@blamejs/core 0.8.42 → 0.8.49

package/lib/keychain.js

@@ -0,0 +1,865 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * @module b.keychain
+ * @nav    Crypto
+ * @title  Keychain
+ *
+ * @intro
+ *   OS keychain abstraction with encrypted-file fallback — stores /
+ *   retrieves / removes a `(service, account) -> password` binding via
+ *   the host operating system's native credential store. Operators
+ *   reach for this from CLI bootstraps that need to materialize a
+ *   database password, outbound webhook secret, SMTP relay credential,
+ *   etc., without baking the value into a config file or env var.
+ *
+ *   Backend dispatch:
+ *     - macOS    -> `/usr/bin/security` (add-/find-/delete-generic-password)
+ *     - Linux    -> `secret-tool` from libsecret; password on stdin so
+ *                   it never reaches /proc/<pid>/cmdline
+ *     - Windows  -> PowerShell + the CredentialManager module; password
+ *                   on stdin via [Console]::In.ReadToEnd(). Falls through
+ *                   to the file backend when CredentialManager is absent
+ *     - File     -> XChaCha20-Poly1305-sealed JSON whose KEK is derived
+ *                   via Argon2id from `opts.passphrase`. Wrap format is
+ *                   shared with `b.vault.wrap` (magic 0xE2). File mode
+ *                   0o600, atomic via `b.atomicFile.write`.
+ *
+ *   Process-list-safety: every native-tool invocation passes the
+ *   password on stdin. macOS `security` is invoked with `-w -` (the
+ *   documented stdin sentinel); secret-tool always reads from stdin;
+ *   PowerShell scripts use `[Console]::In.ReadToEnd()`. The plaintext
+ *   never crosses argv on any backend.
+ *
+ *   Validation tier: config-time / entry-point. Bad opts throw
+ *   `KeychainError` synchronously; native-tool failures surface as
+ *   `KeychainError` with the tool's stderr included.
+ *
+ *   Audit: every call emits one of `keychain.stored` / `keychain.retrieved`
+ *   / `keychain.removed` (or the `.failed` sibling). Audit metadata
+ *   records service / account / backend / outcome. The password value
+ *   is never audited.
+ *
+ * @card
+ *   OS keychain abstraction with encrypted-file fallback — stores / retrieves / removes a `(service, account) -> password` binding via the host operating system's native credential store.
+ */
+
+var fs = require("fs");
+var path = require("path");
+
+var atomicFile = require("./atomic-file");
+var C = require("./constants");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var processSpawn = require("./process-spawn");
+var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
+var safeEnv = require("./parsers/safe-env");
+var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var vaultWrap = require("./vault/wrap");
+var { FrameworkError, KeychainError } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
+
+// ---- Backend detection -----------------------------------------------------
+
+// Cached per-process so multiple calls don't re-stat /usr/bin/security
+// on every invocation. Detection is best-effort — `null` means "fall
+// through to the next backend / file fallback".
+var _cachedBackend = null;
+
+function _detectBackend() {
+  if (_cachedBackend !== null) return _cachedBackend;
+  var p = process.platform;
+  if (p === "darwin") {
+    if (_existsExecutable("/usr/bin/security")) {
+      _cachedBackend = "macos-security";
+      return _cachedBackend;
+    }
+  } else if (p === "linux") {
+    if (_resolveOnPath("secret-tool")) {
+      _cachedBackend = "linux-secret-tool";
+      return _cachedBackend;
+    }
+  } else if (p === "win32") {
+    if (_resolveOnPath("powershell.exe") || _resolveOnPath("pwsh.exe")) {
+      _cachedBackend = "windows-credential";
+      return _cachedBackend;
+    }
+  }
+  _cachedBackend = null;
+  return null;
+}
+
+function _existsExecutable(filepath) {
+  try {
+    var st = fs.statSync(filepath);
+    return st.isFile();
+  } catch (_e) { return false; }
+}
+
+// Allowlist of bin names this module is permitted to resolve on PATH.
+// Frozen so a future caller can't smuggle an attacker-controlled name
+// through _resolveOnPath — the lookup is gated by hardcoded membership
+// in this set, not by any operator-supplied opts.
+var _PATH_RESOLVE_ALLOWLIST = Object.freeze({
+  "secret-tool":    true,
+  "powershell.exe": true,
+  "pwsh.exe":       true,
+});
+
+function _resolveOnPath(binName) {
+  if (typeof binName !== "string" || _PATH_RESOLVE_ALLOWLIST[binName] !== true) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  // Reject any bin name with a path separator — defense in depth on top
+  // of the allowlist; a future contributor adding to the allowlist
+  // can't accidentally land a value with a "/" or "\" in it.
+  if (binName.indexOf("/") !== -1 || binName.indexOf("\\") !== -1) return null;
+  // Windows env vars are case-insensitive; Node populates both PATH and Path.
+  // safeEnv.readVar gates each by name with the standard size cap.
+  var pathEnv = safeEnv.readVar("PATH",  { default: "" }) ||
+                safeEnv.readVar("Path",  { default: "" }) ||
+                "";
+  var sep = process.platform === "win32" ? ";" : ":";
+  var parts = pathEnv.split(sep);
+  for (var i = 0; i < parts.length; i += 1) {
+    var dir = parts[i];
+    if (typeof dir !== "string" || dir.length === 0) continue;
+    var candidate = path.join(dir, binName);
+    if (_existsExecutable(candidate)) return candidate;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+// ---- Opts validation -------------------------------------------------------
+
+function _validateCommonOpts(opts, primitive) {
+  if (opts == null || typeof opts !== "object") {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/bad-opts",
+      primitive + ": opts must be an object");
+  }
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "service", "account", "password", "fallbackFile", "passphrase",
+    "preferFile", "audit",
+  ], primitive);
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.service, "service",
+    KeychainError, "keychain/bad-service");
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.account, "account",
+    KeychainError, "keychain/bad-account");
+  // Service / account names cross argv on every native backend. Refuse
+  // newline / null bytes universally — they enable command injection on
+  // secret-tool's attribute-list parser and embed-an-extra-key on
+  // PowerShell's -Target string.
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+  if (/[\u0000\r\n]/.test(opts.service) || /[\u0000\r\n]/.test(opts.account)) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/bad-identifier",
+      primitive + ": service/account must not contain null or newline bytes");
+  }
+}
+
+function _validateFallbackFile(filepath, primitive) {
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(filepath, "fallbackFile",
+    KeychainError, "keychain/bad-fallback-file");
+  if (!path.isAbsolute(filepath)) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/relative-fallback-file",
+      primitive + ": fallbackFile must be an absolute path; got " + filepath);
+  }
+}
+
+// ---- File-fallback I/O -----------------------------------------------------
+//
+// File format: vault.wrap-sealed buffer whose plaintext is a canonical
+// JSON document of the shape
+//
+//   { version: 1, entries: { "<service>\u0000<account>": "<password>" } }
+//
+// One file holds every binding for the operator's process. Atomic
+// rename on every write (atomicFile.write) so a crash never leaves a
+// half-written ciphertext at `fallbackFile`.
+
+var FILE_FORMAT_VERSION = 1;
+var FILE_KEY_SEPARATOR = "\u0000";
+
+function _bindingKey(service, account) {
+  return service + FILE_KEY_SEPARATOR + account;
+}
+
+async function _readFile(fallbackFile, passphrase) {
+  if (!atomicFile.exists(fallbackFile)) {
+    return { version: FILE_FORMAT_VERSION, entries: {} };
+  }
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(passphrase, "passphrase",
+    KeychainError, "keychain/file-passphrase-required");
+  var sealed = await atomicFile.read(fallbackFile, {
+    maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(4),
+  });
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(sealed)) sealed = Buffer.from(sealed);
+  var pwBuf = Buffer.from(String(passphrase), "utf8");
+  var plaintext;
+  try {
+    plaintext = await vaultWrap.unwrap(sealed, pwBuf);
+  } catch (_e) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/file-unseal-failed",
+      "fallback file passphrase rejected or file corrupted");
+  } finally {
+    safeBuffer.secureZero(pwBuf);
+  }
+  var doc;
+  try {
+    doc = safeJson.parse(plaintext.toString("utf8"));
+  } catch (_e) {
+    safeBuffer.secureZero(plaintext);
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/file-bad-shape",
+      "fallback file payload is not valid JSON");
+  }
+  safeBuffer.secureZero(plaintext);
+  if (!doc || typeof doc !== "object" || doc.version !== FILE_FORMAT_VERSION ||
+      !doc.entries || typeof doc.entries !== "object") {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/file-bad-shape",
+      "fallback file is not a keychain document");
+  }
+  return doc;
+}
+
+async function _writeFile(fallbackFile, doc, passphrase) {
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(passphrase, "passphrase",
+    KeychainError, "keychain/file-passphrase-required");
+  var serialized = Buffer.from(safeJson.canonical(doc), "utf8");
+  var pwBuf = Buffer.from(String(passphrase), "utf8");
+  var sealed;
+  try {
+    sealed = await vaultWrap.wrap(serialized, pwBuf);
+  } finally {
+    safeBuffer.secureZero(pwBuf);
+    safeBuffer.secureZero(serialized);
+  }
+  // atomicFile.write enforces 0o600 by default and writes via
+  // temp + fsync + rename so a crash never leaves a partial file.
+  await atomicFile.write(fallbackFile, sealed, { fileMode: 0o600 });
+}
+
+// ---- Native-backend invocations -------------------------------------------
+
+// Drain a stream into a Buffer, honoring an upper byte cap so a
+// runaway tool can't OOM the framework.
+function _drain(stream, capBytes) {
+  return new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {
+    if (!stream) { resolve(Buffer.alloc(0)); return; }
+    var collector = safeBuffer.boundedChunkCollector({
+      maxBytes:    capBytes,
+      errorClass:  KeychainError,
+      sizeCode:    "keychain/native-output-too-large",
+      sizeMessage: "native tool output exceeded " + capBytes + " bytes",
+    });
+    stream.on("data", function (chunk) {
+      try {
+        collector.push(chunk);
+      } catch (e) {
+        try { stream.destroy(); } catch (_e) { /* destroy best-effort */ }
+        reject(e);
+      }
+    });
+    stream.on("end",   function () { resolve(collector.result()); });
+    stream.on("error", function (e) { reject(e); });
+  });
+}
+
+function _runNative(command, args, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  var stdinBuf = opts.stdin == null ? null
+                 : (Buffer.isBuffer(opts.stdin) ? opts.stdin : Buffer.from(String(opts.stdin), "utf8"));
+  return new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {
+    var child;
+    try {
+      child = processSpawn.spawn(command, args || [], {
+        stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
+      });
+    } catch (e) { reject(e); return; }
+
+    var stdoutCap = opts.maxStdoutBytes || C.BYTES.mib(1);
+    var stderrCap = opts.maxStderrBytes || C.BYTES.kib(64);
+    var settled   = false;
+    var outP = _drain(child.stdout, stdoutCap);
+    var errP = _drain(child.stderr, stderrCap);
+
+    child.on("error", function (e) {
+      if (settled) return;
+      settled = true;
+      if (stdinBuf) safeBuffer.secureZero(stdinBuf);
+      reject(e);
+    });
+
+    child.on("close", function (code, signal) {
+      Promise.all([outP, errP]).then(function (bufs) {
+        if (settled) return;
+        settled = true;
+        if (stdinBuf) safeBuffer.secureZero(stdinBuf);
+        resolve({
+          code:   typeof code === "number" ? code : -1,
+          signal: signal || null,
+          stdout: bufs[0],
+          stderr: bufs[1],
+        });
+      }, function (e) {
+        if (settled) return;
+        settled = true;
+        if (stdinBuf) safeBuffer.secureZero(stdinBuf);
+        reject(e);
+      });
+    });
+
+    if (stdinBuf && child.stdin) {
+      try {
+        child.stdin.on("error", function (_e) { /* broken pipe is fine */ });
+        child.stdin.end(stdinBuf);
+      } catch (_e) { /* tool may have closed stdin already */ }
+    } else if (child.stdin) {
+      try { child.stdin.end(); } catch (_e) { /* close best-effort */ }
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+// ---- macOS: /usr/bin/security ---------------------------------------------
+//
+// add-generic-password supports `-w -` to read the password from stdin
+// (man security(1) — "If pre-existing or read with -w -, the password
+// is read from stdin"). The single dash is the documented sentinel.
+
+async function _macStore(service, account, password) {
+  var r = await _runNative("/usr/bin/security", [
+    "add-generic-password",
+    "-s", service,
+    "-a", account,
+    "-w", "-",   // read password from stdin
+    "-U",        // update if exists
+  ], { stdin: password });
+  if (r.code !== 0) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/macos-store-failed",
+      "security add-generic-password exited " + r.code + ": " +
+      r.stderr.toString("utf8").trim());
+  }
+}
+
+async function _macRetrieve(service, account) {
+  var r = await _runNative("/usr/bin/security", [
+    "find-generic-password",
+    "-s", service,
+    "-a", account,
+    "-w",        // print password on stdout
+  ]);
+  if (r.code === 44) {        // SecKeychainSearchCopyNext: not found
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (r.code !== 0) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/macos-retrieve-failed",
+      "security find-generic-password exited " + r.code + ": " +
+      r.stderr.toString("utf8").trim());
+  }
+  // `security -w` prints the password followed by a newline.
+  var raw = r.stdout.toString("utf8");
+  if (raw.length > 0 && raw[raw.length - 1] === "\n") raw = raw.slice(0, -1);
+  return raw;
+}
+
+async function _macRemove(service, account) {
+  var r = await _runNative("/usr/bin/security", [
+    "delete-generic-password",
+    "-s", service,
+    "-a", account,
+  ]);
+  if (r.code === 44) return false;
+  if (r.code !== 0) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/macos-remove-failed",
+      "security delete-generic-password exited " + r.code + ": " +
+      r.stderr.toString("utf8").trim());
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// ---- Linux: secret-tool ----------------------------------------------------
+//
+// `secret-tool store` reads the password from stdin only — there is no
+// CLI flag for the value (man secret-tool — "Will prompt for the secret
+// or read it from standard input if it isn't a TTY"). Stdin path is
+// process-list-safe by construction.
+
+async function _linuxStore(service, account, password) {
+  var r = await _runNative("secret-tool", [
+    "store",
+    "--label", service,
+    "service", service,
+    "account", account,
+  ], { stdin: password });
+  if (r.code !== 0) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/linux-store-failed",
+      "secret-tool store exited " + r.code + ": " +
+      r.stderr.toString("utf8").trim());
+  }
+}
+
+async function _linuxRetrieve(service, account) {
+  var r = await _runNative("secret-tool", [
+    "lookup",
+    "service", service,
+    "account", account,
+  ]);
+  if (r.code !== 0) {
+    // secret-tool exits 1 when the attribute set has no match. Surface
+    // null instead of throwing — operators expect "not found" to return
+    // null rather than an error.
+    if (r.stderr.toString("utf8").indexOf("No matching") !== -1 || r.stdout.length === 0) {
+      return null;
+    }
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/linux-retrieve-failed",
+      "secret-tool lookup exited " + r.code + ": " +
+      r.stderr.toString("utf8").trim());
+  }
+  var raw = r.stdout.toString("utf8");
+  // secret-tool does NOT append a newline (man secret-tool); guard
+  // anyway in case a future libsecret release changes that.
+  if (raw.length > 0 && raw[raw.length - 1] === "\n") raw = raw.slice(0, -1);
+  if (raw.length === 0) return null;
+  return raw;
+}
+
+async function _linuxRemove(service, account) {
+  var r = await _runNative("secret-tool", [
+    "clear",
+    "service", service,
+    "account", account,
+  ]);
+  if (r.code !== 0) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/linux-remove-failed",
+      "secret-tool clear exited " + r.code + ": " +
+      r.stderr.toString("utf8").trim());
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// ---- Windows: PowerShell + CredentialManager module -----------------------
+//
+// CredentialManager (PSGallery) exposes Get-/New-/Remove-StoredCredential.
+// We pipe the password to PowerShell on stdin via $cred = [Console]::In.
+// ReadLine() so the plaintext never hits argv. When CredentialManager is
+// not installed (`Get-Module -ListAvailable CredentialManager` empty),
+// the calling host gets a not-supported error and the keychain falls
+// through to the file fallback.
+//
+// The script reads: command (one of "store" / "retrieve" / "remove"),
+// service, account from argv; password (store only) from stdin.
+
+var _PS_SCRIPT_HEAD = "" +
+  "$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop';" +
+  "if (-not (Get-Module -ListAvailable -Name CredentialManager)) {" +
+    "Write-Error 'CredentialManager module not installed';" +
+    "exit 2;" +
+  "}" +
+  "Import-Module CredentialManager;";
+
+function _psQuote(value) {
+  // PowerShell single-quoted strings escape ' as ''.
+  return "'" + String(value).replace(/'/g, "''") + "'";
+}
+
+function _psStoreScript(service, account) {
+  var target = service + ":" + account;
+  return _PS_SCRIPT_HEAD +
+    "$pw = [Console]::In.ReadToEnd();" +
+    "if ($pw.EndsWith([char]10)) { $pw = $pw.Substring(0, $pw.Length - 1); }" +
+    "if ($pw.EndsWith([char]13)) { $pw = $pw.Substring(0, $pw.Length - 1); }" +
+    "$secure = ConvertTo-SecureString -String $pw -AsPlainText -Force;" +
+    "New-StoredCredential -Target " + _psQuote(target) +
+      " -UserName " + _psQuote(account) +
+      " -SecurePassword $secure -Persist LocalMachine | Out-Null;" +
+    "Write-Output 'OK';";
+}
+
+function _psRetrieveScript(service, account) {
+  var target = service + ":" + account;
+  return _PS_SCRIPT_HEAD +
+    "$cred = Get-StoredCredential -Target " + _psQuote(target) + ";" +
+    "if ($null -eq $cred) { exit 44; }" +
+    "$ptr = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR($cred.Password);" +
+    "try {" +
+      "$plain = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAuto($ptr);" +
+      "[Console]::Out.Write($plain);" +
+    "} finally {" +
+      "[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ZeroFreeBSTR($ptr);" +
+    "}";
+}
+
+function _psRemoveScript(service, account) {
+  var target = service + ":" + account;
+  return _PS_SCRIPT_HEAD +
+    "try {" +
+      "Remove-StoredCredential -Target " + _psQuote(target) + ";" +
+      "Write-Output 'OK';" +
+    "} catch {" +
+      "if ($_.Exception.Message -match 'not be found') { exit 44; } else { throw; }" +
+    "}";
+}
+
+function _psResolve() {
+  var p = _resolveOnPath("pwsh.exe") || _resolveOnPath("powershell.exe");
+  if (!p) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/windows-no-powershell",
+      "PowerShell executable not found on PATH");
+  }
+  return p;
+}
+
+async function _windowsStore(service, account, password) {
+  var r = await _runNative(_psResolve(), [
+    "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", _psStoreScript(service, account),
+  ], { stdin: password });
+  if (r.code === 2) {
+    var e = new KeychainError("keychain/windows-not-supported",
+      "CredentialManager PowerShell module not installed");
+    e.fallback = true;
+    throw e;
+  }
+  if (r.code !== 0) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/windows-store-failed",
+      "PowerShell New-StoredCredential exited " + r.code + ": " +
+      r.stderr.toString("utf8").trim());
+  }
+}
+
+async function _windowsRetrieve(service, account) {
+  var r = await _runNative(_psResolve(), [
+    "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", _psRetrieveScript(service, account),
+  ]);
+  if (r.code === 2) {
+    var e = new KeychainError("keychain/windows-not-supported",
+      "CredentialManager PowerShell module not installed");
+    e.fallback = true;
+    throw e;
+  }
+  if (r.code === 44) return null;
+  if (r.code !== 0) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/windows-retrieve-failed",
+      "PowerShell Get-StoredCredential exited " + r.code + ": " +
+      r.stderr.toString("utf8").trim());
+  }
+  return r.stdout.toString("utf8");
+}
+
+async function _windowsRemove(service, account) {
+  var r = await _runNative(_psResolve(), [
+    "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", _psRemoveScript(service, account),
+  ]);
+  if (r.code === 2) {
+    var e = new KeychainError("keychain/windows-not-supported",
+      "CredentialManager PowerShell module not installed");
+    e.fallback = true;
+    throw e;
+  }
+  if (r.code === 44) return false;
+  if (r.code !== 0) {
+    throw new KeychainError("keychain/windows-remove-failed",
+      "PowerShell Remove-StoredCredential exited " + r.code + ": " +
+      r.stderr.toString("utf8").trim());
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// ---- Audit emit ------------------------------------------------------------
+// drop-silent — by design (audit is best-effort observability).
+
+function _emit(action, outcome, metadata, auditOn) {
+  if (auditOn === false) return;
+  try {
+    audit().safeEmit({
+      action:   action,
+      outcome: outcome,
+      metadata: metadata || {},
+    });
+  } catch (_e) { /* audit best-effort */ }
+}
+
+// ---- Backend selection -----------------------------------------------------
+
+function _selectBackend(opts) {
+  if (opts && opts.preferFile === true) return "file";
+  return _detectBackend() || "file";
+}
+
+function _isFallbackError(e) {
+  // A KeychainError flagged with .fallback === true means the native
+  // tool reported "not installed / unavailable" rather than an
+  // operational failure. Promote to file fallback transparently.
+  return e instanceof FrameworkError && e.fallback === true;
+}
+
+// ---- Public surface --------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.keychain.store
+ * @signature b.keychain.store(opts)
+ * @since     0.7.0
+ * @related   b.keychain.retrieve, b.keychain.remove
+ *
+ * Persist a `(service, account) -> password` binding to the
+ * platform's native credential store, falling back to an encrypted
+ * file when no native backend is reachable. The password crosses to
+ * the native tool on stdin so it never appears in `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`
+ * or `ps`. Resolves to `{ stored: true, backend }` on success.
+ * Bad opts throw `KeychainError` synchronously.
+ *
+ * Set `preferFile: true` to skip native backend probing entirely (for
+ * deterministic CI / disposable container deployments).
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   {
+ *     service:       string,        // required, no NUL/CR/LF bytes
+ *     account:       string,        // required, no NUL/CR/LF bytes
+ *     password:      string,        // required, non-empty
+ *     fallbackFile?: string,        // absolute path; required if file fallback may engage
+ *     passphrase?:   string,        // required when fallbackFile engages (Argon2id-derived KEK)
+ *     preferFile?:   boolean,       // default: false
+ *     audit?:        boolean,       // default: true (emits keychain.stored)
+ *   }
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   await b.keychain.store({
+ *     service:      "blamejs/db",
+ *     account:      "primary",
+ *     password:     "s3cr3t",
+ *     fallbackFile: "/var/lib/blamejs/keychain.enc",
+ *     passphrase:   process.env.BLAMEJS_KEYCHAIN_PASSPHRASE,
+ *   });
+ *   // → { stored: true, backend: "macos-security" }
+ */
+async function store(opts) {
+  _validateCommonOpts(opts, "keychain.store");
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.password, "password",
+    KeychainError, "keychain/bad-password");
+
+  var backend = _selectBackend(opts);
+  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
+
+  if (backend !== "file") {
+    try {
+      if (backend === "macos-security")    await _macStore(opts.service, opts.account, opts.password);
+      else if (backend === "linux-secret-tool") await _linuxStore(opts.service, opts.account, opts.password);
+      else if (backend === "windows-credential") await _windowsStore(opts.service, opts.account, opts.password);
+      _emit("keychain.stored", "success", {
+        service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: backend,
+      }, auditOn);
+      return { stored: true, backend: backend };
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (!_isFallbackError(e)) {
+        _emit("keychain.stored", "failure", {
+          service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: backend,
+          code: e && e.code, message: e && e.message,
+        }, auditOn);
+        throw e;
+      }
+      // fallthrough to file fallback
+    }
+  }
+
+  _validateFallbackFile(opts.fallbackFile, "keychain.store");
+  var doc = await _readFile(opts.fallbackFile, opts.passphrase);
+  doc.entries[_bindingKey(opts.service, opts.account)] = String(opts.password);
+  await _writeFile(opts.fallbackFile, doc, opts.passphrase);
+  _emit("keychain.stored", "success", {
+    service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: "file",
+  }, auditOn);
+  return { stored: true, backend: "file" };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.keychain.retrieve
+ * @signature b.keychain.retrieve(opts)
+ * @since     0.7.0
+ * @related   b.keychain.store, b.keychain.remove
+ *
+ * Look up the password for `(service, account)` from the native
+ * credential store, falling back to the encrypted file when the
+ * native store has no entry or no native backend is reachable.
+ * Resolves to `{ password, backend }` on a hit, `null` on a clean
+ * miss. Native-tool failures surface as `KeychainError` with the
+ * tool's stderr included.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   {
+ *     service:       string,        // required
+ *     account:       string,        // required
+ *     fallbackFile?: string,        // absolute path; required for file-backend lookup
+ *     passphrase?:   string,        // required when fallbackFile engages
+ *     preferFile?:   boolean,       // default: false
+ *     audit?:        boolean,       // default: true (emits keychain.retrieved)
+ *   }
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var got = await b.keychain.retrieve({
+ *     service:      "blamejs/db",
+ *     account:      "primary",
+ *     fallbackFile: "/var/lib/blamejs/keychain.enc",
+ *     passphrase:   process.env.BLAMEJS_KEYCHAIN_PASSPHRASE,
+ *   });
+ *   // → { password: "s3cr3t", backend: "macos-security" }  // or null on miss
+ */
+async function retrieve(opts) {
+  _validateCommonOpts(opts, "keychain.retrieve");
+
+  var backend = _selectBackend(opts);
+  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
+
+  if (backend !== "file") {
+    try {
+      var pw = null;
+      if (backend === "macos-security")    pw = await _macRetrieve(opts.service, opts.account);
+      else if (backend === "linux-secret-tool") pw = await _linuxRetrieve(opts.service, opts.account);
+      else if (backend === "windows-credential") pw = await _windowsRetrieve(opts.service, opts.account);
+      if (pw === null || pw === undefined) {
+        // Fall through to file fallback when the OS keychain has no
+        // entry — operators may have stored under file mode and later
+        // booted on a host with a native keychain.
+      } else {
+        _emit("keychain.retrieved", "success", {
+          service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: backend,
+        }, auditOn);
+        return { password: pw, backend: backend };
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (!_isFallbackError(e)) {
+        _emit("keychain.retrieved", "failure", {
+          service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: backend,
+          code: e && e.code, message: e && e.message,
+        }, auditOn);
+        throw e;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!opts.fallbackFile) {
+    _emit("keychain.retrieved", "success", {
+      service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: "none",
+      found: false,
+    }, auditOn);
+    return null;
+  }
+  _validateFallbackFile(opts.fallbackFile, "keychain.retrieve");
+  if (!atomicFile.exists(opts.fallbackFile)) {
+    _emit("keychain.retrieved", "success", {
+      service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: "file",
+      found: false,
+    }, auditOn);
+    return null;
+  }
+  var doc = await _readFile(opts.fallbackFile, opts.passphrase);
+  var bindingKey = _bindingKey(opts.service, opts.account);
+  var found = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(doc.entries, bindingKey);
+  if (!found) {
+    _emit("keychain.retrieved", "success", {
+      service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: "file",
+      found: false,
+    }, auditOn);
+    return null;
+  }
+  _emit("keychain.retrieved", "success", {
+    service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: "file",
+  }, auditOn);
+  return { password: doc.entries[bindingKey], backend: "file" };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @primitive b.keychain.remove
+ * @signature b.keychain.remove(opts)
+ * @since     0.7.0
+ * @related   b.keychain.store, b.keychain.retrieve
+ *
+ * Delete the `(service, account)` binding from both the native
+ * credential store (when reachable) and the encrypted file fallback
+ * (when `fallbackFile` is supplied). Resolves to `true` when at least
+ * one backend held the binding, `false` on a no-op. The double-sweep
+ * matters because a binding may have been stored on a prior boot
+ * under a different backend than the current host advertises.
+ *
+ * @opts
+ *   {
+ *     service:       string,        // required
+ *     account:       string,        // required
+ *     fallbackFile?: string,        // absolute path; required for file-backend cleanup
+ *     passphrase?:   string,        // required when fallbackFile engages
+ *     preferFile?:   boolean,       // default: false
+ *     audit?:        boolean,       // default: true (emits keychain.removed)
+ *   }
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   var existed = await b.keychain.remove({
+ *     service:      "blamejs/db",
+ *     account:      "primary",
+ *     fallbackFile: "/var/lib/blamejs/keychain.enc",
+ *     passphrase:   process.env.BLAMEJS_KEYCHAIN_PASSPHRASE,
+ *   });
+ *   // → true
+ */
+async function remove(opts) {
+  _validateCommonOpts(opts, "keychain.remove");
+
+  var backend = _selectBackend(opts);
+  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
+
+  if (backend !== "file") {
+    try {
+      var ok = false;
+      if (backend === "macos-security")    ok = await _macRemove(opts.service, opts.account);
+      else if (backend === "linux-secret-tool") ok = await _linuxRemove(opts.service, opts.account);
+      else if (backend === "windows-credential") ok = await _windowsRemove(opts.service, opts.account);
+      _emit("keychain.removed", ok ? "success" : "no-op", {
+        service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: backend,
+      }, auditOn);
+      // Also sweep file fallback if both could carry the binding.
+      if (opts.fallbackFile && atomicFile.exists(opts.fallbackFile)) {
+        try { await _removeFromFile(opts.fallbackFile, opts.service, opts.account, opts.passphrase); }
+        catch (_e) { /* file remove best-effort when native succeeded */ }
+      }
+      return ok;
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (!_isFallbackError(e)) {
+        _emit("keychain.removed", "failure", {
+          service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: backend,
+          code: e && e.code, message: e && e.message,
+        }, auditOn);
+        throw e;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!opts.fallbackFile || !atomicFile.exists(opts.fallbackFile)) {
+    _emit("keychain.removed", "no-op", {
+      service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: "file",
+    }, auditOn);
+    return false;
+  }
+  _validateFallbackFile(opts.fallbackFile, "keychain.remove");
+  var existed = await _removeFromFile(opts.fallbackFile, opts.service, opts.account, opts.passphrase);
+  _emit("keychain.removed", existed ? "success" : "no-op", {
+    service: opts.service, account: opts.account, backend: "file",
+  }, auditOn);
+  return existed;
+}
+
+async function _removeFromFile(fallbackFile, service, account, passphrase) {
+  var doc = await _readFile(fallbackFile, passphrase);
+  var bindingKey = _bindingKey(service, account);
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(doc.entries, bindingKey)) return false;
+  delete doc.entries[bindingKey];
+  await _writeFile(fallbackFile, doc, passphrase);
+  return true;
+}
+
+// ---- Test seam -------------------------------------------------------------
+// Reset the cached backend probe so a test can flip platform / PATH and
+// re-run detection. NOT operator-facing.
+function _clearBackendCacheForTest() { _cachedBackend = null; }
+
+module.exports = {
+  store:                    store,
+  retrieve:                 retrieve,
+  remove:                   remove,
+  KeychainError:            KeychainError,
+  _clearBackendCacheForTest: _clearBackendCacheForTest,
+};