@nekzus/liop 1.3.0-alpha.1 → 2.0.0-alpha.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +41 -17
- package/dist/bin/agent.d.ts +0 -1
- package/dist/bin/agent.js +5 -306
- package/dist/bin/agent.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{bridge/stream.d.ts → bridge.d.ts} +44 -3
- package/dist/bridge.js +2 -0
- package/dist/bridge.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-4ABAFG44.js +33 -0
- package/dist/chunk-4ABAFG44.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-ANFXJGMP.js +2 -0
- package/dist/chunk-ANFXJGMP.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-DBXGYHKY.js +2 -0
- package/dist/chunk-DBXGYHKY.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-HM77MWB6.js +2 -0
- package/dist/chunk-HM77MWB6.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-HNDVAKEK.js +24 -0
- package/dist/chunk-HNDVAKEK.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-HQZHZM6U.js +2 -0
- package/dist/chunk-HQZHZM6U.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-P52IE4L6.js +2 -0
- package/dist/chunk-P52IE4L6.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-PIBCW4BD.js +13 -0
- package/dist/chunk-PIBCW4BD.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-PPCOS2NU.js +2 -0
- package/dist/chunk-PPCOS2NU.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-RWRRBYG4.js +2 -0
- package/dist/chunk-RWRRBYG4.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-S6RJHZV2.js +2 -0
- package/dist/chunk-S6RJHZV2.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-UVTEJYHN.js +2 -0
- package/dist/chunk-UVTEJYHN.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-X6FJATUE.js +29 -0
- package/dist/chunk-X6FJATUE.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/chunk-XLVRRGOX.js +3 -0
- package/dist/chunk-XLVRRGOX.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/client.js +2 -0
- package/dist/client.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{gateway/router.d.ts → gateway.d.ts} +37 -5
- package/dist/gateway.js +2 -0
- package/dist/gateway.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{client/index.d.ts → index-CyxNLlz7.d.ts} +24 -5
- package/dist/index.d.ts +313 -12
- package/dist/index.js +31 -12
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/kyber-2WDOTUQX.js +2 -0
- package/dist/kyber-2WDOTUQX.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{mesh/node.d.ts → mesh.d.ts} +5 -3
- package/dist/mesh.js +2 -0
- package/dist/mesh.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{server/index.d.ts → server.d.ts} +145 -10
- package/dist/server.js +2 -0
- package/dist/server.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/types.d.ts +17 -14
- package/dist/types.js +2 -26
- package/dist/types.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/{crypto/verifier.d.ts → verifier-DTCD9imJ.d.ts} +3 -1
- package/dist/verifier-RQRYXA4C.js +2 -0
- package/dist/verifier-RQRYXA4C.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/workers/logic-execution.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/workers/logic-execution.js +2 -123
- package/dist/workers/logic-execution.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/workers/zk-verifier.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/workers/zk-verifier.js +2 -98
- package/dist/workers/zk-verifier.js.map +1 -0
- package/package.json +31 -17
- package/dist/bridge/index.d.ts +0 -37
- package/dist/bridge/index.js +0 -249
- package/dist/bridge/stream.js +0 -210
- package/dist/client/index.js +0 -275
- package/dist/crypto/logic-image-id.d.ts +0 -3
- package/dist/crypto/logic-image-id.js +0 -27
- package/dist/crypto/verifier.js +0 -97
- package/dist/economy/estimator.d.ts +0 -53
- package/dist/economy/estimator.js +0 -69
- package/dist/economy/index.d.ts +0 -5
- package/dist/economy/index.js +0 -3
- package/dist/economy/otel.d.ts +0 -38
- package/dist/economy/otel.js +0 -100
- package/dist/economy/telemetry.d.ts +0 -77
- package/dist/economy/telemetry.js +0 -224
- package/dist/errors.d.ts +0 -14
- package/dist/errors.js +0 -19
- package/dist/gateway/hybrid.d.ts +0 -23
- package/dist/gateway/hybrid.js +0 -199
- package/dist/gateway/router.js +0 -1036
- package/dist/mesh/index.d.ts +0 -1
- package/dist/mesh/index.js +0 -1
- package/dist/mesh/node.js +0 -853
- package/dist/prompts/adapters.d.ts +0 -16
- package/dist/prompts/adapters.js +0 -55
- package/dist/rpc/client.d.ts +0 -22
- package/dist/rpc/client.js +0 -40
- package/dist/rpc/codec/lpm.d.ts +0 -20
- package/dist/rpc/codec/lpm.js +0 -36
- package/dist/rpc/crypto/aes.d.ts +0 -22
- package/dist/rpc/crypto/aes.js +0 -47
- package/dist/rpc/crypto/kyber.d.ts +0 -27
- package/dist/rpc/crypto/kyber.js +0 -70
- package/dist/rpc/proto.d.ts +0 -2
- package/dist/rpc/proto.js +0 -33
- package/dist/rpc/server.d.ts +0 -13
- package/dist/rpc/server.js +0 -50
- package/dist/rpc/tls.d.ts +0 -26
- package/dist/rpc/tls.js +0 -54
- package/dist/rpc/types.d.ts +0 -28
- package/dist/rpc/types.js +0 -5
- package/dist/sandbox/guardian.d.ts +0 -18
- package/dist/sandbox/guardian.js +0 -58
- package/dist/sandbox/wasi.d.ts +0 -36
- package/dist/sandbox/wasi.js +0 -209
- package/dist/security/guardian.d.ts +0 -22
- package/dist/security/guardian.js +0 -52
- package/dist/security/zk.d.ts +0 -37
- package/dist/security/zk.js +0 -76
- package/dist/server/index.js +0 -937
- package/dist/server/pii.d.ts +0 -40
- package/dist/server/pii.js +0 -266
- package/dist/utils/logger.d.ts +0 -21
- package/dist/utils/logger.js +0 -70
- package/dist/utils/mcpCompact.d.ts +0 -11
- package/dist/utils/mcpCompact.js +0 -29
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@@ -1,22 +1,136 @@
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import { z } from
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import { MeshNode } from
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import
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import { z } from 'zod';
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import { MeshNode } from './mesh.js';
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import { ServerInfo, CallToolResult, Prompt, GetPromptRequest, GetPromptResult, CallToolRequest, Tool, Resource } from './types.js';
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/** Single named entity detected by the NER scanner. */
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interface NerEntity {
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type: "person" | "place" | "organization";
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text: string;
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}
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/** Result of an NER scan operation. */
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interface NerScanResult {
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detected: boolean;
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entities: NerEntity[];
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}
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/**
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* Scans text content for named entities that may represent PII.
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* Uses `compromise/three` for person, place, and organization detection.
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*
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* Designed for egress filtering — optimized for recall over precision
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* to ensure sensitive data does not leak through aliased output keys.
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*/
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declare class NerScanner {
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private static nlp;
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/**
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* Lazy loads the compromise library only when needed.
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*/
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private getNlp;
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/**
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* Scans a single string value for named entities.
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* Returns detected entities if the text contains recognizable PII.
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*/
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scan(text: string): Promise<NerScanResult>;
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/**
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* Recursively scans all string values within an object/array.
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* Stops at the first detection for performance (fail-fast).
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*/
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scanDeep(input: unknown, seen?: WeakSet<object>): Promise<NerScanResult>;
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}
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/**
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* LIOP Professional PII Engine (The Shield V2 - Tier-1 Military Edition)
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* Implements high-fidelity detection based on NIST and OWASP standards.
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* Features Multi-Layer Verification (Regex + Algorithmic Validators).
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*/
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type PiiRuleDefinition = {
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name: string;
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pattern: string | RegExp;
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validator?: (match: string) => boolean;
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};
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type PiiRule = string | RegExp | PiiRuleDefinition;
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declare const PII_PATTERNS: {
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EMAIL: PiiRuleDefinition;
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CREDIT_CARD: PiiRuleDefinition;
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IP_ADDRESS: PiiRuleDefinition;
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PHONE: PiiRuleDefinition;
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SSN: PiiRuleDefinition;
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IBAN: PiiRuleDefinition;
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PASSPORT_MRZ: PiiRuleDefinition;
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};
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/**
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* Regional and Cultural Security Presets for Out-Of-The-Box compliance.
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* Developers can override, merge, or omit these based on local laws.
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*/
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declare const PII_PRESETS: {
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GLOBAL_STRICT: PiiRuleDefinition[];
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US_COMPLIANT: PiiRuleDefinition[];
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EU_GDPR: PiiRuleDefinition[];
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};
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declare class PiiScanner {
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private patterns;
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private forbiddenKeysSet;
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private nerScanner;
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/**
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* Safelist of keys that contain forbidden substrings but are NOT PII.
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* Prevents false positives from fuzzy matching (e.g., "grid" contains "id").
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*/
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private static readonly KEY_SAFELIST;
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/**
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* Short forbidden tokens (< 4 chars) that require boundary-aware matching.
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* Uses regex boundary detection to avoid false positives.
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*/
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private shortTokenBoundaryPatterns;
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/**
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* Long forbidden tokens (>= 4 chars) that use substring containment.
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*/
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private longForbiddenTokens;
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constructor(patterns?: PiiRule[], forbiddenKeys?: string[], nerScanner?: NerScanner | null);
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/**
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* Scans any input (string, object, array) for PII violations.
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* Returns the pattern/rule name that triggered the violation, or null if safe.
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*
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* Detection pipeline (fail-fast):
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* 1. Exact key match (O(1) Set lookup)
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* 2. Fuzzy key match (boundary detection for short tokens, substring for long)
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* 3. Regex/algorithmic pattern match on string values
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* 4. NER content scan on string values (if enabled)
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*/
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scan(input: unknown, seen?: WeakSet<object>): Promise<string | null>;
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/**
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* Checks a key against fuzzy matching rules.
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* Short tokens use boundary-aware regex; long tokens use substring containment.
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*/
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private checkKeyFuzzy;
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private checkString;
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}
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type ToolHandler<T extends z.ZodRawShape = z.ZodRawShape> = (args: z.infer<z.ZodObject<T>>, extra: {
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signal?: AbortSignal;
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}) => Promise<CallToolResult>;
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interface LiopServerOptions {
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capabilities?: Record<string, unknown>;
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workerPool?: {
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enabled?: boolean;
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minThreads?: number;
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maxThreads?: number;
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idleTimeout?: number;
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/** Max heap memory per worker in MB (default: 64). Prevents heap bomb DoS. */
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maxHeapMb?: number;
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};
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security?: {
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piiPatterns?: PiiRule[];
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forbiddenKeys?: string[];
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/** Enable NLP-based Named Entity Recognition scanning on output values. */
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enableNerScanning?: boolean;
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/** Rate limiting configuration for tool calls (OWASP A01). */
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rateLimit?: {
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/** Maximum calls per window per tool (default: 15). */
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maxPerWindow?: number;
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/** Maximum calls per window across ALL tools combined (default: 40). */
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globalMaxPerWindow?: number;
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/** Sliding window duration in milliseconds (default: 60000 = 1 min). */
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windowMs?: number;
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};
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};
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taxonomy?: {
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domain?: string;
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executionTypes?: string[];
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};
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}
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interface AggregationPolicy {
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/** Maximum number of object-type array elements allowed (default: 10) */
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maxOutputRows?: number;
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/** Allow arrays containing only primitive values (default: true) */
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allowPrimitiveArrays?: boolean;
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}
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interface LogicExecutionPolicy {
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/**
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* Validate the business payload returned by sandbox logic (post-execution).
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* This runs before final egress checks and blocks non-conforming outputs.
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*/
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preflightDenyPatterns?: RegExp[];
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}
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declare class LiopServer {
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private serverInfo;
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private config?;
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private logicCache;
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private readonly CACHE_TTL_MS;
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private readonly THROTTLE_THRESHOLD;
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private readonly THROTTLE_COOLDOWN_MS;
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private toolCallWindows;
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private readonly toolCallMaxPerWindow;
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private readonly toolCallWindowMs;
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private globalCallWindow;
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private readonly globalCallMaxPerWindow;
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private readonly taintAnalyzer;
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private tools;
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private resources;
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private prompts;
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* Manually invalidates the AST Logic Cache (e.g. for Zero-Day patches).
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*/
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clearAstCache(): void;
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/**
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* Sliding window rate limiter for tool call frequency.
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* Prevents micro-query exfiltration attacks where an attacker
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* makes hundreds of individually-legitimate calls to reconstruct
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* the full dataset field by field. (OWASP A01)
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*/
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private checkToolCallRateLimit;
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/**
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* Global cross-tool rate limiter.
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* Prevents attackers from distributing micro-queries across multiple tools
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* to evade per-tool rate limits. (OWASP A01)
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*/
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private checkGlobalRateLimit;
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* Emulates calling a tool (used locally or via LIOPMcpBridge)
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close(): Promise<void>;
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}
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export { type AggregationPolicy, LiopServer, type LiopServerOptions, type LogicExecutionPolicy, NerScanner, PII_PATTERNS, PII_PRESETS, type PiiRule, PiiScanner, type ToolHandler };
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package/dist/server.js
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{"version":3,"sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":"","file":"server.js"}
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package/dist/types.d.ts
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/**
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declare const ToolSchema: z.ZodObject<{
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type Tool = z.infer<typeof ToolSchema>;
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declare const ResourceSchema: z.ZodObject<{
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name: z.ZodString;
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description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
|
|
@@ -32,8 +33,8 @@ export declare const ResourceSchema: z.ZodObject<{
|
|
|
32
33
|
description?: string | undefined;
|
|
33
34
|
mimeType?: string | undefined;
|
|
34
35
|
}>;
|
|
35
|
-
|
|
36
|
-
|
|
36
|
+
type Resource = z.infer<typeof ResourceSchema>;
|
|
37
|
+
declare const PromptSchema: z.ZodObject<{
|
|
37
38
|
name: z.ZodString;
|
|
38
39
|
description: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
|
|
39
40
|
arguments: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodArray<z.ZodObject<{
|
|
@@ -66,12 +67,12 @@ export declare const PromptSchema: z.ZodObject<{
|
|
|
66
67
|
required?: boolean | undefined;
|
|
67
68
|
}[] | undefined;
|
|
68
69
|
}>;
|
|
69
|
-
|
|
70
|
-
|
|
70
|
+
type Prompt = z.infer<typeof PromptSchema>;
|
|
71
|
+
interface CallToolRequest {
|
|
71
72
|
name: string;
|
|
72
73
|
arguments?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
73
74
|
}
|
|
74
|
-
|
|
75
|
+
interface CallToolResult {
|
|
75
76
|
content: Array<{
|
|
76
77
|
type: "text" | "image" | "resource";
|
|
77
78
|
text?: string;
|
|
@@ -85,11 +86,11 @@ export interface CallToolResult {
|
|
|
85
86
|
}>;
|
|
86
87
|
isError?: boolean;
|
|
87
88
|
}
|
|
88
|
-
|
|
89
|
+
interface GetPromptRequest {
|
|
89
90
|
name: string;
|
|
90
91
|
arguments?: Record<string, string>;
|
|
91
92
|
}
|
|
92
|
-
|
|
93
|
+
interface GetPromptResult {
|
|
93
94
|
description?: string;
|
|
94
95
|
messages: Array<{
|
|
95
96
|
role: "user" | "assistant";
|
|
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ export interface GetPromptResult {
|
|
|
110
111
|
};
|
|
111
112
|
}>;
|
|
112
113
|
}
|
|
113
|
-
|
|
114
|
+
interface ServerInfo {
|
|
114
115
|
name: string;
|
|
115
116
|
version: string;
|
|
116
117
|
capabilities?: {
|
|
@@ -127,13 +128,13 @@ export interface ServerInfo {
|
|
|
127
128
|
logging?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
128
129
|
};
|
|
129
130
|
}
|
|
130
|
-
|
|
131
|
+
interface McpRequest {
|
|
131
132
|
method: string;
|
|
132
133
|
params?: unknown;
|
|
133
134
|
id?: string | number | null;
|
|
134
135
|
jsonrpc?: "2.0";
|
|
135
136
|
}
|
|
136
|
-
|
|
137
|
+
interface McpResponse {
|
|
137
138
|
jsonrpc: "2.0";
|
|
138
139
|
id?: string | number | null;
|
|
139
140
|
result?: unknown;
|
|
@@ -143,3 +144,5 @@ export interface McpResponse {
|
|
|
143
144
|
data?: unknown;
|
|
144
145
|
};
|
|
145
146
|
}
|
|
147
|
+
|
|
148
|
+
export { type CallToolRequest, type CallToolResult, type GetPromptRequest, type GetPromptResult, type McpRequest, type McpResponse, type Prompt, PromptSchema, type Resource, ResourceSchema, type ServerInfo, type Tool, ToolSchema };
|
package/dist/types.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,26 +1,2 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
|
|
2
|
-
|
|
3
|
-
* Base Protocol Types representing parity with Model Context Protocol
|
|
4
|
-
*/
|
|
5
|
-
export const ToolSchema = z.object({
|
|
6
|
-
name: z.string(),
|
|
7
|
-
description: z.string().optional(),
|
|
8
|
-
inputSchema: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()), // Represents a JSON Schema
|
|
9
|
-
});
|
|
10
|
-
export const ResourceSchema = z.object({
|
|
11
|
-
uri: z.string(),
|
|
12
|
-
name: z.string(),
|
|
13
|
-
description: z.string().optional(),
|
|
14
|
-
mimeType: z.string().optional(),
|
|
15
|
-
});
|
|
16
|
-
export const PromptSchema = z.object({
|
|
17
|
-
name: z.string(),
|
|
18
|
-
description: z.string().optional(),
|
|
19
|
-
arguments: z
|
|
20
|
-
.array(z.object({
|
|
21
|
-
name: z.string(),
|
|
22
|
-
description: z.string().optional(),
|
|
23
|
-
required: z.boolean().optional(),
|
|
24
|
-
}))
|
|
25
|
-
.optional(),
|
|
26
|
-
});
|
|
1
|
+
export{c as PromptSchema,b as ResourceSchema,a as ToolSchema}from'./chunk-HQZHZM6U.js';//# sourceMappingURL=types.js.map
|
|
2
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=types.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":"","file":"types.js"}
|
|
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
|
|
5
5
|
* It validates both the integrity of the code (ZkImageID) and the mathematical proof
|
|
6
6
|
* of its execution (ZkSeal), as well as hardware-level attestation (TEE).
|
|
7
7
|
*/
|
|
8
|
-
|
|
8
|
+
declare class LiopVerifier {
|
|
9
9
|
private static zkWorkerPool;
|
|
10
10
|
private getZkPool;
|
|
11
11
|
/**
|
|
@@ -27,3 +27,5 @@ export declare class LiopVerifier {
|
|
|
27
27
|
*/
|
|
28
28
|
deriveImageId(logicPayload: Buffer): Buffer;
|
|
29
29
|
}
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
export { LiopVerifier as L };
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":"","file":"verifier-RQRYXA4C.js"}
|
|
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
|
|
1
|
+
interface WorkerData {
|
|
2
2
|
ciphertext: Uint8Array;
|
|
3
3
|
secretKeyObj: ArrayLike<number>;
|
|
4
4
|
kyberPublicKey: Uint8Array;
|
|
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@ export interface WorkerData {
|
|
|
9
9
|
isEncrypted?: boolean;
|
|
10
10
|
aesNonce?: Uint8Array;
|
|
11
11
|
}
|
|
12
|
-
|
|
12
|
+
declare function processLogicExecution(data: WorkerData): Promise<{
|
|
13
13
|
image_id: string;
|
|
14
14
|
output: unknown;
|
|
15
15
|
fuel_consumed: number;
|
|
16
16
|
zk_receipt?: string;
|
|
17
17
|
}>;
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
export { type WorkerData, processLogicExecution as default };
|
|
@@ -1,123 +1,2 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { Buffer } from "
|
|
2
|
-
|
|
3
|
-
import { createMlKem768 } from "mlkem";
|
|
4
|
-
import { deriveLogicImageDigest, normalizeLogicSource, } from "../crypto/logic-image-id.js";
|
|
5
|
-
import { ASTGuardian } from "../sandbox/guardian.js";
|
|
6
|
-
import { WasiSandbox } from "../sandbox/wasi.js";
|
|
7
|
-
export default async function processLogicExecution(data) {
|
|
8
|
-
const { ciphertext, secretKeyObj, wasmBinary, inputs, aesNonce, records, isEncrypted = true, } = data;
|
|
9
|
-
let decryptedPayload;
|
|
10
|
-
const decryptedInputs = {};
|
|
11
|
-
let sessionSecret = Buffer.alloc(32); // Fallback if plain text (no PQC)
|
|
12
|
-
if (isEncrypted) {
|
|
13
|
-
// 1. Decapsulate Kyber secret
|
|
14
|
-
const sk = new Uint8Array(secretKeyObj);
|
|
15
|
-
const ct = new Uint8Array(ciphertext);
|
|
16
|
-
const kem = await createMlKem768();
|
|
17
|
-
const sharedSecret = kem.decap(ct, sk);
|
|
18
|
-
const aesKey = Buffer.from(sharedSecret);
|
|
19
|
-
sessionSecret = aesKey;
|
|
20
|
-
// 2. Decrypt Main Payload (WASM/JS Code)
|
|
21
|
-
// LIOP Serialization: Ciphertext = EncryptedData + 16-byte AuthTag
|
|
22
|
-
const wasmBuffer = Buffer.from(wasmBinary);
|
|
23
|
-
const authTag = wasmBuffer.subarray(-16);
|
|
24
|
-
const encryptedData = wasmBuffer.subarray(0, -16);
|
|
25
|
-
const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", aesKey, Buffer.from(aesNonce || new Uint8Array(12)));
|
|
26
|
-
decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
|
|
27
|
-
let decrypted = decipher.update(encryptedData);
|
|
28
|
-
decrypted = Buffer.concat([decrypted, decipher.final()]);
|
|
29
|
-
decryptedPayload = decrypted;
|
|
30
|
-
// 3. Decrypt Inputs
|
|
31
|
-
for (const [key, encValue] of Object.entries(inputs || {})) {
|
|
32
|
-
const valBuffer = Buffer.from(encValue);
|
|
33
|
-
// Extract 12-byte prepended nonce, ciphertext, and 16-byte AuthTag
|
|
34
|
-
const inputNonce = valBuffer.subarray(0, 12);
|
|
35
|
-
const valTag = valBuffer.subarray(-16);
|
|
36
|
-
const valData = valBuffer.subarray(12, -16);
|
|
37
|
-
const valDecipher = crypto.createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", aesKey, inputNonce);
|
|
38
|
-
valDecipher.setAuthTag(valTag);
|
|
39
|
-
let valDecrypted = valDecipher.update(valData);
|
|
40
|
-
valDecrypted = Buffer.concat([valDecrypted, valDecipher.final()]);
|
|
41
|
-
decryptedInputs[key] = JSON.parse(valDecrypted.toString("utf-8"));
|
|
42
|
-
}
|
|
43
|
-
}
|
|
44
|
-
else {
|
|
45
|
-
// Transparent mode: payload is provided directly
|
|
46
|
-
// If it's WASM (Magic bytes: \0asm), keep as Buffer
|
|
47
|
-
if (wasmBinary[0] === 0x00 &&
|
|
48
|
-
wasmBinary[1] === 0x61 &&
|
|
49
|
-
wasmBinary[2] === 0x73 &&
|
|
50
|
-
wasmBinary[3] === 0x6d) {
|
|
51
|
-
decryptedPayload = Buffer.from(wasmBinary);
|
|
52
|
-
}
|
|
53
|
-
else {
|
|
54
|
-
decryptedPayload = Buffer.from(wasmBinary).toString("utf-8");
|
|
55
|
-
}
|
|
56
|
-
}
|
|
57
|
-
// 3. Inspect AST with Guardian-TS (if WASM)
|
|
58
|
-
const isWasm = decryptedPayload[0] === 0x00 &&
|
|
59
|
-
decryptedPayload[1] === 0x61 &&
|
|
60
|
-
decryptedPayload[2] === 0x73 &&
|
|
61
|
-
decryptedPayload[3] === 0x6d;
|
|
62
|
-
if (decryptedPayload instanceof Buffer && isWasm) {
|
|
63
|
-
// Ensure we pass a compatible BufferSource
|
|
64
|
-
const wasmBytes = new Uint8Array(decryptedPayload);
|
|
65
|
-
const compiledModule = await WebAssembly.compile(wasmBytes);
|
|
66
|
-
ASTGuardian.analyze(compiledModule);
|
|
67
|
-
}
|
|
68
|
-
else if (decryptedPayload instanceof Buffer && !isWasm) {
|
|
69
|
-
decryptedPayload = decryptedPayload.toString("utf-8");
|
|
70
|
-
}
|
|
71
|
-
// Strip only a whole-document LIOP envelope (see logic-image-id.ts).
|
|
72
|
-
if (typeof decryptedPayload === "string") {
|
|
73
|
-
decryptedPayload = normalizeLogicSource(decryptedPayload);
|
|
74
|
-
}
|
|
75
|
-
// 4. Instantiate and Execute WASI Sandbox (or V8 Fallback)
|
|
76
|
-
const sandbox = new WasiSandbox();
|
|
77
|
-
await sandbox.init();
|
|
78
|
-
try {
|
|
79
|
-
const result = await sandbox.execute(decryptedPayload, records, decryptedInputs);
|
|
80
|
-
// 5. Generate Cryptographic Proof of Execution (HMAC-SHA256 Commitment)
|
|
81
|
-
let logicBytes;
|
|
82
|
-
if (typeof decryptedPayload === "string") {
|
|
83
|
-
logicBytes = Buffer.from(decryptedPayload, "utf-8");
|
|
84
|
-
}
|
|
85
|
-
else {
|
|
86
|
-
logicBytes = new Uint8Array(decryptedPayload);
|
|
87
|
-
}
|
|
88
|
-
const imageId = deriveLogicImageDigest(logicBytes).toString("hex");
|
|
89
|
-
const journal = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
|
|
90
|
-
image_id: imageId,
|
|
91
|
-
output_hash: crypto
|
|
92
|
-
.createHash("sha256")
|
|
93
|
-
.update(typeof result.output === "string"
|
|
94
|
-
? result.output
|
|
95
|
-
: JSON.stringify(result.output))
|
|
96
|
-
.digest("hex"),
|
|
97
|
-
fuel: result.fuelConsumed,
|
|
98
|
-
ts: Date.now(),
|
|
99
|
-
}));
|
|
100
|
-
const seal = crypto
|
|
101
|
-
.createHmac("sha256", sessionSecret)
|
|
102
|
-
.update(journal)
|
|
103
|
-
.digest();
|
|
104
|
-
const journalLen = Buffer.alloc(2);
|
|
105
|
-
journalLen.writeUInt16BE(journal.length);
|
|
106
|
-
const receiptBuf = Buffer.concat([
|
|
107
|
-
Buffer.from([0x01]), // Receipt format v1
|
|
108
|
-
journalLen,
|
|
109
|
-
journal,
|
|
110
|
-
seal, // 32 bytes HMAC
|
|
111
|
-
]);
|
|
112
|
-
const zkReceipt = receiptBuf.toString("base64");
|
|
113
|
-
return {
|
|
114
|
-
image_id: imageId,
|
|
115
|
-
zk_receipt: zkReceipt,
|
|
116
|
-
output: result.output,
|
|
117
|
-
fuel_consumed: result.fuelConsumed,
|
|
118
|
-
};
|
|
119
|
-
}
|
|
120
|
-
finally {
|
|
121
|
-
await sandbox.teardown();
|
|
122
|
-
}
|
|
123
|
-
}
|
|
1
|
+
import {a,b}from'../chunk-HNDVAKEK.js';import {a as a$1,b as b$1}from'../chunk-ANFXJGMP.js';import {Buffer}from'buffer';import c from'crypto';import {createMlKem768}from'mlkem';async function I(B){let{ciphertext:D,secretKeyObj:v,wasmBinary:n,inputs:_,aesNonce:N,records:O,isEncrypted:T=true}=B,e,w={},x=Buffer.alloc(32);if(T){let r=new Uint8Array(v),o=new Uint8Array(D),a=(await createMlKem768()).decap(o,r),s=Buffer.from(a);x=s;let i=Buffer.from(n),h=i.subarray(-16),p=i.subarray(0,-16),m=c.createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm",s,Buffer.from(N||new Uint8Array(12)));m.setAuthTag(h);let y=m.update(p);y=Buffer.concat([y,m.final()]),e=y;for(let[j,z]of Object.entries(_||{})){let l=Buffer.from(z),K=l.subarray(0,12),L=l.subarray(-16),W=l.subarray(12,-16),d=c.createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm",s,K);d.setAuthTag(L);let g=d.update(W);g=Buffer.concat([g,d.final()]),w[j]=JSON.parse(g.toString("utf-8"));}}else n[0]===0&&n[1]===97&&n[2]===115&&n[3]===109?e=Buffer.from(n):e=Buffer.from(n).toString("utf-8");let b$2=e[0]===0&&e[1]===97&&e[2]===115&&e[3]===109;if(e instanceof Buffer&&b$2){let r=new Uint8Array(e),o=await WebAssembly.compile(r);a.analyze(o);}else e instanceof Buffer&&!b$2&&(e=e.toString("utf-8"));typeof e=="string"&&(e=a$1(e));let u=new b;await u.init();try{let r=await u.execute(e,O,w),o;typeof e=="string"?o=Buffer.from(e,"utf-8"):o=new Uint8Array(e);let f=b$1(o).toString("hex"),a=Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({image_id:f,output_hash:c.createHash("sha256").update(typeof r.output=="string"?r.output:JSON.stringify(r.output)).digest("hex"),fuel:r.fuelConsumed,ts:Date.now()})),s=c.createHmac("sha256",x).update(a).digest(),i=Buffer.alloc(2);i.writeUInt16BE(a.length);let p=Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([1]),i,a,s]).toString("base64");return {image_id:f,zk_receipt:p,output:r.output,fuel_consumed:r.fuelConsumed}}finally{await u.teardown();}}export{I as default};//# sourceMappingURL=logic-execution.js.map
|
|
2
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=logic-execution.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
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// Can also be JS code in non-encrypted mode\n\tinputs: Record<string, Uint8Array>;\n\trecords?: Record<string, unknown>[];\n\tsessionToken: string;\n\tisEncrypted?: boolean;\n\taesNonce?: Uint8Array;\n}\n\nexport default async function processLogicExecution(data: WorkerData): Promise<{\n\timage_id: string;\n\toutput: unknown;\n\tfuel_consumed: number;\n\tzk_receipt?: string;\n}> {\n\tconst {\n\t\tciphertext,\n\t\tsecretKeyObj,\n\t\twasmBinary,\n\t\tinputs,\n\t\taesNonce,\n\t\trecords,\n\t\tisEncrypted = true,\n\t} = data;\n\n\tlet decryptedPayload: Buffer | string;\n\tconst decryptedInputs: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n\tlet sessionSecret = Buffer.alloc(32); // Fallback if plain text (no PQC)\n\n\tif (isEncrypted) {\n\t\t// 1. Decapsulate Kyber secret\n\t\tconst sk = new Uint8Array(secretKeyObj);\n\t\tconst ct = new Uint8Array(ciphertext);\n\t\tconst kem = await createMlKem768();\n\t\tconst sharedSecret = kem.decap(ct, sk);\n\t\tconst aesKey = Buffer.from(sharedSecret);\n\t\tsessionSecret = aesKey;\n\n\t\t// 2. Decrypt Main Payload (WASM/JS Code)\n\t\t// LIOP Serialization: Ciphertext = EncryptedData + 16-byte AuthTag\n\t\tconst wasmBuffer = Buffer.from(wasmBinary);\n\t\tconst authTag = wasmBuffer.subarray(-16);\n\t\tconst encryptedData = wasmBuffer.subarray(0, -16);\n\n\t\tconst decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(\n\t\t\t\"aes-256-gcm\",\n\t\t\taesKey,\n\t\t\tBuffer.from(aesNonce || new Uint8Array(12)),\n\t\t);\n\t\tdecipher.setAuthTag(authTag);\n\t\tlet decrypted = decipher.update(encryptedData);\n\t\tdecrypted = Buffer.concat([decrypted, decipher.final()]);\n\t\tdecryptedPayload = decrypted;\n\n\t\t// 3. Decrypt Inputs\n\t\tfor (const [key, encValue] of Object.entries(inputs || {})) {\n\t\t\tconst valBuffer = Buffer.from(encValue);\n\t\t\t// Extract 12-byte prepended nonce, ciphertext, and 16-byte AuthTag\n\t\t\tconst inputNonce = valBuffer.subarray(0, 12);\n\t\t\tconst valTag = valBuffer.subarray(-16);\n\t\t\tconst valData = valBuffer.subarray(12, -16);\n\n\t\t\tconst valDecipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(\n\t\t\t\t\"aes-256-gcm\",\n\t\t\t\taesKey,\n\t\t\t\tinputNonce,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\tvalDecipher.setAuthTag(valTag);\n\t\t\tlet valDecrypted = valDecipher.update(valData);\n\t\t\tvalDecrypted = Buffer.concat([valDecrypted, valDecipher.final()]);\n\t\t\tdecryptedInputs[key] = JSON.parse(valDecrypted.toString(\"utf-8\"));\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t// Transparent mode: payload is provided directly\n\t\t// If it's WASM (Magic bytes: \\0asm), keep as Buffer\n\t\tif (\n\t\t\twasmBinary[0] === 0x00 &&\n\t\t\twasmBinary[1] === 0x61 &&\n\t\t\twasmBinary[2] === 0x73 &&\n\t\t\twasmBinary[3] === 0x6d\n\t\t) {\n\t\t\tdecryptedPayload = Buffer.from(wasmBinary);\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tdecryptedPayload = Buffer.from(wasmBinary).toString(\"utf-8\");\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// 3. Inspect AST with Guardian-TS (if WASM)\n\tconst isWasm =\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[0] === 0x00 &&\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[1] === 0x61 &&\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[2] === 0x73 &&\n\t\tdecryptedPayload[3] === 0x6d;\n\n\tif (decryptedPayload instanceof Buffer && isWasm) {\n\t\t// Ensure we pass a compatible BufferSource\n\t\tconst wasmBytes = new Uint8Array(decryptedPayload);\n\t\tconst compiledModule = await WebAssembly.compile(wasmBytes);\n\t\tASTGuardian.analyze(compiledModule);\n\t} else if (decryptedPayload instanceof Buffer && !isWasm) {\n\t\tdecryptedPayload = decryptedPayload.toString(\"utf-8\");\n\t}\n\n\t// Strip only a whole-document LIOP envelope (see logic-image-id.ts).\n\tif (typeof decryptedPayload === \"string\") {\n\t\tdecryptedPayload = normalizeLogicSource(decryptedPayload);\n\t}\n\n\t// 4. Instantiate and Execute WASI Sandbox (or V8 Fallback)\n\tconst sandbox = new WasiSandbox();\n\tawait sandbox.init();\n\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst result = await sandbox.execute(\n\t\t\tdecryptedPayload,\n\t\t\trecords,\n\t\t\tdecryptedInputs,\n\t\t);\n\n\t\t// 5. Generate Cryptographic Proof of Execution (HMAC-SHA256 Commitment)\n\t\tlet logicBytes: Uint8Array;\n\t\tif (typeof decryptedPayload === \"string\") {\n\t\t\tlogicBytes = Buffer.from(decryptedPayload, \"utf-8\");\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tlogicBytes = new Uint8Array(decryptedPayload);\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst imageId = deriveLogicImageDigest(logicBytes).toString(\"hex\");\n\n\t\tconst journal = Buffer.from(\n\t\t\tJSON.stringify({\n\t\t\t\timage_id: imageId,\n\t\t\t\toutput_hash: crypto\n\t\t\t\t\t.createHash(\"sha256\")\n\t\t\t\t\t.update(\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttypeof result.output === \"string\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t? result.output\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t: JSON.stringify(result.output),\n\t\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t\t\t.digest(\"hex\"),\n\t\t\t\tfuel: result.fuelConsumed,\n\t\t\t\tts: Date.now(),\n\t\t\t}),\n\t\t);\n\n\t\tconst seal = crypto\n\t\t\t.createHmac(\"sha256\", sessionSecret)\n\t\t\t.update(journal)\n\t\t\t.digest();\n\t\tconst journalLen = Buffer.alloc(2);\n\t\tjournalLen.writeUInt16BE(journal.length);\n\t\tconst receiptBuf = Buffer.concat([\n\t\t\tBuffer.from([0x01]), // Receipt format v1\n\t\t\tjournalLen,\n\t\t\tjournal,\n\t\t\tseal, // 32 bytes HMAC\n\t\t]);\n\t\tconst zkReceipt = receiptBuf.toString(\"base64\");\n\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\timage_id: imageId,\n\t\t\tzk_receipt: zkReceipt,\n\t\t\toutput: result.output,\n\t\t\tfuel_consumed: result.fuelConsumed,\n\t\t};\n\t} finally {\n\t\tawait sandbox.teardown();\n\t}\n}\n"]}
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import { deriveLogicImageDigest } from "../crypto/logic-image-id.js";
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const journalLen = receiptBuf.readUInt16BE(1);
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.update(journal)
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.digest();
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export default async function workerHandler(task) {
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try {
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if (task.action === "verify_receipt") {
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return await verifyZkReceipt(task);
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}
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throw new Error("Unknown action in ZkVerifier Worker.");
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}
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return {
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verified: false,
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message: `Verification Error: ${error.message}`,
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};
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}
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}
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import {b}from'../chunk-ANFXJGMP.js';import d from'crypto';import'worker_threads';function u(e){return b(e)}async function y(e){let{logicPayload:t,remoteImageIdHex:o,zkReceipt:g,sessionSecret:n}=e,a=u(t).toString("hex");if(a!==o)return {verified:false,message:`Integrity Violation: Local (${a.slice(0,8)}) != Remote (${o.slice(0,8)})`};let r=Buffer.from(g);if(r.length<35)return {verified:false,message:"Receipt too short for binary format."};let s=r[0];if(s!==1)return {verified:false,message:`Unknown receipt version: ${s}`};let c=r.readUInt16BE(1),f=r.subarray(3,3+c),l=r.subarray(3+c);if(l.length!==32)return {verified:false,message:"Invalid seal length (expected 32 bytes HMAC-SHA256)."};try{let i=JSON.parse(f.toString());if(i.image_id!==a)return {verified:!1,message:`Journal ImageID mismatch: ${i.image_id.slice(0,8)} != ${a.slice(0,8)}`}}catch{return {verified:false,message:"Failed to parse journal data."}}if(n&&n.length>0){let i=d.createHmac("sha256",n).update(f).digest();if(!d.timingSafeEqual(l,i))return {verified:false,message:"Invalid seal: HMAC verification failed."}}return {verified:true,message:"HMAC Commitment Verified: Integrity intact."}}async function v(e){try{if(e.action==="verify_receipt")return await y(e);throw new Error("Unknown action in ZkVerifier Worker.")}catch(t){return {verified:false,message:`Verification Error: ${t.message}`}}}export{v as default};//# sourceMappingURL=zk-verifier.js.map
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//# sourceMappingURL=zk-verifier.js.map
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