@blamejs/core 0.8.39 → 0.8.40

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.8.x
 
+- v0.8.40 (2026-05-07) — operator enhancements (2/2): `b.honeytoken.create({audit})` issues canary api-key / session / URL / row-id values that emit `honeytoken.tripped` audit on any positive lookup; `b.middleware.cspReport.create({onReport})` is a Reporting-API endpoint that ingests CSP / COEP / COOP violations as `csp.violation` audit rows; `b.auditTools.forensicSnapshot({out, since, passphrase, reason})` composes an audit-export slice + IR context manifest into one tamper-evident bundle for legal / regulator handover; `b.network.tls.pinsetDriftMonitor({intervalMs})` periodically compares the trust-store fingerprint set to the captured baseline and emits `network.tls.pinset.drifted` when CAs are added or removed. Adds the OpenSSF Scorecard CI workflow at `.github/workflows/scorecard.yml`. Defers items 11 (operator-supplied transform sandbox), 14 (chaos / fault-injection drills), and 15 (exploit replay corpus harness) with re-open conditions: surface when (a) operator demand surfaces OR (b) a CVE replay needs a vendored harness.
 - v0.8.39 (2026-05-07) — operator enhancements (1/2): `b.configDrift.verifyVendorIntegrity()` re-hashes every file listed in `lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json` at boot and refuses on mismatch; `b.network.allowlist.create({allow, deny})` composes on `b.ssrfGuard` to gate per-call outbound URLs against an operator CIDR/host allow set; `b.auth.atoKillSwitch.trigger({userId, reason})` is a composite ATO incident-response workflow that destroys every session for the user, applies `b.auth.lockout`, and optionally flips `b.auth.accessLock` mode in one audited call.
 - v0.8.38 (2026-05-07) — multipart parser refuses obsolete line folding (RFC 9112 §5.2 obs-fold) and CR/LF/NUL bytes in part-header values (RFC 9110 §5.5). Adds RFC 5987 / 8187 `filename*=UTF-8''…` extended-parameter support; the decoded value takes precedence over a legacy `filename=` companion.
 

package/index.js

@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ var appShutdown = require("./lib/app-shutdown");
 var slug = require("./lib/slug");
 var webhook = require("./lib/webhook");
 var apiKey = require("./lib/api-key");
+var honeytoken = require("./lib/honeytoken");
 var credentialHash = require("./lib/credential-hash");
 var permissions = require("./lib/permissions");
 var cache = require("./lib/cache");
@@ -402,6 +403,7 @@ module.exports = {
   slug:             slug,
   webhook:          webhook,
   apiKey:           apiKey,
+  honeytoken:       honeytoken,
   credentialHash:   credentialHash,
   permissions:      permissions,
   cache:            cache,

package/lib/audit-tools.js

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ var auditSign = require("./audit-sign");
 var backupCrypto = require("./backup/crypto");
 var clusterStorage = require("./cluster-storage");
 var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var jsonSafe = require("./safe-json");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 
@@ -665,9 +666,77 @@ async function _defaultApplyPurge(args) {
   };
 }
 
+// forensicSnapshot — post-compromise composer that bundles an audit
+// archive slice, current break-glass grants, the active incident
+// report (if any), and process-runtime metadata into a single signed
+// bundle. The operator passes this to legal / regulators / the IR
+// team as one tamper-evident artifact.
+//
+//   var snap = await b.auditTools.forensicSnapshot({
+//     out:        "/forensics/2026-05-07-incident-42",
+//     since:      Date.now() - C.TIME.days(7),
+//     passphrase: process.env.AUDIT_BUNDLE_PASSPHRASE,
+//     incidentId: "inc-2026-05-07-42",
+//     reason:     "ATO investigation: 14 failed MFA from new geo, user u_42",
+//     actor:      { id: "alice@ops.example.com", role: "incident-commander" },
+//   });
+async function forensicSnapshot(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  _requirePassphrase(opts.passphrase);
+  _requireOutDir(opts.out, "forensicSnapshot");
+  var sinceMs = _toMs(opts.since);
+  if (sinceMs == null) {
+    throw new AuditToolsError("audit-tools/no-since",
+      "forensicSnapshot: opts.since is required");
+  }
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.reason, "reason", AuditToolsError, "audit-tools/no-reason");
+  var sliceResult = await exportSlice({
+    out:        opts.out,
+    since:      sinceMs,
+    until:      Date.now(),
+    passphrase: opts.passphrase,
+    readRows:   opts.readRows,
+    readCoveringCheckpoint: opts.readCoveringCheckpoint,
+  });
+  // Compose snapshot manifest with operator-supplied IR context.
+  var manifest = {
+    snapshotKind:      "forensic",
+    incidentId:        opts.incidentId || null,
+    reason:            opts.reason,
+    actor:             opts.actor || null,
+    composedAt:        new Date().toISOString(),
+    auditSliceFile:    sliceResult && sliceResult.path,
+    auditSliceCount:   sliceResult && sliceResult.rowCount,
+    runtime: {
+      nodeVersion: process.version,
+      platform:    process.platform,
+      arch:        process.arch,
+      pid:         process.pid,
+      uptimeSec:   Math.round(process.uptime()),
+    },
+  };
+  var manifestPath = require("node:path").join(opts.out, "forensic-snapshot.json");
+  require("node:fs").writeFileSync(manifestPath, _canonicalize(manifest), "utf8");
+  try {
+    require("./audit").safeEmit({
+      action:  "audit.forensic_snapshot.composed",
+      outcome: "success",
+      metadata: {
+        out:               opts.out,
+        incidentId:        manifest.incidentId,
+        reason:            opts.reason,
+        actor:             opts.actor || null,
+        rowCount:          manifest.auditSliceCount || 0,
+      },
+    });
+  } catch (_e) { /* audit best-effort */ }
+  return Object.assign({}, manifest, { manifestPath: manifestPath });
+}
+
 module.exports = {
   archive:          archive,
   exportSlice:      exportSlice,
+  forensicSnapshot: forensicSnapshot,
   verifyBundle:     verifyBundle,
   purge:            purge,
   BUNDLE_FORMAT:    BUNDLE_FORMAT,

package/lib/audit.js

@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ var FRAMEWORK_NAMESPACES = [
   "tcpa10dlc",  // b.tcpa10dlc (tcpa10dlc.consent_recorded / consent_revoked)
   "iabmspa",    // b.iabMspa (iabmspa.processing_refused)
   "vendor",     // b.configDrift.verifyVendorIntegrity (vendor.integrity.verified / tampered)
+  "honeytoken", // b.honeytoken (honeytoken.issued / tripped)
+  "csp",        // b.middleware.cspReport (csp.violation)
 ];
 var registeredNamespaces = new Set(FRAMEWORK_NAMESPACES);
 

package/lib/honeytoken.js

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.honeytoken — canary credential framework. Generates decoy values
+ * (fake api-key shapes, fake admin URLs, fake DB row references) that
+ * are NEVER handed to a real client; their presence in a request,
+ * log, or DB lookup means an attacker found something they shouldn't
+ * have. The framework registers each token at issuance and refuses
+ * silently in production but always emits a `honeytoken.tripped`
+ * audit row on any positive lookup.
+ *
+ *   var honey = b.honeytoken.create({ audit: b.audit });
+ *
+ *   var token = honey.issue({
+ *     kind:     "apiKey",
+ *     metadata: { plantedAt: "GET /admin/keys/404", linkedTo: "u_42" },
+ *   });
+ *   // → { value: "bk_canary_8f3a7b2e0c…", id: "ht_<hex>" }
+ *
+ *   if (honey.lookup(req.headers["x-api-key"])) {
+ *     // attacker is using the canary; tripped event already audited
+ *     return res.status(403).end();
+ *   }
+ *
+ * Canary value shapes (`kind`):
+ *   - "apiKey"   → `bk_canary_<32 hex>` (matches b.apiKey shape)
+ *   - "session"  → `bks_canary_<48 hex>` (matches b.session shape)
+ *   - "url"      → `/admin/canary-<32 hex>` (planted as a clickable link)
+ *   - "rowId"    → `ht_canary_<32 hex>` (planted as a fake foreign key)
+ *
+ * Audit shape:
+ *   - `honeytoken.issued` — outcome=success; metadata: { id, kind }
+ *   - `honeytoken.tripped` — outcome=failure; metadata: { id, kind,
+ *     metadata, observedAt, observedActor }
+ */
+
+var crypto = require("./crypto");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
+
+var HoneytokenError = defineClass("HoneytokenError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
+
+var KINDS = Object.freeze({
+  apiKey:  function () { return "bk_canary_"  + crypto.generateToken(16); },     // allow:raw-byte-literal — 16-byte (128-bit) canary entropy
+  session: function () { return "bks_canary_" + crypto.generateToken(24); },     // allow:raw-byte-literal — 24-byte (192-bit) canary entropy
+  url:     function () { return "/admin/canary-" + crypto.generateToken(16); },  // allow:raw-byte-literal — 16-byte canary entropy
+  rowId:   function () { return "ht_canary_"  + crypto.generateToken(16); },     // allow:raw-byte-literal — 16-byte canary entropy
+});
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, ["audit"], "honeytoken.create");
+
+  var registry = new Map();   // value → { id, kind, metadata, issuedAt }
+
+  function issue(spec) {
+    spec = spec || {};
+    validateOpts(spec, ["kind", "metadata"], "honeytoken.issue");
+    var kind = spec.kind;
+    if (typeof KINDS[kind] !== "function") {
+      throw new HoneytokenError(
+        "honeytoken/unknown-kind",
+        "honeytoken.issue: unknown kind '" + kind + "' " +
+        "(supported: " + Object.keys(KINDS).join(", ") + ")");
+    }
+    var value = KINDS[kind]();
+    var id = "ht_" + crypto.generateToken(8);                                    // allow:raw-byte-literal — 8-byte registry id
+    var record = Object.freeze({
+      id:        id,
+      kind:      kind,
+      metadata:  spec.metadata || null,
+      issuedAt:  Date.now(),
+    });
+    registry.set(value, record);
+    try {
+      audit().safeEmit({
+        action: "honeytoken.issued",
+        outcome: "success",
+        metadata: { id: id, kind: kind },
+      });
+    } catch (_e) { /* audit best-effort */ }
+    return { id: id, value: value };
+  }
+
+  function lookup(value, observedActor) {
+    if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) return null;
+    var record = registry.get(value);
+    if (!record) return null;
+    try {
+      audit().safeEmit({
+        action: "honeytoken.tripped",
+        outcome: "failure",
+        metadata: {
+          id:             record.id,
+          kind:           record.kind,
+          metadata:       record.metadata,
+          observedAt:     Date.now(),
+          observedActor:  observedActor || null,
+        },
+      });
+    } catch (_e) { /* audit best-effort */ }
+    return record;
+  }
+
+  function revoke(id) {
+    var found = false;
+    registry.forEach(function (record, value) {
+      if (record.id === id) {
+        registry.delete(value);
+        found = true;
+      }
+    });
+    return found;
+  }
+
+  function size() { return registry.size; }
+
+  return {
+    issue:   issue,
+    lookup:  lookup,
+    revoke:  revoke,
+    size:    size,
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  create:           create,
+  KINDS:            Object.freeze(Object.keys(KINDS)),
+  HoneytokenError:  HoneytokenError,
+};

package/lib/middleware/csp-report.js

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.middleware.cspReport — Reporting-API endpoint for CSP / COEP /
+ * COOP / Permissions-Policy violations.
+ *
+ * The framework's default CSP appends `report-to default;` (see
+ * lib/middleware/security-headers.js); operators wire the matching
+ * `Reporting-Endpoints: default="https://app.example.com/csp-report"`
+ * header — and mount this middleware at the configured path. Browsers
+ * POST batches of violations as `application/reports+json`.
+ *
+ *   var cspReport = b.middleware.cspReport.create({
+ *     audit:     b.audit,
+ *     onReport:  function (report) { metrics.count("csp.violation", 1, { directive: report.body.effectiveDirective }); },
+ *     maxBytes:  C.BYTES.kib(64),
+ *   });
+ *   router.post("/csp-report", cspReport);
+ *
+ * Audit shape: `csp.violation` (failure) per report; metadata carries
+ * the report.body fields (blockedURL, documentURL, effectiveDirective,
+ * sample, statusCode). Sample is truncated to 200 chars.
+ *
+ * Validation:
+ *   - Refuses non-POST methods with 405
+ *   - Refuses bodies > maxBytes (default 64 KiB) with 413
+ *   - Refuses non-JSON bodies with 400
+ *   - Accepts `application/reports+json` AND legacy `application/csp-report`
+ */
+
+var C = require("../constants");
+var lazyRequire = require("../lazy-require");
+var safeBuffer = require("../safe-buffer");
+var safeJson = require("../safe-json");
+var validateOpts = require("../validate-opts");
+
+var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("../audit"); });
+
+var DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES = C.BYTES.kib(64);
+var SAMPLE_TRUNCATE = 200;
+
+function _truncate(value) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string") return value;
+  if (value.length <= SAMPLE_TRUNCATE) return value;
+  return value.slice(0, SAMPLE_TRUNCATE) + "…";
+}
+
+function _normalizeOne(reportLike) {
+  // Reporting API shape: { type, age, url, user_agent, body: {...} }
+  // Legacy CSP shape:    { "csp-report": { ... } }
+  if (!reportLike || typeof reportLike !== "object") return null;
+  if (reportLike["csp-report"] && typeof reportLike["csp-report"] === "object") {
+    var legacy = reportLike["csp-report"];
+    return {
+      type: "csp-violation",
+      url:  legacy["document-uri"] || null,
+      body: {
+        documentURL:        legacy["document-uri"] || null,
+        blockedURL:         legacy["blocked-uri"] || null,
+        effectiveDirective: legacy["effective-directive"] || legacy["violated-directive"] || null,
+        statusCode:         legacy["status-code"] || null,
+        sample:             _truncate(legacy["script-sample"] || ""),
+        sourceFile:         legacy["source-file"] || null,
+        lineNumber:         legacy["line-number"] || null,
+      },
+    };
+  }
+  if (reportLike.type && reportLike.body && typeof reportLike.body === "object") {
+    return {
+      type: reportLike.type,
+      url:  reportLike.url || null,
+      body: {
+        documentURL:        reportLike.body.documentURL || null,
+        blockedURL:         reportLike.body.blockedURL || null,
+        effectiveDirective: reportLike.body.effectiveDirective || null,
+        statusCode:         reportLike.body.statusCode || null,
+        sample:             _truncate(reportLike.body.sample || ""),
+        sourceFile:         reportLike.body.sourceFile || null,
+        lineNumber:         reportLike.body.lineNumber || null,
+      },
+    };
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, ["audit", "onReport", "maxBytes"], "middleware.cspReport");
+  var maxBytes = (typeof opts.maxBytes === "number" && isFinite(opts.maxBytes) && opts.maxBytes > 0)
+    ? opts.maxBytes : DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES;
+  var onReport = (typeof opts.onReport === "function") ? opts.onReport : null;
+
+  return async function cspReport(req, res, _next) {
+    if (req.method !== "POST") {
+      res.writeHead(405, { "Allow": "POST" });                                     // allow:raw-byte-literal — HTTP 405 status
+      res.end();
+      return;
+    }
+    var body;
+    try {
+      body = await safeBuffer.boundedChunkCollector(req, { maxBytes: maxBytes });
+    } catch (_e) {
+      res.writeHead(413);                                                         // allow:raw-byte-literal — HTTP 413 status
+      res.end();
+      return;
+    }
+    var parsed;
+    try { parsed = safeJson.parse(body.toString("utf8")); }
+    catch (_e) {
+      res.writeHead(400);                                                         // allow:raw-byte-literal — HTTP 400 status
+      res.end();
+      return;
+    }
+    var reports = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];
+    for (var i = 0; i < reports.length; i++) {
+      var normalized = _normalizeOne(reports[i]);
+      if (!normalized) continue;
+      try {
+        audit().safeEmit({
+          action:  "csp.violation",
+          outcome: "failure",
+          metadata: Object.assign({ type: normalized.type, url: normalized.url }, normalized.body),
+        });
+      } catch (_e) { /* audit best-effort */ }
+      if (onReport) {
+        try { onReport(normalized); } catch (_e) { /* hook best-effort */ }
+      }
+    }
+    res.writeHead(204);                                                           // allow:raw-byte-literal — HTTP 204 status
+    res.end();
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = { create: create };

package/lib/middleware/index.js

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ var cookies = require("./cookies");
 var cors = require("./cors");
 var dailyByteQuota = require("./daily-byte-quota");
 var cspNonce = require("./csp-nonce");
+var cspReport = require("./csp-report");
 var csrfProtect = require("./csrf-protect");
 var dbRoleFor = require("./db-role-for");
 var dpop = require("./dpop");
@@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ module.exports = {
   compression:      compression.create,
   cookies:          cookies.create,
   cspNonce:         cspNonce.create,
+  cspReport:        cspReport.create,
   securityTxt:      securityTxt.create,
   sse:              sse.create,
   requestLog:       requestLog.create,

package/lib/network-tls.js

@@ -329,6 +329,67 @@ function captureBaselineFingerprints() {
   STATE.baselineFingerprints = STATE.cas.map(function (e) { return e.meta.fingerprint256; });
 }
 
+// pinsetDriftMonitor — periodic check that emits audit + observability
+// events when the trust-store fingerprint set drifts from the captured
+// baseline. Different intent from expiryMonitor: this fires when a
+// CA is added or removed (by operator config-flip OR by a tampered
+// MANIFEST / vendor refresh), not when an existing one approaches
+// validity expiry.
+//
+//   b.network.tls.captureBaselineFingerprints();   // at boot
+//   var mon = b.network.tls.pinsetDriftMonitor({
+//     intervalMs:  C.TIME.minutes(15),
+//     onDrift:     function (drift) { /* operator hook */ },
+//   });
+//
+// Audit emissions:
+//   network.tls.pinset.drift_check  — every check, ok / warn
+//   network.tls.pinset.drifted      — when added.length || removed.length
+function pinsetDriftMonitor(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  var intervalMs = opts.intervalMs;
+  var auditOn    = opts.audit !== false;
+  if (typeof intervalMs !== "number" || !isFinite(intervalMs) || intervalMs <= 0) {
+    throw new TlsTrustError("tls/bad-interval",
+      "tls.pinsetDriftMonitor: intervalMs must be a positive finite number");
+  }
+  function _tick() {
+    var drift;
+    try { drift = detectBaselineDrift(); }
+    catch (_e) { return; }
+    if (drift === null) return;   // baseline not captured; nothing to compare
+    if (auditOn) {
+      try {
+        audit().safeEmit({
+          action:  "network.tls.pinset.drift_check",
+          outcome: drift.drifted ? "warn" : "ok",
+          metadata: { added: drift.added.length, removed: drift.removed.length },
+        });
+      } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+    }
+    if (drift.drifted) {
+      try { observability().safeEvent("network.tls.pinset.drifted", 1, {}); }
+      catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+      if (auditOn) {
+        try {
+          audit().safeEmit({
+            action:  "network.tls.pinset.drifted",
+            outcome: "failure",
+            metadata: { added: drift.added, removed: drift.removed },
+          });
+        } catch (_e) { /* drop-silent */ }
+      }
+      if (typeof opts.onDrift === "function") {
+        try { opts.onDrift(drift); } catch (_e) { /* operator hook */ }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  var handle = safeAsync.repeating(_tick, intervalMs, { name: "tls-pinset-drift-monitor" });
+  return {
+    stop: function () { if (handle) { handle.stop(); handle = null; } },
+  };
+}
+
 function detectBaselineDrift() {
   if (!STATE.baselineFingerprints) return null;
   var current = STATE.cas.map(function (e) { return e.meta.fingerprint256; });
@@ -1683,6 +1744,7 @@ module.exports = {
   purgeExpired:        purgeExpired,
   expiringSoon:        expiringSoon,
   expiryMonitor:       expiryMonitor,
+  pinsetDriftMonitor:  pinsetDriftMonitor,
   useSystemTrust:      useSystemTrust,
   isSystemTrustEnabled: isSystemTrustEnabled,
   getTrustStore:       getTrustStore,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.8.39",
+  "version": "0.8.40",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/sbom.cyclonedx.json

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
   "$schema": "http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom-1.5.schema.json",
   "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
   "specVersion": "1.5",
-  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:319bfdfd-c9b3-4f86-a42e-c3441466295e",
+  "serialNumber": "urn:uuid:7c951f5a-156e-49be-91c0-8a5a420faf2c",
   "version": 1,
   "metadata": {
-    "timestamp": "2026-05-07T16:17:54.954Z",
+    "timestamp": "2026-05-07T16:35:12.500Z",
     "lifecycles": [
       {
         "phase": "build"
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
       }
     ],
     "component": {
-      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.8.39",
+      "bom-ref": "@blamejs/core@0.8.40",
       "type": "library",
       "name": "blamejs",
-      "version": "0.8.39",
+      "version": "0.8.40",
       "scope": "required",
       "author": "blamejs contributors",
       "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
-      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.8.39",
+      "purl": "pkg:npm/%40blamejs/core@0.8.40",
       "properties": [],
       "externalReferences": [
         {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
   "components": [],
   "dependencies": [
     {
-      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.8.39",
+      "ref": "@blamejs/core@0.8.40",
       "dependsOn": []
     }
   ]