SessionArmor 0.5.0__tar.gz → 1.0.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/CHANGELOG.md +121 -0
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/CONTRIBUTING.md +23 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/MANIFEST.in +3 -1
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0/src/SessionArmor.egg-info → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/PKG-INFO +106 -21
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/README.md +103 -20
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/SECURITY.md +2 -3
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/VERSIONING.md +78 -0
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/docs/ACCESSGATE_INTEGRATION.md +102 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/docs/RELEASE.md +14 -3
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md +4 -1
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/mcp/README.md +1 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/mcp/agent-contract.json +6 -5
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/pyproject.toml +9 -2
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/requirements/build.in +1 -1
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/requirements/build.txt +603 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0/src/SessionArmor.egg-info}/PKG-INFO +106 -21
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/SessionArmor.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +5 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/SessionArmor.egg-info/requires.txt +1 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/__init__.py +1 -1
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/adapters/django/audit.py +119 -48
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/adapters/django/gate.py +138 -48
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/adapters/django/session.py +246 -68
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/adapters/django/utils.py +103 -34
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/decisions.py +12 -6
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/mcp/agent-contract.json +6 -5
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/mcp/server.py +25 -7
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/tests/test_accessgate_bridge.py +57 -0
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/tests/test_audit.py +254 -0
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/tests/test_fail_closed_paths.py +219 -0
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/tests/test_gate.py +410 -0
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/tests/test_mcp_server.py +280 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/tests/test_package.py +22 -1
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/tests/test_release_tools.py +62 -0
- sessionarmor-1.0.0/tests/test_session.py +633 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/tests/test_utils.py +124 -0
- sessionarmor-0.5.0/docs/ACCESSGATE_INTEGRATION.md +0 -40
- sessionarmor-0.5.0/tests/test_audit.py +0 -107
- sessionarmor-0.5.0/tests/test_gate.py +0 -190
- sessionarmor-0.5.0/tests/test_mcp_server.py +0 -150
- sessionarmor-0.5.0/tests/test_release_tools.py +0 -20
- sessionarmor-0.5.0/tests/test_session.py +0 -219
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/LICENSE +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/docs/AUDIT_SCOPE.md +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/docs/SECURE_DEVELOPMENT.md +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/docs/SECURITY_ASSURANCE.md +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/docs/security-model.md +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/mcp/server.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/setup.cfg +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/SessionArmor.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/SessionArmor.egg-info/entry_points.txt +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/SessionArmor.egg-info/top_level.txt +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/adapters/__init__.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/adapters/django/__init__.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/assurance.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/exceptions.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/mcp/__init__.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/src/session_armor/py.typed +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/tests/conftest.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/tests/settings.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/tests/test_assurance.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/tests/urls.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/tools/__init__.py +0 -0
- {sessionarmor-0.5.0 → sessionarmor-1.0.0}/tools/generate_sbom.py +0 -0
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## [Unreleased]
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## [1.0.0] - 2026-11-05
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### Changed
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- Stabilized the documented framework-neutral assurance and gate-decision APIs,
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Django middleware adapters, extension hooks, and local MCP entry point.
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- Adopted the shared SemVer, owner-review, manual-workflow, and immutable-release
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policy in `VERSIONING.md`, with matching Claude and Codex instructions.
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- Aligned package, runtime, and public MCP versions; preserved the assurance v1
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schema and the 0.6 middleware behavior.
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- Declared packaged MIT license files and a PEP 639-capable build backend.
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- Made the hash-locked release toolchain cover Windows, Linux, and Python 3.10+
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instead of relying on a Linux/Python 3.13-only dependency resolution.
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- Allowed the AccessGate 1.x release in the development integration dependency.
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### Documentation
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- Documented the stable API, pre-0.5 migration boundaries, supported integration
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ranges, and the local-only scope of the public agent contract.
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### Security
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- Updated the locked setuptools build tool to 84.2.1, addressing
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GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w in the previous Windows build toolchain.
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## [0.6.0] - 2026-10-29
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### Security
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- `SessionSecurityMiddleware`, `GateMiddleware` and `AuditMiddleware` match
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`exempt_paths` against `request.path_info` (the path Django routes on) instead
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of `request.path`, so a `SCRIPT_NAME` taken from a forwarded request header
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can no longer exempt a protected view. Remove any mount prefix written into
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`exempt_paths`.
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- An exempt path of `/` exempts only the root URL; as a prefix it used to exempt
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every path from session checks, gates and audit.
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- `SESSION_ARMOR_STATE_KEY`, `SESSION_ARMOR_AUDIT_PEPPER` and fallback keys must
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be `str` or `bytes`; other types, such as an integer that `bytes()` turned into
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a public all-zero key, raise `SessionConfigurationError`.
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- `hash_ip()` hashes values in the reserved `session-armor:` namespace under a
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separate derived key, so no digest can equal a state-MAC subkey when the audit
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pepper and the state key share `SECRET_KEY`. Other digests are unchanged.
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- Gate cache entries record the gate class that wrote them; a gate never reuses a
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result cached by a different class with the same `gate_id`.
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- Audit: `error_type` is reserved evidence that hooks can neither supply nor
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change, `get_extra_fields()` keys that repeat identity keys raise
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`AuditEmissionError`, and `before_log()` edits made in place on reserved fields
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are rejected like edits on a copy.
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- Audit: a client IP that cannot be validated is recorded as `ip_hash: null`
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instead of losing the event, and a request whose view logs the user out is
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recorded and attributed to the user it arrived with.
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### Added
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- `SESSION_ARMOR_STATE_KEY_FALLBACKS` for graceful key rotation: retired keys only
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verify existing state, which is then re-signed with the current key. When it is
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unset, a state key that follows `SECRET_KEY` honours `SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`.
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- `SessionSecurityMiddleware.establish(request, user=None)` binds a session during
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the login request.
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- `SessionSecurityMiddleware.refresh_assurance(request, user=None)` re-verifies
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the session and re-issues trusted evidence right before a late authorization
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decision, and `rebaseline_claims(..., refresh_assurance=True)` does the same
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after a claim rebaseline, so integrations never build `SessionAssurance`.
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- `SessionSecurityMiddleware.has_state()`, `discard_state()` and
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`binding_digests()` replace reading the private `_sa_*`/`_ss_*` keys and
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re-deriving per-factor diagnostics.
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- `GateMiddleware.error_cache_ttl` caps how long a rejection from `on_error()` is
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reused, `follow_session_exemptions` lets a gate follow SessionArmor's own
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exemptions, and `get_cached_decision()` returns the last stored gate result.
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- `AuditMiddleware.get_audit_path()` keeps secrets carried in URL paths out of
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audit records; the returned path stays reserved evidence.
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### Changed
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- A request without a User-Agent is bound to an explicit "absent" marker instead
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of failing evaluation; a session started with a User-Agent still ends with
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`fingerprint_mismatch` if the header disappears.
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- IPv4-mapped IPv6 peers (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) are returned and matched in IPv4
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form. Dual-stack deployments see one `fingerprint_mismatch` per live session and
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new audit `ip_hash` values for those clients after upgrading;
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`::ffff:0:0/96` is rejected as a catch-all CIDR.
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- With a non-zero `SESSION_ARMOR_TRUSTED_PROXY_DEPTH`, `get_client_ip` reads only
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the client entry and the trusted hops, and forwarded entries may carry a port.
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- `GateMiddleware` no longer converts exceptions from the view or inner
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middleware into `gate_evaluation_error` rejections; only gate evaluation fails
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closed.
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- Evidence never reports `established_at`/`last_activity_at` later than its
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denies those sessions with `invalid_session_timeline`.
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- HMAC subkeys are cached per key and purpose, and audit events the logger would
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drop are validated but not rendered; stored MACs and emitted lines are
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unchanged.
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- Django hooks declare `HttpResponseBase` return types; the branch-coverage gate
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is 83% with new fail-closed regression tests, and a bridge test runs real
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evidence through AccessGate (the `dev` extra installs AccessGate).
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- Release workflows stay manually dispatched but refuse refs other than `main`
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or `v<version>`, run lint, type checks and tests first, and build with the
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### Fixed
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- Contained session-evaluation and re-verification errors are logged at WARNING
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with a traceback on `session_armor.session`; an exception from `on_timeout()` is
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logged and no longer replaces the timeout reason; a malformed
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`SESSION_ARMOR_STATE_KEY_FALLBACKS` is reported on the first request.
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- `on_violation()` runs once even when terminating the session fails.
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- The default `get_login_url()` honours a lazy `LOGIN_URL` such as
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- Gates with `requires_auth = False` no longer reject every anonymous request.
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- `GateDecision` applies the string-length and finite-number checks to list items
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in `context`.
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- Audit entries over 16,384 characters are re-rendered with only the reserved and
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identity fields and `truncated: true` instead of being cut into invalid JSON.
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- The MCP server writes ASCII-only JSON, reads stdin as UTF-8 under any locale,
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answers unserializable responses with -32603 and invalid UTF-8 with -32700
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instead of exiting, omits `outputSchema` when a tool defines none, answers
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- The `get_client_ip` docstring, the README "check once" gate example and the
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SECURITY.md support table match the code and the 0.5.x line.
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## [0.5.0] - 2026-08-16
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### Changed
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# Contributing to SessionArmor
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Issues and pull requests are welcome. For a vulnerability, use the private
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reporting route in [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) instead of a public issue.
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Fork the repository, keep your change focused, explain its behavior and
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compatibility impact, update the relevant docs, and include appropriate test
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evidence. Never submit credentials, customer data, or production examples.
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Contributions are provided under the repository's [MIT license](LICENSE);
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preserve copyright and third-party license notices.
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The owner (`@bezu-1`) reviews and approves external changes before merge.
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receive the same owner review as application code.
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PRs, issues, comments, and agent mentions cannot authorize coding agents, GitHub
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app access must also be restricted separately in the owner's account settings.
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Only the owner starts manual workflows; contributors should include their local
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test results. Do not request that an agent approve or merge its own work.
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See [VERSIONING.md](VERSIONING.md) for the common versioning and release policy
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and the README's development instructions for this package's local checks.
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Metadata-Version: 2.4
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Name: SessionArmor
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Version: 0.
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Version: 1.0.0
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Summary: Framework-neutral session-assurance contracts with optional security adapters.
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Author-email: Tunet Ltd <alex@tunet.xyz>
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License-Expression: MIT
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Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/issues
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Project-URL: Changelog, https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md
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Keywords: django,middleware,security,session,audit,gates,nist,owasp
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Classifier: Development Status :: 5 - Production/Stable
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Classifier: Framework :: Django
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Classifier: Framework :: Django :: 4.2
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Classifier: Framework :: Django :: 5.0
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Requires-Dist: django-stubs>=4.2.0; extra == "dev"
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Requires-Dist: pip-audit>=2.7; extra == "dev"
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Requires-Dist: AccessGate<2,>=0.3.0a1; extra == "dev"
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# SessionArmor
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**Framework-neutral session-assurance contracts with an optional Django adapter for session integrity, privacy-aware audit logging, and configurable request gates.**
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Part of the [Tunet](https://tunet.xyz/engineering/)
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Part of the [Tunet](https://tunet.xyz/engineering/) open-source libraries, alongside [AccessGate](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/access_gate), [GeoCanon](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/GeoCanon), and [SwapLayer](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/swap_layer). See the [SessionArmor product page](https://tunet.xyz/engineering/session-armor/) for the public capability overview.
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## Version 1.0
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here. See the [changelog](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) and [release procedure](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/docs/RELEASE.md).
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rejection is cached for the full TTL like any other result. Set
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`error_cache_ttl` (seconds) to re-check sooner once a dependency recovers.
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version, a pass is never reused and `check()` runs on every request.
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`None`; anything else, an empty string included, fails closed:
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> version changes — so it
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> **Sticky passes and revocation.** With `recheck_after_pass = False` and a
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> state version but no `sticky_pass_max_age`, a pass is cached until the
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> session ends, `invalidate()` is called, or the state version changes — so it
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> is **not** appropriate for authorization/entitlement gates where access may
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> be revoked. For those, use a normal TTL gate, drive
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> `get_state_version()`, or set `sticky_pass_max_age` (seconds) to cap how long
|
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> a sticky pass may be reused before a forced re-check.
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# writing SessionArmor's private session keys.
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# writing SessionArmor's private session keys. Pass the updated user when
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# request.user still holds the old claims; refresh_assurance=True also
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# re-verifies and re-issues this request's evidence, so code never builds
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# SessionAssurance itself.
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MySessionSecurity(lambda request: request).rebaseline_claims(
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)
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# At an authentication boundary (a new sign-in on an existing session), forget
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# the previous state; has_state(session) says whether rebaseline_claims() can run.
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# In the login view, once the session holds the new identity, bind it to the
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# client that logged in. Otherwise the first later request presenting the new
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# cookie sets the binding (with signed cookies, at any time until it expires).
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MySessionSecurity(lambda request: request).establish(request, user)
|
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|
```
|
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`exempt_paths` are matched against `request.path_info`, the path Django routes
|
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on, so leave any deployment mount prefix out of them. Matching respects path
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segments: `/health` exempts `/health` and `/health/live` but not
|
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`/health-internal`, and `/` exempts only the root URL.
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To diagnose a `fingerprint_mismatch`, `binding_digests(request)` returns keyed
|
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digests of each binding factor (`hash_ip(value, length=12)` with the audit
|
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+
pepper), so logs can show which factor changed without holding a raw IP or
|
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User-Agent.
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|
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|
## AccessGate integration
|
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|
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|
SessionArmor and AccessGate are complementary boundaries. SessionArmor decides
|
|
@@ -234,7 +304,10 @@ engine = AuthorizationEngine([
|
|
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|
```
|
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|
|
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|
The assurance policy is deny-only: a trusted session never grants a permission
|
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|
-
by itself.
|
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|
+
by itself. When slow work sits between SessionArmor and the authorization
|
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|
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decision, call `refresh_assurance(request)` just before deciding: it
|
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+
re-verifies the session and re-issues the evidence, and can withdraw trust but
|
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|
+
never grant it. See [`docs/ACCESSGATE_INTEGRATION.md`](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/docs/ACCESSGATE_INTEGRATION.md).
|
|
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|
|
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|
## Customizing Audit Logging
|
|
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|
|
|
@@ -252,6 +325,10 @@ class MyAudit(AuditMiddleware):
|
|
|
252
325
|
}
|
|
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|
```
|
|
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|
|
|
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|
+
`path` is reserved evidence that `before_log()` cannot change. When URL paths
|
|
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|
+
carry secrets (invitation tokens, one-time codes), override
|
|
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|
+
`get_audit_path(request)` to return a redacted path instead.
|
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
---
|
|
256
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|
|
|
257
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|
## Development
|
|
@@ -275,7 +352,7 @@ mypy src/session_armor
|
|
|
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|
|
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|
## Public Agent MCP Contract
|
|
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|
|
|
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|
-
SessionArmor includes a public agent-operability contract in [`mcp/`](mcp/). It describes how external agents can safely help with middleware ordering, security settings, audit customization, gate design, browser-visible docs, and rollout planning without requiring source-code access or production session data.
|
|
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|
+
SessionArmor includes a public agent-operability contract in [`mcp/`](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/tree/main/mcp/). It describes how external agents can safely help with middleware ordering, security settings, audit customization, gate design, browser-visible docs, and rollout planning without requiring source-code access or production session data.
|
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|
|
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|
From a checkout, run the dependency-free contract server with `python mcp/server.py`. After installation, agents can use the packaged stdio command:
|
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|
|
|
@@ -283,6 +360,14 @@ From a checkout, run the dependency-free contract server with `python mcp/server
|
|
|
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|
sessionarmor-mcp
|
|
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|
```
|
|
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|
|
|
363
|
+
This starts a local documentation and draft-generation server using the caller's
|
|
364
|
+
own environment. It does not connect to Tunet's agents, paid accounts, release
|
|
365
|
+
credentials, or production systems, and no hosted maintainer agent is included.
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
## Contributing and releases
|
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) for the owner-reviewed contribution process and [VERSIONING.md](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/VERSIONING.md) for the shared SemVer and release policy. Public PRs and agent mentions cannot authorize maintainer work; repository jobs require owner dispatch. Vendor-hosted GitHub app access is controlled separately in the owner's account settings.
|
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|
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|
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|
## License
|
|
287
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|
|
|
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|
-
MIT — Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Tunet Ltd. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).
|
|
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|
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MIT — Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Tunet Ltd. See [LICENSE](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/LICENSE).
|
|
@@ -8,7 +8,20 @@
|
|
|
8
8
|
|
|
9
9
|
**Framework-neutral session-assurance contracts with an optional Django adapter for session integrity, privacy-aware audit logging, and configurable request gates.**
|
|
10
10
|
|
|
11
|
-
Part of the [Tunet](https://tunet.xyz/engineering/)
|
|
11
|
+
Part of the [Tunet](https://tunet.xyz/engineering/) open-source libraries, alongside [AccessGate](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/access_gate), [GeoCanon](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/GeoCanon), and [SwapLayer](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/swap_layer). See the [SessionArmor product page](https://tunet.xyz/engineering/session-armor/) for the public capability overview.
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
## Version 1.0
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
The documented assurance contracts, typed gate decisions, explicit Django adapter,
|
|
16
|
+
extension hooks, and `sessionarmor-mcp` entry point form the stable 1.x API.
|
|
17
|
+
The dependency-free core supports Python 3.10–3.13; the Django extra supports
|
|
18
|
+
Django 4.2–5.2 (`<6`). Use a Django version still receiving upstream security
|
|
19
|
+
updates. The `session-armor.assurance/v1` schema remains unchanged.
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
Upgrading from 0.5 or 0.6 keeps the explicit imports below. Older integrations
|
|
22
|
+
must move middleware imports to `session_armor.adapters.django`, return
|
|
23
|
+
`GateDecision` from gate hooks, and use the `SESSION_ARMOR_*` settings documented
|
|
24
|
+
here. See the [changelog](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) and [release procedure](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/docs/RELEASE.md).
|
|
12
25
|
|
|
13
26
|
---
|
|
14
27
|
|
|
@@ -33,7 +46,7 @@ All three are **hookable** — override methods to customize behavior without to
|
|
|
33
46
|
- [NIST SP 800-53 AU-3/AU-12](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final) (Audit Content/Generation)
|
|
34
47
|
- [OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html)
|
|
35
48
|
|
|
36
|
-
SessionArmor adds controls around an existing Django authentication and session setup; it does not replace HTTPS, secure cookie settings, CSRF protection, authorization, MFA, or incident response. Fingerprint binding is a replay signal rather than proof of device identity and can require tuning for mobile or privacy-network traffic. See the [security model](docs/security-model.md) for deployment assumptions, limitations, and a release checklist.
|
|
49
|
+
SessionArmor adds controls around an existing Django authentication and session setup; it does not replace HTTPS, secure cookie settings, CSRF protection, authorization, MFA, or incident response. Fingerprint binding is a replay signal rather than proof of device identity and can require tuning for mobile or privacy-network traffic. See the [security model](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/docs/security-model.md) for deployment assumptions, limitations, and a release checklist.
|
|
37
50
|
|
|
38
51
|
---
|
|
39
52
|
|
|
@@ -74,6 +87,7 @@ SESSION_ARMOR_CLOCK_SKEW = 60
|
|
|
74
87
|
SESSION_ARMOR_LAST_ACTIVE_RESOLUTION = 0
|
|
75
88
|
SESSION_ARMOR_NO_STORE = True
|
|
76
89
|
SESSION_ARMOR_STATE_KEY = SECRET_KEY
|
|
90
|
+
SESSION_ARMOR_STATE_KEY_FALLBACKS = None # None: follow SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS
|
|
77
91
|
SESSION_ARMOR_AUDIT_PEPPER = SECRET_KEY
|
|
78
92
|
|
|
79
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|
# Forwarded headers are ignored unless both values are configured.
|
|
@@ -87,10 +101,20 @@ SESSION_ARMOR_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS = ()
|
|
|
87
101
|
> of `SECRET_KEY`, or to share it across services for cross-log correlation.
|
|
88
102
|
> If unset, it falls back to `SECRET_KEY`.
|
|
89
103
|
|
|
104
|
+
> **Note on key rotation.** `SESSION_ARMOR_STATE_KEY_FALLBACKS` lists retired
|
|
105
|
+
> state keys. They only verify existing session state, which is then re-signed
|
|
106
|
+
> with the current key; they never sign. Left at `None`, a state key that
|
|
107
|
+
> follows `SECRET_KEY` uses Django's `SECRET_KEY_FALLBACKS`, so Django's
|
|
108
|
+
> documented rotation keeps sessions alive. Do not keep a key that may have
|
|
109
|
+
> leaked. Session identifiers (the gate cache scope) change once, so gates
|
|
110
|
+
> re-check once.
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
90
112
|
> **Note on proxy trust.** The secure default (`DEPTH = 0`) ignores
|
|
91
113
|
> `X-Forwarded-For`. To use it, configure both the exact number of proxy hops
|
|
92
114
|
> and their CIDR ranges. Each trusted hop is checked from the socket peer back
|
|
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|
-
> toward the client; malformed
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> toward the client; a malformed client entry or hop and catch-all trusted
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> networks are rejected. Entries left of the client are never read, and
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> forwarded entries may carry a port.
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## Building a Gate
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return redirect('/accept-terms/')
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```
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A gate with `requires_trusted_session = True` rejects every path that
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`SessionSecurityMiddleware` exempts, unless its own `exempt_paths` repeat them.
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Set `follow_session_exemptions = True` to let those requests through instead.
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If `check()` raises, `on_error()` turns the failure into a rejection, and that
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rejection is cached for the full TTL like any other result. Set
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`error_cache_ttl` (seconds) to re-check sooner once a dependency recovers.
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The page a rejection leads to can read the last result with
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`ComplianceGate.get_cached_decision(request)` or `get_context(request)`; the
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`_gate_*` session keys behind them are private.
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### "Check once" gates
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For gates that should only kick in once (onboarding, compliance), set
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`recheck_after_pass = False`: a passing result
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(
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`recheck_after_pass = False`: a passing result is then reused with no TTL
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re-checks, for up to `sticky_pass_max_age` seconds and while
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`get_state_version()` returns the version it was cached under. A sticky pass
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needs at least one of the two: with no `sticky_pass_max_age` and a `None`
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version, a pass is never reused and `check()` runs on every request.
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Rejections still re-check on the TTL. To push new requirements to
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already-passed sessions (a new document version, a new onboarding step),
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implement `get_state_version()` against a shared cache key and bump that key
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on publish — every active session re-checks exactly once, with no per-request
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database hits. It must return a non-empty string of at most 256 characters or
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`None`; anything else, an empty string included, fails closed:
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```python
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from django.core.cache import cache
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class ComplianceGate(GateMiddleware):
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gate_id = 'compliance'
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recheck_after_pass = False # Pass once, stay passed
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+
sticky_pass_max_age = 3600 # Re-check a pass at least hourly, version or not
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def get_state_version(self, request) -> str | None:
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# Bumped by admin tooling when a new document version is published
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# Bumped by admin tooling when a new document version is published;
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# None until the key is first set.
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+
return cache.get(f'compliance_version:{request.user.platform}')
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def check(self, request) -> GateDecision:
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|
return (
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@@ -143,10 +186,11 @@ class ComplianceGate(GateMiddleware):
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|
)
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|
```
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> **Sticky passes and revocation.** With `recheck_after_pass = False
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|
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>
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-
> version changes — so it
|
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|
-
>
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|
+
> **Sticky passes and revocation.** With `recheck_after_pass = False` and a
|
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|
+
> state version but no `sticky_pass_max_age`, a pass is cached until the
|
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|
+
> session ends, `invalidate()` is called, or the state version changes — so it
|
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+
> is **not** appropriate for authorization/entitlement gates where access may
|
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|
+
> be revoked. For those, use a normal TTL gate, drive
|
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|
> `get_state_version()`, or set `sticky_pass_max_age` (seconds) to cap how long
|
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|
> a sticky pass may be reused before a forced re-check.
|
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|
|
|
@@ -168,10 +212,34 @@ class MySessionSecurity(SessionSecurityMiddleware):
|
|
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|
return f'/{platform}/login/' if platform else '/login/'
|
|
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|
|
|
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|
# After a reviewed server-side claim update, use the public API rather than
|
|
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|
-
# writing SessionArmor's private session keys.
|
|
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|
-
|
|
215
|
+
# writing SessionArmor's private session keys. Pass the updated user when
|
|
216
|
+
# request.user still holds the old claims; refresh_assurance=True also
|
|
217
|
+
# re-verifies and re-issues this request's evidence, so code never builds
|
|
218
|
+
# SessionAssurance itself.
|
|
219
|
+
MySessionSecurity(lambda request: request).rebaseline_claims(
|
|
220
|
+
request, updated_user, refresh_assurance=True
|
|
221
|
+
)
|
|
222
|
+
|
|
223
|
+
# At an authentication boundary (a new sign-in on an existing session), forget
|
|
224
|
+
# the previous state; has_state(session) says whether rebaseline_claims() can run.
|
|
225
|
+
MySessionSecurity.discard_state(request.session)
|
|
226
|
+
|
|
227
|
+
# In the login view, once the session holds the new identity, bind it to the
|
|
228
|
+
# client that logged in. Otherwise the first later request presenting the new
|
|
229
|
+
# cookie sets the binding (with signed cookies, at any time until it expires).
|
|
230
|
+
MySessionSecurity(lambda request: request).establish(request, user)
|
|
173
231
|
```
|
|
174
232
|
|
|
233
|
+
`exempt_paths` are matched against `request.path_info`, the path Django routes
|
|
234
|
+
on, so leave any deployment mount prefix out of them. Matching respects path
|
|
235
|
+
segments: `/health` exempts `/health` and `/health/live` but not
|
|
236
|
+
`/health-internal`, and `/` exempts only the root URL.
|
|
237
|
+
|
|
238
|
+
To diagnose a `fingerprint_mismatch`, `binding_digests(request)` returns keyed
|
|
239
|
+
digests of each binding factor (`hash_ip(value, length=12)` with the audit
|
|
240
|
+
pepper), so logs can show which factor changed without holding a raw IP or
|
|
241
|
+
User-Agent.
|
|
242
|
+
|
|
175
243
|
## AccessGate integration
|
|
176
244
|
|
|
177
245
|
SessionArmor and AccessGate are complementary boundaries. SessionArmor decides
|
|
@@ -191,7 +259,10 @@ engine = AuthorizationEngine([
|
|
|
191
259
|
```
|
|
192
260
|
|
|
193
261
|
The assurance policy is deny-only: a trusted session never grants a permission
|
|
194
|
-
by itself.
|
|
262
|
+
by itself. When slow work sits between SessionArmor and the authorization
|
|
263
|
+
decision, call `refresh_assurance(request)` just before deciding: it
|
|
264
|
+
re-verifies the session and re-issues the evidence, and can withdraw trust but
|
|
265
|
+
never grant it. See [`docs/ACCESSGATE_INTEGRATION.md`](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/docs/ACCESSGATE_INTEGRATION.md).
|
|
195
266
|
|
|
196
267
|
## Customizing Audit Logging
|
|
197
268
|
|
|
@@ -209,6 +280,10 @@ class MyAudit(AuditMiddleware):
|
|
|
209
280
|
}
|
|
210
281
|
```
|
|
211
282
|
|
|
283
|
+
`path` is reserved evidence that `before_log()` cannot change. When URL paths
|
|
284
|
+
carry secrets (invitation tokens, one-time codes), override
|
|
285
|
+
`get_audit_path(request)` to return a redacted path instead.
|
|
286
|
+
|
|
212
287
|
---
|
|
213
288
|
|
|
214
289
|
## Development
|
|
@@ -232,7 +307,7 @@ mypy src/session_armor
|
|
|
232
307
|
|
|
233
308
|
## Public Agent MCP Contract
|
|
234
309
|
|
|
235
|
-
SessionArmor includes a public agent-operability contract in [`mcp/`](mcp/). It describes how external agents can safely help with middleware ordering, security settings, audit customization, gate design, browser-visible docs, and rollout planning without requiring source-code access or production session data.
|
|
310
|
+
SessionArmor includes a public agent-operability contract in [`mcp/`](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/tree/main/mcp/). It describes how external agents can safely help with middleware ordering, security settings, audit customization, gate design, browser-visible docs, and rollout planning without requiring source-code access or production session data.
|
|
236
311
|
|
|
237
312
|
From a checkout, run the dependency-free contract server with `python mcp/server.py`. After installation, agents can use the packaged stdio command:
|
|
238
313
|
|
|
@@ -240,6 +315,14 @@ From a checkout, run the dependency-free contract server with `python mcp/server
|
|
|
240
315
|
sessionarmor-mcp
|
|
241
316
|
```
|
|
242
317
|
|
|
318
|
+
This starts a local documentation and draft-generation server using the caller's
|
|
319
|
+
own environment. It does not connect to Tunet's agents, paid accounts, release
|
|
320
|
+
credentials, or production systems, and no hosted maintainer agent is included.
|
|
321
|
+
|
|
322
|
+
## Contributing and releases
|
|
323
|
+
|
|
324
|
+
See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) for the owner-reviewed contribution process and [VERSIONING.md](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/VERSIONING.md) for the shared SemVer and release policy. Public PRs and agent mentions cannot authorize maintainer work; repository jobs require owner dispatch. Vendor-hosted GitHub app access is controlled separately in the owner's account settings.
|
|
325
|
+
|
|
243
326
|
## License
|
|
244
327
|
|
|
245
|
-
MIT — Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Tunet Ltd. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).
|
|
328
|
+
MIT — Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Tunet Ltd. See [LICENSE](https://github.com/Tunet-xyz/session_armor/blob/main/LICENSE).
|