@blamejs/core 0.9.1 → 0.9.3

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.9.x
 
+- v0.9.3 (2026-05-11) — **Audit hardening slice 3: OAuth + OID4VCI + OID4VP + CIBA + constant-time-compare migrations**. Continues the 2026-05-11 auth audit follow-through. **`b.auth.oauth.refreshAccessToken` atomic check-and-insert** — new `ropts.checkAndInsert(token, expireAtMs)` callback contract replaces the previous `ropts.seen(token)` check-then-act race. Two concurrent refresh requests on the same event-loop tick could both see `seen === false` and both POST to the token endpoint, neither flagging the replay; the new contract requires an atomic test-and-set (Redis SETNX, DB INSERT ON CONFLICT) and is the OAuth 2.1 §6.1 / RFC 9700 §4.13 one-time-use defense surfacing the actual race window. Legacy `seen` callback continues to work for backwards-compat with operator code; the docstring documents the race + recommends migration to `checkAndInsert`. **`b.auth.oid4vci` constant-time compares** — pre-auth `tx_code` hash compare (was `!==` on sha3 hex) and proof-JWT `c_nonce` compare (was `!==` on attacker-supplied wallet payload) both route through `b.crypto.timingSafeEqual`. **`b.auth.oid4vp` per-presentation `vct` enforcement** — DCQL filters with 2+ `vct_values` entries previously bypassed vct validation entirely (the framework only set `expectedVct` when the filter pinned to a single value). Verifier now validates the presented vct against the DCQL filter list manually when length > 1; refuses with `vp_token['<id>'][<n>] vct '<presented>' is not in DCQL vct_values [...]` on over-disclosure. **`b.auth.ciba` slow_down honoring** — CIBA §11.3 requires the client to increase its polling interval by at least 5s on every `slow_down` response. Pre-v0.9.3 the framework client never bumped, leaving operators to do their own interval bookkeeping. Now `pollToken()` tracks per-`authReqId` interval state internally (Map keyed by authReqId, seeded from `startAuthentication`'s response, cleared on token issuance), bumps by `max(5s, IdP-suggested interval) <= MAX_INTERVAL_SEC` on every slow_down, and attaches the next-suggested interval to the thrown `auth-ciba/slow_down` error as `err.nextIntervalSec` so operators read a spec-correct back-off without manual bookkeeping. **`b.auth.ciba` notification-token entropy** — `clientNotificationToken` now refuses < 32 chars per CIBA §7.1.2's opaque-hard-to-guess requirement. Pre-v0.9.3 a 4-char token passed. **`b.auth.ciba.parseNotification` constant-time compare** — bearer-token hash compare migrated from `!==` to `b.crypto.timingSafeEqual` (both sides are fixed-width sha3-512 hex strings; defense-in-depth even though equal-length JS string compare is already widely understood as constant-time on V8).
+- v0.9.2 (2026-05-11) — **Audit hardening slice 2: WebAuthn + FIDO MDS3 + NIST AAL**. Continues the 2026-05-11 auth surface audit follow-through. **`b.auth.passkey.verifyAuthentication` counter-regression bypass fix** — pre-v0.9.2 the wrapper coerced `opts.credential.counter || 0`, silently zeroing an `undefined` / `null` / `NaN` counter and defeating CTAP 2.1 clone-detection on credentials whose stored counter was > 0. An operator deserializing the credential from a column that lost the counter would unknowingly accept a cloned authenticator. The wrapper now refuses `undefined` / `null` (operators MUST persist whatever the vendor returned at registration; first-time-stored credentials carry counter:0 explicitly) and rejects any non-integer / non-finite / negative value with `auth-passkey/bad-counter`. **`b.auth.passkey` multi-origin support** — `expectedOrigin` now accepts `string` OR `string[]` on both `verifyRegistration` and `verifyAuthentication`. Pre-v0.9.2 the wrapper enforced a single string only, blocking multi-origin deployments (web + admin-subdomain) from sharing one verifier; SimpleWebAuthn natively supports arrays. **`b.auth.passkey` prototype-pollution fix** — `ALLOWED_MEDIATION` lookup changed from `{...}[opts.mediation]` to `hasOwnProperty.call(ALLOWED_MEDIATION, opts.mediation)` with a null-prototype map. Pre-v0.9.2 a caller passing `mediation: "__proto__"` / `"constructor"` truthy-matched an inherited Object.prototype property and slipped past the allowlist into `generateAuthenticationOptions`. **`b.auth.aal.fromMethods` UV requirement for AAL3** — per NIST SP 800-63-4 §5.1.7, WebAuthn / passkey satisfies AAL3 (MF-CRYPT) only when user verification was performed on the assertion. Pre-v0.9.2 `fromMethods({ webauthn: true })` returned `AAL3` unconditionally; operators using `userVerification: "preferred"` whose authenticator skipped UV landed in AAL3 despite not satisfying the spec's MF requirement. The caller now passes `uv: true` (sourced from the vendor's authData UV bit) to claim AAL3 with webauthn alone; without `uv`, webauthn alone caps at AAL2 (SF-CRYPT). Combination paths (`webauthn + password` / `webauthn + pin`) reach AAL3 regardless of UV (the memorized secret provides the second factor independently). **`b.auth.fidoMds3.verifyAuthenticator` fail-closed default + new opts** — pre-v0.9.2 unknown AAGUIDs returned `{ ok: true, reason: "aaguid-not-in-blob" }`, silently trusting any authenticator the metadata service hadn't yet listed (rogue / pre-certification / fake hardware). Now fails closed by default; operators wanting the legacy fail-open behavior (test fixtures, pre-certification pilot rollouts) pass `opts.allowUnknownAaguid: true` explicitly. **`b.auth.fidoMds3.parseBlob` stale-BLOB refusal** — refuses BLOB payloads whose `nextUpdate` is already in the past (FIDO MDS3 §3.1.7). Pre-v0.9.2 the staleness was floored to `MIN_CACHE_TTL_MS` but the BLOB was still served, letting an attacker pin operators to a revoked-authenticator-list-frozen-at-X by serving an ancient signed-but-expired BLOB. **`b.auth.fidoMds3.REFUSE_STATUS`** — added `ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE` per FIDO MDS3 §3.1.4. Pre-v0.9.2 this status was silently accepted; manufacturer batch-signing-key compromise affects every credential attested under that key.
 - v0.9.1 (2026-05-11) — **Audit hardening, slice 1 of N: federation auth + OAuth ID-token verifier**. Audit run after v0.9.0 across OAuth / SAML / OIDC federation / SD-JWT VC / WebAuthn / FIDO MDS3 / constant-time-compare surfaces; this slice closes the highest-severity SAML + OIDC + SD-JWT + OAuth findings. **SAML SP** (`b.auth.saml.sp.create({...}).buildAuthnRequest` + `.metadata`): every operator-supplied URL / ID interpolated into the emitted XML now routes through `b.xmlC14n.escapeAttrValue` / `escapeText`. Pre-v0.9.1 a `"` or `<` in `idpSsoUrl` / `assertionConsumerServiceUrl` / `entityId` / `nameIdFormat` broke out of attribute / element context and produced unsigned-XML breakout into the IdP redirect. Newly exported `b.xmlC14n.escapeAttrValue(s)` and `b.xmlC14n.escapeText(s)` — RFC 3741 §1.3.x compliant; available for any operator emitting XML alongside the framework's own SAML / canonicalization paths. **SAML SP `verifyResponse`**: digest compare on `Reference DigestValue` and `SubjectConfirmation InResponseTo` now use `b.crypto.timingSafeEqual` instead of `Buffer.compare` / `!==`. **SAML XSW defense**: refuses Response payloads that carry duplicate `<Status>`, `<StatusCode>`, `<Assertion>`, `<Subject>`, or `<NameID>` children — XML signature wrapping attacks ferry an unsigned sibling next to a signed element and exploit first-match parsers; the verifier now asserts single-child cardinality on every security-critical element via `_findAllChildren(...).length === 1`. **OIDC federation** (`b.auth.openidFederation.verifyEntityStatement`): JWK key-type cross-check against the JWS `alg` header BEFORE `nodeCrypto.createPublicKey` — an attacker-controlled entity-config declaring `alg: "ES256"` while supplying an RSA JWK would previously load through Node's silent algorithm-vs-key coercion path. Now refuses with `auth-openid-federation/alg-kty-mismatch` for any `alg=ES*` not paired with `kty=EC`, `alg=PS*`/`RS*` not paired with `RSA`, or `alg=EdDSA` not paired with `OKP`. **`b.auth.openidFederation.buildTrustChain` error-masking**: trust-chain ascent previously swallowed every per-authority failure via `catch (_e) {}` and continued to the next `authority_hint`; signature-failure errors from one authority no longer mask, the chain now refuses on cryptographic refusal (`bad-jwk`, `alg-kty-mismatch`, `bad-signature`, `signature-failed`). Network / 404 / iss-sub-mismatch errors still continue to the next hint but are collected and surfaced in the `no-ascent` failure shape. **SD-JWT VC verify** (`b.auth.sdJwtVc.verify`): three correctness fixes. (1) `_sd_alg` default switched from `sha3-512` to `sha-256` per IETF draft §4.1.1 — prior default broke verification against spec-conformant issuers when the issuer omitted `_sd_alg`. (2) Disclosure-replay defense: every disclosure digest tracked in a Set; second occurrence of the same digest refuses with `auth-sd-jwt-vc/disclosure-replay`. (3) Claim-shadowing defense: holder-supplied disclosures whose name collides with an issuer-signed top-level claim (`iss`, `sub`, `aud`, `iat`, `nbf`, `exp`, `jti`, `vct`, `cnf`, `_sd`, `_sd_alg`, `status`) refuse with `auth-sd-jwt-vc/protected-claim-shadow` instead of silently overwriting the signed value. (4) KB-JWT `sd_hash` now uses the credential's declared `_sd_alg` (was hardcoded sha256, breaking against issuers using sha3-512); `sd_hash` compare routed through `b.crypto.timingSafeEqual`. **OAuth `verifyIdToken`** (`b.auth.oauth.verifyIdToken`): three hardening fixes that bring the verifier to parity with the framework's other JWS verifiers. (1) `nodeCrypto.verify` wrapped in try/catch — previously panicked on key/sig shape mismatch (e.g. ES256 sig against an RS256 key returned by a buggy IdP with duplicate kids), bubbling a raw `Error` to the operator's handler instead of an `OAuthError`. (2) RFC 7515 §4.1.11 `crit` header refusal — every sibling verifier (`b.auth.jwt`, `b.auth.jwt.verifyExternal`, `b.auth.dpop`) refuses; verifyIdToken previously silently ignored, letting an attacker-controlled OP ship critical extensions the verifier doesn't understand. (3) `state` and `nonce` claim compares routed through `b.crypto.timingSafeEqual` — these are CSRF / replay tokens compared against attacker-controlled callback / payload data.
 - v0.9.0 (2026-05-11) — **Minor: 3 new RFC primitives + `b.structuredFields` shared substrate + full audit-derived hardening sweep + 5 new bug-class detectors**. **`b.structuredFields`** consolidates the quote-aware top-level splitter (`splitTopLevel(s, sep)`), the raw-value control-byte refusal scan (`refuseControlBytes` / `containsControlBytes`), and the sf-string unquote (`unquoteSfString`) used by every RFC 8941 / RFC 9110 / RFC 9111 / RFC 9213 / RFC 9421 / RFC 6266 / RFC 6265 / RFC 6455 parser in the framework — replaces the per-file open-coded copies that were drifting site-by-site. **8 audit-surfaced bug-class sites fixed in this same patch** (no deferred follow-up): (1) `b.middleware.bodyParser._contentType` + `_parseHeaderParams` — RFC 9110 Content-Type / RFC 6266 Content-Disposition parameters can carry quoted-string values (`boundary="foo;bar"` / `filename="weird;name.txt"`); bare `.split(";")` previously sliced through quoted semicolons and corrupted multipart boundaries. (2) `b.requestHelpers.parseListHeader({ strictToken: true })` — control-byte scan now runs on the RAW value before `.trim()` so a leading `\n<token>` no longer slips past `RFC_9110_TOKEN_RE` (same v0.8.90 bug class; used by webhook signature parsing and WS subprotocol negotiation). (3) `b.middleware.tusUpload._parseChecksumHeader` — same trim-before-validate fix. (4) `b.httpClient.cache._parseCacheControl` — quote-aware `,` splitter (RFC 9111 §5.2 + RFC 9110 §5.6.4 directive values may be quoted-string). (5) `b.httpClient.cookieJar._parseSetCookie` — quote-aware `;` splitter defends RFC 7230 quoted-string attribute values (`SameSite="Strict"` from interop-imperfect upstreams). (6) `b.websocket._parseExtensionHeader` — quote-aware `;` and `,` splitters defend RFC 6455 §9.1 + RFC 7230 token-or-quoted-string parameter values against forward-compat extensions shipping quoted params. (7) `b.aiPref.parseHeader` — control-byte refusal added on the RAW value before split + trim. (8) `b.auth.stepUp.parseChallenge` — same trim-before-validate fix (returns `null` per defensive-reader contract instead of throwing). Also: `b.logStream.init({ minLevel })` now validates the level vocabulary at config time so a typo'd `"infos"` (which previously produced `LEVEL_PRIORITY["infos"] === undefined` and silently dropped every log record) throws at boot. `b.crypto.httpSig`'s RFC 9421 Signature-Input parameter parser uses the quote-aware `;` splitter (RFC 8941 §3.1.2 sf-string parameter values). `b.security.assertProductionPosture({ minTlsVersion })` validates `minTlsVersion` against the canonical TLS vocabulary BEFORE the rank comparison (a typo previously silently passed because `indexOf` returned `-1` — same bug class as v0.8.88 `b.auth.fal.meets`). **3 new RFC primitives**: **`b.cdnCacheControl`** ships an RFC 9213 directive list builder + parser shared across `Cache-Control`, `CDN-Cache-Control`, `Surrogate-Control`, and the operator-specific `Cloudflare-` / `Vercel-` / `Fastly-` / `Akamai-` / `Netlify-CDN-Cache-Control` variants. `build({...})` emits the directive list string (numeric directives non-negative-integer-only; refuses Infinity / NaN / floats / negatives; full RFC 9111 boolean directive set; `extensions` for non-standard directives with RFC 7234 §5.2 token-shape enforcement); refuses `public + private` conflict per RFC 9111 §5.2.2.5/§5.2.2.6. `parse(headerValue)` decodes any targeted header into `{ public, private, noStore, maxAge, sMaxAge, ..., directives, fields }` with **qualified-form support** (`private="Authorization"` flag stays enabled, field-name list under `.fields[camel]` per RFC 9111 §5.2.2.4 / §5.2.2.6 — presence == enabled, the argument narrows scope), **bare `max-stale` parses as `Infinity`** per RFC 9111 §5.2.1.2 (instead of buggy `Number(true) === 1`), and a quote-aware top-level `,` splitter so a `, ` inside a quoted directive value doesn't fake-split. `isTargetedHeader(name)` + curated `TARGETED_HEADERS` allowlist. **`b.clientHints`** ships a Sec-CH-UA-* request-header family parser per W3C UA Client Hints + IETF draft-davidben-http-client-hint-reliability. `parse(req.headers)` returns `{ brands, mobile, platform, platformVersion, arch, bitness, model, fullVersionList, wow64, formFactors, raw }`; quote-aware splitters at brand-list and brand-member-parameter level (RFC 8941 §4.1.1.4 parameter values may be sf-string); refuses control characters in any Sec-CH-* value. `acceptList(hintNames)` builds `Accept-CH` with typo-defense (unknown hint name throws `client-hints/unknown-hint`); dedupes case-variant duplicates; canonicalizes to W3C mixed-case spelling. `KNOWN_HINTS` exports the well-known 22-name list. **`b.network.dns.classifyDnskeyAlgorithm(algorithm)` / `classifyDsDigestType(digestType)`** — RFC 9905 DNSSEC SHA-1 deprecation classifier. Covers every IANA-assigned DNSKEY algorithm (including PRIVATEDNS/PRIVATEOID/INDIRECT/Reserved entries) and RFC 9558 §3 DS digest types 5 (GOST R 34.11-2012) + 6 (SM3); operators auditing inbound DNSSEC chain-of-trust evidence refuse validations where `deprecated === true`. Inline `allow:bare-split-on-quoted-header` markers added across `mail-auth.js` (DKIM / DMARC / ARC tag-list grammar — token-only), `network-smtp-policy.js` (TLS-RPT — token-only), `middleware/scim-server.js` (RFC 7644 §3.9 SCIM attribute paths), `http-client-cache.js` (RFC 9110 §12.5.5 Vary field-names), `http-message-signature.js` (RFC 9421 component-id covered list), `middleware/body-parser.js` (RFC 9112 §6.1 Transfer-Encoding token-only), each citing the controlling RFC clause showing why quoted-string is not a legal value in that grammar. **5 new bug-class detectors** in `test/layer-0-primitives/codebase-patterns.test.js` so the same shapes can't drift back in: (a) `trim-before-validate` — control-byte refusal scans must run on the RAW header value BEFORE `.trim()` strips leading/trailing C0/DEL bytes; detector now catches BOTH the `charCodeAt` codepoint-loop shape AND the `<NAME>_RE.test(<trimmed>)` grammar-regex shape; (b) `enum-rank-without-validation` — `_rankFn(X) >= _rankFn(Y)` arithmetic comparisons must have a preceding `isValid*` / `KNOWN_*` membership check on both inputs (catches `b.auth.fal.meets` bug shape); (c) `bool-string-coerce-shape` — boolean directive parsing must NOT use `val === "" || val === "true"` coercion (catches `b.cdnCacheControl.parse` qualified-form bug shape); (d) `bare-split-on-quoted-header` — RFC structured-fields parsers in files that ALSO handle sf-string unquote regex must use the shared quote-aware `b.structuredFields.splitTopLevel`, not bare `.split(",") / .split(";")`; (e) `scoped-context-binding-unused` — scope-named factory bindings (`forwarderDomain` / `realm` / `origin` / `audience` / `issuer`) captured in the factory must be compared against the inbound value's embedded scope in the `verify` / `reverse` / `decode` path (catches the v0.8.89 SRS forwarder-domain bug shape). Operators upgrade `0.8.90` → `0.9.0`; v0.8.91 was never tagged (its surface is folded into v0.9.0 with the audit-derived hardening).
 - v0.8.90 (2026-05-11) — **RFC 8689 REQUIRETLS support** (`b.mail.requireTls`). Per-message TLS-requirement signaling between sender and receiver MTAs. Complements MTA-STS / DANE (policy-side, domain-scoped) with a per-message knob that overrides policy when the operator wants stricter-than-policy delivery — message bounces instead of falling back to cleartext if no downstream MTA can deliver under TLS. **`peerSupports(ehloLines)`**: walks a parsed EHLO response and returns `true` when the peer advertised the `REQUIRETLS` keyword; case-insensitive per RFC 5321 §2.4; refuses substring matches (`FOO-REQUIRETLS-BAR` does NOT match); empty / non-array input returns `false`. **`mailFromExtension({ requireTls })`**: builds the trailing `" REQUIRETLS"` token to append to a MAIL FROM line; refuses non-boolean flag value (a truthy-but-wrong-shape value like `"yes"` throws instead of silently succeeding). **`parseTlsRequiredHeader(headerValue)`**: parses the RFC 8689 §5 `TLS-Required` header — returns `"no"` only when the value is the literal token `no` (case-insensitive, ignoring whitespace) per spec; any other non-empty value returns `"yes"` (RFC 8689 §5: "any value other than 'No' MUST be treated as if the field had been absent" — conservative strict path); returns `null` for absent / empty / non-string input; refuses control characters on the **raw** header value before `trim()` runs so a leading `\n` / trailing `\r` / NUL / DEL byte can no longer slip past as the literal token `no` (ASCII HT remains permitted as structural folding whitespace).

package/lib/auth/aal.js

@@ -70,38 +70,51 @@ function _bandRank(band) {
 var KNOWN_METHODS = [
   "password", "pin", "totp", "sms", "webauthn", "passkey",
   "hardware", "mtls",
+  // `uv` is a webauthn-side qualifier: when true, the
+  // authenticator-data UV bit was set on the assertion. Required
+  // for AAL3 paired with `webauthn` / `passkey` per SP 800-63-4
+  // §5.1.7.
+  "uv",
 ];
 
 function fromMethods(methods) {
   if (!methods || typeof methods !== "object") {
     throw new AuthError("auth-aal/bad-methods",
-      "fromMethods: methods must be an object like { password: true, webauthn: true }");
+      "fromMethods: methods must be an object like { password: true, webauthn: true, uv: true }");
   }
   var has = function (m) { return methods[m] === true; };
-
-  // Phishing-resistant multi-factor → AAL3.
-  // - WebAuthn / passkey with UV=true alone satisfies AAL3 per
-  //   SP 800-63-4 §5.1.7 (cryptographic authenticator + verifier impl
-  //   binding + user verification = MF-CRYPT).
-  // - Hardware authenticator + memorized secret also satisfies AAL3
-  //   (SF-CRYPT + memorized = MF-equivalent under §4.4.1).
-  if (has("webauthn") || has("passkey")) return AAL3;
+  // SP 800-63-4 §5.1.7 — WebAuthn / passkey satisfies AAL3 only when
+  // user verification (UV) was actually performed on the assertion
+  // (MF-CRYPT requires the verifier to confirm the user authorized
+  // the operation). Pre-v0.9.2 this returned AAL3 unconditionally
+  // for any webauthn:true assertion; an operator using
+  // `userVerification: "preferred"` whose authenticator skipped UV
+  // landed in AAL3 despite not satisfying the spec's MF requirement.
+  //
+  // The operator passes `methods.uv: true` when verifyAuthentication's
+  // result confirmed UV on the authenticator data (vendor's
+  // `userVerified` flag). When `uv` is omitted or false, webauthn
+  // alone caps at AAL2 (SF-CRYPT — the cryptographic authenticator
+  // is verified, but user-verification proof is missing).
+  // Operators wanting the legacy optimistic path can pass
+  // `methods.uv: true` based on their startAuthentication
+  // `userVerification: "required"` setting having forced UV.
+  if ((has("webauthn") || has("passkey")) && has("uv")) return AAL3;
+  if ((has("webauthn") || has("passkey")) && !has("uv")) {
+    // SF-CRYPT (cryptographic but no UV-bound MF). Combine with a
+    // memorized secret to satisfy MF.
+    if (has("password") || has("pin")) return AAL3;
+    return AAL2;
+  }
   if (has("hardware") && (has("password") || has("pin"))) return AAL3;
 
-  // Multi-factor → AAL2.
-  // - password + totp / sms / hardware single-factor / mtls.
-  // - SP 800-63-4 §5.1.3.3 — SMS is RESTRICTED but still satisfies
-  //   AAL2 with the operator's documented risk acceptance.
   if (has("password") || has("pin")) {
     if (has("totp") || has("sms") || has("hardware") || has("mtls")) return AAL2;
     return AAL1;     // memorized secret alone
   }
 
-  // Single-factor cryptographic — mtls / hardware on its own → AAL1
-  // unless paired with a memorized secret (handled above).
   if (has("hardware") || has("mtls")) return AAL1;
 
-  // No recognized method asserted.
   throw new AuthError("auth-aal/no-methods",
     "fromMethods: methods object did not assert any known authenticator " +
     "(known: " + KNOWN_METHODS.join(", ") + ")");

package/lib/auth/ciba.js

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ var lazyRequire  = require("../lazy-require");
 var validateOpts = require("../validate-opts");
 var safeJson     = require("../safe-json");
 var safeUrl      = require("../safe-url");
-var { generateToken, sha3Hash } = require("../crypto");
+var { generateToken, sha3Hash, timingSafeEqual } = require("../crypto");
 var { AuthError } = require("../framework-error");
 
 var httpClient    = lazyRequire(function () { return require("../http-client"); });
@@ -169,6 +169,16 @@ function create(opts) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-ciba/no-notification-token",
       "auth.ciba.client.create: clientNotificationToken required for ping/push delivery modes");
   }
+  // Minimum-entropy guard on the client_notification_token (audit
+  // 2026-05-11). CIBA §7.1.2 requires the token be opaque + hard to
+  // guess; the framework's other token-shaped primitives enforce 32
+  // chars minimum. A 4-char token was previously accepted; refuse.
+  if (clientNotificationToken !== null && clientNotificationToken.length < 32) {                  // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 9700 §7.1.2 token char-length minimum, not bytes
+    throw new AuthError("auth-ciba/notification-token-too-short",
+      "auth.ciba.client.create: clientNotificationToken must be >= 32 chars " +
+      "(generate via b.crypto.generateToken(32) or stronger; CIBA §7.1.2 " +
+      "requires opaque hard-to-guess token).");
+  }
 
   // Each backchannel-authentication request mints a fresh
   // `client_notification_token` per the spec? No — the RP registers
@@ -368,6 +378,10 @@ function create(opts) {
       ? rv.interval : DEFAULT_INTERVAL_SEC;
     var expiresIn = typeof rv.expires_in === "number" && rv.expires_in > 0
       ? rv.expires_in : DEFAULT_EXPIRES_SEC;
+    // Seed the per-authReqId interval tracker so pollToken's
+    // slow_down handler bumps from the IdP-supplied starting point
+    // (CIBA §11.3 minimum-5s bump on every slow_down response).
+    _registerInitialInterval(rv.auth_req_id, interval);
 
     _emitAudit("start", "success", {
       authReqIdHash: sha3Hash("auth-ciba:" + rv.auth_req_id),
@@ -399,6 +413,17 @@ function create(opts) {
    *   var tokens = await ciba.pollToken({ authReqId: ticket.authReqId });
    *   // → { accessToken, idToken, refreshToken, tokenType, scope, expiresIn, raw }
    */
+  // Per-authReqId interval tracking — CIBA §11.3 requires the client
+  // to increase its polling interval by at least 5s on every
+  // `slow_down` response. The framework client now maintains this
+  // state internally so operators reading `err.nextIntervalSec` get
+  // a spec-correct back-off without rolling their own counter.
+  var _intervalState = new Map();   // authReqId → current interval sec
+
+  function _registerInitialInterval(authReqId, intervalSec) {
+    _intervalState.set(authReqId, intervalSec);
+  }
+
   async function pollToken(popts) {
     popts = popts || {};
     if (typeof popts.authReqId !== "string" || popts.authReqId.length === 0) {
@@ -421,7 +446,33 @@ function create(opts) {
       body.set("client_id", opts.clientId);
     }
     if (clientAuth === "mtls") body.set("client_id", opts.clientId);
-    var rv = await _postForm(endpoint, body);
+    var rv;
+    try {
+      rv = await _postForm(endpoint, body);
+    } catch (err) {
+      // CIBA §11.3 — on slow_down response, increase polling
+      // interval by at least 5s. Attach the next-suggested-interval
+      // to the error so the operator's poll loop reads a spec-
+      // correct back-off without manual bookkeeping. The IdP MAY
+      // optionally return its own `interval` value in the 400 body;
+      // honor that when >= current + 5, otherwise enforce the
+      // minimum 5s bump.
+      if (err && err.code === "auth-ciba/slow_down") {
+        var current = _intervalState.get(popts.authReqId) || DEFAULT_INTERVAL_SEC;
+        var idpSuggested = err.cibaError && typeof err.cibaError.interval === "number"
+          ? err.cibaError.interval : null;
+        var next = current + 5;                                                                 // allow:raw-time-literal — §11.3 mandates +5s minimum
+        if (idpSuggested !== null && idpSuggested > next && idpSuggested <= MAX_INTERVAL_SEC) {
+          next = idpSuggested;
+        }
+        if (next > MAX_INTERVAL_SEC) next = MAX_INTERVAL_SEC;
+        _intervalState.set(popts.authReqId, next);
+        err.nextIntervalSec = next;
+      }
+      throw err;
+    }
+    // Token issued — clear interval tracking for this authReqId.
+    _intervalState.delete(popts.authReqId);
     _emitAudit("token_received", "success", {
       authReqIdHash: sha3Hash("auth-ciba:" + popts.authReqId),
     });
@@ -479,13 +530,15 @@ function create(opts) {
       throw new AuthError("auth-ciba/bad-bearer",
         "ciba.parseNotification: empty bearer or no expected token configured");
     }
-    // Constant-time compare via the framework's primitive shape —
-    // sha3-of-each + ===-of-hash is constant-time over equal-length
-    // hashes regardless of presented length, so a length-side-channel
-    // probe can't enumerate the prefix.
+    // Constant-time compare on the SHA3 hash of both tokens —
+    // matches the project-wide discipline (audit 2026-05-11). Both
+    // sides are fixed-width sha3-512 hex strings; timingSafeEqual
+    // adds explicit defense-in-depth over `!==` even though equal-
+    // length JS string compare is already broadly understood as
+    // constant-time on V8.
     var presentedHash = sha3Hash(presented);
     var expectedHash  = sha3Hash(clientNotificationToken);
-    if (presentedHash !== expectedHash) {
+    if (!timingSafeEqual(presentedHash, expectedHash)) {
       _emitAudit("notification_token_mismatch", "failure", {});
       throw new AuthError("auth-ciba/wrong-bearer",
         "ciba.parseNotification: client_notification_token does not match");

package/lib/auth/fido-mds3.js

@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ var REFUSE_STATUS = {
   REVOKED:                       1,
   USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE:  1,
   USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE:    1,
+  // FIDO MDS3 §3.1.4 — attestation-key compromise means the
+  // manufacturer's batch-signing key is suspect; every credential
+  // attested under that key MUST be refused. Pre-v0.9.2 this token
+  // was missing from the refuse-list (audit 2026-05-11).
+  ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE:    1,
 };
 
 // FIDO Certified levels that surface as certifiedLevel. The spec uses
@@ -333,6 +338,21 @@ function _verifyAndParseBlob(token) {
     throw new FidoMds3Error("fido-mds3/bad-payload",
       "BLOB payload 'nextUpdate' missing or not YYYY-MM-DD: " + payload.nextUpdate);
   }
+  // Stale-BLOB refusal — FIDO MDS3 §3.1.7 says clients SHOULD refresh
+  // by nextUpdate; a BLOB whose nextUpdate is already in the past is
+  // not safe to trust even though its cert chain still validates.
+  // Pre-v0.9.2 the staleness was floored to MIN_CACHE_TTL_MS in
+  // _ttlFromNextUpdate but the BLOB itself was still served from
+  // cache; an attacker serving an ancient signed-but-expired BLOB
+  // could keep operators on a revoked-authenticator-list-frozen-at-X.
+  // Refuse at parse time so neither fetch nor cache lookup honors it.
+  // (Audit 2026-05-11.)
+  if (nextUpdate.getTime() < Date.now()) {
+    throw new FidoMds3Error("fido-mds3/blob-stale",
+      "BLOB payload nextUpdate \"" + payload.nextUpdate +
+      "\" is in the past — refusing to trust a stale metadata BLOB " +
+      "(FIDO MDS3 §3.1.7)");
+  }
   return {
     entries:     payload.entries,
     no:          payload.no,
@@ -539,7 +559,7 @@ function _certifiedLevel(statusReports) {
 
 /**
  * @primitive b.auth.fidoMds3.verifyAuthenticator
- * @signature b.auth.fidoMds3.verifyAuthenticator(blob, registrationInfo)
+ * @signature b.auth.fidoMds3.verifyAuthenticator(blob, registrationInfo, opts)
  * @since     0.8.53
  * @status    stable
  * @related   b.auth.fidoMds3.fetch, b.auth.fidoMds3.lookupAaguid
@@ -549,21 +569,31 @@ function _certifiedLevel(statusReports) {
  * `{ ok, statement, statusReports, certifiedLevel, reason? }`. Refuses
  * (ok: false) when the authenticator's status reports include any of
  * REVOKED / USER_KEY_PHYSICAL_COMPROMISE / USER_KEY_REMOTE_COMPROMISE
- * (FIDO MDS3 section 3.1.4 compromise bucket). Returns
- * `ok: true, statement: null` for AAGUIDs not present in the BLOB —
- * operators choose whether unknown AAGUIDs are permitted via an
- * allowlist policy on top of this primitive.
+ * / ATTESTATION_KEY_COMPROMISE (FIDO MDS3 section 3.1.4 compromise
+ * bucket).
+ *
+ * AAGUIDs not present in the BLOB **fail closed by default** in
+ * v0.9.2+ (pre-v0.9.2 returned `ok: true, statement: null`, silently
+ * trusting any authenticator not yet in the metadata service). To
+ * accept unknown AAGUIDs (test fixtures, pre-certification rollouts),
+ * pass `opts.allowUnknownAaguid: true`; the `reason` field then notes
+ * the operator opt-in.
  *
  * Audits auth.fido_mds3.verify.refused (drop-silent) on compromise.
  *
+ * @opts
+ *   allowUnknownAaguid: boolean,   // default false (fail-closed)
+ *
  * @example
  *   var blob = { entries: [] };
  *   var reg  = { aaguid: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" };
- *   var rv   = b.auth.fidoMds3.verifyAuthenticator(blob, reg);
+ *   var rv   = b.auth.fidoMds3.verifyAuthenticator(blob, reg,
+ *                                                  { allowUnknownAaguid: true });
  *   rv.ok === true && rv.statement === null;
- *   // → true
+ *   // → true (with operator opt-in)
  */
-function verifyAuthenticator(blob, registrationInfo) {
+function verifyAuthenticator(blob, registrationInfo, vopts) {
+  vopts = vopts || {};
   if (!blob) {
     throw new FidoMds3Error("fido-mds3/bad-blob", "blob is required");
   }
@@ -573,12 +603,23 @@ function verifyAuthenticator(blob, registrationInfo) {
   }
   var entry = lookupAaguid(blob, registrationInfo.aaguid);
   if (!entry) {
+    // Fail-CLOSED default for unknown AAGUIDs (audit 2026-05-11).
+    // Pre-v0.9.2 default was `ok: true, reason: "aaguid-not-in-blob"`
+    // — an attacker registering a credential with an AAGUID not in
+    // the BLOB (rogue authenticator, fake hardware) silently passed.
+    // The framework's primitive now refuses by default; operators
+    // who genuinely want to accept unknown authenticators (test
+    // fixtures, pre-certification pilot rollouts) pass
+    // `vopts.allowUnknownAaguid: true` explicitly.
+    var unknownOk = vopts.allowUnknownAaguid === true;
     return {
-      ok:             true,
+      ok:             unknownOk,
       statement:      null,
       statusReports:  [],
       certifiedLevel: { level: 0, plus: false },
-      reason:         "aaguid-not-in-blob",
+      reason:         unknownOk
+        ? "aaguid-not-in-blob (operator opted in via allowUnknownAaguid)"
+        : "aaguid-not-in-blob",
     };
   }
   var statusReports = Array.isArray(entry.statusReports) ? entry.statusReports : [];

package/lib/auth/oauth.js

@@ -561,20 +561,45 @@ function create(opts) {
     // constrained confidential clients. Operators with sender-
     // constrained tokens (DPoP / mTLS) can opt out by NOT supplying
     // a seen callback.
-    if (typeof ropts.seen === "function") {
-      var alreadySeen;
+    //
+    // Atomic check-and-insert (audit 2026-05-11) — pre-v0.9.3 the
+    // check ran via `ropts.seen(token)` which was a check-then-act
+    // race: two concurrent refresh requests landed on the same
+    // event-loop tick could both see `seen === false` and both POST
+    // to the token endpoint, neither flagging the replay. The new
+    // contract is `ropts.checkAndInsert(token, expireAtMs)` which
+    // MUST atomically test-and-set: returns true if the token was
+    // ALREADY in the store (replay) and false if it just inserted
+    // the token. The legacy `seen` callback continues to work for
+    // backward compatibility but emits a deprecation warning.
+    var alreadySeen = false;
+    if (typeof ropts.checkAndInsert === "function") {
+      var nowMs = Date.now();
+      // 24h max refresh-token TTL — operators with shorter TTLs
+      // should configure their store's own expiry policy.
+      var expireAtMs = nowMs + C.TIME.hours(24);
+      try { alreadySeen = await ropts.checkAndInsert(refreshToken, expireAtMs); }
+      catch (e) {
+        throw new OAuthError("auth-oauth/seen-callback-failed",
+          "refreshAccessToken: checkAndInsert() callback threw: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
+      }
+    } else if (typeof ropts.seen === "function") {
+      // Legacy non-atomic path. Documented as a check-then-act race;
+      // operators sharing a single-writer store (Redis SETNX, DB
+      // INSERT ON CONFLICT) MUST migrate to checkAndInsert. Stays
+      // here for backwards-compat with existing operator code.
       try { alreadySeen = await ropts.seen(refreshToken); }
       catch (e) {
         throw new OAuthError("auth-oauth/seen-callback-failed",
           "refreshAccessToken: seen() callback threw: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
       }
-      if (alreadySeen === true) {
-        throw new OAuthError("auth-oauth/refresh-token-replay",
-          "refreshAccessToken: refresh token has been presented before — refused " +
-          "(OAuth 2.1 §6.1 / RFC 9700 §4.13 one-time-use defense). The operator MUST " +
-          "treat this as a token-theft signal: revoke the refresh-token family + force " +
-          "the user to re-authenticate.");
-      }
+    }
+    if (alreadySeen === true) {
+      throw new OAuthError("auth-oauth/refresh-token-replay",
+        "refreshAccessToken: refresh token has been presented before — refused " +
+        "(OAuth 2.1 §6.1 / RFC 9700 §4.13 one-time-use defense). The operator MUST " +
+        "treat this as a token-theft signal: revoke the refresh-token family + force " +
+        "the user to re-authenticate.");
     }
     var endpoint = await _resolveEndpoint("tokenEndpoint");
     var body = new URLSearchParams();

package/lib/auth/oid4vci.js

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ var lazyRequire  = require("../lazy-require");
 var validateOpts = require("../validate-opts");
 var safeJson     = require("../safe-json");
 var nodeCrypto   = require("node:crypto");
-var { generateToken, sha3Hash } = require("../crypto");
+var { generateToken, sha3Hash, timingSafeEqual } = require("../crypto");
 var { AuthError } = require("../framework-error");
 
 var cache       = lazyRequire(function () { return require("../cache"); });
@@ -116,9 +116,14 @@ function _verifyProofJwt(proofJwt, expectedAud, expectedCNonce, expectedClientId
     throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/wrong-proof-aud",
       "credential issuance: proof JWT aud \"" + payload.aud + "\" mismatch (expected \"" + expectedAud + "\")");
   }
-  if (expectedCNonce !== null && payload.nonce !== expectedCNonce) {
-    throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/wrong-proof-nonce",
-      "credential issuance: proof JWT nonce mismatch (replay defense — wallet must use the c_nonce from the most recent issuer response)");
+  if (expectedCNonce !== null) {
+    // Constant-time c_nonce compare — secret-shaped value vs
+    // attacker-controlled wallet payload. (Audit 2026-05-11.)
+    if (typeof payload.nonce !== "string" ||
+        !timingSafeEqual(payload.nonce, expectedCNonce)) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/wrong-proof-nonce",
+        "credential issuance: proof JWT nonce mismatch (replay defense — wallet must use the c_nonce from the most recent issuer response)");
+    }
   }
   if (typeof payload.iat !== "number") {
     throw new AuthError("auth-oid4vci/no-proof-iat",
@@ -400,8 +405,11 @@ function create(opts) {
           "exchangePreAuthorizedCode: tx_code required (offer mandates it)");
       }
       var txHash = sha3Hash("oid4vci-tx:" + eopts.txCode);
-      // Constant-time-ish compare via fixed-size sha3 hash equality.
-      if (txHash !== entry.txCodeHash) {
+      // Constant-time compare on the hashed tx_code (audit 2026-05-11
+      // — was `!==` on fixed-width sha3 hex; per CLAUDE.md rule §5
+      // every framework-internal compare against attacker-controlled
+      // input routes through timingSafeEqual).
+      if (!timingSafeEqual(txHash, entry.txCodeHash)) {
         // Don't consume on failure — wallet may be retrying. Operator
         // attaches their own attempt counter / lockout via b.auth.lockout.
         _emitAudit("tx_code_mismatch", "failure", {

package/lib/auth/oid4vp.js

@@ -452,6 +452,16 @@ function create(opts) {
           continue;
         }
         try {
+          // Per-presentation vct enforcement (audit 2026-05-11): when
+          // DCQL's `vct_values` has 1 entry, `expectedVct` pins it.
+          // With 2+ entries the verifier's expectedVct opt can't hold
+          // a list, so we verify-without-expected and then validate
+          // the actual vct against the DCQL list manually — over-
+          // disclosure defense (a holder presenting a vct outside
+          // the DCQL filter would previously slip through).
+          var dcqlVctValues = cq.meta && Array.isArray(cq.meta.vct_values) ? cq.meta.vct_values : null;
+          var expectedVct = dcqlVctValues && dcqlVctValues.length === 1
+            ? dcqlVctValues[0] : undefined;
           var verified = await sdJwtVcCore().verify(t, {
             issuerKeyResolver:      opts.issuerKeyResolver,
             audience:               audience,
@@ -459,9 +469,16 @@ function create(opts) {
             requireKeyBinding:      true,
             requireKeyAttestation:  vopts.requireKeyAttestation === true,
             keyAttestationVerifier: opts.keyAttestationVerifier || null,
-            expectedVct:            cq.meta && cq.meta.vct_values && cq.meta.vct_values.length === 1
-                                      ? cq.meta.vct_values[0] : undefined,
+            expectedVct:            expectedVct,
           });
+          if (dcqlVctValues && dcqlVctValues.length > 1) {
+            if (!verified.claims || dcqlVctValues.indexOf(verified.claims.vct) === -1) {
+              verifyErrors.push("vp_token['" + id + "'][" + ti + "] vct '" +
+                ((verified.claims && verified.claims.vct) || "<missing>") +
+                "' is not in DCQL vct_values [" + dcqlVctValues.join(", ") + "]");
+              continue;
+            }
+          }
           presentations.push({
             id:                   id,
             format:               cq.format,

package/lib/auth/passkey.js

@@ -112,13 +112,39 @@ async function startRegistration(opts) {
   return options;
 }
 
+function _validateExpectedOrigin(value) {
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    if (value.length === 0) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-expectedOrigin",
+        "expectedOrigin must be a non-empty string or array of strings");
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    if (value.length === 0) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-expectedOrigin",
+        "expectedOrigin array must contain at least one non-empty string");
+    }
+    for (var i = 0; i < value.length; i += 1) {
+      if (typeof value[i] !== "string" || value[i].length === 0) {
+        throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-expectedOrigin",
+          "expectedOrigin[" + i + "] must be a non-empty string");
+      }
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-expectedOrigin",
+    "expectedOrigin must be a non-empty string or array of strings");
+}
+
 async function verifyRegistration(opts) {
   if (!opts) throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-opts", "opts is required");
   if (!opts.response) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-response", "opts.response is required");
   }
   _requireString(opts.expectedChallenge, "expectedChallenge");
-  _requireString(opts.expectedOrigin, "expectedOrigin");
+  // Multi-origin deployments (web + admin subdomain) need string[].
+  _validateExpectedOrigin(opts.expectedOrigin);
   _requireString(opts.expectedRPID, "expectedRPID");
 
   var rv = await _vendor().verifyRegistrationResponse({
@@ -161,12 +187,17 @@ async function verifyRegistration(opts) {
 // Credential Management spec: "silent" / "optional" / "required" /
 // "conditional". "conditional" enables passkey autofill on
 // <input autocomplete="webauthn">.
-var ALLOWED_MEDIATION = { silent: 1, optional: 1, required: 1, conditional: 1 };
+// Null-prototype map so `opts.mediation === "__proto__"` /
+// `"constructor"` can't truthy-match an inherited property and slip
+// past the allowlist (audit 2026-05-11).
+var ALLOWED_MEDIATION = Object.assign(Object.create(null),
+  { silent: 1, optional: 1, required: 1, conditional: 1 });
 
 async function startAuthentication(opts) {
   if (!opts) throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-opts", "opts is required");
   _requireString(opts.rpId, "rpId");
-  if (opts.mediation !== undefined && !ALLOWED_MEDIATION[opts.mediation]) {
+  if (opts.mediation !== undefined &&
+      !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ALLOWED_MEDIATION, opts.mediation)) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/bad-mediation",
       "mediation must be one of silent/optional/required/conditional");
   }
@@ -352,12 +383,40 @@ async function verifyAuthentication(opts) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-response", "opts.response is required");
   }
   _requireString(opts.expectedChallenge, "expectedChallenge");
-  _requireString(opts.expectedOrigin, "expectedOrigin");
+  _validateExpectedOrigin(opts.expectedOrigin);
   _requireString(opts.expectedRPID, "expectedRPID");
   if (!opts.credential || !opts.credential.id || !opts.credential.publicKey) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-credential",
       "opts.credential { id, publicKey, counter? } is required");
   }
+  // Counter regression bypass fix (audit 2026-05-11) — pre-v0.9.2
+  // shape `opts.credential.counter || 0` silently zeroed an
+  // undefined / null / NaN counter, defeating CTAP 2.1 clone-
+  // detection on credentials whose stored counter is > 0. An
+  // operator who deserialized the credential from a column that
+  // dropped the counter would unknowingly accept a cloned
+  // authenticator. Require an explicit non-negative integer.
+  var counter;
+  if (opts.credential.counter === undefined || opts.credential.counter === null) {
+    // First-time-stored credentials legitimately have no counter
+    // yet (registration ran on a vendor returning 0). Operators
+    // MUST persist whatever the vendor returned; if they didn't,
+    // refuse rather than silently coerce.
+    throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/missing-counter",
+      "opts.credential.counter is required (set to 0 at registration; " +
+      "store the newCounter returned by verifyAuthentication on every " +
+      "successful auth). undefined / null is refused to prevent clone-" +
+      "detection bypass when the persisted column is missing.");
+  }
+  if (typeof opts.credential.counter !== "number" ||
+      !isFinite(opts.credential.counter) ||
+      opts.credential.counter < 0 ||
+      Math.floor(opts.credential.counter) !== opts.credential.counter) {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-passkey/bad-counter",
+      "opts.credential.counter must be a non-negative integer (got " +
+      typeof opts.credential.counter + ")");
+  }
+  counter = opts.credential.counter;
 
   var rv = await _vendor().verifyAuthenticationResponse({
     response:           opts.response,
@@ -367,7 +426,7 @@ async function verifyAuthentication(opts) {
     credential:         {
       id:         opts.credential.id,
       publicKey:  opts.credential.publicKey,
-      counter:    opts.credential.counter || 0,
+      counter:    counter,
       transports: opts.credential.transports,
     },
     requireUserVerification: opts.requireUserVerification !== false,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.9.1",
+  "version": "0.9.3",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cdx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.6",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:bffe9a17-1586-474d-aa8f-75dd58525185",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:f34cb19c-6c49-42cb-80d5-8727b4fb0f86",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-05-11T23:22:03.045Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-05-12T00:20:11.455Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.9.1",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.9.3",
       "type": "library",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.9.1",
+      "version": "0.9.3",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.9.1",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.9.3",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.9.1",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.9.3",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]