@blamejs/core 0.8.43 → 0.8.50

package/lib/crypto.js

@@ -1,32 +1,71 @@
 "use strict";
 /**
- * Centralized crypto module — envelope-versioned PQC primitives.
- *
- * Algorithm suite (modernity bar, per blamejs principle #8):
- *   KEM:        ML-KEM-1024 + P-384 ECDH hybrid (FIPS 203 + classical defense in depth)
- *   Symmetric:  XChaCha20-Poly1305 (24-byte nonce — no nonce-reuse risk under volume)
- *   KDF:        SHAKE256 (FIPS 202)
- *   Hash:       SHA3-512
- *   HMAC:       HMAC-SHA3-512
- *   Signatures: ML-DSA-87 / SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f (auto-detected from key PEM)
- *
- * Argon2id lives in lib/vault-wrap.js (used to derive vault and
- * audit-signing key passphrases), not here.
- *
- * Envelope versioning (lib/constants.js → ENVELOPE_MAGIC, KEM_IDS, etc.):
- *   byte 0: ENVELOPE_MAGIC (0xE1)
- *   byte 1: KEM ID
- *   byte 2: CIPHER ID
- *   byte 3: KDF ID
- *
- * Old data decrypts under whichever IDs were written into its envelope; new
- * writes use ACTIVE.{KEM, CIPHER, KDF}. Algorithm rotation is forward-only —
- * see roadmap "Modernity posture" for the rotation policy.
+ * @module b.crypto
+ * @featured true
+ * @nav    Crypto
+ * @title  Crypto
+ *
+ * @intro
+ *   The framework's PQC-first cryptography surface. Every default is
+ *   post-quantum-aware: ML-KEM-1024 + ECDH P-384 hybrid for key
+ *   encapsulation (FIPS 203 + classical defense-in-depth), XChaCha20-
+ *   Poly1305 for authenticated symmetric encryption (24-byte nonce —
+ *   no nonce-reuse risk under high volume), SHAKE256 as the KDF
+ *   (FIPS 202 XOF — arbitrary output length), SHA3-512 for hashing,
+ *   HMAC-SHA3-512 for keyed integrity, and ML-DSA-87 / SLH-DSA-SHAKE-
+ *   256f for signatures (auto-detected from the key PEM). Argon2id
+ *   passphrase stretching lives in `b.vaultWrap`, not here.
+ *
+ *   Envelope wire format (length-prefixed, self-describing):
+ *
+ *     byte 0 : ENVELOPE_MAGIC
+ *     byte 1 : KEM ID         (ML_KEM_1024 / ML_KEM_1024_P384 / ML_KEM_768_X25519)
+ *     byte 2 : CIPHER ID      (XCHACHA20_POLY1305)
+ *     byte 3 : KDF ID         (SHAKE256)
+ *     ...    : KEM ciphertext, ephemeral ECDH pubkey, nonce, AEAD ciphertext
+ *
+ *   The four-byte header is bound as AEAD AAD so an algorithm-
+ *   substitution attack (a tampered byte-1 KEM ID, byte-2 cipher ID,
+ *   etc.) fails Poly1305 verification. Old envelopes decrypt under the
+ *   IDs written into their header; new writes use the active suite.
+ *   The KDF additionally absorbs a NIST SP 800-56C r2 §4.1 FixedInfo
+ *   suite-binding label so a key derived under one suite is not
+ *   silently usable under another.
+ *
+ *   Three KEM hybrids ship: ML-KEM-1024 KEM-only (legacy single-
+ *   component), ML-KEM-1024 + ECDH P-384 (framework default), and
+ *   ML-KEM-768 + X25519 (IETF / Cloudflare / Chrome TLS 1.3 codepoint
+ *   0x11EC — smaller payload, wider browser interop).
+ *
+ *   SHA-1 / SHA-256 / AES-GCM / classical-only ECDH are intentionally
+ *   absent from the public surface. Operators who genuinely need them
+ *   call `node:crypto` directly so the choice surfaces in their code.
+ *
+ * @card
+ *   The framework's PQC-first cryptography surface.
  */
 var nodeCrypto = require("crypto");
+var nodeFs = require("fs");
+var { pipeline } = require("stream/promises");
 var { xchacha20poly1305 } = require("./vendor/noble-ciphers.cjs");
 var C = require("./constants");
 
+// Streaming-hash algorithm allowlist. Mirrors the framework's PQC-
+// first crypto policy: SHA3 / SHAKE family is the default surface;
+// SHA-512 is permitted for legitimate interop (signing artifacts that
+// downstream verifiers compute as SHA-512). MD5 / SHA-1 / SHA-256 are
+// not on the list — operators who genuinely need them call
+// node:crypto directly so the choice surfaces in their code.
+var STREAM_HASH_ALGORITHMS = Object.freeze({
+  "sha3-256":   { algorithm: "sha3-256",   needsOutputLength: false },
+  "sha3-384":   { algorithm: "sha3-384",   needsOutputLength: false },
+  "sha3-512":   { algorithm: "sha3-512",   needsOutputLength: false },
+  "sha512":     { algorithm: "sha512",     needsOutputLength: false },
+  "shake256":   { algorithm: "shake256",   needsOutputLength: true  },
+});
+var STREAM_HASH_DEFAULT = "sha3-512";
+var SHAKE256_DEFAULT_LEN = 64;
+
 // ===========================================================
 // Core primitives — everything else is built from these
 // ===========================================================
@@ -40,6 +79,74 @@ function hmac(key, data, algorithm) {
   return nodeCrypto.createHmac(algorithm, key).update(data).digest("hex");
 }
 
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.hashStream
+ * @signature b.crypto.hashStream(readable, algorithm)
+ * @since     0.5.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.hashFile, b.crypto.sha3Hash
+ *
+ * Streams a Readable through `createHash(algorithm)` and resolves with
+ * the raw digest Buffer. Default algorithm is SHA3-512. Algorithm is
+ * validated against the allowlist (sha3-256 / sha3-384 / sha3-512 /
+ * sha512 / shake256) so a typo or weak choice throws at config time
+ * rather than producing a digest under a surprise algorithm. Read-
+ * only — no audit emit.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var fs = require("fs");
+ *   var stream = fs.createReadStream("/etc/hosts");
+ *   b.crypto.hashStream(stream, "sha3-512").then(function (digest) {
+ *     digest.toString("hex");
+ *     // → "abcd0123...e8f9" (128 hex chars, SHA3-512 = 64 bytes)
+ *   });
+ */
+function hashStream(readable, algorithm) {
+  var alg = (algorithm || STREAM_HASH_DEFAULT).toLowerCase();
+  var entry = STREAM_HASH_ALGORITHMS[alg];
+  if (!entry) {
+    return Promise.reject(new TypeError(
+      "crypto.hashStream: unsupported algorithm '" + algorithm +
+      "' (allowed: " + Object.keys(STREAM_HASH_ALGORITHMS).join(", ") + ")"
+    ));
+  }
+  if (!readable || typeof readable.pipe !== "function") {
+    return Promise.reject(new TypeError(
+      "crypto.hashStream: readable must be a Readable stream"
+    ));
+  }
+  var hashOpts = entry.needsOutputLength ? { outputLength: SHAKE256_DEFAULT_LEN } : undefined;
+  var digester = nodeCrypto.createHash(entry.algorithm, hashOpts);
+  return pipeline(readable, digester).then(function () {
+    return digester.digest();
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.hashFile
+ * @signature b.crypto.hashFile(filePath, algorithm)
+ * @since     0.5.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.hashStream, b.crypto.sha3Hash
+ *
+ * Opens `filePath` as a Readable and streams it through `hashStream`.
+ * Resolves with the raw digest Buffer. Default algorithm is SHA3-512.
+ * Read-only — no audit emit; the path is operator-supplied and the
+ * digest is the only observable side-effect.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   b.crypto.hashFile("/etc/hosts", "sha3-256").then(function (digest) {
+ *     digest.toString("hex");
+ *     // → "0123abcd...ef89" (64 hex chars, SHA3-256 = 32 bytes)
+ *   });
+ */
+function hashFile(filePath, algorithm) {
+  if (typeof filePath !== "string" || filePath.length === 0) {
+    return Promise.reject(new TypeError(
+      "crypto.hashFile: path must be a non-empty string"
+    ));
+  }
+  return hashStream(nodeFs.createReadStream(filePath), algorithm);
+}
+
 function random(byteLength) {
   var n = byteLength || 32;
   // SHAKE256 over OS-RNG bytes. The OS RNG (nodeCrypto.randomBytes) is
@@ -65,6 +172,25 @@ function generateKeyPair(algorithm, options) {
   return { publicKey: pair.publicKey, privateKey: pair.privateKey };
 }
 
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.timingSafeEqual
+ * @signature b.crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.hmacSha3
+ *
+ * Constant-time equality comparison. Coerces non-Buffer inputs via
+ * `Buffer.from(String(...))`, returns `false` immediately when lengths
+ * differ (length itself is not a secret), then routes equal-length
+ * inputs through `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. Use when comparing HMAC
+ * digests, session tokens, password-reset codes, or any
+ * attacker-influenced value where a timing oracle would leak bits.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var expected = b.crypto.hmacSha3("server-key", "payload");
+ *   var supplied = "ab12...e9";   // from request header / body
+ *   var ok = b.crypto.timingSafeEqual(supplied, expected);
+ *   // → true when bytes match, false otherwise (no early exit on mismatch)
+ */
 function timingSafeEqual(a, b) {
   var bufA = Buffer.isBuffer(a) ? a : Buffer.from(String(a));
   var bufB = Buffer.isBuffer(b) ? b : Buffer.from(String(b));
@@ -77,7 +203,39 @@ function timingSafeEqual(a, b) {
 // ===========================================================
 
 // ---- Hashing ----
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.sha3Hash
+ * @signature b.crypto.sha3Hash(data)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.hmacSha3, b.crypto.kdf, b.crypto.hashFile
+ *
+ * Returns the lowercase-hex SHA3-512 digest of the input. SHA3-512 is
+ * the framework's default hash — collision-resistant, sponge-based,
+ * and PQC-aligned (no quantum speedup beyond Grover's). Suitable for
+ * content fingerprints, integrity checks, derived-column inputs, and
+ * Merkle-tree leaves.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var digest = b.crypto.sha3Hash("hello world");
+ *   // → "75d527c368f2efe848ecf6b073a36767800805e9eef2b1857d5f984f036eb6df..."
+ */
 function sha3Hash(data) { return hash(data, "sha3-512").toString("hex"); }
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.hmacSha3
+ * @signature b.crypto.hmacSha3(key, data)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.sha3Hash, b.crypto.timingSafeEqual
+ *
+ * Returns the lowercase-hex HMAC-SHA3-512 of `data` keyed by `key`.
+ * Use for keyed integrity checks (webhook signatures, request
+ * authentication tags, audit-chain links). Pair with
+ * `b.crypto.timingSafeEqual` when comparing supplied vs computed tags.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var tag = b.crypto.hmacSha3("shared-secret", "POST /webhook|123");
+ *   // → "8f1c...d4e2" (128 hex chars, HMAC-SHA3-512 = 64 bytes)
+ */
 function hmacSha3(key, data) { return hmac(key, data, "sha3-512"); }
 
 // (SHA-1 is intentionally NOT exported from b.crypto. The framework's
@@ -89,8 +247,133 @@ function hmacSha3(key, data) { return hmac(key, data, "sha3-512"); }
 //  framework spent every other line keeping out.)
 
 // ---- KDF ----
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.kdf
+ * @signature b.crypto.kdf(input, outputLength)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.sha3Hash, b.crypto.generateBytes
+ *
+ * SHAKE256-based key derivation. Returns a Buffer of exactly
+ * `outputLength` bytes derived from `input`. SHAKE256 is an XOF
+ * (extendable-output function) — arbitrary output length without the
+ * truncation pitfalls of fixed-width SHA3 + slice. Used internally
+ * for envelope symmetric-key derivation; operators reach for it when
+ * they need application-specific subkeys with explicit length.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var seed = Buffer.from("master-secret|session-42", "utf8");
+ *   var subkey = b.crypto.kdf(seed, 32);
+ *   subkey.length;
+ *   // → 32 (32-byte XChaCha20 key)
+ */
 function kdf(input, outputLength) { return hash(input, "shake256", outputLength); }
 
+// ---- App-namespaced indexable hash (for derived-hash columns) ----
+//
+// b.crypto.namespaceHash(prefix, value) → hex-encoded SHA3-512 of
+// `prefix + ":" + value`. Operators wire this into derived-hash
+// columns (emailHash, certFpHash, externalIdHash) where the goal is
+// indexed exact-match lookup, NOT credential storage. Returns hex —
+// not the envelope-versioned base64 b.credentialHash.hash returns —
+// because hex strings are stable, indexable column values across
+// every database backend the framework supports.
+//
+// Why a separate primitive vs `b.crypto.sha3Hash(prefix + ":" + value)`:
+//   - Centralized prefix-shape validation (NUL/CR/LF rejection,
+//     length bound) — operator can't accidentally smuggle a
+//     framework-derived prefix through a user-controlled value.
+//   - Clear name documents the intent ("indexable namespace hash"
+//     vs "raw content digest"), so callers are less likely to
+//     reach for the credential-storage primitive when they want a
+//     read-only lookup hash.
+//
+// Read-only / deterministic — no audit emit (the input is operator-
+// supplied; the digest is the only observable side-effect, returned
+// to the caller). NUL / CR / LF in `prefix` are refused so an
+// operator can't smuggle a control sequence into framework or
+// downstream tooling that consumes the audit log; the bound on
+// `prefix` length prevents oversized namespace separators (the
+// framework's HASH_PREFIX entries are <= 16 bytes).
+var NAMESPACE_HASH_PREFIX_MAX_BYTES = 64;
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.namespaceHash
+ * @signature b.crypto.namespaceHash(prefix, value, opts)
+ * @since     0.6.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.sha3Hash, b.credentialHash.hash
+ *
+ * App-namespaced indexable SHA3-512 hash for derived-hash columns
+ * (emailHash, certFpHash, externalIdHash). Returns lowercase hex —
+ * stable, indexable column values across every supported database.
+ * Centralizes prefix-shape validation: NUL / CR / LF in `prefix` are
+ * refused outright, and `prefix` is bounded to 64 UTF-8 bytes so an
+ * operator can't smuggle log-injection or oversized labels into
+ * derived-column inputs. Use when the goal is exact-match lookup,
+ * NOT credential storage — for password-style storage use
+ * `b.credentialHash.hash`.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   reserved: object,   // accepted but ignored — reserved for a future algorithm-selection knob
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var emailHash = b.crypto.namespaceHash("email", "alice@example.com");
+ *   // → "1f3a...c08d" (128 hex chars, SHA3-512 of "email:alice@example.com")
+ *
+ *   var certFpHash = b.crypto.namespaceHash("cert-fp", Buffer.from([1, 2, 3, 4]));
+ *   // Buffer/Uint8Array values are coerced to UTF-8 string before hashing.
+ */
+function namespaceHash(prefix, value, opts) {
+  // opts reserved for future extension (algorithm selection); current
+  // surface is fixed to SHA3-512 — no operator demand for SHAKE256
+  // variable-length output here, since the indexed column shape is
+  // fixed-width hex.
+  if (opts && typeof opts !== "object") {
+    throw new TypeError("crypto.namespaceHash: opts must be a plain object when provided");
+  }
+  if (typeof prefix !== "string") {
+    throw new TypeError("crypto.namespaceHash: prefix must be a string");
+  }
+  if (prefix.length === 0) {
+    throw new TypeError("crypto.namespaceHash: prefix must be non-empty");
+  }
+  // Byte-length bound — operator's prefix is the namespace label and
+  // shouldn't bloat the hash input. Use Buffer.byteLength so multi-
+  // byte UTF-8 prefixes can't slip through a code-unit-only check.
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(prefix, "utf8") > NAMESPACE_HASH_PREFIX_MAX_BYTES) {
+    throw new TypeError(
+      "crypto.namespaceHash: prefix exceeds " + NAMESPACE_HASH_PREFIX_MAX_BYTES +
+      " bytes (UTF-8); operator-derived prefixes should be short labels"
+    );
+  }
+  // NUL / CR / LF in prefix — refuse outright. NUL truncates in many
+  // C-string consumers (audit-log path, downstream DB tooling); CR/LF
+  // smuggles log-injection patterns into anything that renders the
+  // prefix verbatim.
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+  if (/[\u0000\r\n]/.test(prefix)) {
+    throw new TypeError(
+      "crypto.namespaceHash: prefix contains NUL / CR / LF — refuse"
+    );
+  }
+  // value is the operator-supplied content. Coerce Buffer/Uint8Array
+  // to utf-8 string for concatenation; reject anything else so the
+  // caller surfaces the type error explicitly rather than silently
+  // hashing `[object Object]`.
+  var valueStr;
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    valueStr = value;
+  } else if (Buffer.isBuffer(value)) {
+    valueStr = value.toString("utf8");
+  } else if (value instanceof Uint8Array) {
+    valueStr = Buffer.from(value).toString("utf8");
+  } else {
+    throw new TypeError(
+      "crypto.namespaceHash: value must be a string, Buffer, or Uint8Array"
+    );
+  }
+  return hash(prefix + ":" + valueStr, "sha3-512").toString("hex");
+}
+
 // _suiteFixedInfo — NIST SP 800-56C r2 §4.1 OtherInfo / RFC 9180
 // (HPKE) §5.1 suite_id binding. Returns the byte string that the KDF
 // MUST absorb alongside the shared-secret(s) so a key derived under
@@ -105,7 +388,48 @@ function _suiteFixedInfo(kemId, cipherId, kdfId) {
 }
 
 // ---- Random ----
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.generateBytes
+ * @signature b.crypto.generateBytes(byteLength)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.generateToken, b.uuid.v4
+ *
+ * Cryptographically secure random Buffer of length `byteLength`
+ * (default 32). The bytes are SHAKE256(OS-RNG bytes) — defense-in-
+ * depth over `crypto.randomBytes` so a hypothetical OS-RNG weakness
+ * is not directly observable downstream. Use for session IDs, KDF
+ * salts, AEAD nonces, anything requiring unpredictable bytes.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var sessionId = b.crypto.generateBytes(16).toString("hex");
+ *   // → "5b8f2a4c7d1e9f0b3c6a8d2e4f7c1b5d" (32 hex chars, 16 random bytes)
+ *
+ *   var nonce = b.crypto.generateBytes(24);   // XChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce
+ *   nonce.length;
+ *   // → 24
+ */
 function generateBytes(byteLength) { return Buffer.from(random(byteLength)); }
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.generateToken
+ * @signature b.crypto.generateToken(byteLength)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.generateBytes, b.uuid.v4
+ *
+ * Hex-encoded random token. Same entropy source as `generateBytes`
+ * (SHAKE256 over OS-RNG bytes) but returned as a lowercase hex string
+ * — convenient for HTTP headers, URL parameters, log fields, or any
+ * context where a Buffer would need to be encoded anyway. Default
+ * `byteLength` is 32 (64 hex chars, ~256 bits of entropy).
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var token = b.crypto.generateToken();
+ *   token.length;
+ *   // → 64 (32 bytes hex-encoded)
+ *
+ *   var shortId = b.crypto.generateToken(8);
+ *   // → "a3f9...b1" (16 hex chars, 8 random bytes)
+ */
 function generateToken(byteLength) { return random(byteLength || 32).toString("hex"); }
 
 // ---- Subresource Integrity (W3C SRI 1.0) ----
@@ -127,6 +451,32 @@ function generateToken(byteLength) { return random(byteLength || 32).toString("h
 //   → "sha384-X1... sha384-X2..."   (per W3C §3.3 multi-integrity)
 var SRI_ALGORITHMS = { "sha256": "sha256", "sha384": "sha384", "sha512": "sha512" };
 
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.sri
+ * @signature b.crypto.sri(content, opts)
+ * @since     0.5.0
+ * @related   b.staticServe
+ *
+ * Computes a W3C Subresource Integrity 1.0 attribute string —
+ * `sha###-base64` — that operators paste into `<script integrity>` or
+ * `<link integrity>` tags. Defends against CDN compromise and ISP
+ * MITM injection: the browser refuses to load the resource when its
+ * computed hash diverges from the integrity attribute. SRI 1.0 §3.2
+ * supports sha256 / sha384 / sha512; sha384 is the recommended
+ * default (collision margin without sha512's 64-byte overhead). Pass
+ * an array of contents to emit multiple integrity tokens space-
+ * separated per §3.3 (browser picks the strongest it recognizes).
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   algorithm: string,   // "sha256" | "sha384" | "sha512" — default "sha384"
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var attr = b.crypto.sri(Buffer.from("alert(1);", "utf8"), { algorithm: "sha384" });
+ *   // → "sha384-pNdyOuHIPKgRPnYJTBxEEEZcJj1qHxJzNheCuHGRy3Cm0UpVbcnruIvMRIs5VcDb"
+ *
+ *   var multi = b.crypto.sri(["payload-a", "payload-b"], { algorithm: "sha512" });
+ *   // → "sha512-... sha512-..." (two tokens, space-separated)
+ */
 function sri(content, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   var algorithm = (opts.algorithm || "sha384").toLowerCase();
@@ -149,6 +499,31 @@ function sri(content, opts) {
 }
 
 // ---- Key generation ----
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair
+ * @signature b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair()
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.encrypt, b.crypto.decrypt, b.crypto.generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair
+ *
+ * Generates a hybrid recipient keypair for `b.crypto.encrypt`:
+ * ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203 PQC KEM) plus ECDH P-384 (classical defense-
+ * in-depth). Returns `{ publicKey, privateKey, ecPublicKey,
+ * ecPrivateKey }` — all four PEMs. Persist the private halves in
+ * sealed storage; publish the public halves to recipients. The
+ * framework default for at-rest envelopes and api-encrypt strategies.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair();
+ *   var sealed = b.crypto.encrypt("secret payload", {
+ *     publicKey:    pair.publicKey,
+ *     ecPublicKey:  pair.ecPublicKey,
+ *   });
+ *   var roundTrip = b.crypto.decrypt(sealed, {
+ *     privateKey:    pair.privateKey,
+ *     ecPrivateKey:  pair.ecPrivateKey,
+ *   });
+ *   // → "secret payload"
+ */
 function generateEncryptionKeyPair() {
   var mlkem = generateKeyPair("ml-kem-1024");
   var ec = generateKeyPair("ec", { namedCurve: "P-384" });
@@ -160,15 +535,76 @@ function generateEncryptionKeyPair() {
   };
 }
 
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair
+ * @signature b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair(algorithm)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.sign, b.crypto.verify
+ *
+ * Generates a PQC signature keypair. Default algorithm is `ml-dsa-87`
+ * (FIPS 204 — lattice-based, fast verify); pass `slh-dsa-shake-256f`
+ * for hash-based signatures (larger, slower, but minimal cryptographic
+ * assumptions — useful for long-lived audit-chain keys). Returns
+ * `{ publicKey, privateKey }` PEMs. The signing primitives auto-
+ * detect the algorithm from the key PEM, so callers don't need to
+ * pass it explicitly to `sign` / `verify`.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair();
+ *   var sig = b.crypto.sign("audit:row=42|action=delete", pair.privateKey);
+ *   var ok  = b.crypto.verify("audit:row=42|action=delete", sig, pair.publicKey);
+ *   // → true
+ *
+ *   // Hash-based alternative:
+ *   var slh = b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair("slh-dsa-shake-256f");
+ */
 function generateSigningKeyPair(algorithm) {
   return generateKeyPair(algorithm || "ml-dsa-87");
 }
 
 // ---- Signatures (auto-detect algorithm from key PEM) ----
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.sign
+ * @signature b.crypto.sign(data, privateKeyPem)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.verify, b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair
+ *
+ * Produces a PQC signature over `data`. Algorithm is auto-detected
+ * from the private-key PEM (ML-DSA-87 lattice / SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f
+ * hash-based). Returns a Buffer. Pair with `b.crypto.verify` on the
+ * recipient side; use for audit-chain links, webhook tags,
+ * cross-service request signatures.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair();
+ *   var sig = b.crypto.sign("payload-to-sign", pair.privateKey);
+ *   sig.length > 0;
+ *   // → true (ML-DSA-87 signature ~ 4627 bytes)
+ */
 function sign(data, privateKeyPem) {
   return nodeCrypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(data), privateKeyPem);
 }
 
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.verify
+ * @signature b.crypto.verify(data, signature, publicKeyPem)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.sign, b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair
+ *
+ * Verifies a signature produced by `b.crypto.sign`. Returns `true` on
+ * a valid signature, `false` otherwise — never throws on a malformed
+ * signature, so operators don't need to wrap the call. Algorithm is
+ * auto-detected from the public-key PEM.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair();
+ *   var sig  = b.crypto.sign("hello", pair.privateKey);
+ *   var ok   = b.crypto.verify("hello", sig, pair.publicKey);
+ *   // → true
+ *
+ *   var tampered = b.crypto.verify("HELLO", sig, pair.publicKey);
+ *   // → false (data mismatch)
+ */
 function verify(data, signature, publicKeyPem) {
   return nodeCrypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(data), publicKeyPem, signature);
 }
@@ -181,6 +617,38 @@ function verify(data, signature, publicKeyPem) {
 var _hybridDisabledAuditEmitted = false;
 
 // ---- Envelope encrypt (ML-KEM-1024 + P-384 ECDH hybrid + SHAKE256 + XChaCha20) ----
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.encrypt
+ * @signature b.crypto.encrypt(plaintext, publicKeys)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.decrypt, b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair, b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519
+ *
+ * Seals `plaintext` into a base64 envelope under the recipient's
+ * keypair. Default suite is ML-KEM-1024 + ECDH P-384 hybrid (FIPS 203
+ * KEM with classical defense-in-depth) plus SHAKE256 KDF and
+ * XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD. The 4-byte envelope header (magic + KEM
+ * ID + cipher ID + KDF ID) is bound as AEAD AAD so an algorithm-
+ * substitution attack on the header fails Poly1305 verification.
+ * Pass `{ publicKey, ecPublicKey }` for the hybrid path; passing only
+ * an ML-KEM PEM falls back to KEM-only and emits a one-shot
+ * `system.crypto.hybrid_disabled` audit (operators wanting the silent
+ * KEM-only path call `encryptMlkem768X25519` or seal manually).
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair();
+ *   var sealed = b.crypto.encrypt("PHI: patient-42 dx=...", {
+ *     publicKey:    pair.publicKey,
+ *     ecPublicKey:  pair.ecPublicKey,
+ *   });
+ *   typeof sealed;
+ *   // → "string" (base64 envelope)
+ *
+ *   var plain = b.crypto.decrypt(sealed, {
+ *     privateKey:    pair.privateKey,
+ *     ecPrivateKey:  pair.ecPrivateKey,
+ *   });
+ *   // → "PHI: patient-42 dx=..."
+ */
 function encrypt(plaintext, publicKeys) {
   var mlkemPubPem = typeof publicKeys === "string" ? publicKeys : publicKeys.publicKey;
   var ecPubPem = typeof publicKeys === "string" ? null : publicKeys.ecPublicKey;
@@ -256,6 +724,33 @@ function encryptMlkemOnly(plaintext, publicKeyPem) {
 }
 
 // ---- Envelope decrypt (dispatches on envelope IDs, supports both KEM IDs) ----
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.decrypt
+ * @signature b.crypto.decrypt(ciphertext, privateKeys)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.encrypt, b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair, b.crypto.decryptMlkem768X25519
+ *
+ * Opens a base64 envelope produced by `b.crypto.encrypt`. The
+ * envelope header is parsed first and the decrypt path dispatches by
+ * KEM ID — ML-KEM-1024 + P-384, ML-KEM-1024 KEM-only, or ML-KEM-768 +
+ * X25519 — so old envelopes continue to decrypt under whichever suite
+ * sealed them while new writes use the active suite. Throws on
+ * malformed magic, unsupported cipher / KDF, or Poly1305 tag failure.
+ * Pass `{ privateKey, ecPrivateKey }` for the default hybrid; the
+ * ML-KEM-768 + X25519 KEM ID also requires `x25519PrivateKey`.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair();
+ *   var sealed = b.crypto.encrypt("session-token=abc123", {
+ *     publicKey:    pair.publicKey,
+ *     ecPublicKey:  pair.ecPublicKey,
+ *   });
+ *   var opened = b.crypto.decrypt(sealed, {
+ *     privateKey:    pair.privateKey,
+ *     ecPrivateKey:  pair.ecPrivateKey,
+ *   });
+ *   // → "session-token=abc123"
+ */
 function decrypt(ciphertext, privateKeys) {
   var packed = Buffer.from(ciphertext, "base64");
   if (packed[0] === 0xE1) {                                                       // allow:raw-byte-literal — legacy envelope magic
@@ -339,6 +834,32 @@ function decryptEnvelope(packed, privateKeys) {
 // binding (b.breakGlass.encryptCell binds (table, rowId, column) so a
 // ciphertext from row A literally cannot decrypt as row B even with
 // the same key).
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.encryptPacked
+ * @signature b.crypto.encryptPacked(buffer, key, aad)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.decryptPacked, b.crypto.encrypt
+ *
+ * Symmetric (key-already-known) authenticated encryption. Returns a
+ * self-describing Buffer: 1-byte format ID + 24-byte XChaCha20-
+ * Poly1305 nonce + ciphertext+tag. Operators who already hold a
+ * symmetric key (sealed-storage cell encryption, break-glass row
+ * encryption) reach for this instead of the envelope variants. The
+ * optional `aad` (additional authenticated data) is mixed into the
+ * Poly1305 tag; encrypt-time and decrypt-time AAD must match exactly
+ * or decryption fails. Wire it for context-binding (e.g. `(table,
+ * rowId, column)` so a ciphertext from row A literally cannot decrypt
+ * as row B even with the same key).
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var key  = b.crypto.generateBytes(32);
+ *   var data = Buffer.from("row-42 column-ssn", "utf8");
+ *   var aad  = Buffer.from("patients|42|ssn", "utf8");
+ *   var packed = b.crypto.encryptPacked(data, key, aad);
+ *   var plain  = b.crypto.decryptPacked(packed, key, aad);
+ *   plain.toString("utf8");
+ *   // → "row-42 column-ssn"
+ */
 function encryptPacked(buffer, key, aad) {
   var nonce = random(C.BYTES.bytes(24));
   var ct = xchacha20poly1305(key, nonce, aad ? Buffer.from(aad) : undefined).encrypt(buffer);
@@ -349,6 +870,26 @@ function encryptPacked(buffer, key, aad) {
   ]);
 }
 
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.decryptPacked
+ * @signature b.crypto.decryptPacked(packed, key, aad)
+ * @since     0.1.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.encryptPacked
+ *
+ * Inverse of `encryptPacked`. Reads the 1-byte format ID, extracts
+ * the 24-byte XChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce, and decrypts the trailing
+ * ciphertext under `key` + `aad`. Throws on unsupported format byte
+ * or AAD / tag mismatch — operators wrap when a graceful per-cell
+ * fallback is required.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var key  = b.crypto.generateBytes(32);
+ *   var aad  = Buffer.from("audit|2026-05-08", "utf8");
+ *   var pkt  = b.crypto.encryptPacked(Buffer.from("hello", "utf8"), key, aad);
+ *   var open = b.crypto.decryptPacked(pkt, key, aad);
+ *   open.toString("utf8");
+ *   // → "hello"
+ */
 function decryptPacked(packed, key, aad) {
   if (packed[0] !== C.FORMAT.XCHACHA20_POLY1305) {
     throw new Error("Invalid packed format: unsupported version");
@@ -384,6 +925,32 @@ function decryptPacked(packed, key, aad) {
 // x25519PrivateKey } — privateKey is the ML-KEM-768 PEM, NOT the
 // default ML-KEM-1024.
 
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair
+ * @signature b.crypto.generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair()
+ * @since     0.7.28
+ * @related   b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519, b.crypto.decryptMlkem768X25519, b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair
+ *
+ * Generates the IETF / Cloudflare / Chrome TLS 1.3 hybrid keypair
+ * (codepoint 0x11EC): ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) + X25519 (RFC 7748).
+ * Smaller payload than ML-KEM-1024 + P-384 (~1.1 KB vs ~1.6 KB) and
+ * wider interop with peers using the same hybrid (Cloudflare
+ * Workers, Chrome, browsers offering hybrid PQ key share). Returns
+ * `{ mlkemPublicKey, mlkemPrivateKey, x25519PublicKey,
+ * x25519PrivateKey }`.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = b.crypto.generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair();
+ *   var sealed = b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519("interop payload", {
+ *     mlkemPublicKey:   pair.mlkemPublicKey,
+ *     x25519PublicKey:  pair.x25519PublicKey,
+ *   });
+ *   var plain = b.crypto.decryptMlkem768X25519(sealed, {
+ *     privateKey:       pair.mlkemPrivateKey,
+ *     x25519PrivateKey: pair.x25519PrivateKey,
+ *   });
+ *   // → "interop payload"
+ */
 function generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair() {
   var mlkem = generateKeyPair("ml-kem-768");
   var x25519 = generateKeyPair("x25519");
@@ -395,6 +962,30 @@ function generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair() {
   };
 }
 
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519
+ * @signature b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519(plaintext, recipient)
+ * @since     0.7.28
+ * @related   b.crypto.decryptMlkem768X25519, b.crypto.encrypt, b.crypto.generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair
+ *
+ * Seals `plaintext` under the IETF / Cloudflare / Chrome TLS 1.3
+ * hybrid (ML-KEM-768 + X25519). Recipient shape is
+ * `{ mlkemPublicKey, x25519PublicKey }` — both PEMs. Same envelope
+ * wire format as the default hybrid; the KEM ID byte is
+ * `KEM_IDS.ML_KEM_768_X25519` so `b.crypto.decrypt` dispatches
+ * correctly on the receive side. Reach for this when the recipient
+ * publishes ML-KEM-768 + X25519 keys (TLS-1.3 codepoint 0x11EC peers,
+ * cross-stack interop with Cloudflare Workers or Chrome-side WebCrypto).
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = b.crypto.generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair();
+ *   var sealed = b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519("cross-stack message", {
+ *     mlkemPublicKey:   pair.mlkemPublicKey,
+ *     x25519PublicKey:  pair.x25519PublicKey,
+ *   });
+ *   typeof sealed;
+ *   // → "string" (base64 envelope, ~1.1 KB for short plaintexts)
+ */
 function encryptMlkem768X25519(plaintext, recipient) {
   if (!recipient || !recipient.mlkemPublicKey || !recipient.x25519PublicKey) {
     throw new Error("encryptMlkem768X25519 requires { mlkemPublicKey, x25519PublicKey }");
@@ -440,6 +1031,31 @@ function encryptMlkem768X25519(plaintext, recipient) {
 //
 //   recipient: { privateKey, x25519PrivateKey }   — operator's keys
 //   ciphertext: base64 envelope from encryptMlkem768X25519
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.decryptMlkem768X25519
+ * @signature b.crypto.decryptMlkem768X25519(ciphertext, recipient)
+ * @since     0.7.28
+ * @related   b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519, b.crypto.decrypt
+ *
+ * Symmetric named-pair to `encryptMlkem768X25519`. Rejects any
+ * envelope whose KEM ID byte is not `ML_KEM_768_X25519` so an
+ * operator who calls this with a ciphertext sealed under a different
+ * algorithm gets a clear error rather than the generic dispatch path.
+ * Recipient shape is `{ privateKey, x25519PrivateKey }` — `privateKey`
+ * is the ML-KEM-768 PEM, NOT the framework default ML-KEM-1024.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var pair = b.crypto.generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair();
+ *   var sealed = b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519("interop", {
+ *     mlkemPublicKey:   pair.mlkemPublicKey,
+ *     x25519PublicKey:  pair.x25519PublicKey,
+ *   });
+ *   var plain = b.crypto.decryptMlkem768X25519(sealed, {
+ *     privateKey:       pair.mlkemPrivateKey,
+ *     x25519PrivateKey: pair.x25519PrivateKey,
+ *   });
+ *   // → "interop"
+ */
 function decryptMlkem768X25519(ciphertext, recipient) {
   if (!recipient || typeof recipient !== "object" ||
       !recipient.privateKey || !recipient.x25519PrivateKey) {
@@ -501,6 +1117,36 @@ function _extractEcdhP384FromCert(certDer) {
 //     peerCertDer:    Buffer | Uint8Array,    // peer's TLS cert (DER)
 //     peerKemPubkey:  string,                  // peer's ML-KEM-1024 pubkey PEM
 //   });
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.encryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer
+ * @signature b.crypto.encryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer(plaintext, opts)
+ * @since     0.7.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.decryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer, b.crypto.encrypt
+ *
+ * Produces an envelope sealed to a peer identified by their TLS cert
+ * (P-384 ECDH half) plus a peer-supplied ML-KEM-1024 pubkey. The wire
+ * format is identical to `b.crypto.encrypt` — only the input keys
+ * differ. Use for sealed-storage records with peer recipients,
+ * cross-service messages between cert-identified peers without a
+ * shared framework keypair, or audit-log entries tagged with peer
+ * recipients. The cert must carry an ECDH P-384 SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+ * — anything else throws `crypto/cert-key-not-ecdh-p384`.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   peerCertDer:    Buffer,   // peer's TLS cert as DER bytes (Buffer or Uint8Array)
+ *   peerKemPubkey:  string,   // peer's ML-KEM-1024 pubkey PEM (non-empty string)
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var fs = require("fs");
+ *   var peerCertDer   = fs.readFileSync("/etc/ssl/peer.cert.der");
+ *   var peerKemPubkey = fs.readFileSync("/etc/ssl/peer.mlkem.pem", "utf8");
+ *   var sealed = b.crypto.encryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer("cross-peer payload", {
+ *     peerCertDer:    peerCertDer,
+ *     peerKemPubkey:  peerKemPubkey,
+ *   });
+ *   typeof sealed;
+ *   // → "string" (base64 envelope)
+ */
 function encryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer(plaintext, opts) {
   if (!opts || typeof opts !== "object") {
     throw new Error("encryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer: opts object required");
@@ -534,6 +1180,35 @@ function encryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer(plaintext, opts) {
 //     certPrivateKey: KeyObject | string,    // this operator's cert P-384 priv
 //     kemSecret:      string,                 // this operator's ML-KEM-1024 priv PEM
 //   });
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.decryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer
+ * @signature b.crypto.decryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer(envelope, opts)
+ * @since     0.7.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.encryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer, b.crypto.decrypt
+ *
+ * Decrypts an envelope sealed to this operator's TLS cert ECDH-pubkey
+ * + ML-KEM-1024 pubkey. `certPrivateKey` accepts either a node:crypto
+ * `KeyObject` (ECDH P-384, namedCurve secp384r1) or its PEM-encoded
+ * pkcs8 string; `kemSecret` is always the ML-KEM-1024 PEM. A non-
+ * P-384 cert key throws `crypto/cert-key-not-ecdh-p384`. Mirror of
+ * `encryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer` for the receive side.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   certPrivateKey: object,   // KeyObject or PEM string — ECDH P-384 priv (secp384r1)
+ *   kemSecret:      string,   // operator's ML-KEM-1024 priv PEM (non-empty)
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var fs = require("fs");
+ *   var ourCertPriv  = fs.readFileSync("/etc/ssl/our.cert.key.pem", "utf8");
+ *   var ourKemSecret = fs.readFileSync("/etc/ssl/our.mlkem.priv.pem", "utf8");
+ *   var sealed = "AaECA..."; // base64 envelope received from peer
+ *   var plain = b.crypto.decryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer(sealed, {
+ *     certPrivateKey: ourCertPriv,
+ *     kemSecret:      ourKemSecret,
+ *   });
+ *   typeof plain;
+ *   // → "string"
+ */
 function decryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer(envelope, opts) {
   if (!opts || typeof opts !== "object") {
     throw new Error("decryptEnvelopeAsCertPeer: opts object required");
@@ -608,6 +1283,30 @@ function _pemToDer(pemOrDer) {
   }
   return Buffer.from(match[1].replace(/\s+/g, ""), "base64");
 }
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.hashCertFingerprint
+ * @signature b.crypto.hashCertFingerprint(pemOrDer)
+ * @since     0.7.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.isCertRevoked, b.crypto.sha3Hash
+ *
+ * Computes a stable SHA3-512 fingerprint of an X.509 certificate.
+ * Accepts either DER bytes (Buffer) or a PEM string (BEGIN/END
+ * envelope is stripped, base64 body decoded). Returns
+ * `{ hex, colon }` so callers can compare against either rendering
+ * style — lowercase hex (concise, log-friendly) or uppercase
+ * colon-separated hex (matches `openssl x509 -fingerprint` output
+ * shape). Use for peer-cert pinning, mTLS bootstrap allowlists,
+ * webhook verification, certificate-transparency cross-checks.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var fs = require("fs");
+ *   var pem = fs.readFileSync("/etc/ssl/peer.cert.pem", "utf8");
+ *   var fp  = b.crypto.hashCertFingerprint(pem);
+ *   fp.hex.length;
+ *   // → 128 (SHA3-512 = 64 bytes hex-encoded)
+ *   fp.colon.split(":").length;
+ *   // → 64 (one byte per group)
+ */
 function hashCertFingerprint(pemOrDer) {
   var der = _pemToDer(pemOrDer);
   var digest = hash(der, "sha3-512");
@@ -622,6 +1321,26 @@ function hashCertFingerprint(pemOrDer) {
 // fingerprints. Allowlist entries may be the colon form, the lower-
 // case hex form, or both — every comparison runs through
 // timingSafeEqual to avoid leaking which entry matched.
+/**
+ * @primitive b.crypto.isCertRevoked
+ * @signature b.crypto.isCertRevoked(pemOrDer, denyList)
+ * @since     0.7.0
+ * @related   b.crypto.hashCertFingerprint, b.crypto.timingSafeEqual
+ *
+ * Returns `true` when the cert's SHA3-512 fingerprint matches any
+ * entry in `denyList`. `denyList` entries may be the colon-separated
+ * uppercase hex form, the lowercase hex form, or both — every
+ * comparison runs through `crypto.timingSafeEqual` so the answer
+ * doesn't leak which entry matched. Use for cert-transparency-style
+ * deny lists, revoked-peer sweeps, or compromised-CA blocking.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var fs   = require("fs");
+ *   var pem  = fs.readFileSync("/etc/ssl/peer.cert.pem", "utf8");
+ *   var deny = ["DEADBEEF:CAFEBABE:1234:5678:..."];
+ *   var revoked = b.crypto.isCertRevoked(pem, deny);
+ *   // → false (when the fingerprint is not in the deny list)
+ */
 function isCertRevoked(pemOrDer, denyList) {
   if (!Array.isArray(denyList)) {
     throw new TypeError("crypto.isCertRevoked: denyList must be an array of fingerprint strings");
@@ -654,6 +1373,9 @@ module.exports = {
   // Hashing
   sha3Hash:                    sha3Hash,
   hmacSha3:                    hmacSha3,
+  hashFile:                    hashFile,
+  hashStream:                  hashStream,
+  namespaceHash:               namespaceHash,
   kdf:                         kdf,
   // Comparison
   timingSafeEqual:             timingSafeEqual,