agent-firewall-security 2.3.0__tar.gz → 2.5.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/PKG-INFO +259 -6
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/README.md +258 -5
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/agent_firewall_security.egg-info/PKG-INFO +259 -6
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/agent_firewall_security.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +28 -1
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/a2a/__init__.py +34 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/a2a/auth.py +81 -4
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/adapters/anthropic.py +94 -51
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/adapters/generic.py +112 -49
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/adapters/openai.py +87 -49
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/__init__.py +209 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/blast.py +450 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/controller.py +1177 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/decay.py +267 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/envelope.py +979 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/explain.py +451 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/preflight.py +614 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/response.py +557 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/restriction.py +523 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/aegis/state.py +384 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/attenuation.py +134 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/authorization.py +22 -1
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/benchmarks.py +1493 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/cli_v21.py +20 -4
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/continuous_auth/engine.py +198 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/delegation.py +14 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/http.py +101 -74
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/invariants/__init__.py +14 -2
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/invariants/__main__.py +163 -159
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/invariants/exercise.py +399 -269
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/invariants/registry.py +438 -358
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/firewall/invariants/runtime.py +3339 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/invariants/source.py +397 -323
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/invariants/static.py +185 -21
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/sdk.py +1082 -122
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/introspect.py +43 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_2_invariants.py +39 -19
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_3_invariant_gate.py +436 -304
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_3_self_attack.py +59 -12
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_aegis_adversarial.py +1468 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_aegis_concurrency.py +1155 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_aegis_controller.py +1450 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_aegis_corrections.py +477 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_aegis_fuzz.py +949 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_aegis_gate.py +504 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_aegis_state.py +633 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_attenuation_narrowing.py +369 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_benchmarks.py +337 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_envelope_soundness.py +154 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_4_integration_boundary.py +979 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_5_benchmarks.py +252 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_5_boundary_totality.py +1124 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_5_composition.py +1269 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_5_integration_divergence.py +932 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_5_stale_revalidation.py +1242 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.5.0/tests/test_v2_5_verdict_census.py +534 -0
- agent_firewall_security-2.3.0/firewall/a2a/__init__.py +0 -21
- agent_firewall_security-2.3.0/firewall/attenuation.py +0 -159
- agent_firewall_security-2.3.0/firewall/benchmarks.py +0 -295
- agent_firewall_security-2.3.0/firewall/invariants/runtime.py +0 -1173
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/agent_firewall_security.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/agent_firewall_security.egg-info/entry_points.txt +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/agent_firewall_security.egg-info/requires.txt +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/agent_firewall_security.egg-info/top_level.txt +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/adapters/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/adapters/normalize.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/adversarial/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/agents/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/agents/adapters.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/agents/base.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/artifact/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/artifact/reader.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/artifact/writer.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/attackgraph/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/attackgraph/engine.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/attest/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/attest/authority.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/capability.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/capability2/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/capability2/constraints.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/cli.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/cli_v19.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/cli_v20.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/containment/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/containment/controller.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/continuous_auth/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/continuous_auth/monitor.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/continuous_auth/predicates.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/deception/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/defense/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/defense/mesh.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/delegation_budget.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/delegation_lineage.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/delegation_store.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/engine.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/evidence.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/evidence_graph/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/evidence_graph/graph.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/evidence_integrity/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/explain.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ident/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ident/registry.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/identity.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/immune/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/immune/engine.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/incident/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/incident/package.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/intel/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/intel/engine.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/invariants/model.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/key_management.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/key_store.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/lab/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/lab/engine.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/lifecycle.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/lifecycle_store.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/mcp.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/namespace.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/network/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/network/attack_path.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/network/behavior.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/network/correlation.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/network/graph.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/network/model.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/network/response.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/network/simulator.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/network/state.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/north_star.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/passport/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/passport/builder.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/platform/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/platform/provenance.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/policy.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/policy_analysis/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/posture/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/posture/engine.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/protect.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/provenance/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/provenance/registry.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/recorder/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/recorder/checkpoint.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/recorder/encoding.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/recorder/events.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/recorder/identity.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/recorder/recorder.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/recorder/redact.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/refusal_state.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/replay.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/replay_store.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/replaylab/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/replaylab/laboratory.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/research/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/research/lab.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/response2/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/response2/adaptive.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/revocation.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/revocation_store.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/risk_context.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/security_context.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/security_decision.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/security_memory/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/semantic_chain.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/simulation/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/simulation/case.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/simulation/recorder.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/simulation/replay.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/simulation/report.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/simulation/rollout.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/simulation/ruleset.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/task/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/task/registry.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/timeline/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/timeline/graph.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/timeline/timeline.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/timeline/trajectory.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/tools.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/transport.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/trust/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/trust/graph.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/twin/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/twin/adversarial.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/twin/twin.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/__main__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/control.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/demo.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/server.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/service.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/console.css +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/console.js +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/control.js +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/index.html +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/recorder.css +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/recorder.js +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/soc.css +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/soc.js +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/v20.css +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/v20.js +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/v21.css +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/static/v21.js +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/v18.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/v19.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/v20.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/ui/v21.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/verify/__init__.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/firewall/verify/verifier.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/setup.cfg +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_continuous_auth.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_engine.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_sdk_continuous_auth.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_security_decision.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_2_adversarial_defense.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_2_adversarial_twin.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_2_capability_delegation.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_2_deception_integrity.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_2_evidence_integrity.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_2_platform_provenance.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_2_security_memory.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_3_duplicate_concepts.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_3_intel_coordination.py +0 -0
- {agent_firewall_security-2.3.0 → agent_firewall_security-2.5.0}/tests/test_v2_3_policy_analysis.py +0 -0
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
Metadata-Version: 2.4
|
|
2
2
|
Name: agent-firewall-security
|
|
3
|
-
Version: 2.
|
|
3
|
+
Version: 2.5.0
|
|
4
4
|
Summary: Security and canonical authorization infrastructure for AI agents and automated tool use.
|
|
5
5
|
Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/Shubhbhangoo/agent-firewall
|
|
6
6
|
Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/Shubhbhangoo/agent-firewall
|
|
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ Requires-Dist: hypothesis>=6.0; extra == "dev"
|
|
|
28
28
|
|
|
29
29
|
Agent Firewall is built around one security boundary: **authorization remains deterministic, explicit, and fail-closed**. Identity, provenance, monitoring, behavioral analysis, simulation, evidence, and response provide security context around that boundary, but they do not become an alternative path to authorization.
|
|
30
30
|
|
|
31
|
+
> **v2.5** is an attack release. It adds no subsystem and no authorization path: twenty-two attacks were run against v2.4's shipped boundary, and the twelve that found a place where `authorize()` raised instead of deciding are now denials that name what could not be read. An expired capability that returned `authorized` because the verifier had no clock is the one that mattered most.
|
|
32
|
+
>
|
|
33
|
+
> **v2.4** adds **Aegis**, an adaptive authority control plane: a live grant can be narrowed, suspended, revalidated or revoked while a task is running. It adds no second authorization path — Aegis reaches `FirewallSDK.authorize()` through one gate that can only deny or abstain, and learns what happened through one callback the SDK invokes *after* the decision exists.
|
|
34
|
+
>
|
|
31
35
|
> **v2.3** is a correctness release. It adds no subsystem and no authorization path: the work was to attack v2.2's shipped behaviour, fix the three fail-open paths that broke, stop analytical output from reading as verified when it was not, and make the strict invariant gate something CI can actually fail on.
|
|
32
36
|
>
|
|
33
37
|
> **v2.2** makes the control plane adaptive: authority is re-evaluated when the state it rested on changes, contradictions between independent claim sources are reported rather than resolved, and the architectural properties the design rests on are checked by code instead of asserted in prose.
|
|
@@ -92,6 +96,187 @@ When required evidence is unavailable, verification fails, identity is unknown,
|
|
|
92
96
|
|
|
93
97
|
---
|
|
94
98
|
|
|
99
|
+
## What v2.5 changes
|
|
100
|
+
|
|
101
|
+
v2.5 adds no subsystem. The work was to attack v2.4's shipped boundary until
|
|
102
|
+
a guarantee broke; twenty-two attacks are recorded in
|
|
103
|
+
[`docs/v2.5-boundary.md`](docs/v2.5-boundary.md), each with the entry point, a
|
|
104
|
+
reproduction through the public API, the verdict before and after, and the
|
|
105
|
+
direction authority moved.
|
|
106
|
+
|
|
107
|
+
### Twelve crashes that were not decisions
|
|
108
|
+
|
|
109
|
+
`FAIL_CLOSED` has said since v2.2 that "the authorization path never raises in
|
|
110
|
+
place of deciding". All eight probes behind it were malformed *input* against
|
|
111
|
+
a healthy firewall, so the invariant held green while twelve paths through
|
|
112
|
+
`FirewallSDK.authorize()` still raised — nine of them on a read of the
|
|
113
|
+
firewall's own state, which no amount of hostile input reaches.
|
|
114
|
+
|
|
115
|
+
- **An expired capability returned `authorized`.** A `CapabilityVerifier`
|
|
116
|
+
built without a `clock` is a legitimate configuration: verify signatures,
|
|
117
|
+
leave expiry to the firewall's time gate. `_gate_time` responded to an
|
|
118
|
+
unreadable clock by not checking the window at all. Now
|
|
119
|
+
`clock_unavailable:{cause}`, and the verifier always carries a clock.
|
|
120
|
+
- **Five state reads propagated whatever the store raised** — refusal state,
|
|
121
|
+
risk state, issuer trust, revocation and delegation lineage. Each is now
|
|
122
|
+
`..._unavailable:{Type}`. The bundled `SQLiteRevocationStore` behind a
|
|
123
|
+
closed connection reaches one of them for real.
|
|
124
|
+
- **An unwritable audit sink destroyed the denial it was recording.** The
|
|
125
|
+
verdict now survives and the loss travels in `trace["evidence_error"]`; the
|
|
126
|
+
same failure on the allow path withholds the allow as
|
|
127
|
+
`evidence_unavailable:{Type}`.
|
|
128
|
+
- **Malformed arguments and an unreadable envelope projection** answer with
|
|
129
|
+
`invalid_request`, `invalid_capability`, `capability_time_invalid`, and the
|
|
130
|
+
bottom envelope rather than an exception.
|
|
131
|
+
|
|
132
|
+
The shape is the same in all twelve: a caller's `except Exception` was
|
|
133
|
+
deciding what happened to an unauthorized request, and now the boundary
|
|
134
|
+
decides.
|
|
135
|
+
|
|
136
|
+
### One question asked, another one executed
|
|
137
|
+
|
|
138
|
+
Five defects sat between a caller and the boundary, and none of them bypassed
|
|
139
|
+
it or made it answer wrongly — the boundary was asked a different question
|
|
140
|
+
from the one the glue then acted on. Three adapters authorized
|
|
141
|
+
`{"amount": 10}` and executed `amount=5000`, by three mechanisms: a
|
|
142
|
+
non-idempotent `normalize`, a caller mapping that answered differently on the
|
|
143
|
+
second read, and a hostile `Mapping` re-materialized for the handler. The fix
|
|
144
|
+
is structural rather than defensive — normalize or settle once, then hand the
|
|
145
|
+
*same object* to the boundary and to the handler. A fourth defect was created
|
|
146
|
+
by that fix (a `request_builder` mutating the mapping the handler would then
|
|
147
|
+
unpack) and closed before shipping; a fifth let an unreadable replay store
|
|
148
|
+
escape `HTTPFirewall.authorize` after the boundary had allowed.
|
|
149
|
+
|
|
150
|
+
### A monitoring surface that reported withdrawn authority
|
|
151
|
+
|
|
152
|
+
`revalidate()` served a cached allow across an Aegis suspension, across a
|
|
153
|
+
narrowing, and across a latched refusal, while `authorize()` denied all three.
|
|
154
|
+
No enforcement path consumes that answer as permission, so the boundary held
|
|
155
|
+
— but the surface whose only job is to notice a withdrawal did not notice.
|
|
156
|
+
`SecurityContextSnapshot` now carries `aegis_restrictions` and
|
|
157
|
+
`refusal_state`, so the change routes revalidation through `authorize()`. Both
|
|
158
|
+
are *state* probes: they report what state exists and never decide whether it
|
|
159
|
+
excludes the request, which is deliberately coarser than the gates and costs
|
|
160
|
+
exactly one redundant authorization when a digest moves for a reason the
|
|
161
|
+
boundary tolerates.
|
|
162
|
+
|
|
163
|
+
### A sixteenth invariant, and three of the fifteen strengthened
|
|
164
|
+
|
|
165
|
+
`REVALIDATION_CONSISTENCY` is new: continuous revalidation never reports an
|
|
166
|
+
authority the boundary denies, sampled over six security-state changes, each
|
|
167
|
+
with its own negative control. `AUTHORIZATION_UNIQUENESS` is now a census of
|
|
168
|
+
all 50 verdict-construction sites in the package against a closed allow-list
|
|
169
|
+
keyed by `(module, function)` — a planted second authorization path inside
|
|
170
|
+
`sdk.py` previously passed it. `FAIL_CLOSED` gained nine dependency-failure
|
|
171
|
+
probes. And `ENVELOPE_SOUNDNESS` stopped absorbing the one case it was most
|
|
172
|
+
exposed to: the reads that produce a bottom envelope were the same reads that
|
|
173
|
+
raised, and it reported `HOLDS` on them anyway. Nothing was added to raise the
|
|
174
|
+
count — where an invariant already covered a property, it was strengthened
|
|
175
|
+
instead.
|
|
176
|
+
|
|
177
|
+
### What it costs, and what was refused
|
|
178
|
+
|
|
179
|
+
The two new snapshot probes cost about 4.5 µs of a ~70 µs snapshot, roughly
|
|
180
|
+
0.4% of the authorization they accompany, so neither fix has a performance
|
|
181
|
+
argument against it. Four optimizations were deliberately not made, and the
|
|
182
|
+
two that would have reclaimed the ~1.1 ms a changed revalidation costs are
|
|
183
|
+
the ones worth stating: both amount to concluding that a refusal does not
|
|
184
|
+
apply, which is an allow reached outside `authorize()`. One of the two is
|
|
185
|
+
enforced by a failing test rather than by prose. See
|
|
186
|
+
[`docs/v2.5-performance.md`](docs/v2.5-performance.md).
|
|
187
|
+
|
|
188
|
+
---
|
|
189
|
+
|
|
190
|
+
## What v2.4 adds
|
|
191
|
+
|
|
192
|
+
v2.2 made the platform adaptive *above* the boundary: when watched state
|
|
193
|
+
changed, a decision was re-run. v2.4 makes **authority itself** adaptive. A
|
|
194
|
+
grant that is already in use can be narrowed, suspended, revalidated or
|
|
195
|
+
revoked, and the change is enforced on the next authorization — and, for
|
|
196
|
+
suspension, inside the commit transaction of one already in flight.
|
|
197
|
+
|
|
198
|
+
Aegis is off by default. `FirewallSDK(aegis_enabled=True)` opts in; with no
|
|
199
|
+
controller attached the adaptive gate abstains and v2.3 behaviour is exact.
|
|
200
|
+
|
|
201
|
+
### One deny-only seam
|
|
202
|
+
|
|
203
|
+
Nine modules, 5,382 lines, none of which imports `firewall.sdk`. Everything
|
|
204
|
+
Aegis does reaches the outside world through two points: `_gate_aegis`, the
|
|
205
|
+
ninth of eleven gates, which can only deny or abstain; and
|
|
206
|
+
`observe_authorization`, which the SDK calls *after* a decision exists.
|
|
207
|
+
Because the callback runs after, no Aegis state can be a precondition of the
|
|
208
|
+
allow it observes. Authority flows from the boundary into Aegis and never the
|
|
209
|
+
other way.
|
|
210
|
+
|
|
211
|
+
```text
|
|
212
|
+
change -> classify -> KEEP | REVALIDATE | NARROW | SUSPEND | REVOKE
|
|
213
|
+
|
|
|
214
|
+
v
|
|
215
|
+
restriction written
|
|
216
|
+
|
|
|
217
|
+
v
|
|
218
|
+
FirewallSDK.authorize() -> _gate_aegis -> DENY
|
|
219
|
+
```
|
|
220
|
+
|
|
221
|
+
There is no arrow from Aegis to ALLOW. That absence is the design.
|
|
222
|
+
|
|
223
|
+
### The authority envelope
|
|
224
|
+
|
|
225
|
+
An `AuthorityEnvelope` is a bound on what a capability may still do, folded
|
|
226
|
+
across its delegation chain by a per-dimension greatest-lower-bound. Twelve
|
|
227
|
+
fields — patterns, tool, time window, constraint bounds, depth, its ceiling,
|
|
228
|
+
issuers, issuer trust, revocation, budget, chain membership, and a bottom
|
|
229
|
+
marker — and every dimension that bounds a request has a named enforcement
|
|
230
|
+
site at the boundary. A dimension with no enforcement site would be
|
|
231
|
+
decoration.
|
|
232
|
+
|
|
233
|
+
The theorem is one-directional and stated that way: if the envelope
|
|
234
|
+
**excludes** a request, the boundary denies it. The converse does not hold,
|
|
235
|
+
and the API is named so that misuse reads wrong — `excludes()` returns a
|
|
236
|
+
reason, `may_admit()` means "this envelope does not itself refuse", and
|
|
237
|
+
`__bool__` **raises** on an envelope, a grant, a preflight, a blast radius
|
|
238
|
+
and a classification, so `if preflight(...)` is an error rather than an
|
|
239
|
+
accidental allow.
|
|
240
|
+
|
|
241
|
+
### Seven states ordered by residual authority
|
|
242
|
+
|
|
243
|
+
`ISSUED`, `ACTIVE`, `REVALIDATING`, `NARROWED`, `SUSPENDED`, `REVOKED`,
|
|
244
|
+
`EXPIRED`. A transition is legal only if it does not increase residual
|
|
245
|
+
authority. `REVALIDATING -> ACTIVE` is the only edge that restores authority,
|
|
246
|
+
and it requires an `AuthorizationResult` that is allowed, reasoned
|
|
247
|
+
`authorized`, and traced to that capability's fingerprint. `REVOKED` and
|
|
248
|
+
`EXPIRED` are terminal and checked before the ordering rule, so no evidence
|
|
249
|
+
or clock change produces an edge out of either.
|
|
250
|
+
|
|
251
|
+
The state machine is a record and a legality check. It is deliberately **not**
|
|
252
|
+
an enforcement channel: the gate reads restrictions, not states, because
|
|
253
|
+
wiring the state model into the gate would make the authorization path depend
|
|
254
|
+
on a structure whose own updates require an authorization result.
|
|
255
|
+
|
|
256
|
+
### Unknown never becomes safe
|
|
257
|
+
|
|
258
|
+
An unrecognised trigger is `REVALIDATE`, not `KEEP` (which would make an
|
|
259
|
+
unknown event benign) and not `REVOKE` (which would make any unknown string a
|
|
260
|
+
denial-of-service lever). Nothing maps to `KEEP` at all — it is reachable
|
|
261
|
+
only by establishing five positive conditions, so "nothing changed" must be
|
|
262
|
+
shown rather than assumed. An unreadable budget is exhausted, not unlimited;
|
|
263
|
+
an unreadable restriction matches; unestablished issuer trust is `None`, not
|
|
264
|
+
`True`; an unresolvable chain yields the bottom envelope; a traversal that
|
|
265
|
+
exceeds its bounds is `UNANALYZABLE` rather than a partial answer presented
|
|
266
|
+
as complete. `UNKNOWN_NON_AUTHORIZATION` checks these exhaustively.
|
|
267
|
+
|
|
268
|
+
### What it does not claim
|
|
269
|
+
|
|
270
|
+
Envelope soundness runs in one direction. `canonical_allow_for` is a
|
|
271
|
+
structural check, not a cryptographic one — it bounds mistakes, not an
|
|
272
|
+
adversary already inside the process. The commit-time re-read covers
|
|
273
|
+
suspension only. The restriction cap trades availability for integrity:
|
|
274
|
+
sixteen narrowings drive a grant to `SUSPEND`, which is fail-closed and still
|
|
275
|
+
a lever. §16 of [`docs/v2.4-aegis.md`](docs/v2.4-aegis.md) is the full list,
|
|
276
|
+
and §17 maps each guarantee to the test file that establishes it.
|
|
277
|
+
|
|
278
|
+
---
|
|
279
|
+
|
|
95
280
|
## What v2.3 changes
|
|
96
281
|
|
|
97
282
|
v2.3 adds no subsystem. Three requests that v2.2 allowed are now denied,
|
|
@@ -137,9 +322,9 @@ section, so deleting one fails rather than quietly shrinking the suite. See
|
|
|
137
322
|
### A strict invariant gate that can pass
|
|
138
323
|
|
|
139
324
|
`python -m firewall.invariants --strict` exited 2 on every invocation,
|
|
140
|
-
because
|
|
325
|
+
because seven of the sixteen invariants are claims about live state that a
|
|
141
326
|
source-only run never reaches. A gate that always fails is a gate that gets
|
|
142
|
-
removed, so those
|
|
327
|
+
removed, so those seven were effectively ungated in CI.
|
|
143
328
|
`firewall/invariants/exercise.py` builds the canonical estate through the
|
|
144
329
|
SDK's public API only, and CI now runs the source-only and exercised gates
|
|
145
330
|
as separate steps. What a green exercised run establishes is bounded to that
|
|
@@ -427,10 +612,10 @@ The architecture is designed around explicit security invariants.
|
|
|
427
612
|
- **Tool output is data, not authority.**
|
|
428
613
|
- **LLM output cannot directly authorize or approve a protected operation.**
|
|
429
614
|
- **High-impact response actions remain policy and approval gated.**
|
|
430
|
-
- **A check that could not run is not a check that passed.**
|
|
615
|
+
- **A check that could not run is not a check that passed.** A dependency the boundary cannot read is a denial that names it, not a check skipped — true of the boundary's own state reads from v2.5, and of malformed input before that.
|
|
431
616
|
- **Security failures default toward refusal rather than implicit trust.**
|
|
432
617
|
|
|
433
|
-
These are implementation properties of the system, not a claim that any deployment is universally secure.
|
|
618
|
+
These are implementation properties of the system, not a claim that any deployment is universally secure. Sixteen such properties are additionally stated once in `firewall.invariants` and checked by code rather than asserted in prose alone; see [`docs/v2.2-invariants.md`](docs/v2.2-invariants.md) for the invariants themselves, [`docs/v2.3-invariant-gate.md`](docs/v2.3-invariant-gate.md) for what a green gate run does and does not establish, [`docs/v2.4-aegis.md`](docs/v2.4-aegis.md) for the four the authority control plane adds, and [`docs/v2.5-boundary.md`](docs/v2.5-boundary.md) for the sixteenth and for what each of them does **not** establish.
|
|
434
619
|
|
|
435
620
|
Where a property does **not** hold, it is stated rather than left to be inferred. A posture change is detected but does not by itself flip a verdict; `retire_key` is not containment for a stolen key, since a retired key's signatures keep verifying so that rotation does not invalidate capabilities in flight; an `amount_max` ceiling is per request, so two siblings each holding one can spend it twice unless a lineage budget is configured; and possession of a trusted signing key is authority, which no cryptography can undo. [`docs/v2.3-self-attack.md`](docs/v2.3-self-attack.md) records each of these against the test that pins it.
|
|
436
621
|
|
|
@@ -516,9 +701,15 @@ The authorization path evaluates the security conditions required by the capabil
|
|
|
516
701
|
|
|
517
702
|
## Command surface
|
|
518
703
|
|
|
704
|
+
v2.4 adds no new CLI subcommands. One existing command changes what it
|
|
705
|
+
prints: `firewall delegate-authorize` now labels an allow it reached without
|
|
706
|
+
an attached `sdk_provider` as `ALLOWED (relationship only)` and says not to
|
|
707
|
+
enforce on it. The exit status stays 0 — the question asked was answered
|
|
708
|
+
affirmatively — but the answer no longer overstates itself.
|
|
709
|
+
|
|
519
710
|
v2.3 adds no new CLI subcommands. It adds one flag to the invariant
|
|
520
711
|
checker: `python -m firewall.invariants --exercise --strict` builds the
|
|
521
|
-
canonical estate so that all
|
|
712
|
+
canonical estate so that all sixteen invariants can be reached, which makes
|
|
522
713
|
`--strict` a gate that can pass and is therefore worth failing.
|
|
523
714
|
|
|
524
715
|
v2.2 adds no new CLI subcommands. Its one new entry point is the invariant
|
|
@@ -571,6 +762,62 @@ python -m firewall.benchmarks
|
|
|
571
762
|
|
|
572
763
|
The repository contains unit, integration, adversarial, hardening, evidence, UI/API, benchmark, and research tests.
|
|
573
764
|
|
|
765
|
+
The v2.5 test surface adds 190 tests — 4,277 in the suite as a whole, on
|
|
766
|
+
Python 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 — of which 189 are in six files, one per campaign.
|
|
767
|
+
Among the properties covered:
|
|
768
|
+
|
|
769
|
+
- every one of the boundary's own dependency reads answering with a denial
|
|
770
|
+
that names it, including against the bundled stores behind a closed
|
|
771
|
+
connection rather than only against injected hostility
|
|
772
|
+
- a denial surviving the loss of its own audit record, and an allow that
|
|
773
|
+
cannot be recorded being withheld
|
|
774
|
+
- an expired capability denied when the clock cannot be read, on every cause:
|
|
775
|
+
no clock at all, a clock that raises, and a clock returning `nan`
|
|
776
|
+
- one validity window measured in one time base, under an injected clock in
|
|
777
|
+
both directions
|
|
778
|
+
- a planted second authorization path being named by the invariant that
|
|
779
|
+
forbids one, with the census verified against all 50 construction sites
|
|
780
|
+
- the payload the boundary authorized being the object the handler executes,
|
|
781
|
+
parametrized over all three adapters, including against a mutating
|
|
782
|
+
`request_builder`
|
|
783
|
+
- revalidation refusing to report an authority the boundary denies, across an
|
|
784
|
+
Aegis suspension, a narrowing, a lift, and a latched refusal, each with a
|
|
785
|
+
negative control that blinds the snapshot field and shows the invariant
|
|
786
|
+
violating
|
|
787
|
+
- an unreadable replay store becoming a `503` rather than escaping a method
|
|
788
|
+
typed to return a decision
|
|
789
|
+
- the three surviving MCP/HTTP divergences reproduced rather than asserted, so
|
|
790
|
+
a future unification fails a test that says why it stays
|
|
791
|
+
|
|
792
|
+
The v2.4 test surface adds 384 tests across eleven files — 4,087 in the suite
|
|
793
|
+
as a whole, on Python 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 — including stateful security-state
|
|
794
|
+
fuzzing, eight named concurrency races, and an integration-boundary sweep.
|
|
795
|
+
Among the properties covered:
|
|
796
|
+
|
|
797
|
+
- no path from adaptive analysis to an allow, and no Aegis module able to
|
|
798
|
+
construct an `AuthorizationResult`
|
|
799
|
+
- every forbidden transition refused individually: out of `REVOKED`, out of
|
|
800
|
+
`EXPIRED`, `NARROWED` to wider, `SUSPENDED` to `ACTIVE` without a canonical
|
|
801
|
+
allow, and a child exceeding its parent
|
|
802
|
+
- an envelope that excludes a request always accompanied by a boundary that
|
|
803
|
+
denies it
|
|
804
|
+
- no field of the envelope widening under delegation or attenuation
|
|
805
|
+
- a `nan` bound bounding nothing being denied, while an `inf` bound still
|
|
806
|
+
means unbounded
|
|
807
|
+
- a 400-digit integer producing a decision rather than an exception out of
|
|
808
|
+
`authorize()`
|
|
809
|
+
- every authorization-reachable Aegis method total, including against an
|
|
810
|
+
injected hostile controller
|
|
811
|
+
- a restriction written mid-flight being observed, and a suspension being
|
|
812
|
+
caught inside the commit transaction
|
|
813
|
+
- `__bool__` raising on every analysis object, so a truthiness test cannot
|
|
814
|
+
become an allow
|
|
815
|
+
- every integration surface reaching the canonical boundary, with no local
|
|
816
|
+
allow anywhere
|
|
817
|
+
- no dataclass field in the package carrying a default that Python 3.11
|
|
818
|
+
rejects, so a defect that hides on the development interpreter cannot wait
|
|
819
|
+
for CI to find it
|
|
820
|
+
|
|
574
821
|
The v2.3 test surface adds the thirteen-question self-attack suite, which
|
|
575
822
|
covers, among other properties:
|
|
576
823
|
|
|
@@ -697,6 +944,12 @@ See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for the project's security reporting policy.
|
|
|
697
944
|
|
|
698
945
|
Detailed specifications are maintained in the repository:
|
|
699
946
|
|
|
947
|
+
- `docs/v2.5-boundary.md`
|
|
948
|
+
- `docs/v2.5-performance.md`
|
|
949
|
+
- `docs/v2.4-aegis.md`
|
|
950
|
+
- `docs/v2.4-aegis-design.md`
|
|
951
|
+
- `docs/v2.4-performance.md`
|
|
952
|
+
- `docs/v2.4-migration.md`
|
|
700
953
|
- `docs/v2.3-security-corrections.md`
|
|
701
954
|
- `docs/v2.3-self-attack.md`
|
|
702
955
|
- `docs/v2.3-invariant-gate.md`
|
|
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
|
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
Agent Firewall is built around one security boundary: **authorization remains deterministic, explicit, and fail-closed**. Identity, provenance, monitoring, behavioral analysis, simulation, evidence, and response provide security context around that boundary, but they do not become an alternative path to authorization.
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
|
+
> **v2.5** is an attack release. It adds no subsystem and no authorization path: twenty-two attacks were run against v2.4's shipped boundary, and the twelve that found a place where `authorize()` raised instead of deciding are now denials that name what could not be read. An expired capability that returned `authorized` because the verifier had no clock is the one that mattered most.
|
|
8
|
+
>
|
|
9
|
+
> **v2.4** adds **Aegis**, an adaptive authority control plane: a live grant can be narrowed, suspended, revalidated or revoked while a task is running. It adds no second authorization path — Aegis reaches `FirewallSDK.authorize()` through one gate that can only deny or abstain, and learns what happened through one callback the SDK invokes *after* the decision exists.
|
|
10
|
+
>
|
|
7
11
|
> **v2.3** is a correctness release. It adds no subsystem and no authorization path: the work was to attack v2.2's shipped behaviour, fix the three fail-open paths that broke, stop analytical output from reading as verified when it was not, and make the strict invariant gate something CI can actually fail on.
|
|
8
12
|
>
|
|
9
13
|
> **v2.2** makes the control plane adaptive: authority is re-evaluated when the state it rested on changes, contradictions between independent claim sources are reported rather than resolved, and the architectural properties the design rests on are checked by code instead of asserted in prose.
|
|
@@ -68,6 +72,187 @@ When required evidence is unavailable, verification fails, identity is unknown,
|
|
|
68
72
|
|
|
69
73
|
---
|
|
70
74
|
|
|
75
|
+
## What v2.5 changes
|
|
76
|
+
|
|
77
|
+
v2.5 adds no subsystem. The work was to attack v2.4's shipped boundary until
|
|
78
|
+
a guarantee broke; twenty-two attacks are recorded in
|
|
79
|
+
[`docs/v2.5-boundary.md`](docs/v2.5-boundary.md), each with the entry point, a
|
|
80
|
+
reproduction through the public API, the verdict before and after, and the
|
|
81
|
+
direction authority moved.
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
### Twelve crashes that were not decisions
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
`FAIL_CLOSED` has said since v2.2 that "the authorization path never raises in
|
|
86
|
+
place of deciding". All eight probes behind it were malformed *input* against
|
|
87
|
+
a healthy firewall, so the invariant held green while twelve paths through
|
|
88
|
+
`FirewallSDK.authorize()` still raised — nine of them on a read of the
|
|
89
|
+
firewall's own state, which no amount of hostile input reaches.
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
- **An expired capability returned `authorized`.** A `CapabilityVerifier`
|
|
92
|
+
built without a `clock` is a legitimate configuration: verify signatures,
|
|
93
|
+
leave expiry to the firewall's time gate. `_gate_time` responded to an
|
|
94
|
+
unreadable clock by not checking the window at all. Now
|
|
95
|
+
`clock_unavailable:{cause}`, and the verifier always carries a clock.
|
|
96
|
+
- **Five state reads propagated whatever the store raised** — refusal state,
|
|
97
|
+
risk state, issuer trust, revocation and delegation lineage. Each is now
|
|
98
|
+
`..._unavailable:{Type}`. The bundled `SQLiteRevocationStore` behind a
|
|
99
|
+
closed connection reaches one of them for real.
|
|
100
|
+
- **An unwritable audit sink destroyed the denial it was recording.** The
|
|
101
|
+
verdict now survives and the loss travels in `trace["evidence_error"]`; the
|
|
102
|
+
same failure on the allow path withholds the allow as
|
|
103
|
+
`evidence_unavailable:{Type}`.
|
|
104
|
+
- **Malformed arguments and an unreadable envelope projection** answer with
|
|
105
|
+
`invalid_request`, `invalid_capability`, `capability_time_invalid`, and the
|
|
106
|
+
bottom envelope rather than an exception.
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
The shape is the same in all twelve: a caller's `except Exception` was
|
|
109
|
+
deciding what happened to an unauthorized request, and now the boundary
|
|
110
|
+
decides.
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
112
|
+
### One question asked, another one executed
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
Five defects sat between a caller and the boundary, and none of them bypassed
|
|
115
|
+
it or made it answer wrongly — the boundary was asked a different question
|
|
116
|
+
from the one the glue then acted on. Three adapters authorized
|
|
117
|
+
`{"amount": 10}` and executed `amount=5000`, by three mechanisms: a
|
|
118
|
+
non-idempotent `normalize`, a caller mapping that answered differently on the
|
|
119
|
+
second read, and a hostile `Mapping` re-materialized for the handler. The fix
|
|
120
|
+
is structural rather than defensive — normalize or settle once, then hand the
|
|
121
|
+
*same object* to the boundary and to the handler. A fourth defect was created
|
|
122
|
+
by that fix (a `request_builder` mutating the mapping the handler would then
|
|
123
|
+
unpack) and closed before shipping; a fifth let an unreadable replay store
|
|
124
|
+
escape `HTTPFirewall.authorize` after the boundary had allowed.
|
|
125
|
+
|
|
126
|
+
### A monitoring surface that reported withdrawn authority
|
|
127
|
+
|
|
128
|
+
`revalidate()` served a cached allow across an Aegis suspension, across a
|
|
129
|
+
narrowing, and across a latched refusal, while `authorize()` denied all three.
|
|
130
|
+
No enforcement path consumes that answer as permission, so the boundary held
|
|
131
|
+
— but the surface whose only job is to notice a withdrawal did not notice.
|
|
132
|
+
`SecurityContextSnapshot` now carries `aegis_restrictions` and
|
|
133
|
+
`refusal_state`, so the change routes revalidation through `authorize()`. Both
|
|
134
|
+
are *state* probes: they report what state exists and never decide whether it
|
|
135
|
+
excludes the request, which is deliberately coarser than the gates and costs
|
|
136
|
+
exactly one redundant authorization when a digest moves for a reason the
|
|
137
|
+
boundary tolerates.
|
|
138
|
+
|
|
139
|
+
### A sixteenth invariant, and three of the fifteen strengthened
|
|
140
|
+
|
|
141
|
+
`REVALIDATION_CONSISTENCY` is new: continuous revalidation never reports an
|
|
142
|
+
authority the boundary denies, sampled over six security-state changes, each
|
|
143
|
+
with its own negative control. `AUTHORIZATION_UNIQUENESS` is now a census of
|
|
144
|
+
all 50 verdict-construction sites in the package against a closed allow-list
|
|
145
|
+
keyed by `(module, function)` — a planted second authorization path inside
|
|
146
|
+
`sdk.py` previously passed it. `FAIL_CLOSED` gained nine dependency-failure
|
|
147
|
+
probes. And `ENVELOPE_SOUNDNESS` stopped absorbing the one case it was most
|
|
148
|
+
exposed to: the reads that produce a bottom envelope were the same reads that
|
|
149
|
+
raised, and it reported `HOLDS` on them anyway. Nothing was added to raise the
|
|
150
|
+
count — where an invariant already covered a property, it was strengthened
|
|
151
|
+
instead.
|
|
152
|
+
|
|
153
|
+
### What it costs, and what was refused
|
|
154
|
+
|
|
155
|
+
The two new snapshot probes cost about 4.5 µs of a ~70 µs snapshot, roughly
|
|
156
|
+
0.4% of the authorization they accompany, so neither fix has a performance
|
|
157
|
+
argument against it. Four optimizations were deliberately not made, and the
|
|
158
|
+
two that would have reclaimed the ~1.1 ms a changed revalidation costs are
|
|
159
|
+
the ones worth stating: both amount to concluding that a refusal does not
|
|
160
|
+
apply, which is an allow reached outside `authorize()`. One of the two is
|
|
161
|
+
enforced by a failing test rather than by prose. See
|
|
162
|
+
[`docs/v2.5-performance.md`](docs/v2.5-performance.md).
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
---
|
|
165
|
+
|
|
166
|
+
## What v2.4 adds
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
v2.2 made the platform adaptive *above* the boundary: when watched state
|
|
169
|
+
changed, a decision was re-run. v2.4 makes **authority itself** adaptive. A
|
|
170
|
+
grant that is already in use can be narrowed, suspended, revalidated or
|
|
171
|
+
revoked, and the change is enforced on the next authorization — and, for
|
|
172
|
+
suspension, inside the commit transaction of one already in flight.
|
|
173
|
+
|
|
174
|
+
Aegis is off by default. `FirewallSDK(aegis_enabled=True)` opts in; with no
|
|
175
|
+
controller attached the adaptive gate abstains and v2.3 behaviour is exact.
|
|
176
|
+
|
|
177
|
+
### One deny-only seam
|
|
178
|
+
|
|
179
|
+
Nine modules, 5,382 lines, none of which imports `firewall.sdk`. Everything
|
|
180
|
+
Aegis does reaches the outside world through two points: `_gate_aegis`, the
|
|
181
|
+
ninth of eleven gates, which can only deny or abstain; and
|
|
182
|
+
`observe_authorization`, which the SDK calls *after* a decision exists.
|
|
183
|
+
Because the callback runs after, no Aegis state can be a precondition of the
|
|
184
|
+
allow it observes. Authority flows from the boundary into Aegis and never the
|
|
185
|
+
other way.
|
|
186
|
+
|
|
187
|
+
```text
|
|
188
|
+
change -> classify -> KEEP | REVALIDATE | NARROW | SUSPEND | REVOKE
|
|
189
|
+
|
|
|
190
|
+
v
|
|
191
|
+
restriction written
|
|
192
|
+
|
|
|
193
|
+
v
|
|
194
|
+
FirewallSDK.authorize() -> _gate_aegis -> DENY
|
|
195
|
+
```
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
There is no arrow from Aegis to ALLOW. That absence is the design.
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
### The authority envelope
|
|
200
|
+
|
|
201
|
+
An `AuthorityEnvelope` is a bound on what a capability may still do, folded
|
|
202
|
+
across its delegation chain by a per-dimension greatest-lower-bound. Twelve
|
|
203
|
+
fields — patterns, tool, time window, constraint bounds, depth, its ceiling,
|
|
204
|
+
issuers, issuer trust, revocation, budget, chain membership, and a bottom
|
|
205
|
+
marker — and every dimension that bounds a request has a named enforcement
|
|
206
|
+
site at the boundary. A dimension with no enforcement site would be
|
|
207
|
+
decoration.
|
|
208
|
+
|
|
209
|
+
The theorem is one-directional and stated that way: if the envelope
|
|
210
|
+
**excludes** a request, the boundary denies it. The converse does not hold,
|
|
211
|
+
and the API is named so that misuse reads wrong — `excludes()` returns a
|
|
212
|
+
reason, `may_admit()` means "this envelope does not itself refuse", and
|
|
213
|
+
`__bool__` **raises** on an envelope, a grant, a preflight, a blast radius
|
|
214
|
+
and a classification, so `if preflight(...)` is an error rather than an
|
|
215
|
+
accidental allow.
|
|
216
|
+
|
|
217
|
+
### Seven states ordered by residual authority
|
|
218
|
+
|
|
219
|
+
`ISSUED`, `ACTIVE`, `REVALIDATING`, `NARROWED`, `SUSPENDED`, `REVOKED`,
|
|
220
|
+
`EXPIRED`. A transition is legal only if it does not increase residual
|
|
221
|
+
authority. `REVALIDATING -> ACTIVE` is the only edge that restores authority,
|
|
222
|
+
and it requires an `AuthorizationResult` that is allowed, reasoned
|
|
223
|
+
`authorized`, and traced to that capability's fingerprint. `REVOKED` and
|
|
224
|
+
`EXPIRED` are terminal and checked before the ordering rule, so no evidence
|
|
225
|
+
or clock change produces an edge out of either.
|
|
226
|
+
|
|
227
|
+
The state machine is a record and a legality check. It is deliberately **not**
|
|
228
|
+
an enforcement channel: the gate reads restrictions, not states, because
|
|
229
|
+
wiring the state model into the gate would make the authorization path depend
|
|
230
|
+
on a structure whose own updates require an authorization result.
|
|
231
|
+
|
|
232
|
+
### Unknown never becomes safe
|
|
233
|
+
|
|
234
|
+
An unrecognised trigger is `REVALIDATE`, not `KEEP` (which would make an
|
|
235
|
+
unknown event benign) and not `REVOKE` (which would make any unknown string a
|
|
236
|
+
denial-of-service lever). Nothing maps to `KEEP` at all — it is reachable
|
|
237
|
+
only by establishing five positive conditions, so "nothing changed" must be
|
|
238
|
+
shown rather than assumed. An unreadable budget is exhausted, not unlimited;
|
|
239
|
+
an unreadable restriction matches; unestablished issuer trust is `None`, not
|
|
240
|
+
`True`; an unresolvable chain yields the bottom envelope; a traversal that
|
|
241
|
+
exceeds its bounds is `UNANALYZABLE` rather than a partial answer presented
|
|
242
|
+
as complete. `UNKNOWN_NON_AUTHORIZATION` checks these exhaustively.
|
|
243
|
+
|
|
244
|
+
### What it does not claim
|
|
245
|
+
|
|
246
|
+
Envelope soundness runs in one direction. `canonical_allow_for` is a
|
|
247
|
+
structural check, not a cryptographic one — it bounds mistakes, not an
|
|
248
|
+
adversary already inside the process. The commit-time re-read covers
|
|
249
|
+
suspension only. The restriction cap trades availability for integrity:
|
|
250
|
+
sixteen narrowings drive a grant to `SUSPEND`, which is fail-closed and still
|
|
251
|
+
a lever. §16 of [`docs/v2.4-aegis.md`](docs/v2.4-aegis.md) is the full list,
|
|
252
|
+
and §17 maps each guarantee to the test file that establishes it.
|
|
253
|
+
|
|
254
|
+
---
|
|
255
|
+
|
|
71
256
|
## What v2.3 changes
|
|
72
257
|
|
|
73
258
|
v2.3 adds no subsystem. Three requests that v2.2 allowed are now denied,
|
|
@@ -113,9 +298,9 @@ section, so deleting one fails rather than quietly shrinking the suite. See
|
|
|
113
298
|
### A strict invariant gate that can pass
|
|
114
299
|
|
|
115
300
|
`python -m firewall.invariants --strict` exited 2 on every invocation,
|
|
116
|
-
because
|
|
301
|
+
because seven of the sixteen invariants are claims about live state that a
|
|
117
302
|
source-only run never reaches. A gate that always fails is a gate that gets
|
|
118
|
-
removed, so those
|
|
303
|
+
removed, so those seven were effectively ungated in CI.
|
|
119
304
|
`firewall/invariants/exercise.py` builds the canonical estate through the
|
|
120
305
|
SDK's public API only, and CI now runs the source-only and exercised gates
|
|
121
306
|
as separate steps. What a green exercised run establishes is bounded to that
|
|
@@ -403,10 +588,10 @@ The architecture is designed around explicit security invariants.
|
|
|
403
588
|
- **Tool output is data, not authority.**
|
|
404
589
|
- **LLM output cannot directly authorize or approve a protected operation.**
|
|
405
590
|
- **High-impact response actions remain policy and approval gated.**
|
|
406
|
-
- **A check that could not run is not a check that passed.**
|
|
591
|
+
- **A check that could not run is not a check that passed.** A dependency the boundary cannot read is a denial that names it, not a check skipped — true of the boundary's own state reads from v2.5, and of malformed input before that.
|
|
407
592
|
- **Security failures default toward refusal rather than implicit trust.**
|
|
408
593
|
|
|
409
|
-
These are implementation properties of the system, not a claim that any deployment is universally secure.
|
|
594
|
+
These are implementation properties of the system, not a claim that any deployment is universally secure. Sixteen such properties are additionally stated once in `firewall.invariants` and checked by code rather than asserted in prose alone; see [`docs/v2.2-invariants.md`](docs/v2.2-invariants.md) for the invariants themselves, [`docs/v2.3-invariant-gate.md`](docs/v2.3-invariant-gate.md) for what a green gate run does and does not establish, [`docs/v2.4-aegis.md`](docs/v2.4-aegis.md) for the four the authority control plane adds, and [`docs/v2.5-boundary.md`](docs/v2.5-boundary.md) for the sixteenth and for what each of them does **not** establish.
|
|
410
595
|
|
|
411
596
|
Where a property does **not** hold, it is stated rather than left to be inferred. A posture change is detected but does not by itself flip a verdict; `retire_key` is not containment for a stolen key, since a retired key's signatures keep verifying so that rotation does not invalidate capabilities in flight; an `amount_max` ceiling is per request, so two siblings each holding one can spend it twice unless a lineage budget is configured; and possession of a trusted signing key is authority, which no cryptography can undo. [`docs/v2.3-self-attack.md`](docs/v2.3-self-attack.md) records each of these against the test that pins it.
|
|
412
597
|
|
|
@@ -492,9 +677,15 @@ The authorization path evaluates the security conditions required by the capabil
|
|
|
492
677
|
|
|
493
678
|
## Command surface
|
|
494
679
|
|
|
680
|
+
v2.4 adds no new CLI subcommands. One existing command changes what it
|
|
681
|
+
prints: `firewall delegate-authorize` now labels an allow it reached without
|
|
682
|
+
an attached `sdk_provider` as `ALLOWED (relationship only)` and says not to
|
|
683
|
+
enforce on it. The exit status stays 0 — the question asked was answered
|
|
684
|
+
affirmatively — but the answer no longer overstates itself.
|
|
685
|
+
|
|
495
686
|
v2.3 adds no new CLI subcommands. It adds one flag to the invariant
|
|
496
687
|
checker: `python -m firewall.invariants --exercise --strict` builds the
|
|
497
|
-
canonical estate so that all
|
|
688
|
+
canonical estate so that all sixteen invariants can be reached, which makes
|
|
498
689
|
`--strict` a gate that can pass and is therefore worth failing.
|
|
499
690
|
|
|
500
691
|
v2.2 adds no new CLI subcommands. Its one new entry point is the invariant
|
|
@@ -547,6 +738,62 @@ python -m firewall.benchmarks
|
|
|
547
738
|
|
|
548
739
|
The repository contains unit, integration, adversarial, hardening, evidence, UI/API, benchmark, and research tests.
|
|
549
740
|
|
|
741
|
+
The v2.5 test surface adds 190 tests — 4,277 in the suite as a whole, on
|
|
742
|
+
Python 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 — of which 189 are in six files, one per campaign.
|
|
743
|
+
Among the properties covered:
|
|
744
|
+
|
|
745
|
+
- every one of the boundary's own dependency reads answering with a denial
|
|
746
|
+
that names it, including against the bundled stores behind a closed
|
|
747
|
+
connection rather than only against injected hostility
|
|
748
|
+
- a denial surviving the loss of its own audit record, and an allow that
|
|
749
|
+
cannot be recorded being withheld
|
|
750
|
+
- an expired capability denied when the clock cannot be read, on every cause:
|
|
751
|
+
no clock at all, a clock that raises, and a clock returning `nan`
|
|
752
|
+
- one validity window measured in one time base, under an injected clock in
|
|
753
|
+
both directions
|
|
754
|
+
- a planted second authorization path being named by the invariant that
|
|
755
|
+
forbids one, with the census verified against all 50 construction sites
|
|
756
|
+
- the payload the boundary authorized being the object the handler executes,
|
|
757
|
+
parametrized over all three adapters, including against a mutating
|
|
758
|
+
`request_builder`
|
|
759
|
+
- revalidation refusing to report an authority the boundary denies, across an
|
|
760
|
+
Aegis suspension, a narrowing, a lift, and a latched refusal, each with a
|
|
761
|
+
negative control that blinds the snapshot field and shows the invariant
|
|
762
|
+
violating
|
|
763
|
+
- an unreadable replay store becoming a `503` rather than escaping a method
|
|
764
|
+
typed to return a decision
|
|
765
|
+
- the three surviving MCP/HTTP divergences reproduced rather than asserted, so
|
|
766
|
+
a future unification fails a test that says why it stays
|
|
767
|
+
|
|
768
|
+
The v2.4 test surface adds 384 tests across eleven files — 4,087 in the suite
|
|
769
|
+
as a whole, on Python 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 — including stateful security-state
|
|
770
|
+
fuzzing, eight named concurrency races, and an integration-boundary sweep.
|
|
771
|
+
Among the properties covered:
|
|
772
|
+
|
|
773
|
+
- no path from adaptive analysis to an allow, and no Aegis module able to
|
|
774
|
+
construct an `AuthorizationResult`
|
|
775
|
+
- every forbidden transition refused individually: out of `REVOKED`, out of
|
|
776
|
+
`EXPIRED`, `NARROWED` to wider, `SUSPENDED` to `ACTIVE` without a canonical
|
|
777
|
+
allow, and a child exceeding its parent
|
|
778
|
+
- an envelope that excludes a request always accompanied by a boundary that
|
|
779
|
+
denies it
|
|
780
|
+
- no field of the envelope widening under delegation or attenuation
|
|
781
|
+
- a `nan` bound bounding nothing being denied, while an `inf` bound still
|
|
782
|
+
means unbounded
|
|
783
|
+
- a 400-digit integer producing a decision rather than an exception out of
|
|
784
|
+
`authorize()`
|
|
785
|
+
- every authorization-reachable Aegis method total, including against an
|
|
786
|
+
injected hostile controller
|
|
787
|
+
- a restriction written mid-flight being observed, and a suspension being
|
|
788
|
+
caught inside the commit transaction
|
|
789
|
+
- `__bool__` raising on every analysis object, so a truthiness test cannot
|
|
790
|
+
become an allow
|
|
791
|
+
- every integration surface reaching the canonical boundary, with no local
|
|
792
|
+
allow anywhere
|
|
793
|
+
- no dataclass field in the package carrying a default that Python 3.11
|
|
794
|
+
rejects, so a defect that hides on the development interpreter cannot wait
|
|
795
|
+
for CI to find it
|
|
796
|
+
|
|
550
797
|
The v2.3 test surface adds the thirteen-question self-attack suite, which
|
|
551
798
|
covers, among other properties:
|
|
552
799
|
|
|
@@ -673,6 +920,12 @@ See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for the project's security reporting policy.
|
|
|
673
920
|
|
|
674
921
|
Detailed specifications are maintained in the repository:
|
|
675
922
|
|
|
923
|
+
- `docs/v2.5-boundary.md`
|
|
924
|
+
- `docs/v2.5-performance.md`
|
|
925
|
+
- `docs/v2.4-aegis.md`
|
|
926
|
+
- `docs/v2.4-aegis-design.md`
|
|
927
|
+
- `docs/v2.4-performance.md`
|
|
928
|
+
- `docs/v2.4-migration.md`
|
|
676
929
|
- `docs/v2.3-security-corrections.md`
|
|
677
930
|
- `docs/v2.3-self-attack.md`
|
|
678
931
|
- `docs/v2.3-invariant-gate.md`
|