@adcp/sdk 8.1.0-beta.7 → 8.1.0-beta.8

package/dist/lib/types/log-event.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
+// AUTO-GENERATED — DO NOT EDIT.
+// Per-tool .d.ts slice for `log_event`. Built from the published
+// `tools.generated.d.ts` + `core.generated.d.ts` + `enums.generated.d.ts`
+// by `scripts/generate-per-tool-types.ts`.
+//
+// Self-contained: imports nothing from the broader SDK. Adopters who
+// import only this slice pay a fraction of the tsc cost of pulling in
+// `@adcp/sdk` root — useful when strict + skipLibCheck:false adopters
+// hit memory pressure on the full surface.
+
+/**
+ * Request parameters for logging marketing events
+ */
+export interface LogEventRequest {
+    /**
+     * Release-precision AdCP version (VERSION.RELEASE, e.g. "3.0", "3.1", "3.1-beta"). On a request: the buyer's release pin — the seller validates against its supported_versions and returns VERSION_UNSUPPORTED on cross-major mismatch, or downshifts to the highest supported release within the same major. On a response: the release the seller actually served — clients SHOULD validate the response against that release's schema, not against their pin. Patches are not negotiated; surface them as build_version on capabilities for operational visibility. When omitted, falls back to adcp_major_version (deprecated) or server default. Buyers SHOULD emit both adcp_version and adcp_major_version through 3.x to remain compatible with sellers that only read the legacy field. NORMALIZATION: SDKs that read full-semver values from bundle metadata (e.g. ComplianceIndex.published_version = "3.1.0-beta.1") MUST normalize to release-precision ("3.1-beta.1") before emitting on the wire — meta-field values are NOT valid wire values.
+     */
+    adcp_version?: string;
+    /**
+     * DEPRECATED in favor of adcp_version (release-precision string). Servers MUST continue to honor this field through 3.x. Removed in 4.0. Original semantics: the AdCP major version the buyer's payloads conform to. Sellers validate against their supported major_versions and return VERSION_UNSUPPORTED if unsupported. When omitted, the seller assumes its highest supported version.
+     */
+    adcp_major_version?: number;
+    /**
+     * Event source configured on the account via sync_event_sources
+     */
+    event_source_id: string;
+    /**
+     * Test event code for validation without affecting production data. Events with this code appear in the platform's test events UI.
+     */
+    test_event_code?: string;
+    /**
+     * Events to log
+     */
+    events: Event[];
+    /**
+     * Client-generated unique key for this request. Prevents duplicate event logging on retries. MUST be unique per (seller, request) pair to prevent cross-seller correlation. Use a fresh UUID v4 for each request.
+     * @minLength 16
+     * @maxLength 255
+     * @pattern ^[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{16,255}$
+     */
+    idempotency_key: string;
+    context?: ContextObject;
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Response from event logging operation. Returns either event processing results OR operation-level errors.
+ */
+export type LogEventResponse = {
+    /**
+     * Session/conversation identifier for tracking related operations across multiple task invocations. Managed by the protocol layer to maintain conversational context. Distinct from `context` (per-request opaque echo, see below).
+     */
+    context_id?: string;
+    context?: ContextObject;
+    /**
+     * Unique identifier for tracking asynchronous operations. Present when a task requires extended processing time. Used to query task status and retrieve results when complete.
+     */
+    task_id?: string;
+    status: TaskStatus;
+    /**
+     * Human-readable summary of the task result. Provides natural language explanation of what happened, suitable for display to end users or for AI agent comprehension. Generated by the protocol layer based on the task response.
+     */
+    message?: string;
+    /**
+     * ISO 8601 timestamp when the response was generated. Useful for debugging, logging, cache validation, and tracking async operation progress.
+     */
+    timestamp?: string;
+    /**
+     * Set to true when this response was returned from the idempotency cache rather than from a fresh execution. Set to false (or omitted) when the request was executed fresh. Buyers use this to distinguish cached replays from new executions — matters for billing reconciliation, audit logs, state-machine routing (cached state-tracking fields are historical snapshots, not current state — re-read via the resource's read endpoint), and any downstream system that assumes exactly-once event semantics. From 3.1 onward, `replayed` MAY appear on responses to any request that resolved via the idempotency cache, including read tools — universal `idempotency_key` (see security.mdx §Idempotency) means the cache holds read responses too.
+     */
+    replayed?: boolean;
+    adcp_error?: Error;
+    push_notification_config?: PushNotificationConfig;
+    /**
+     * Governance context token issued by the account's governance agent during check_governance. Buyers attach it to governed purchase requests (media buys, rights acquisitions, signal activations, creative services); sellers persist it and include it on all subsequent governance calls for that action's lifecycle. An account binds to one governance agent (see sync_governance); governance is phased across `purchase` / `modification` / `delivery`, not partitioned across specialist agents, so the envelope carries a single token for the full lifecycle.
+     *
+     * Value format: governance agents MUST emit a compact JWS per the AdCP JWS profile (see Security — Signed Governance Context). Sellers MAY verify; sellers that do not verify MUST persist and forward the token unchanged. In 3.1 all sellers MUST verify. Non-JWS values from pre-3.0 governance agents are deprecated.
+     *
+     * This is the primary correlation key for audit and reporting across the governance lifecycle.
+     */
+    governance_context?: string;
+    /**
+     * Conceptual grouping for the task-specific response data defined by individual task response schemas (e.g., get-products-response.json, create-media-buy-response.json). `payload` is a documentary construct — it is NOT a required wire field, and its on-the-wire shape depends on transport (see Transport serialization below). Task response schemas declare body fields without wrapping them in a `payload` object; the wire representation places those body fields per transport convention. On MCP the body fields appear as siblings of envelope fields at the root of the tool response; on A2A they appear inside `task.artifacts[0].parts[].DataPart`; on REST they appear at the root of the JSON body.
+     */
+    payload?: {};
+    /**
+     * Release-precision AdCP version (VERSION.RELEASE, e.g. "3.0", "3.1", "3.1-beta"). On a request: the buyer's release pin — the seller validates against its supported_versions and returns VERSION_UNSUPPORTED on cross-major mismatch, or downshifts to the highest supported release within the same major. On a response: the release the seller actually served — clients SHOULD validate the response against that release's schema, not against their pin. Patches are not negotiated; surface them as build_version on capabilities for operational visibility. When omitted, falls back to adcp_major_version (deprecated) or server default. Buyers SHOULD emit both adcp_version and adcp_major_version through 3.x to remain compatible with sellers that only read the legacy field. NORMALIZATION: SDKs that read full-semver values from bundle metadata (e.g. ComplianceIndex.published_version = "3.1.0-beta.1") MUST normalize to release-precision ("3.1-beta.1") before emitting on the wire — meta-field values are NOT valid wire values.
+     */
+    adcp_version?: string;
+    /**
+     * DEPRECATED in favor of adcp_version (release-precision string). Servers MUST continue to honor this field through 3.x. Removed in 4.0. Original semantics: the AdCP major version the buyer's payloads conform to. Sellers validate against their supported major_versions and return VERSION_UNSUPPORTED if unsupported. When omitted, the seller assumes its highest supported version.
+     */
+    adcp_major_version?: number;
+} & (LogEventSuccess | LogEventError);
+
+/**
+ * Success response - events received and queued for processing
+ */
+export interface LogEventSuccess {
+    /**
+     * Number of events received
+     * @minimum 0
+     */
+    events_received: number;
+    /**
+     * Number of events successfully queued for processing
+     * @minimum 0
+     */
+    events_processed: number;
+    /**
+     * Events that failed validation
+     */
+    partial_failures?: {
+        /**
+         * ID of the failed event
+         */
+        event_id: string;
+        /**
+         * Error code
+         */
+        code: string;
+        /**
+         * Human-readable error message
+         */
+        message: string;
+    }[];
+    /**
+     * Non-fatal issues (low match quality, missing recommended fields, deprecation notices)
+     */
+    warnings?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Overall match quality score for the batch (0.0 = no matches, 1.0 = all matched)
+     * @minimum 0
+     * @maximum 1
+     */
+    match_quality?: number;
+    /**
+     * When true, this response contains simulated data from sandbox mode.
+     */
+    sandbox?: boolean;
+    context?: ContextObject;
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Error response - request failed entirely
+ */
+export interface LogEventError {
+    /**
+     * Operation-level errors
+     */
+    errors: Error[];
+    context?: ContextObject;
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Where the conversion event originated
+ */
+export type ActionSource = 'website' | 'app' | 'offline' | 'phone_call' | 'chat' | 'email' | 'in_store' | 'system_generated' | 'other';
+
+/**
+ * Legacy authentication schemes for the webhook auth block. Bearer: token sent in Authorization header. HMAC-SHA256: legacy shared-secret signing. Both are deprecated; new integrations SHOULD omit the authentication block and use the RFC 9421 webhook signing profile (applicable on schemas where authentication is optional). Removed in AdCP 4.0.
+ */
+export type AuthenticationScheme = 'Bearer' | 'HMAC-SHA256';
+
+/**
+ * Opaque correlation data that is echoed unchanged in responses. Used for internal tracking, UI session IDs, trace IDs, and other caller-specific identifiers that don't affect protocol behavior. Context data is never parsed by AdCP agents - it's simply preserved and returned.
+ */
+export interface ContextObject {
+}
+
+/**
+ * A marketing event (conversion, engagement, or custom) for attribution and optimization
+ */
+export interface Event {
+    /**
+     * Unique identifier for deduplication (scoped to event_type + event_source_id)
+     * @minLength 1
+     * @maxLength 256
+     */
+    event_id: string;
+    event_type: EventType;
+    /**
+     * ISO 8601 timestamp when the event occurred
+     * @format date-time
+     */
+    event_time: string;
+    user_match?: UserMatch;
+    custom_data?: EventCustomData;
+    action_source?: ActionSource;
+    /**
+     * URL where the event occurred (required when action_source is 'website')
+     */
+    event_source_url?: string;
+    /**
+     * Name for custom events (used when event_type is 'custom')
+     */
+    custom_event_name?: string;
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Event-specific data (value, currency, items, etc.)
+ */
+export interface EventCustomData {
+    /**
+     * Monetary value of the event (should be accompanied by currency)
+     * @minimum 0
+     */
+    value?: number;
+    /**
+     * ISO 4217 currency code
+     * @pattern ^[A-Z]{3}$
+     */
+    currency?: string;
+    /**
+     * Unique order or transaction identifier
+     */
+    order_id?: string;
+    /**
+     * Item identifiers for catalog attribution. Values are matched against catalog items using the identifier type declared by the catalog's content_id_type field (e.g., SKUs, GTINs, or vertical-specific IDs like job_id).
+     */
+    content_ids?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Category of content associated with the event (e.g., 'product', 'job', 'hotel'). Corresponds to the catalog type when used for catalog attribution.
+     */
+    content_type?: string;
+    /**
+     * Name of the product or content
+     */
+    content_name?: string;
+    /**
+     * Category of the product or content
+     */
+    content_category?: string;
+    /**
+     * Number of items in the event
+     * @minimum 0
+     */
+    num_items?: number;
+    /**
+     * Search query for search events
+     */
+    search_string?: string;
+    /**
+     * Per-item details for e-commerce events
+     */
+    contents?: {
+        /**
+         * Product or content identifier
+         */
+        id: string;
+        /**
+         * Quantity of this item
+         * @minimum 1
+         */
+        quantity?: number;
+        /**
+         * Price per unit of this item
+         * @minimum 0
+         */
+        price?: number;
+        /**
+         * Brand name of this item
+         */
+        brand?: string;
+    }[];
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Standard marketing event types for event logging, aligned with IAB ECAPI
+ */
+export type EventType = 'page_view' | 'view_content' | 'select_content' | 'select_item' | 'search' | 'share' | 'add_to_cart' | 'remove_from_cart' | 'viewed_cart' | 'add_to_wishlist' | 'initiate_checkout' | 'add_payment_info' | 'purchase' | 'refund' | 'lead' | 'qualify_lead' | 'close_convert_lead' | 'disqualify_lead' | 'complete_registration' | 'subscribe' | 'start_trial' | 'app_install' | 'app_launch' | 'contact' | 'schedule' | 'donate' | 'submit_application' | 'custom';
+
+/**
+ * Extension object for platform-specific, vendor-namespaced parameters. Extensions are always optional and must be namespaced under a vendor/platform key (e.g., ext.gam, ext.roku). Used for custom capabilities, partner-specific configuration, and features being proposed for standardization.
+ */
+export interface ExtensionObject {
+}
+
+/**
+ * Push notification configuration for async task updates (A2A and REST protocols). Echoed from the request to confirm webhook settings. Specifies URL, authentication scheme (Bearer or HMAC-SHA256), and credentials. MCP uses progress notifications instead of webhooks.
+ */
+export interface PushNotificationConfig {
+    /**
+     * Webhook endpoint URL for task status notifications. The wire contract is unconstrained beyond `format: "uri"` — in particular, publishers SHOULD NOT enforce a destination-port allowlist by default, since buyers legitimately host receivers on non-standard TLS ports (`:9443`, `:4443`, path-routed multi-tenant gateways). The SSRF guard the protocol relies on is the IP-range check + DNS-rebinding-resistant connect pin defined in [Webhook URL validation (SSRF)](/docs/building/by-layer/L1/security#webhook-url-validation-ssrf), not port filtering. Operators who want a hardened destination-port allowlist as defense-in-depth (e.g., locked-down enterprise egress) opt in explicitly — see [Destination port: permissive by default](/docs/building/by-layer/L1/security#destination-port-permissive-by-default).
+     */
+    url: string;
+    /**
+     * Buyer-supplied correlation identifier for the operation that will produce webhooks against this registration. The seller MUST echo this value verbatim into every webhook payload's `operation_id` field (see [`mcp-webhook-payload.json`](/schemas/core/mcp-webhook-payload.json) and [Webhooks — Operation IDs](/docs/building/by-layer/L3/webhooks#operation-ids-and-url-templates)). Buyers SHOULD generate a unique value per task invocation (UUID recommended). This field is the canonical registration channel for `operation_id`; buyers MAY additionally embed the same value in the URL path or query as a routing aid for their own HTTP server, but the URL is opaque to the seller and the wire-level source of truth is this field. Sellers MUST NOT parse the URL to recover `operation_id`. Sellers that receive a webhook registration without `operation_id` MAY reject the task with `INVALID_REQUEST`.
+     * @minLength 1
+     * @maxLength 255
+     * @pattern ^[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{1,255}$
+     */
+    operation_id?: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional client-provided token for webhook validation. The seller MUST echo this value verbatim in every webhook payload's `token` field (see [`mcp-webhook-payload.json`](/schemas/core/mcp-webhook-payload.json) for the receiver-side validation obligation). Length bounds give receivers a defensive range check on the echoed value; senders SHOULD generate tokens with at least 128 bits of entropy (≥22 base64url characters). This is a complementary authenticity mechanism that can layer on top of the RFC 9421 webhook signature — unlike the `authentication` block below, it is not on the 4.0 removal track. Receivers that registered both a signing key (RFC 9421) and a `token` MUST NOT treat a valid token echo as authorization to skip signature verification; both checks remain independent obligations.
+     * @minLength 16
+     * @maxLength 4096
+     */
+    token?: string;
+    /**
+     * Legacy authentication configuration (A2A-compatible). Opts the seller into Bearer or HMAC-SHA256 signing instead of the default RFC 9421 webhook profile. Deprecated; removed in AdCP 4.0. **Precedence is a switch, not a fallback:** presence of this block selects the legacy scheme; absence selects 9421. A seller MUST NOT sign the same webhook both ways, and a buyer MUST NOT attempt 'try 9421 first, fall back to HMAC' verification — signature mode is determined solely by whether this block was present at registration time. The seller's baseline 9421 webhook-signing key published at its brand.json `agents[]` `jwks_uri` does not override this selector; it is always discoverable but only used when `authentication` is omitted. See docs/building/implementation/security.mdx#webhook-callbacks for the full precedence and downgrade-resistance rules (including the `webhook_mode_mismatch` rejection a buyer MUST apply when a received webhook's signing mode does not match the registered mode).
+     */
+    authentication?: {
+        /**
+         * Array of authentication schemes. Supported: ['Bearer'] for simple token auth, ['HMAC-SHA256'] for legacy shared-secret signing. Both are deprecated; new integrations SHOULD omit `authentication` and use the RFC 9421 webhook profile.
+         */
+        schemes: AuthenticationScheme[];
+        /**
+         * Credentials for the legacy scheme. For Bearer: token sent in Authorization header. For HMAC-SHA256: shared secret used to generate signature. Minimum 32 characters. Exchanged out-of-band during onboarding.
+         * @minLength 32
+         */
+        credentials: string;
+    };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Current task execution state. Indicates whether the task is completed, in progress (working), submitted for async processing, failed, or requires user input. REQUIRED on every task response envelope. Synchronous tasks (including read-only metadata calls like `get_adcp_capabilities`) MUST emit `status: "completed"`; async tasks emit `submitted`, `working`, `input-required`, etc. per their lifecycle. Agents MUST NOT emit the legacy task_status or response_status fields alongside this field — the status field is the single authoritative task state.
+ */
+export type TaskStatus = 'submitted' | 'working' | 'input-required' | 'completed' | 'canceled' | 'failed' | 'rejected' | 'auth-required' | 'unknown';
+
+/**
+ * Type of user identifier. Used in audience sync, event logging, and TMP identity match requests to tell the receiver which identity graph to resolve against.
+ */
+export type UIDType = 'rampid' | 'rampid_derived' | 'id5' | 'uid2' | 'euid' | 'pairid' | 'maid' | 'hashed_email' | 'publisher_first_party' | 'other';
+
+/**
+ * User identifiers for attribution matching
+ */
+export type UserMatch = {
+    [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
+} & {
+    /**
+     * Universal ID values for user matching
+     */
+    uids?: {
+        type: UIDType;
+        /**
+         * Universal ID value
+         */
+        value: string;
+    }[];
+    /**
+     * SHA-256 hash of lowercase, trimmed email address. Buyer must normalize before hashing: lowercase, trim whitespace. Pseudonymous PII, not anonymous — the email namespace is small enough that an unsalted SHA-256 is recoverable via precomputed dictionaries. Treat as PII for retention, consent, and access-control purposes. See docs/reference/privacy-considerations#unsalted-hashed-identifiers-are-pseudonymous-not-anonymous.
+     * @pattern ^[a-f0-9]{64}$
+     */
+    hashed_email?: string;
+    /**
+     * SHA-256 hash of E.164-formatted phone number (e.g. +12065551234). Buyer must normalize to E.164 before hashing. Pseudonymous PII, not anonymous — the E.164 namespace is small enough that an unsalted SHA-256 is recoverable via precomputed dictionaries. Treat as PII for retention, consent, and access-control purposes. See docs/reference/privacy-considerations#unsalted-hashed-identifiers-are-pseudonymous-not-anonymous.
+     * @pattern ^[a-f0-9]{64}$
+     */
+    hashed_phone?: string;
+    /**
+     * Platform click identifier (fbclid, gclid, ttclid, ScCid, etc.)
+     */
+    click_id?: string;
+    /**
+     * Type of click identifier (e.g. fbclid, gclid, ttclid, msclkid, ScCid)
+     */
+    click_id_type?: string;
+    /**
+     * Client IP address for probabilistic matching
+     */
+    client_ip?: string;
+    /**
+     * Client user agent string for probabilistic matching
+     */
+    client_user_agent?: string;
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+};