teapot-coding-agent 0.36.9 → 0.36.10

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@@ -221,6 +221,34 @@ export class ServerAuth {
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  discoveryState() {
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  return this.store.discoveryState;
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * The issuer this client believes it is talking to, from our OWN discovery record.
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+ *
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+ * Needed because the SDK treats a missing `iss` on the callback as an ATTACK when the server's
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+ * metadata declares `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported` (RFC 9207), and throws
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+ * `IssuerMismatchError` before the code is ever redeemed.
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+ *
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+ * Notion declares that support and then does not send `iss`. MEASURED against
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+ * `mcp.notion.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`:
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+ * `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true`, while its real redirect carries only
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+ * `code` and `state`. Reproduced directly against the SDK with this machine's stored grant:
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+ * `IssuerMismatchError: expected "https://mcp.notion.com", received undefined` — i.e. every
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+ * browser-completed authorization was discarded at the last step, which is the "コールバック踏んだ
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+ * のに Unauthorized" report.
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+ *
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+ * Supplying the issuer ourselves is sound here: the code arrived on OUR loopback listener, and
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+ * this value comes from the discovery document we fetched before sending the browser out. RFC 9207
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+ * exists to stop a MIX-UP attack, and there is no mix-up to detect when the client already knows
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+ * which authorization server it directed the user to. The SDK's own check
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+ * (`iss !== expectedIssuer`) still runs, so a genuinely wrong issuer is still rejected.
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+ */
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+ expectedIssuer() {
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+ const meta = this.store.discoveryState?.authorizationServerMetadata;
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+ if (typeof meta?.issuer === "string" && meta.issuer)
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+ return meta.issuer;
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+ const url = this.store.discoveryState?.authorizationServerUrl;
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+ return typeof url === "string" && url ? url : undefined;
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+ }
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  async saveDiscoveryState(state) {
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  if (!state || typeof state !== "object")
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  return;
@@ -262,7 +262,27 @@ export class McpRegistry {
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  try {
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  const { code, iss } = await loop.wait(FLOW_TIMEOUT_MS);
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  const conn = await connectMcp(st.config, { provider: auth });
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- await conn.finishAuth(code, iss);
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+ /**
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+ * Supply `iss` from OUR discovery record when the callback omitted it.
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+ *
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+ * RFC 9207 §2 says a server that advertises
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+ * `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true` MUST include `iss` in the
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+ * response, and §2.4 says clients MUST reject a response without it. Notion advertises
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+ * `true` and then sends only `code` and `state`, so a strictly-conforming client discards
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+ * every completed authorization — which is "Notionがコールバック踏んだのに Unauthorized".
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+ *
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+ * §2.4 also allows the opposite: "clients ... MAY accept authorization responses that do
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+ * not contain the iss parameter ... Local policy or configuration can determine whether to
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+ * accept such responses". We accept them, using the issuer we recorded BEFORE sending the
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+ * browser out, because that is the value the mix-up check needs.
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+ *
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+ * MEASURED against the real SDK with this machine's stored grant:
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+ * no iss -> IssuerMismatchError "received undefined" (the reported failure)
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+ * correct iss -> the token endpoint is reached (invalid_grant for a dummy code)
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+ * wrong iss -> IssuerMismatchError "received https://evil.example"
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+ * so the check is not disabled — a genuinely mismatched issuer is still rejected.
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+ */
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+ await conn.finishAuth(code, iss ?? auth.expectedIssuer());
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  st.connection = conn;
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  st.tools = await conn.tools();
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  st.status = "connected";
@@ -52,6 +52,18 @@ export const ConfigPatchSchema = z.object({
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  // null clears a saved window pin → back to per-model inference (same contract as contextTokenBudget)
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  contextWindowTokens: z.number().int().min(1_000).nullable().optional(),
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  maxSpawnDepth: z.number().int().min(0).max(8).optional(),
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+ /**
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+ * The shared secret protecting `/api/*` — settable from the settings panel.
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+ *
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+ * It used to be reachable only through `POST /api/setup`, which refuses once a config file exists.
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+ * That was fine while the first-run wizard existed; the wizard is gone, so there was NO way to set
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+ * a password at all. Asked as "初回起動ウィザードは前に廃止したはずだからパスワード設定できないの
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+ * では?" — correct.
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+ *
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+ * An EMPTY STRING is meaningful and clears it (back to loopback-only trust), which is why this
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+ * accepts `""` rather than requiring a minimum length. `TEAPOT_API_TOKEN` still wins over it.
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+ */
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+ password: z.string().max(200).optional(),
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  /** #161: prune old tool output early (opt-in, for small-window models) */
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  shortContext: z.boolean().optional(),
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  // soft cap on LLM turns in one round; reaching it nudges the model to wrap
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -146,10 +146,11 @@ async function main() {
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  * On LOOPBACK this is the normal, safe default — so say so plainly instead of printing an
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  * alarming "no API token set" on every start.
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  *
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- * Asked as "no API token setはなんだろう": nothing is wrong. A fresh install has no password
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- * because the setup wizard has to reach the API to set one, and binding 127.0.0.1 means only
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- * processes on this machine can connect. The message now states that, and is written to stdout
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- * at info level — `console.error` made a healthy start look like a fault.
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+ * Asked as "no API token setはなんだろう": nothing is wrong. On loopback only this machine can
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+ * connect, so an unset password is the safe default rather than a fault — and it is settable in
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+ * settings → live update (it uses to be reachable only through the first-run wizard, which was
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+ * removed). The message now says that, on stdout at info level; `console.error` made a healthy
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+ * start look like a fault.
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  *
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  * The WARNING branch is unchanged and still goes to stderr: that one IS a problem.
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  */
package/dist/master.js CHANGED
@@ -505,6 +505,18 @@ export class Master {
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  */
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  if (this.config.customThemes !== undefined)
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  this.raw.customThemes = this.config.customThemes;
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+ /**
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+ * The API password — same mirror, same trap.
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+ *
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+ * It was never in `raw` because it was only ever written by the first-run setup path, which
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+ * wrote the file wholesale. Now that the settings panel can change it, a missing mirror would
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+ * make "set a password" appear to work and vanish on the next restart, leaving the server open
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+ * while the operator believes it is closed — the worst possible direction for this field.
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+ */
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+ if (this.config.password !== undefined)
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+ this.raw.password = this.config.password;
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+ else
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+ delete this.raw.password;
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  if (this.config.themePrefs !== undefined)
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  this.raw.themePrefs = this.config.themePrefs;
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  /**
@@ -663,6 +675,14 @@ export class Master {
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  updateConfig(patch) {
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  if (patch.providers)
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  this.config.providers = patch.providers;
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+ /**
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+ * `!== undefined`, so `""` is honoured as "clear it".
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+ *
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+ * A truthiness check would silently keep the old password when the operator emptied the field,
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+ * which is the one case where they are explicitly asking to remove the protection.
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+ */
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+ if (patch.password !== undefined)
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+ this.config.password = patch.password || undefined;
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  if (patch.defaultProvider !== undefined)
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  this.config.defaultProvider = patch.defaultProvider;
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  if (patch.progressIntervalMs !== undefined) {
@@ -112,9 +112,10 @@ export function buildApp(master) {
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  // the config's `password` field. Static files stay public; only /api/* is
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  // gated.
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  //
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- // Read DYNAMICALLY: the first-run wizard sets `config.password` through
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- // /api/setup AFTER buildApp ran — a const captured here once meant a
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- // freshly-set-up server stayed wide open until the next process restart.
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+ // Read DYNAMICALLY: `config.password` changes while this app is running — the
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+ // settings panel writes it through `PUT /api/config`. A const captured here once
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+ // meant a password set after boot did not take effect until a process restart,
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+ // leaving the server open while the operator believed it was closed.
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  const apiToken = () => process.env.TEAPOT_API_TOKEN || master.config.password || "";
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  /**
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  * Routes where `?token=` is accepted (#79).
@@ -215,10 +216,12 @@ export function buildApp(master) {
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  /**
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  * With no token configured the API is still open to LOCAL clients, but it now says so loudly.
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  *
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- * Opening it is a real decision: the first-run wizard sets the password through
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- * `/api/setup`, so the server cannot demand a token before one exists. Leaving that silent is
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- * how the OpenCode advisory happened — their server was unauthenticated by default and nobody
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- * noticed. The header makes the state visible to every client, and the startup banner warns.
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+ * Opening it is a real decision: a fresh install has no password, and on loopback that is the
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+ * safe default — only this machine can reach it. (It IS settable now, in settings → live update;
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+ * before that the only path was `POST /api/setup`, which refuses once a config file exists, so
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+ * the wizard's removal had left no way at all.) Leaving the state silent is how the OpenCode
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+ * advisory happened — their server was unauthenticated by default and nobody noticed. The header
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+ * makes it visible to every client, and the startup banner says it once in plain words.
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  */
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  if (!want) {
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  c.header("x-teapot-auth", "none");
@@ -918,6 +921,13 @@ export function buildApp(master) {
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  * one would nag about a working setup.
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  */
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  needsSetup: Object.keys(master.config.providers ?? {}).length === 0,
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+ /**
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+ * Whether an API password is set — the FACT only, never the value.
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+ *
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+ * The panel needs it to label the field honestly ("unchanged" vs "none"); sending the secret
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+ * back would put it in the DOM and in any devtools capture of the response.
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+ */
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+ hasPassword: Boolean(master.config.password),
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  providers: mask(master.config.providers),
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  defaultProvider: master.config.defaultProvider,
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  progressIntervalMs: master.config.progressIntervalMs,
@@ -975,6 +985,7 @@ export function buildApp(master) {
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  shortContext: patch.shortContext,
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  tasks: patch.tasks,
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  mcpServers: patch.mcpServers,
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+ ...(patch.password !== undefined ? { password: patch.password } : {}),
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  });
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  // #67: apply the new server list to the live registry and connect in the
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  // background — an added server's tools must appear on the next turn without a
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "teapot-coding-agent",
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- "version": "0.36.9",
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+ "version": "0.36.10",
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  "description": "A lightweight, always-on multi-agent harness for AI coding agents",
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  "type": "module",
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  "license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",