@openpalm/lib 0.10.2 → 0.11.0-beta.2

package/src/control-plane/compose-errors.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
+import {
+  parseComposeStderr,
+  summarizeComposeStderr,
+} from "./compose-errors.js";
+
+describe("parseComposeStderr", () => {
+  it("returns empty for empty input", () => {
+    expect(parseComposeStderr("")).toEqual([]);
+    expect(parseComposeStderr("\n\n")).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("extracts pull access denied for a single service", () => {
+    const stderr = [
+      " Network openpalm_default  Created",
+      " voice Pulling",
+      " voice Error pull access denied for openpalm/voice, repository does not exist or may require 'docker login'",
+      "Error response from daemon: pull access denied for openpalm/voice, repository does not exist or may require 'docker login': denied: requested access to the resource is denied",
+    ].join("\n");
+
+    const failures = parseComposeStderr(stderr);
+    expect(failures.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+    expect(failures[0].service).toBe("voice");
+    expect(failures[0].reason).toMatch(/pull access denied/);
+  });
+
+  it("handles spinner / status prefix glyphs", () => {
+    const stderr = " ⠿ voice Error    pull access denied for openpalm/voice";
+    const failures = parseComposeStderr(stderr);
+    expect(failures).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(failures[0].service).toBe("voice");
+    expect(failures[0].reason).toMatch(/pull access denied/);
+  });
+
+  it("captures quoted Service failed lines", () => {
+    const stderr =
+      'Service "discord" failed to build: failed to solve: process did not complete';
+    const failures = parseComposeStderr(stderr);
+    expect(failures).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(failures[0].service).toBe("discord");
+    expect(failures[0].reason).toMatch(/failed to solve/);
+  });
+
+  it("deduplicates identical (service, reason) pairs", () => {
+    const stderr = [
+      "voice Error pull access denied for openpalm/voice",
+      "voice Error pull access denied for openpalm/voice",
+    ].join("\n");
+    const failures = parseComposeStderr(stderr);
+    expect(failures).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it("returns multiple distinct failures", () => {
+    const stderr = [
+      "voice Error pull access denied for openpalm/voice",
+      "discord Error no such image: openpalm/discord:latest",
+    ].join("\n");
+    const failures = parseComposeStderr(stderr);
+    expect(failures).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(failures.map((f) => f.service).sort()).toEqual(["discord", "voice"]);
+  });
+
+  it("falls back to image name when only daemon error is present", () => {
+    const stderr =
+      "Error response from daemon: pull access denied for openpalm/voice, repository does not exist";
+    const failures = parseComposeStderr(stderr);
+    expect(failures).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(failures[0].service).toBe("openpalm/voice");
+    expect(failures[0].reason).toMatch(/pull access denied/);
+  });
+
+  it("ignores non-error noise (Pulling/Created/Started)", () => {
+    const stderr = [
+      " Network openpalm_default  Created",
+      " Container openpalm-guardian-1  Started",
+      " assistant Pulling",
+    ].join("\n");
+    expect(parseComposeStderr(stderr)).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("does not treat 'Error response from daemon' as a service name", () => {
+    const stderr = "Error response from daemon: something bad happened";
+    // No service-prefixed line, no pull access denied, no quoted service —
+    // parser should NOT invent a service called "Error".
+    expect(parseComposeStderr(stderr)).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("summarizeComposeStderr", () => {
+  it("returns first non-empty line", () => {
+    expect(summarizeComposeStderr("\n\n  hello world  \nnext line")).toBe(
+      "hello world"
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("truncates long lines", () => {
+    const long = "x".repeat(800);
+    const out = summarizeComposeStderr(long, 100);
+    expect(out.length).toBe(100);
+    expect(out.endsWith("…")).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("returns empty string for empty input", () => {
+    expect(summarizeComposeStderr("")).toBe("");
+  });
+});

package/src/control-plane/compose-errors.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/**
+ * Parse `docker compose` stderr for per-service failures.
+ *
+ * `docker compose up -d` reports its progress on stderr — one or more
+ * status lines per service, plus a daemon-level "Error response from daemon"
+ * summary. When a single addon service fails to pull or start, the rest of
+ * the stack often comes up fine, so the only signal that anything is wrong
+ * is whatever appears on stderr. This helper extracts the per-service
+ * failure messages so callers can surface them to operators.
+ */
+export type ComposeServiceFailure = {
+  service: string;
+  reason: string;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Lines we recognise as per-service failure indicators. The compose CLI
+ * has rendered these in a few different shapes across versions:
+ *
+ *   "voice Error pull access denied for openpalm/voice ..."
+ *   " ⠿ voice Error    pull access denied for openpalm/voice ..."
+ *   "Service \"voice\" failed to build: ..."
+ *
+ * We also pick up the bare daemon error and attribute it to the service
+ * named in nearby lines when no service-prefixed line is present.
+ */
+const SERVICE_ERROR_RE = /^[\s⠦⠧⠇⠏⠋⠙⠹⠸⠼⠴⠿✔✘×]*\s*([A-Za-z0-9._-]+)\s+(Error|Failed|failed)\s+(.+)$/;
+const SERVICE_FAILED_QUOTED_RE = /Service\s+["']([A-Za-z0-9._-]+)["']\s+failed[^:]*:\s*(.+)$/i;
+const SERVICE_NOT_FOUND_RE = /no such service:\s*([A-Za-z0-9._-]+)/i;
+const PULL_ACCESS_DENIED_RE = /pull access denied for\s+([^\s,]+)/i;
+
+function pushUnique(
+  failures: ComposeServiceFailure[],
+  entry: ComposeServiceFailure
+): void {
+  const trimmed = { service: entry.service.trim(), reason: entry.reason.trim() };
+  if (!trimmed.service || !trimmed.reason) return;
+  const dup = failures.find(
+    (f) => f.service === trimmed.service && f.reason === trimmed.reason
+  );
+  if (!dup) failures.push(trimmed);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Best-effort extraction of failures from compose stderr.
+ *
+ * - Returns one entry per (service, reason) pair, in stderr order.
+ * - Does NOT fabricate service names: if a daemon error appears without
+ *   any nearby service-prefixed line, the caller's intended-services list
+ *   is used by the route, not this parser.
+ */
+export function parseComposeStderr(stderr: string): ComposeServiceFailure[] {
+  const failures: ComposeServiceFailure[] = [];
+  if (!stderr) return failures;
+
+  const lines = stderr.split(/\r?\n/);
+
+  for (const raw of lines) {
+    const line = raw.replace(/\s+$/, "");
+    if (!line.trim()) continue;
+
+    const quoted = SERVICE_FAILED_QUOTED_RE.exec(line);
+    if (quoted) {
+      pushUnique(failures, { service: quoted[1], reason: quoted[2] });
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    const m = SERVICE_ERROR_RE.exec(line);
+    if (m) {
+      // Skip generic prefixes that look like services but aren't
+      // (e.g. "Error response from daemon ..." would match if the parser
+      // is too lenient — the verb word would be the second token).
+      const candidate = m[1];
+      if (candidate.toLowerCase() === "error") continue;
+      pushUnique(failures, { service: candidate, reason: m[3] });
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    const notFound = SERVICE_NOT_FOUND_RE.exec(line);
+    if (notFound) {
+      pushUnique(failures, {
+        service: notFound[1],
+        reason: `no such service: ${notFound[1]}`,
+      });
+      continue;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If we still found nothing but the stderr clearly mentions a pull
+  // access denied, surface the offending image as the "service" identifier
+  // — better than swallowing the failure entirely.
+  if (failures.length === 0) {
+    const denied = PULL_ACCESS_DENIED_RE.exec(stderr);
+    if (denied) {
+      pushUnique(failures, {
+        service: denied[1],
+        reason: `pull access denied for ${denied[1]}`,
+      });
+    }
+  }
+
+  return failures;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Summarise compose stderr in a single short line, suitable for log
+ * envelopes / API error messages when no per-service parse succeeded.
+ * Returns the first non-empty stderr line, capped.
+ */
+export function summarizeComposeStderr(stderr: string, maxLen = 500): string {
+  if (!stderr) return "";
+  const first = stderr
+    .split(/\r?\n/)
+    .map((l) => l.trim())
+    .find((l) => l.length > 0) ?? "";
+  return first.length > maxLen ? first.slice(0, maxLen - 1) + "…" : first;
+}

package/src/control-plane/config-persistence.ts

@@ -6,67 +6,54 @@
  * the rollback module (snapshot to ~/.cache/openpalm/rollback/).
  */
 import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, existsSync, readdirSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs";
-import { parseEnvFile, mergeEnvContent } from './env.js';
+import { dirname } from "node:path";
+import { parse as yamlParse } from "yaml";
+import { parseEnvFile, mergeEnvContent, expandEnvVars } from './env.js';
 import type { ControlPlaneState, ArtifactMeta } from "./types.js";
 import { isChannelAddon } from "./channels.js";
-import { readStackSpec } from "./stack-spec.js";
-import { writeCapabilityVars } from "./spec-to-env.js";
 import { listEnabledAddonIds } from "./registry.js";
 
-import { generateRedactSchema } from "./redact-schema.js";
-import { readStackEnv } from "./secrets.js";
 import {
   readCoreCompose,
-  ensureUserEnvSchema,
-  ensureSystemEnvSchema,
 } from "./core-assets.js";
 export { sha256, randomHex } from "./crypto.js";
 import { sha256, randomHex } from "./crypto.js";
 
 const DEFAULT_IMAGE_TAG = process.env.OP_IMAGE_TAG ?? "latest";
 
-// ── Stack Config (stack.yml) ─────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * Check whether Ollama is enabled via active stack/addons/ overlay.
- */
-export function isOllamaEnabled(state: ControlPlaneState): boolean {
-  return listEnabledAddonIds(state.homeDir).includes("ollama");
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether admin is enabled via active stack/addons/ overlay.
- */
-export function isAdminEnabled(state: ControlPlaneState): boolean {
-  return listEnabledAddonIds(state.homeDir).includes("admin");
-}
-
 // ── Env File Management ──────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /**
  * Return the env files used for docker compose --env-file args.
  * These are the live vault env files.
  *
- * Order: stack.env -> user.env -> guardian.env
+ * Order: stack.env -> guardian.env
+ *
+ * Note: `vault/user/user.env` is no longer a
+ * compose env_file. User-managed env secrets live in the akm
+ * `vault:user` store and are sourced by the assistant entrypoint at
+ * container startup. The legacy file is migrated into akm and deleted
+ * on upgrade; subsequent `docker compose` invocations must not reference
+ * it (compose interpolates `${VAR}` against the merged --env-file
+ * contents, and a stale user.env would shadow the akm-sourced values).
  */
 export function buildEnvFiles(state: ControlPlaneState): string[] {
   return [
-    `${state.vaultDir}/stack/stack.env`,
-    `${state.vaultDir}/user/user.env`,
-    `${state.vaultDir}/stack/guardian.env`,
+    `${state.stackDir}/stack.env`,
+    `${state.stackDir}/guardian.env`,
   ].filter(existsSync);
 }
 
 /**
- * Write system-managed values to vault/stack/stack.env.
+ * Write system-managed values to config/stack/stack.env.
  *
  * Channel HMAC secrets are NOT written here — they belong in guardian.env.
  * Use writeChannelSecrets() for channel secrets.
  */
 export function writeSystemEnv(state: ControlPlaneState): void {
-  mkdirSync(`${state.vaultDir}/stack`, { recursive: true });
+  mkdirSync(state.stackDir, { recursive: true });
 
-  const systemEnvPath = `${state.vaultDir}/stack/stack.env`;
+  const systemEnvPath = `${state.stackDir}/stack.env`;
 
   let base = "";
   if (existsSync(systemEnvPath)) {
@@ -98,18 +85,15 @@ function generateFallbackSystemEnv(state: ControlPlaneState): string {
     "# Auto-generated fallback.",
     "",
     "# ── Authentication ──────────────────────────────────────────────────",
-    `OP_ADMIN_TOKEN=\${OP_ADMIN_TOKEN}`,
-    `OP_ASSISTANT_TOKEN=\${OP_ASSISTANT_TOKEN}`,
+    `OP_UI_LOGIN_PASSWORD=\${OP_UI_LOGIN_PASSWORD}`,
     "",
     "# ── Service Auth ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────",
-    `OP_MEMORY_TOKEN=${process.env.OP_MEMORY_TOKEN ?? ""}`,
     "OP_OPENCODE_PASSWORD=",
     "",
     "# ── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────",
     `OP_HOME=${state.homeDir}`,
     `OP_UID=${uid}`,
     `OP_GID=${gid}`,
-    `OP_DOCKER_SOCK=${process.env.OP_DOCKER_SOCK ?? "/var/run/docker.sock"}`,
     "",
     "# ── Images ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────",
     `OP_IMAGE_NAMESPACE=${process.env.OP_IMAGE_NAMESPACE ?? "openpalm"}`,
@@ -119,7 +103,6 @@ function generateFallbackSystemEnv(state: ControlPlaneState): string {
     `OP_ASSISTANT_PORT=3800`,
     `OP_ADMIN_PORT=3880`,
     `OP_ADMIN_OPENCODE_PORT=3881`,
-    `OP_MEMORY_PORT=3898`,
     `OP_GUARDIAN_PORT=3899`,
     ""
   ].join("\n");
@@ -191,19 +174,19 @@ function extractChannelSecrets(parsed: Record<string, string>): Record<string, s
 }
 
 /**
- * Read channel HMAC secrets from vault/stack/guardian.env.
+ * Read channel HMAC secrets from config/stack/guardian.env.
  */
-export function readChannelSecrets(vaultDir: string): Record<string, string> {
-  return extractChannelSecrets(parseEnvFile(`${vaultDir}/stack/guardian.env`));
+export function readChannelSecrets(stackDir: string): Record<string, string> {
+  return extractChannelSecrets(parseEnvFile(`${stackDir}/guardian.env`));
 }
 
 /**
- * Write channel HMAC secrets to vault/stack/guardian.env.
+ * Write channel HMAC secrets to state/guardian.env.
  * Merges with existing content; does not overwrite unrelated entries.
  */
-export function writeChannelSecrets(vaultDir: string, secrets: Record<string, string>): void {
-  const guardianPath = `${vaultDir}/stack/guardian.env`;
-  mkdirSync(`${vaultDir}/stack`, { recursive: true });
+export function writeChannelSecrets(stackDir: string, secrets: Record<string, string>): void {
+  const guardianPath = `${stackDir}/guardian.env`;
+  mkdirSync(stackDir, { recursive: true });
 
   let base = "";
   if (existsSync(guardianPath)) {
@@ -223,48 +206,103 @@ export function writeChannelSecrets(vaultDir: string, secrets: Record<string, st
   chmodSync(guardianPath, 0o600);
 }
 
+// ── Volume Mount Targets ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Parse all enabled compose files and pre-create every host-side volume
+ * mount target as the current user. This prevents Docker from creating
+ * them as root-owned, which causes EACCES inside non-root containers.
+ *
+ * For file mounts (basename contains a `.`), creates an empty file.
+ * For directory mounts (basename has no `.`), creates the directory.
+ *
+ * Heuristic: a basename containing a `.` is treated as a file. This
+ * intentionally includes leading-dot files (e.g. `.env`) because Docker
+ * bind mounts to them must be regular files. Bare directory names like
+ * `stack` or `addons` lack extensions and are created as directories.
+ *
+ * Only mount sources under `state.homeDir` are touched; external paths
+ * (e.g. `/var/run/docker.sock`) are left alone.
+ */
+export function ensureComposeVolumeTargets(state: ControlPlaneState): void {
+  const composeFiles = discoverStackOverlays(`${state.homeDir}/stack`);
+  if (composeFiles.length === 0) return;
+
+  const envVars: Record<string, string> = {
+    ...(process.env as Record<string, string>),
+    ...parseEnvFile(`${state.stackDir}/stack.env`),
+  };
+
+  for (const file of composeFiles) {
+    let doc: Record<string, unknown>;
+    try {
+      doc = yamlParse(readFileSync(file, 'utf-8')) as Record<string, unknown>;
+    } catch {
+      continue;
+    }
+    const services = doc?.services;
+    if (!services || typeof services !== 'object') continue;
+
+    for (const svc of Object.values(services as Record<string, unknown>)) {
+      if (!svc || typeof svc !== 'object') continue;
+      const svcRecord = svc as Record<string, unknown>;
+      if (!Array.isArray(svcRecord.volumes)) continue;
+      for (const vol of svcRecord.volumes as unknown[]) {
+        const volRecord = typeof vol === 'object' && vol !== null
+          ? (vol as Record<string, unknown>)
+          : null;
+        const rawSource = typeof vol === 'string'
+          ? vol.split(':')[0]
+          : String(volRecord?.source ?? '');
+        if (!rawSource) continue;
+
+        const hostPath = expandEnvVars(rawSource, envVars);
+        if (!hostPath || !hostPath.startsWith('/')) continue;
+        if (existsSync(hostPath)) continue;
+
+        // A basename containing a `.` (anywhere, including leading) is a file.
+        // Bare names like `stack` or `data` are directories.
+        const basename = hostPath.split('/').pop() ?? '';
+        const isFile = basename.includes('.');
+
+        if (isFile) {
+          mkdirSync(dirname(hostPath), { recursive: true });
+          writeFileSync(hostPath, '');
+        } else {
+          mkdirSync(hostPath, { recursive: true });
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 // ── Persistence (direct-write to live paths) ────────────────────────
 
 export function writeRuntimeFiles(
   state: ControlPlaneState
 ): void {
-  // Write core compose to stack/
-  const stackDir = `${state.homeDir}/stack`;
-  mkdirSync(stackDir, { recursive: true });
-  writeFileSync(`${stackDir}/core.compose.yml`, state.artifacts.compose);
+  // Write core compose to config/stack/
+  mkdirSync(state.stackDir, { recursive: true });
+  writeFileSync(`${state.stackDir}/core.compose.yml`, state.artifacts.compose);
 
   // Load persisted channel HMAC secrets from guardian.env,
   // then generate new ones for new channel addons.
-  const channelSecrets = readChannelSecrets(state.vaultDir);
-  const addonStackDir = `${state.homeDir}/stack`;
+  const channelSecrets = readChannelSecrets(state.stackDir);
   for (const addon of listEnabledAddonIds(state.homeDir)) {
-    const composePath = `${addonStackDir}/addons/${addon}/compose.yml`;
+    const composePath = `${state.stackDir}/addons/${addon}/compose.yml`;
     if (isChannelAddon(composePath) && !channelSecrets[addon]) {
       channelSecrets[addon] = randomHex(16);
     }
   }
 
   // Write channel secrets to guardian.env (the canonical source)
-  writeChannelSecrets(state.vaultDir, channelSecrets);
+  writeChannelSecrets(state.stackDir, channelSecrets);
 
   // Write system.env (no channel secrets — those live in guardian.env)
   writeSystemEnv(state);
 
-  // Ensure env schema directories exist
-  ensureUserEnvSchema();
-  ensureSystemEnvSchema();
-
-  const spec = readStackSpec(state.configDir);
-  // Write OP_CAP_* capability vars to stack.env from stack spec
-  if (spec) {
-    writeCapabilityVars(spec, state.vaultDir);
-  }
-
-  // Generate redact.env.schema from canonical mappings
-  const systemEnv = readStackEnv(state.vaultDir);
-  const redactDir = `${state.dataDir}/secrets`;
-  mkdirSync(redactDir, { recursive: true });
-  writeFileSync(`${redactDir}/redact.env.schema`, generateRedactSchema(systemEnv));
+  // Ensure state directory exists
+  mkdirSync(state.stateDir, { recursive: true });
 
   state.artifactMeta = buildRuntimeFileMeta(state.artifacts);
 }

package/src/control-plane/core-assets.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+import { describe, expect, it, beforeEach, afterEach } from "bun:test";
+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { seedStashAssets } from "./core-assets.js";
+
+describe("seedStashAssets", () => {
+  let homeDir: string;
+  const originalHome = process.env.OP_HOME;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    homeDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "stash-seed-test-"));
+    process.env.OP_HOME = homeDir;
+    mkdirSync(join(homeDir, "stash"), { recursive: true });
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    process.env.OP_HOME = originalHome;
+    // Restore writable mode in case a test chmod'd the stash dir.
+    try {
+      chmodSync(join(homeDir, "stash"), 0o755);
+    } catch {
+      // ignore — dir may not exist
+    }
+    rmSync(homeDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it("writes every seed under stash/ on first run", () => {
+    const seeds = {
+      "skills/test-skill/SKILL.md": "---\nname: test-skill\ntype: skill\n---\nhello\n",
+      "commands/test-cmd.md": "---\nname: test-cmd\ntype: command\n---\nrun me\n",
+    };
+    const written = seedStashAssets(seeds);
+
+    expect(written.sort()).toEqual(Object.keys(seeds).sort());
+    for (const [rel, content] of Object.entries(seeds)) {
+      const target = join(homeDir, "stash", rel);
+      expect(existsSync(target)).toBe(true);
+      expect(readFileSync(target, "utf-8")).toBe(content);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("does not overwrite existing files (user edits win)", () => {
+    const seeds = { "skills/keep-mine/SKILL.md": "ORIGINAL SEED\n" };
+    const userEdit = "USER EDIT — must not be overwritten\n";
+
+    // Simulate a previous install: seed first.
+    seedStashAssets(seeds);
+    const target = join(homeDir, "stash/skills/keep-mine/SKILL.md");
+    expect(readFileSync(target, "utf-8")).toBe("ORIGINAL SEED\n");
+
+    // User edits the file.
+    writeFileSync(target, userEdit);
+
+    // Re-run: must return [] and leave the user's content intact.
+    const written = seedStashAssets(seeds);
+    expect(written).toEqual([]);
+    expect(readFileSync(target, "utf-8")).toBe(userEdit);
+  });
+
+  it("creates nested directories under stash/ as needed", () => {
+    const seeds = { "skills/deep/nested/asset/SKILL.md": "x" };
+    seedStashAssets(seeds);
+    expect(existsSync(join(homeDir, "stash/skills/deep/nested/asset/SKILL.md"))).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("returns an empty list when called with no seeds", () => {
+    expect(seedStashAssets({})).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects seed keys that escape the stash directory", () => {
+    // Path-traversal guard: ../ sequences in keys must throw rather than
+    // silently writing outside stash/.
+    expect(() =>
+      seedStashAssets({ "../../etc/cron.d/evil": "owned\n" }),
+    ).toThrow(/escapes stash dir/);
+
+    // Confirm the malicious payload was NOT written anywhere relative to
+    // the temp home.
+    expect(existsSync(join(homeDir, "..", "..", "etc", "cron.d", "evil"))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects seed keys that traverse through the stash dir back out", () => {
+    expect(() =>
+      seedStashAssets({ "skills/../../../escape.md": "x" }),
+    ).toThrow(/escapes stash dir/);
+  });
+
+  it("surfaces errors when the stash directory is read-only", () => {
+    // Skip when running as root (chmod is a no-op for the superuser).
+    const uid = process.getuid?.();
+    if (uid === 0) return;
+
+    const stashDir = join(homeDir, "stash");
+    chmodSync(stashDir, 0o555);
+    try {
+      expect(() =>
+        seedStashAssets({ "skills/readonly/SKILL.md": "nope\n" }),
+      ).toThrow();
+    } finally {
+      chmodSync(stashDir, 0o755);
+    }
+  });
+});