@gaodefa/daocore 2026.5.29 → 2026.5.30

package/dist/dialogue-BXayGhnz.js

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+import { a as parseCrestodianOperation, t as describeCrestodianPersistentOperation } from "./operations-DT4bsxV6.js";
+import { r as loadCrestodianOverview } from "./overview-D2tJdx4_.js";
+//#region src/crestodian/dialogue.ts
+function approvalQuestion(operation) {
+	return `Apply this operation: ${describeCrestodianPersistentOperation(operation)}?`;
+}
+function isYes(input) {
+	return /^(y|yes|apply|do it|approved?)$/i.test(input.trim());
+}
+async function resolveCrestodianOperation(input, runtime, opts) {
+	const operation = parseCrestodianOperation(input);
+	if (!shouldAskAssistant(input, operation)) return operation;
+	const overview = await (opts.loadOverview ?? loadCrestodianOverview)();
+	const plan = await (opts.planWithAssistant ?? (await import("./assistant-Cp9pGaBw.js")).planCrestodianCommand)({
+		input,
+		overview
+	});
+	if (!plan) return operation;
+	const planned = parseCrestodianOperation(plan.command);
+	if (planned.kind === "none") return operation;
+	logAssistantPlan(runtime, plan, overview);
+	return planned;
+}
+function shouldAskAssistant(input, operation) {
+	if (operation.kind !== "none") return false;
+	const trimmed = input.trim().toLowerCase();
+	if (!trimmed || trimmed === "quit" || trimmed === "exit") return false;
+	return true;
+}
+function logAssistantPlan(runtime, plan, overview) {
+	const modelLabel = plan.modelLabel ?? overview.defaultModel ?? "configured model";
+	runtime.log(`[crestodian] planner: ${modelLabel}`);
+	if (plan.reply) runtime.log(plan.reply);
+	runtime.log(`[crestodian] interpreted: ${plan.command}`);
+}
+//#endregion
+export { isYes as n, resolveCrestodianOperation as r, approvalQuestion as t };

package/dist/dir-fetch-tool-Cara5mZh.js

@@ -0,0 +1,565 @@
+import { t as callGatewayTool } from "./gateway-Dyc7qEu3.js";
+import { u as saveMediaBuffer } from "./store-53qCOCD8.js";
+import { i as resolveNodeIdFromList, t as listNodes } from "./nodes-utils-CIusEv3-.js";
+import "./media-store-OUXlIgle.js";
+import "./agent-harness-runtime-Dq1fCBOM.js";
+import { l as FILE_TRANSFER_SUBDIR, n as DIR_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES, r as DIR_FETCH_TOOL_DESCRIPTOR, t as DIR_FETCH_DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES } from "./descriptors-DuJgViRb.js";
+import { i as mimeFromExtension, t as IMAGE_MIME_INLINE_SET } from "./mime-CfMm5H5N.js";
+import { t as appendFileTransferAudit } from "./audit-1F6TbN6E.js";
+import { a as readTrimmedString, i as readGatewayCallOptions, n as readBoolean, o as throwFromNodePayload, r as readClampedInt, t as humanSize } from "./params-Dxls3_Dh.js";
+import path from "node:path";
+import fs from "node:fs/promises";
+import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
+import crypto from "node:crypto";
+//#region extensions/file-transfer/src/tools/dir-fetch-tool.ts
+const MEDIA_URL_CAP = 25;
+const TAR_UNPACK_TIMEOUT_MS = 6e4;
+const TAR_UNPACK_MAX_ENTRIES = 5e3;
+const DIR_FETCH_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
+const DIR_FETCH_MAX_SINGLE_FILE_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
+async function computeFileSha256(filePath) {
+	const hash = crypto.createHash("sha256");
+	const handle = await fs.open(filePath, "r");
+	try {
+		const chunkSize = 64 * 1024;
+		const buf = Buffer.allocUnsafe(chunkSize);
+		while (true) {
+			const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(buf, 0, chunkSize, null);
+			if (bytesRead === 0) break;
+			hash.update(buf.subarray(0, bytesRead));
+		}
+	} finally {
+		await handle.close();
+	}
+	return hash.digest("hex");
+}
+/**
+* Run two passes against the buffer to enumerate entries BEFORE we extract:
+*
+*   1. `tar -tf -` produces names ONLY, one per line. This is whitespace-safe
+*      because each line is exactly one path; no parsing of fixed columns.
+*      Used to validate paths (reject absolute, '..' traversal).
+*   2. `tar -tvf -` adds type info via the `ls -l`-style perm prefix.
+*      Used ONLY to detect symlinks / hardlinks / non-regular entries via
+*      the FIRST CHARACTER of each line, never the path column.
+*
+* Size limits are enforced at the *extraction* step instead — the tar
+* unpack process is bounded by the maxBytes we already pass through, and
+* the post-extract walkDir is hard-capped by TAR_UNPACK_MAX_ENTRIES.
+* Trying to parse uncompressed sizes from `tar -tvf` output is fragile
+* (filenames with whitespace shift the columns) and Aisle flagged that
+* shape as a bypass primitive — drop it.
+*/
+async function listTarPaths(tarBuffer) {
+	return new Promise((resolve) => {
+		const child = spawn(process.platform !== "win32" ? "/usr/bin/tar" : "tar", ["-tzf", "-"], { stdio: [
+			"pipe",
+			"pipe",
+			"pipe"
+		] });
+		let stdout = "";
+		let stderr = "";
+		let aborted = false;
+		const watchdog = setTimeout(() => {
+			aborted = true;
+			try {
+				child.kill("SIGKILL");
+			} catch {}
+			resolve({
+				ok: false,
+				reason: "tar -tzf timed out"
+			});
+		}, 3e4);
+		child.stdout.on("data", (c) => {
+			stdout += c.toString();
+			if (stdout.length > 32 * 1024 * 1024) {
+				aborted = true;
+				try {
+					child.kill("SIGKILL");
+				} catch {}
+				clearTimeout(watchdog);
+				resolve({
+					ok: false,
+					reason: "tar -tzf output too large"
+				});
+			}
+		});
+		child.stderr.on("data", (c) => {
+			stderr += c.toString();
+		});
+		child.on("close", (code) => {
+			clearTimeout(watchdog);
+			if (aborted) return;
+			if (code !== 0) {
+				resolve({
+					ok: false,
+					reason: `tar -tzf exited ${code}: ${stderr.slice(0, 200)}`
+				});
+				return;
+			}
+			resolve({
+				ok: true,
+				paths: stdout.split("\n").filter((l) => l.length > 0)
+			});
+		});
+		child.on("error", (e) => {
+			clearTimeout(watchdog);
+			if (!aborted) resolve({
+				ok: false,
+				reason: `tar -tzf error: ${String(e)}`
+			});
+		});
+		child.stdin.end(tarBuffer);
+	});
+}
+async function listTarTypeChars(tarBuffer) {
+	return new Promise((resolve) => {
+		const child = spawn(process.platform !== "win32" ? "/usr/bin/tar" : "tar", ["-tzvf", "-"], { stdio: [
+			"pipe",
+			"pipe",
+			"pipe"
+		] });
+		let stdout = "";
+		let stderr = "";
+		let aborted = false;
+		const watchdog = setTimeout(() => {
+			aborted = true;
+			try {
+				child.kill("SIGKILL");
+			} catch {}
+			resolve({
+				ok: false,
+				reason: "tar -tzvf timed out"
+			});
+		}, 3e4);
+		child.stdout.on("data", (c) => {
+			stdout += c.toString();
+			if (stdout.length > 32 * 1024 * 1024) {
+				aborted = true;
+				try {
+					child.kill("SIGKILL");
+				} catch {}
+				clearTimeout(watchdog);
+				resolve({
+					ok: false,
+					reason: "tar -tzvf output too large"
+				});
+			}
+		});
+		child.stderr.on("data", (c) => {
+			stderr += c.toString();
+		});
+		child.on("close", (code) => {
+			clearTimeout(watchdog);
+			if (aborted) return;
+			if (code !== 0) {
+				resolve({
+					ok: false,
+					reason: `tar -tzvf exited ${code}: ${stderr.slice(0, 200)}`
+				});
+				return;
+			}
+			resolve({
+				ok: true,
+				typeChars: stdout.split("\n").filter((l) => l.length > 0).map((l) => l.charAt(0))
+			});
+		});
+		child.on("error", (e) => {
+			clearTimeout(watchdog);
+			if (!aborted) resolve({
+				ok: false,
+				reason: `tar -tzvf error: ${String(e)}`
+			});
+		});
+		child.stdin.end(tarBuffer);
+	});
+}
+async function preValidateTarball(tarBuffer) {
+	const namesResult = await listTarPaths(tarBuffer);
+	if (!namesResult.ok) return namesResult;
+	const paths = namesResult.paths;
+	if (paths.length > TAR_UNPACK_MAX_ENTRIES) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: `archive contains ${paths.length} entries; limit ${TAR_UNPACK_MAX_ENTRIES}`
+	};
+	const typesResult = await listTarTypeChars(tarBuffer);
+	if (!typesResult.ok) return typesResult;
+	const typeChars = typesResult.typeChars;
+	if (typeChars.length !== paths.length) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: `tar -tzf and tar -tzvf disagree on entry count (${paths.length} vs ${typeChars.length}); refusing`
+	};
+	for (let i = 0; i < paths.length; i++) {
+		const entryPath = paths[i];
+		const t = typeChars[i];
+		if (t === "l" || t === "h") return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: `archive contains link entry: ${entryPath}`
+		};
+		if (t !== "-" && t !== "d") return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: `archive contains non-regular entry type '${t}': ${entryPath}`
+		};
+		if (path.isAbsolute(entryPath)) return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: `archive contains absolute path: ${entryPath}`
+		};
+		const norm = path.posix.normalize(entryPath);
+		if (norm === ".." || norm.startsWith("../") || norm.includes("/../")) return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: `archive contains '..' traversal: ${entryPath}`
+		};
+		if (entryPath.includes("\\")) return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: `archive contains backslash in path: ${entryPath}`
+		};
+	}
+	return { ok: true };
+}
+async function validateTarUncompressedBudget(tarBuffer, maxBytes = DIR_FETCH_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_BYTES) {
+	return new Promise((resolve) => {
+		const child = spawn(process.platform !== "win32" ? "/usr/bin/tar" : "tar", ["-xOzf", "-"], { stdio: [
+			"pipe",
+			"pipe",
+			"pipe"
+		] });
+		let totalBytes = 0;
+		let stderr = "";
+		let settled = false;
+		let watchdog;
+		const finish = (result) => {
+			if (settled) return;
+			settled = true;
+			clearTimeout(watchdog);
+			resolve(result);
+		};
+		watchdog = setTimeout(() => {
+			try {
+				child.kill("SIGKILL");
+			} catch {}
+			finish({
+				ok: false,
+				reason: "tar uncompressed budget validation timed out"
+			});
+		}, TAR_UNPACK_TIMEOUT_MS);
+		child.stdout.on("data", (chunk) => {
+			totalBytes += chunk.byteLength;
+			if (totalBytes > maxBytes) {
+				try {
+					child.kill("SIGKILL");
+				} catch {}
+				finish({
+					ok: false,
+					reason: `archive expands past uncompressed budget ${maxBytes} bytes`
+				});
+			}
+		});
+		child.stderr.on("data", (chunk) => {
+			stderr += chunk.toString();
+			if (stderr.length > 4096) stderr = stderr.slice(-4096);
+		});
+		child.on("close", (code) => {
+			if (settled) return;
+			if (code !== 0) {
+				finish({
+					ok: false,
+					reason: `tar uncompressed budget validation exited ${code}: ${stderr.slice(0, 200)}`
+				});
+				return;
+			}
+			finish({ ok: true });
+		});
+		child.on("error", (error) => {
+			finish({
+				ok: false,
+				reason: `tar uncompressed budget validation error: ${String(error)}`
+			});
+		});
+		child.stdin.on("error", (error) => {
+			if (settled && error.code === "EPIPE") return;
+			finish({
+				ok: false,
+				reason: `tar uncompressed budget validation input error: ${String(error)}`
+			});
+		});
+		child.stdin.end(tarBuffer);
+	});
+}
+/**
+* Unpack a gzipped tarball into a target directory via `tar -xzf -`.
+* Caller MUST have run `preValidateTarball` first — this function trusts
+* that the archive contains only regular files / dirs with relative,
+* non-traversing paths. Without that pre-validation, raw `tar -xzf` is
+* unsafe (tarbomb, symlink-then-write tricks, decompression bomb).
+*
+* The `-P` flag is intentionally omitted so absolute paths in the
+* archive are stripped to relative ones (defense-in-depth on top of the
+* pre-validation rejection). A hard wall-clock timeout caps the unpack
+* at TAR_UNPACK_TIMEOUT_MS to avoid hangs.
+*
+* BSD tar (macOS) and GNU tar disagree on flags: `--no-overwrite-dir` is
+* GNU-only and BSD tar rejects it. We use only flags both implementations
+* accept. Defense-in-depth comes from the pre-validation step instead.
+*
+* `--no-same-owner` and `--no-same-permissions` are accepted by both BSD
+* and GNU tar. They prevent the archive from setting file ownership
+* (uid/gid) and dangerous mode bits (setuid/setgid/world-writable) on
+* the gateway filesystem. If the gateway is ever run as root or with
+* elevated privileges, a malicious node could otherwise plant
+* privileged executables here.
+*/
+async function unpackTar(tarBuffer, destDir) {
+	await fs.mkdir(destDir, {
+		recursive: true,
+		mode: 448
+	});
+	return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+		const child = spawn(process.platform !== "win32" ? "/usr/bin/tar" : "tar", [
+			"-xzf",
+			"-",
+			"-C",
+			destDir,
+			"--no-same-owner",
+			"--no-same-permissions"
+		], { stdio: [
+			"pipe",
+			"ignore",
+			"pipe"
+		] });
+		let stderrOut = "";
+		const watchdog = setTimeout(() => {
+			try {
+				child.kill("SIGKILL");
+			} catch {}
+			reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`tar unpack timed out after ${TAR_UNPACK_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`));
+		}, TAR_UNPACK_TIMEOUT_MS);
+		child.stderr.on("data", (chunk) => {
+			stderrOut += chunk.toString();
+		});
+		child.on("close", (code) => {
+			clearTimeout(watchdog);
+			if (code !== 0) {
+				reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`tar unpack exited ${code}: ${stderrOut.slice(0, 300)}`));
+				return;
+			}
+			resolve();
+		});
+		child.on("error", (e) => {
+			clearTimeout(watchdog);
+			reject(e);
+		});
+		child.stdin.end(tarBuffer);
+	});
+}
+/**
+* Walk a directory recursively, collecting file entries (skips directories).
+* Skips symlinks — we don't want to follow links the archive might have
+* carried in. Files only.
+*/
+async function walkDir(dir, rootDir) {
+	const entries = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
+	const results = [];
+	for (const entry of entries) {
+		const absPath = path.join(dir, entry.name);
+		if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+			const nested = await walkDir(absPath, rootDir);
+			results.push(...nested);
+		} else if (entry.isFile()) {
+			const relPath = path.relative(rootDir, absPath);
+			results.push({
+				relPath,
+				absPath
+			});
+		}
+	}
+	return results;
+}
+function createDirFetchTool() {
+	return {
+		...DIR_FETCH_TOOL_DESCRIPTOR,
+		execute: async (_toolCallId, args) => {
+			const params = args;
+			const node = readTrimmedString(params, "node");
+			const dirPath = readTrimmedString(params, "path");
+			if (!node) throw new Error("node required");
+			if (!dirPath) throw new Error("path required");
+			const maxBytes = readClampedInt({
+				input: params,
+				key: "maxBytes",
+				defaultValue: DIR_FETCH_DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES,
+				hardMin: 1,
+				hardMax: DIR_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES
+			});
+			const includeDotfiles = readBoolean(params, "includeDotfiles", false);
+			const gatewayOpts = readGatewayCallOptions(params);
+			const nodes = await listNodes(gatewayOpts);
+			const nodeId = resolveNodeIdFromList(nodes, node, false);
+			const nodeDisplayName = nodes.find((n) => n.nodeId === nodeId)?.displayName ?? node;
+			const startedAt = Date.now();
+			const raw = await callGatewayTool("node.invoke", gatewayOpts, {
+				nodeId,
+				command: "dir.fetch",
+				params: {
+					path: dirPath,
+					maxBytes,
+					includeDotfiles
+				},
+				idempotencyKey: crypto.randomUUID()
+			});
+			const payload = raw?.payload && typeof raw.payload === "object" && !Array.isArray(raw.payload) ? raw.payload : null;
+			if (!payload) {
+				await appendFileTransferAudit({
+					op: "dir.fetch",
+					nodeId,
+					nodeDisplayName,
+					requestedPath: dirPath,
+					decision: "error",
+					errorMessage: "invalid payload",
+					durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt
+				});
+				throw new Error("invalid dir.fetch payload");
+			}
+			if (payload.ok === false) {
+				await appendFileTransferAudit({
+					op: "dir.fetch",
+					nodeId,
+					nodeDisplayName,
+					requestedPath: dirPath,
+					canonicalPath: typeof payload.canonicalPath === "string" ? payload.canonicalPath : void 0,
+					decision: "error",
+					errorCode: typeof payload.code === "string" ? payload.code : void 0,
+					errorMessage: typeof payload.message === "string" ? payload.message : void 0,
+					durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt
+				});
+				throwFromNodePayload("dir.fetch", payload);
+			}
+			const canonicalPath = typeof payload.path === "string" ? payload.path : "";
+			const tarBase64 = typeof payload.tarBase64 === "string" ? payload.tarBase64 : "";
+			const tarBytes = typeof payload.tarBytes === "number" ? payload.tarBytes : -1;
+			const sha256 = typeof payload.sha256 === "string" ? payload.sha256 : "";
+			const fileCount = typeof payload.fileCount === "number" ? payload.fileCount : 0;
+			if (!canonicalPath || !tarBase64 || tarBytes < 0 || !sha256) throw new Error("invalid dir.fetch payload (missing fields)");
+			const tarBuffer = Buffer.from(tarBase64, "base64");
+			if (tarBuffer.byteLength !== tarBytes) throw new Error(`dir.fetch size mismatch: payload says ${tarBytes} bytes, decoded ${tarBuffer.byteLength}`);
+			if (crypto.createHash("sha256").update(tarBuffer).digest("hex") !== sha256) throw new Error("dir.fetch sha256 mismatch (integrity failure)");
+			const validation = await preValidateTarball(tarBuffer);
+			if (!validation.ok) {
+				await appendFileTransferAudit({
+					op: "dir.fetch",
+					nodeId,
+					nodeDisplayName,
+					requestedPath: dirPath,
+					canonicalPath,
+					decision: "error",
+					errorCode: "UNSAFE_ARCHIVE",
+					errorMessage: validation.reason,
+					sizeBytes: tarBytes,
+					sha256,
+					durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt
+				});
+				throw new Error(`dir.fetch UNSAFE_ARCHIVE: ${validation.reason}`);
+			}
+			const budget = await validateTarUncompressedBudget(tarBuffer);
+			if (!budget.ok) {
+				await appendFileTransferAudit({
+					op: "dir.fetch",
+					nodeId,
+					nodeDisplayName,
+					requestedPath: dirPath,
+					canonicalPath,
+					decision: "error",
+					errorCode: "TREE_TOO_LARGE",
+					errorMessage: budget.reason,
+					sizeBytes: tarBytes,
+					sha256,
+					durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt
+				});
+				throw new Error(`dir.fetch UNCOMPRESSED_TOO_LARGE: ${budget.reason}`);
+			}
+			const savedTar = await saveMediaBuffer(tarBuffer, "application/gzip", FILE_TRANSFER_SUBDIR, DIR_FETCH_HARD_MAX_BYTES);
+			const tarDir = path.dirname(savedTar.path);
+			const unpackId = `dir-fetch-${path.basename(savedTar.path, path.extname(savedTar.path))}`;
+			const rootDir = path.join(tarDir, unpackId);
+			await unpackTar(tarBuffer, rootDir);
+			const walked = await walkDir(rootDir, rootDir);
+			const files = [];
+			let totalUncompressed = 0;
+			const abortAndCleanup = async (reason) => {
+				await fs.rm(rootDir, {
+					recursive: true,
+					force: true
+				}).catch(() => {});
+				await appendFileTransferAudit({
+					op: "dir.fetch",
+					nodeId,
+					nodeDisplayName,
+					requestedPath: dirPath,
+					canonicalPath,
+					decision: "error",
+					errorCode: "TREE_TOO_LARGE",
+					errorMessage: reason,
+					sizeBytes: tarBytes,
+					sha256,
+					durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt
+				});
+				throw new Error(`dir.fetch UNCOMPRESSED_TOO_LARGE: ${reason}`);
+			};
+			for (const { relPath, absPath } of walked) {
+				let size = 0;
+				try {
+					size = (await fs.stat(absPath)).size;
+				} catch {
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (size > DIR_FETCH_MAX_SINGLE_FILE_BYTES) await abortAndCleanup(`extracted file ${relPath} is ${size} bytes (limit ${DIR_FETCH_MAX_SINGLE_FILE_BYTES})`);
+				totalUncompressed += size;
+				if (totalUncompressed > DIR_FETCH_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_BYTES) await abortAndCleanup(`extracted tree exceeds uncompressed budget ${DIR_FETCH_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_BYTES} bytes (decompression bomb?)`);
+				const mimeType = mimeFromExtension(relPath);
+				const fileSha256 = await computeFileSha256(absPath);
+				files.push({
+					relPath,
+					size,
+					mimeType,
+					sha256: fileSha256,
+					localPath: absPath
+				});
+			}
+			const imageFiles = files.filter((f) => IMAGE_MIME_INLINE_SET.has(f.mimeType));
+			const nonImageFiles = files.filter((f) => !IMAGE_MIME_INLINE_SET.has(f.mimeType));
+			const allOrdered = [...imageFiles, ...nonImageFiles];
+			const droppedFromMedia = Math.max(0, allOrdered.length - MEDIA_URL_CAP);
+			const mediaUrls = allOrdered.slice(0, MEDIA_URL_CAP).map((f) => f.localPath);
+			const shortHash = sha256.slice(0, 12);
+			const mediaNote = droppedFromMedia ? ` (channel attaches first ${MEDIA_URL_CAP}; ${droppedFromMedia} more in details.files)` : "";
+			const summaryText = `Fetched ${fileCount} files from ${canonicalPath} (${humanSize(tarBytes)} compressed, sha256:${shortHash}) — saved on the gateway under ${rootDir}/${mediaNote}`;
+			await appendFileTransferAudit({
+				op: "dir.fetch",
+				nodeId,
+				nodeDisplayName,
+				requestedPath: dirPath,
+				canonicalPath,
+				decision: "allowed",
+				sizeBytes: tarBytes,
+				sha256,
+				durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt
+			});
+			return {
+				content: [{
+					type: "text",
+					text: summaryText
+				}],
+				details: {
+					path: canonicalPath,
+					rootDir,
+					fileCount,
+					tarBytes,
+					sha256,
+					files,
+					media: { mediaUrls }
+				}
+			};
+		}
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+export { createDirFetchTool };

package/dist/dir-list-tool-CQ8Bo5Ez.js

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+import { t as callGatewayTool } from "./gateway-Dyc7qEu3.js";
+import { i as resolveNodeIdFromList, t as listNodes } from "./nodes-utils-CIusEv3-.js";
+import "./agent-harness-runtime-Dq1fCBOM.js";
+import { a as DIR_LIST_TOOL_DESCRIPTOR, i as DIR_LIST_HARD_MAX_ENTRIES } from "./descriptors-DuJgViRb.js";
+import { t as appendFileTransferAudit } from "./audit-1F6TbN6E.js";
+import { a as readTrimmedString, i as readGatewayCallOptions, o as throwFromNodePayload, r as readClampedInt } from "./params-Dxls3_Dh.js";
+import crypto from "node:crypto";
+//#region extensions/file-transfer/src/tools/dir-list-tool.ts
+function createDirListTool() {
+	return {
+		...DIR_LIST_TOOL_DESCRIPTOR,
+		execute: async (_toolCallId, args) => {
+			const params = args;
+			const node = readTrimmedString(params, "node");
+			const dirPath = readTrimmedString(params, "path");
+			if (!node) throw new Error("node required");
+			if (!dirPath) throw new Error("path required");
+			const maxEntries = readClampedInt({
+				input: params,
+				key: "maxEntries",
+				defaultValue: 200,
+				hardMin: 1,
+				hardMax: DIR_LIST_HARD_MAX_ENTRIES
+			});
+			const pageToken = typeof params.pageToken === "string" && params.pageToken.trim() ? params.pageToken.trim() : void 0;
+			const gatewayOpts = readGatewayCallOptions(params);
+			const nodes = await listNodes(gatewayOpts);
+			const nodeId = resolveNodeIdFromList(nodes, node, false);
+			const nodeDisplayName = nodes.find((n) => n.nodeId === nodeId)?.displayName ?? node;
+			const startedAt = Date.now();
+			const raw = await callGatewayTool("node.invoke", gatewayOpts, {
+				nodeId,
+				command: "dir.list",
+				params: {
+					path: dirPath,
+					pageToken,
+					maxEntries
+				},
+				idempotencyKey: crypto.randomUUID()
+			});
+			const payload = raw?.payload && typeof raw.payload === "object" && !Array.isArray(raw.payload) ? raw.payload : null;
+			if (!payload) {
+				await appendFileTransferAudit({
+					op: "dir.list",
+					nodeId,
+					nodeDisplayName,
+					requestedPath: dirPath,
+					decision: "error",
+					errorMessage: "invalid payload",
+					durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt
+				});
+				throw new Error("invalid dir.list payload");
+			}
+			if (payload.ok === false) {
+				await appendFileTransferAudit({
+					op: "dir.list",
+					nodeId,
+					nodeDisplayName,
+					requestedPath: dirPath,
+					canonicalPath: typeof payload.canonicalPath === "string" ? payload.canonicalPath : void 0,
+					decision: "error",
+					errorCode: typeof payload.code === "string" ? payload.code : void 0,
+					errorMessage: typeof payload.message === "string" ? payload.message : void 0,
+					durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt
+				});
+				throwFromNodePayload("dir.list", payload);
+			}
+			const canonicalPath = typeof payload.path === "string" ? payload.path : dirPath;
+			const entries = Array.isArray(payload.entries) ? payload.entries : [];
+			const truncated = payload.truncated === true;
+			const nextPageToken = typeof payload.nextPageToken === "string" ? payload.nextPageToken : void 0;
+			const fileCount = entries.filter((e) => !e.isDir).length;
+			const dirCount = entries.filter((e) => e.isDir).length;
+			const summary = `Listed ${canonicalPath}: ${fileCount} file${fileCount !== 1 ? "s" : ""}, ${dirCount} subdir${dirCount !== 1 ? "s" : ""}${truncated ? " (more entries available — pass nextPageToken)" : ""}`;
+			await appendFileTransferAudit({
+				op: "dir.list",
+				nodeId,
+				nodeDisplayName,
+				requestedPath: dirPath,
+				canonicalPath,
+				decision: "allowed",
+				durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt
+			});
+			return {
+				content: [{
+					type: "text",
+					text: summary
+				}],
+				details: {
+					path: canonicalPath,
+					entries,
+					nextPageToken,
+					truncated
+				}
+			};
+		}
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+export { createDirListTool };