warrant
+
+A portable, cryptographically-verifiable authority grant for AI agents — cross-org, no shared infrastructure.
+
+Lets one team's AI agent cryptographically verify another team's agent's delegated authority, with no shared secret. Ships two `IssuerResolver` implementations: out-of-band issuer-key pinning via `PinnedResolver` (TOFU), and real trust bootstrap via `DidWebResolver` (HTTPS + domain ownership, per the [did:web method spec](https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-web/)). Also ships opt-in revocation checking (`RevocationChecker`) — pre-expiry invalidation of a specific `Grant`, checked as the last gate in `verify()`. Spun out of [`agent-guard`](https://github.com/agent-rails/agent-guard) (which stays the local, single-org authorization/audit boundary) specifically because cross-org verification needs a different crypto trust model — asymmetric signing, not a shared HMAC secret.
+
+Deeper reference: [`docs/DESIGN.md`](docs/DESIGN.md) (why it's shaped this way, including the design history — what was tried, what was corrected, and why), [`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT_MODEL.md) (what's defended, what's explicitly not).
+
+## The shape
+
+- A `Grant` is issuer-signed (Ed25519), scoped, expiring — VC-data-model-*shaped*, not VC-spec-conformant (no `credentialStatus` field on the Grant itself; see THREAT_MODEL.md). Revocation checking exists, but as a separate, opt-in gate `verify()` runs against a caller-supplied `RevocationChecker` — not as data carried on the credential.
+- `subject` is the holder's public key — but a Grant alone is still a bearer credential unless paired with a fresh `PossessionProof` at verification time, proving the presenter actually holds the matching private key.
+- `IssuerResolver` resolves an issuer identifier to a public key. `PinnedResolver` — honestly named: it performs zero trust verification, it's out-of-band key pinning (TOFU). `DidWebResolver` is real trust bootstrap via HTTPS + domain ownership: it fetches `https://<domain>/.well-known/did.json` (or a path-scoped variant, e.g. `example.com:agents:team-a` → `https://example.com/agents/team-a/did.json`) and extracts an Ed25519 key from the DID document — binding selection to the document's `id`, the method's `controller`, and any declared `assertionMethod`, not array order. Every failure (DNS/HTTP error, non-200 status, `id` mismatch, malformed document, wrong key type, ambiguous or no matching `verificationMethod`) fails closed as `UnresolvableIssuer`.
+- Revocation is opt-in: a `Verifier` constructed without a `revocation_checker` behaves exactly as before this existed — TTL is the only expiry mechanism. Opting in means the issuer publishes a `RevocationList` (a signed set of revoked `grant_binding` values carrying a signed `issued_at`/`expires_at`/monotonic `sequence` — see `sign_revocation_list()`), and a caller wires up `StaticRevocationChecker` (for an already-fetched list) or `HttpRevocationChecker` (fetches + verifies on every `is_revoked()` call, no caching). Any inability to determine revocation status — fetch failure, malformed list, bad signature, a stale/expired or rolled-back list, or a list whose issuer doesn't match the grant's — fails closed: the grant is rejected, never silently treated as "not revoked." `StaticRevocationChecker` checks freshness only when it is constructed and keeps answering from that list afterwards; replace it before the list's `expires_at`.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pip install agent-warrant
+```
+
+## Development
+
+Dev dependencies (pytest, ruff, hypothesis) are the `dev` extra. Quote the extra so the shell does not expand the brackets:
+
+```bash
+uv venv
+uv pip install -e '.[dev]'    # or, inside any venv: pip install -e '.[dev]'
+.venv/bin/ruff check
+.venv/bin/ruff format --check
+.venv/bin/pytest -q
+```
+
+## Quickstart
+
+```python
+from agent_warrant import Issuer, HolderKeypair, PinnedResolver, Verifier, generate_keypair, encode_public_key
+
+# Team A: mints a grant for a holder it doesn't need to share any secret with.
+team_a_key = generate_keypair()
+issuer = Issuer(issuer_id="team-a", private_key=team_a_key)
+
+holder_key = generate_keypair()
+holder = HolderKeypair(holder_key)
+grant = issuer.issue(subject=encode_public_key(holder_key.public_key()), scope={"tool": "read_file"})
+proof = holder.prove_possession(grant)
+
+# Team B: only ever obtains team A's PUBLIC key, out-of-band. No shared secret.
+# `path_prefix` is illustrative application data: agent-warrant authenticates
+# the scope but does not interpret or enforce it for authorization.
+resolver = PinnedResolver({"team-a": team_a_key.public_key()})
+verifier = Verifier(resolver)
+
+result = verifier.check(grant.encode(), proof)
+assert result.valid
+```
+
+A stolen `grant.encode()` string alone is not enough — presenting it without a valid `PossessionProof` (or with a proof forged by a different keypair) is rejected. See `tests/test_integration.py::test_stolen_grant_without_possession_proof_is_rejected` for the live proof.
+
+### did:web, instead of pinning
+
+```python
+from agent_warrant import DidWebResolver, Verifier
+
+# No out-of-band key exchange -- team-a's key is fetched from
+# https://team-a.example.com/.well-known/did.json and cryptographically
+# tied to domain ownership over HTTPS, the same trust model TLS uses.
+resolver = DidWebResolver()
+verifier = Verifier(resolver)
+result = verifier.check(grant.encode(), proof)  # grant.issuer == "team-a.example.com"
+```
+
+### Revocation, opt-in
+
+```python
+from agent_warrant import StaticRevocationChecker, Verifier, sign_revocation_list
+
+# Team A decides to invalidate a specific grant before its TTL expires
+# (compromised holder key, mistaken scope, ended sponsorship) and signs a
+# RevocationList naming it -- by grant_binding, this project's stable
+# identity for a specific Grant (see PossessionProof.grant_binding).
+revocation_list = sign_revocation_list("team-a", [proof.grant_binding], team_a_key)
+
+# Team B opts in by wiring a RevocationChecker into its Verifier. Without
+# this, revocation is never checked -- default behavior is unchanged.
+checker = StaticRevocationChecker(revocation_list, resolver)
+verifier = Verifier(resolver, revocation_checker=checker)
+result = verifier.check(grant.encode(), proof)
+assert result.valid is False and "revoked" in result.reason
+```
+
+`HttpRevocationChecker` + `HttpRevocationListFetcher` do the same thing over HTTPS instead of an in-process `RevocationList` -- fetching and re-verifying the signed list on every `is_revoked()` call, no caching. If the revocation endpoint is unreachable, verification fails closed (rejected), not open.
+
+## Constraints worth knowing before you hit them
+
+- **Encoded grant size**: capped at `agent_warrant.grant.MAX_ENCODED_GRANT_BYTES` (16KB). A compact authority claim never legitimately needs more — if your `scope` is large enough to hit this, reconsider what you're encoding into it rather than raising the constant (it's load-bearing for a resource-exhaustion defense, see docs/THREAT_MODEL.md).
+- **`DidWebResolver` fetches on every `resolve()` call, no caching.** And because `grant.issuer` reaches `resolver.resolve()` before any signature check, an unauthenticated grant can make the verifying process issue an outbound HTTPS request to an attacker-influenced host. `https_fetch.py` resolves the host once, rejects the fetch if any resolved address is private/loopback/link-local/reserved/multicast/unspecified, pins the screened IP, and connects to it directly while verifying TLS against the original hostname (SSRF hardening; this closes the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU a check-then-connect pattern would have). A wall-clock watchdog bounds the total time any single fetch can consume against a slow-drip host. See docs/THREAT_MODEL.md for the remaining residual (the DNS-resolution step uses the OS resolver's own timeout).
+- **Revocation is opt-in and unbundled from StatusList2021.** It's a small signed set of revoked `grant_binding` values, sized for a known, bounded cross-org verifier population -- not the anonymity-preserving bitstring StatusList2021 uses for public, anonymous-verifier scale. See docs/DESIGN.md for why that tradeoff fits this project's actual shape.
+
+## Design history worth knowing before extending this
+
+This design went through two real review cycles (documented in full at `~/identity-unification-plan.md` in the originating session) before any code was written. The most important correction: an earlier draft called `subject = holder's public key` alone "holder-binding" — it wasn't. A public key sitting in an issuer-signed credential with no separate possession check at verification time is still a bearer credential; anyone who intercepts the encoded grant can replay it. `PossessionProof` exists specifically to close that gap, mirroring `agent-guard`'s own `PoPProof`/`verify_pop` pattern. Read `docs/DESIGN.md` before changing anything in `grant.py`'s `verify()` — most of its structure (narrow exception catches, version-check-first ordering, the iat type guard) is there because a specific finding required it, not by convention.

agent_warrant-0.1.0/README.md

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+# agent-warrant
+
+A portable, cryptographically-verifiable authority grant for AI agents — cross-org, no shared infrastructure.
+
+Lets one team's AI agent cryptographically verify another team's agent's delegated authority, with no shared secret. Ships two `IssuerResolver` implementations: out-of-band issuer-key pinning via `PinnedResolver` (TOFU), and real trust bootstrap via `DidWebResolver` (HTTPS + domain ownership, per the [did:web method spec](https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-web/)). Also ships opt-in revocation checking (`RevocationChecker`) — pre-expiry invalidation of a specific `Grant`, checked as the last gate in `verify()`. Spun out of [`agent-guard`](https://github.com/agent-rails/agent-guard) (which stays the local, single-org authorization/audit boundary) specifically because cross-org verification needs a different crypto trust model — asymmetric signing, not a shared HMAC secret.
+
+Deeper reference: [`docs/DESIGN.md`](docs/DESIGN.md) (why it's shaped this way, including the design history — what was tried, what was corrected, and why), [`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT_MODEL.md) (what's defended, what's explicitly not).
+
+## The shape
+
+- A `Grant` is issuer-signed (Ed25519), scoped, expiring — VC-data-model-*shaped*, not VC-spec-conformant (no `credentialStatus` field on the Grant itself; see THREAT_MODEL.md). Revocation checking exists, but as a separate, opt-in gate `verify()` runs against a caller-supplied `RevocationChecker` — not as data carried on the credential.
+- `subject` is the holder's public key — but a Grant alone is still a bearer credential unless paired with a fresh `PossessionProof` at verification time, proving the presenter actually holds the matching private key.
+- `IssuerResolver` resolves an issuer identifier to a public key. `PinnedResolver` — honestly named: it performs zero trust verification, it's out-of-band key pinning (TOFU). `DidWebResolver` is real trust bootstrap via HTTPS + domain ownership: it fetches `https://<domain>/.well-known/did.json` (or a path-scoped variant, e.g. `example.com:agents:team-a` → `https://example.com/agents/team-a/did.json`) and extracts an Ed25519 key from the DID document — binding selection to the document's `id`, the method's `controller`, and any declared `assertionMethod`, not array order. Every failure (DNS/HTTP error, non-200 status, `id` mismatch, malformed document, wrong key type, ambiguous or no matching `verificationMethod`) fails closed as `UnresolvableIssuer`.
+- Revocation is opt-in: a `Verifier` constructed without a `revocation_checker` behaves exactly as before this existed — TTL is the only expiry mechanism. Opting in means the issuer publishes a `RevocationList` (a signed set of revoked `grant_binding` values carrying a signed `issued_at`/`expires_at`/monotonic `sequence` — see `sign_revocation_list()`), and a caller wires up `StaticRevocationChecker` (for an already-fetched list) or `HttpRevocationChecker` (fetches + verifies on every `is_revoked()` call, no caching). Any inability to determine revocation status — fetch failure, malformed list, bad signature, a stale/expired or rolled-back list, or a list whose issuer doesn't match the grant's — fails closed: the grant is rejected, never silently treated as "not revoked." `StaticRevocationChecker` checks freshness only when it is constructed and keeps answering from that list afterwards; replace it before the list's `expires_at`.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pip install agent-warrant
+```
+
+## Development
+
+Dev dependencies (pytest, ruff, hypothesis) are the `dev` extra. Quote the extra so the shell does not expand the brackets:
+
+```bash
+uv venv
+uv pip install -e '.[dev]'    # or, inside any venv: pip install -e '.[dev]'
+.venv/bin/ruff check
+.venv/bin/ruff format --check
+.venv/bin/pytest -q
+```
+
+## Quickstart
+
+```python
+from agent_warrant import Issuer, HolderKeypair, PinnedResolver, Verifier, generate_keypair, encode_public_key
+
+# Team A: mints a grant for a holder it doesn't need to share any secret with.
+team_a_key = generate_keypair()
+issuer = Issuer(issuer_id="team-a", private_key=team_a_key)
+
+holder_key = generate_keypair()
+holder = HolderKeypair(holder_key)
+grant = issuer.issue(subject=encode_public_key(holder_key.public_key()), scope={"tool": "read_file"})
+proof = holder.prove_possession(grant)
+
+# Team B: only ever obtains team A's PUBLIC key, out-of-band. No shared secret.
+# `path_prefix` is illustrative application data: agent-warrant authenticates
+# the scope but does not interpret or enforce it for authorization.
+resolver = PinnedResolver({"team-a": team_a_key.public_key()})
+verifier = Verifier(resolver)
+
+result = verifier.check(grant.encode(), proof)
+assert result.valid
+```
+
+A stolen `grant.encode()` string alone is not enough — presenting it without a valid `PossessionProof` (or with a proof forged by a different keypair) is rejected. See `tests/test_integration.py::test_stolen_grant_without_possession_proof_is_rejected` for the live proof.
+
+### did:web, instead of pinning
+
+```python
+from agent_warrant import DidWebResolver, Verifier
+
+# No out-of-band key exchange -- team-a's key is fetched from
+# https://team-a.example.com/.well-known/did.json and cryptographically
+# tied to domain ownership over HTTPS, the same trust model TLS uses.
+resolver = DidWebResolver()
+verifier = Verifier(resolver)
+result = verifier.check(grant.encode(), proof)  # grant.issuer == "team-a.example.com"
+```
+
+### Revocation, opt-in
+
+```python
+from agent_warrant import StaticRevocationChecker, Verifier, sign_revocation_list
+
+# Team A decides to invalidate a specific grant before its TTL expires
+# (compromised holder key, mistaken scope, ended sponsorship) and signs a
+# RevocationList naming it -- by grant_binding, this project's stable
+# identity for a specific Grant (see PossessionProof.grant_binding).
+revocation_list = sign_revocation_list("team-a", [proof.grant_binding], team_a_key)
+
+# Team B opts in by wiring a RevocationChecker into its Verifier. Without
+# this, revocation is never checked -- default behavior is unchanged.
+checker = StaticRevocationChecker(revocation_list, resolver)
+verifier = Verifier(resolver, revocation_checker=checker)
+result = verifier.check(grant.encode(), proof)
+assert result.valid is False and "revoked" in result.reason
+```
+
+`HttpRevocationChecker` + `HttpRevocationListFetcher` do the same thing over HTTPS instead of an in-process `RevocationList` -- fetching and re-verifying the signed list on every `is_revoked()` call, no caching. If the revocation endpoint is unreachable, verification fails closed (rejected), not open.
+
+## Constraints worth knowing before you hit them
+
+- **Encoded grant size**: capped at `agent_warrant.grant.MAX_ENCODED_GRANT_BYTES` (16KB). A compact authority claim never legitimately needs more — if your `scope` is large enough to hit this, reconsider what you're encoding into it rather than raising the constant (it's load-bearing for a resource-exhaustion defense, see docs/THREAT_MODEL.md).
+- **`DidWebResolver` fetches on every `resolve()` call, no caching.** And because `grant.issuer` reaches `resolver.resolve()` before any signature check, an unauthenticated grant can make the verifying process issue an outbound HTTPS request to an attacker-influenced host. `https_fetch.py` resolves the host once, rejects the fetch if any resolved address is private/loopback/link-local/reserved/multicast/unspecified, pins the screened IP, and connects to it directly while verifying TLS against the original hostname (SSRF hardening; this closes the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU a check-then-connect pattern would have). A wall-clock watchdog bounds the total time any single fetch can consume against a slow-drip host. See docs/THREAT_MODEL.md for the remaining residual (the DNS-resolution step uses the OS resolver's own timeout).
+- **Revocation is opt-in and unbundled from StatusList2021.** It's a small signed set of revoked `grant_binding` values, sized for a known, bounded cross-org verifier population -- not the anonymity-preserving bitstring StatusList2021 uses for public, anonymous-verifier scale. See docs/DESIGN.md for why that tradeoff fits this project's actual shape.
+
+## Design history worth knowing before extending this
+
+This design went through two real review cycles (documented in full at `~/identity-unification-plan.md` in the originating session) before any code was written. The most important correction: an earlier draft called `subject = holder's public key` alone "holder-binding" — it wasn't. A public key sitting in an issuer-signed credential with no separate possession check at verification time is still a bearer credential; anyone who intercepts the encoded grant can replay it. `PossessionProof` exists specifically to close that gap, mirroring `agent-guard`'s own `PoPProof`/`verify_pop` pattern. Read `docs/DESIGN.md` before changing anything in `grant.py`'s `verify()` — most of its structure (narrow exception catches, version-check-first ordering, the iat type guard) is there because a specific finding required it, not by convention.

agent_warrant-0.1.0/agent_warrant/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from .canonical import canonicalize
+from .exceptions import RevocationSourceUnreachable, UnresolvableIssuer
+from .grant import CURRENT_VERSION, Grant, PossessionProof, VerifyResult, prove, sign, verify
+from .identity import decode_public_key, encode_public_key, generate_keypair
+from .issuer import HolderKeypair, Issuer, Verifier
+from .resolver import DidWebResolver, IssuerResolver, PinnedResolver
+from .revocation import (
+    HttpRevocationChecker,
+    HttpRevocationListFetcher,
+    RevocationChecker,
+    RevocationList,
+    RevocationListFetcher,
+    StaticRevocationChecker,
+    sign_revocation_list,
+)
+
+__all__ = [
+    "CURRENT_VERSION",
+    "DidWebResolver",
+    "Grant",
+    "HolderKeypair",
+    "HttpRevocationChecker",
+    "HttpRevocationListFetcher",
+    "Issuer",
+    "IssuerResolver",
+    "PinnedResolver",
+    "PossessionProof",
+    "RevocationChecker",
+    "RevocationList",
+    "RevocationListFetcher",
+    "RevocationSourceUnreachable",
+    "StaticRevocationChecker",
+    "UnresolvableIssuer",
+    "VerifyResult",
+    "Verifier",
+    "canonicalize",
+    "decode_public_key",
+    "encode_public_key",
+    "generate_keypair",
+    "prove",
+    "sign",
+    "sign_revocation_list",
+    "verify",
+]