knowless 1.0.0 → 1.0.1

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package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -26,6 +26,57 @@ v1.0.0 are:
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  Feature requests are deflected to PRD §14 NO-GO, to sibling projects,
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  or to forking. The library being "done" is a feature.
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+ ### Fixed
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+
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+ - **XFF/X-Real-IP never honored through handler path (AF-28).**
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+ `createHandlers` pre-built `trustedProxies` into a `{ has }` object
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+ and passed it to `determineSourceIp`, which re-called
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+ `buildTrustedPeers` on it. The pre-built object is not a `BlockList`,
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+ array, or `Set`, so the peer list fell through to `[]`. Net effect:
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+ trusted-proxy matching was silently empty in the handler code path —
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+ rate limiting hit the reverse-proxy IP instead of the real client IP,
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+ and XFF/X-Real-IP headers were ignored regardless of the
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+ `trustedProxies` config. Abuse unit tests were passing because they
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+ call `determineSourceIp` directly with raw arrays, bypassing the
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+ handler path. Fix: removed the pre-build in `createHandlers`;
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+ `determineSourceIp` now receives `cfg.trustedProxies` directly. Closes
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+ AF-28.
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+
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+ - **`validateSubject` allowed CR/LF, enabling header injection in
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+ standalone callers (AF-29).** The ASCII regex `/^[\x00-\x7f]*$/`
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+ matched CR (0x0D) and LF (0x0A). `validateSubject` is re-exported as a
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+ public validator (AF-9.1 / v0.1.7) so callers using it as a standalone
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+ gate were unprotected. `composeRaw` caught the injection downstream, but
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+ the validator is the authoritative public guard. Fix: added an explicit
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+ `/[\r\n]/` check to `validateSubject`, consistent with the guards already
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+ present in `validateFromName` and `validateBodyOverride`. Closes AF-29.
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+
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+ - **Factory `subject` not validated at startup (AF-30).** The factory
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+ `subject` option was never passed to `validateSubject` during
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+ `createHandlers` startup, breaking the fail-fast pattern that
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+ `bodyFooter` (`validateBodyFooter` in `index.js`) and `fromName`
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+ (`validateFromName` in `createMailer`) already followed. A non-ASCII
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+ subject or empty string silently passed config time and would only fail
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+ at first `mailer.submit()` — potentially hours into production. Fix:
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+ added `validateSubject(cfg.subject)` to the config-validation block in
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+ `createHandlers`. Closes AF-30.
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+
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+ - **`validateBodyFooter` rejected 4-line footers with a trailing newline
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+ (AF-31).** `footer.split('\n').length > 4` counted 5 split parts for
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+ `"a\nb\nc\nd\n"` (4 logical lines, trailing newline as is conventional
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+ for multi-line strings). Fix: strip a single trailing newline before
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+ counting: `footer.replace(/\n$/, '').split('\n').length > 4`. Closes
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+ AF-31.
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+
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+ ### Documentation
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+
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+ - **`runSendLink` JSDoc corrected: `handle` is null for both malformed
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+ email and per-IP rate-limit short-circuit (AF-32).** The JSDoc stated
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+ `handle` is null "only when the email failed to normalize." The per-IP
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+ rate-limit early return also returns `handle: null` because `deriveHandle`
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+ has not run at that point. No behavior change — documentation only. Closes
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+ AF-32.
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+
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  ## [1.0.0] — 2026-04-29
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  **Walk-away release.** No new API surface vs v0.2.3 — v1.0.0 is the
@@ -659,10 +659,11 @@ rate-limits) belongs above the library.
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  who hold raw 32-byte keys.
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  18. **`bodyFooter` constraints (AF-8.2).** ASCII only — `·` is NOT
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- ASCII, use `|` or `-`. ≤ 240 chars, ≤ 4 lines, no `http(s)://`
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- URLs (would conflict with the magic-link line). Validated at
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- factory startup; fails fast. Goes after RFC 3676 `"-- "`
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- delimiter so mail clients strip it from quoted replies.
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+ ASCII, use `|` or `-`. ≤ 240 chars, ≤ 4 lines (a single trailing
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+ newline is allowed and not counted as an extra line), no
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+ `http(s)://` URLs (would conflict with the magic-link line).
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+ Validated at factory startup; fails fast. Goes after RFC 3676
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+ `"-- "` delimiter so mail clients strip it from quoted replies.
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  19. **`startLogin` is silent at every layer (FR-6).** Returns
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  `{handle, submitted: true}` for *every* branch — real send, sham,
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "knowless",
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- "version": "1.0.0",
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+ "version": "1.0.1",
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  "description": "Small, opinionated, full-stack passwordless auth for Node.js services that don't need to email their users for anything but the sign-in link.",
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  "type": "module",
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  "main": "./src/index.js",
package/src/handlers.js CHANGED
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import { newSid, signSession, verifySessionSignature } from './session.js';
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  import { composeBody, validateSubject, validateBodyOverride } from './mailer.js';
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  import { renderLoginForm } from './form.js';
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  import {
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- buildTrustedPeers,
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  determineSourceIp,
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  rateLimitExceeded,
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  rateLimitIncrement,
@@ -191,9 +190,7 @@ export function createHandlers({ store, mailer, config, events }) {
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  throw new Error('config.baseUrl invalid');
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  }
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  }
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-
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- // Build once at handler creation; supports plain IPs and CIDRs (AF-6.3).
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- const trustedProxies = buildTrustedPeers(cfg.trustedProxies);
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+ validateSubject(cfg.subject);
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  // AF-7.1: emit at most one warning per handler instance about an
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  // upstream body parser swallowing the request body. Loud enough to
@@ -253,8 +250,9 @@ export function createHandlers({ store, mailer, config, events }) {
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  *
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  * @returns {Promise<{handle: string|null, isSham: boolean,
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  * emailNorm: string, nextValidated: string|null}>}
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- * handle is null only when the email failed to normalize (programmer
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- * bug for startLogin; same-shape silent for /login).
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+ * handle is null when the email failed to normalize (programmer bug
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+ * for startLogin) OR when per-IP rate-limit short-circuited before
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+ * handle derivation; same-shape silent for /login.
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  */
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  async function runSendLink({
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  emailRaw,
@@ -469,7 +467,7 @@ export function createHandlers({ store, mailer, config, events }) {
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  return;
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  }
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- const sourceIp = determineSourceIp(req, trustedProxies);
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+ const sourceIp = determineSourceIp(req, cfg.trustedProxies);
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  const result = await runSendLink({ emailRaw, nextRaw, sourceIp });
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  sameResponse(res, result.emailNorm, result.nextValidated ?? '');
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  }
package/src/mailer.js CHANGED
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ export function validateBodyFooter(footer) {
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  if (footer.length > 240) throw new Error('bodyFooter must be ≤ 240 chars');
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  if (!ASCII_RE.test(footer)) throw new Error('bodyFooter must be ASCII');
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  if (footer.includes('\r')) throw new Error('bodyFooter must not contain CR');
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- if (footer.split('\n').length > 4) {
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+ if (footer.replace(/\n$/, '').split('\n').length > 4) {
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  throw new Error('bodyFooter must be ≤ 4 lines');
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  }
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  if (/https?:\/\//i.test(footer)) {
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ export function validateSubject(subject) {
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  }
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  if (subject.length > 60) throw new Error('subject longer than 60 chars');
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  if (!ASCII_RE.test(subject)) throw new Error('subject contains non-ASCII');
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+ if (/[\r\n]/.test(subject)) throw new Error('subject must not contain CR/LF');
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  const warnings = [];
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  const triggers = ['!!', '$$', 'FREE', 'URGENT', 'WINNER'];
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  for (const t of triggers) {