@adcp/sdk 8.1.0-beta.6 → 8.1.0-beta.8

package/dist/lib/types/sync-audiences.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,707 @@
+// AUTO-GENERATED — DO NOT EDIT.
+// Per-tool .d.ts slice for `sync_audiences`. Built from the published
+// `tools.generated.d.ts` + `core.generated.d.ts` + `enums.generated.d.ts`
+// by `scripts/generate-per-tool-types.ts`.
+//
+// Self-contained: imports nothing from the broader SDK. Adopters who
+// import only this slice pay a fraction of the tsc cost of pulling in
+// `@adcp/sdk` root — useful when strict + skipLibCheck:false adopters
+// hit memory pressure on the full surface.
+
+/**
+ * Request parameters for managing CRM-based audiences on an account with upsert semantics. Existing audiences matched by audience_id are updated, new ones are created. Members are specified as delta operations: add appends new members, remove drops existing ones. Recommend no more than 100,000 members per call; for larger lists, chunk and call incrementally using add/remove deltas. When delete_missing is true, buyer-managed audiences on the account not in this request are removed — do not combine with omitted audiences or all buyer-managed audiences will be deleted. When audiences is omitted, the call is discovery-only: it returns all audiences on the account without modification.
+ */
+export interface SyncAudiencesRequest {
+    /**
+     * Release-precision AdCP version (VERSION.RELEASE, e.g. "3.0", "3.1", "3.1-beta"). On a request: the buyer's release pin — the seller validates against its supported_versions and returns VERSION_UNSUPPORTED on cross-major mismatch, or downshifts to the highest supported release within the same major. On a response: the release the seller actually served — clients SHOULD validate the response against that release's schema, not against their pin. Patches are not negotiated; surface them as build_version on capabilities for operational visibility. When omitted, falls back to adcp_major_version (deprecated) or server default. Buyers SHOULD emit both adcp_version and adcp_major_version through 3.x to remain compatible with sellers that only read the legacy field. NORMALIZATION: SDKs that read full-semver values from bundle metadata (e.g. ComplianceIndex.published_version = "3.1.0-beta.1") MUST normalize to release-precision ("3.1-beta.1") before emitting on the wire — meta-field values are NOT valid wire values.
+     */
+    adcp_version?: string;
+    /**
+     * DEPRECATED in favor of adcp_version (release-precision string). Servers MUST continue to honor this field through 3.x. Removed in 4.0. Original semantics: the AdCP major version the buyer's payloads conform to. Sellers validate against their supported major_versions and return VERSION_UNSUPPORTED if unsupported. When omitted, the seller assumes its highest supported version.
+     */
+    adcp_major_version?: number;
+    /**
+     * Client-generated unique key for at-most-once execution. `audience_id` gives resource-level dedup per audience, but the sync envelope emits audit events and may trigger downstream refreshes — this key prevents those side effects from firing twice on retry. Also serves as a request ID on discovery-only calls (when `audiences` is omitted). MUST be unique per (seller, request) pair. Use a fresh UUID v4 for each request.
+     * @minLength 16
+     * @maxLength 255
+     * @pattern ^[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{16,255}$
+     */
+    idempotency_key: string;
+    account: AccountReference;
+    /**
+     * Audiences to sync (create or update). When omitted, the call is discovery-only and returns all existing audiences on the account without modification.
+     */
+    audiences?: {
+        /**
+         * Buyer's identifier for this audience. Used to reference the audience in targeting overlays.
+         */
+        audience_id: string;
+        /**
+         * Human-readable name for this audience
+         */
+        name?: string;
+        /**
+         * Human-readable description of this audience's composition or purpose (e.g., 'High-value customers who purchased in the last 90 days').
+         */
+        description?: string;
+        /**
+         * Intended use for this audience. 'crm': target these users. 'suppression': exclude these users from delivery. 'lookalike_seed': use as a seed for the seller's lookalike modeling. Sellers may handle audiences differently based on type (e.g., suppression lists bypass minimum size requirements on some platforms).
+         */
+        audience_type?: 'crm' | 'suppression' | 'lookalike_seed';
+        /**
+         * Buyer-defined tags for organizing and filtering audiences (e.g., 'holiday_2026', 'high_ltv'). Tags are stored by the seller and returned in discovery-only calls.
+         */
+        tags?: string[];
+        /**
+         * Members to add to this audience. Hashed before sending — normalize emails to lowercase+trim, phones to E.164.
+         */
+        add?: AudienceMember[];
+        /**
+         * Members to remove from this audience. If the same identifier appears in both add and remove in a single request, remove takes precedence.
+         */
+        remove?: AudienceMember[];
+        /**
+         * When true, delete this audience from the account entirely. All other fields on this audience object are ignored. Use this to delete a specific audience without affecting others.
+         */
+        delete?: boolean;
+        consent_basis?: ConsentBasis;
+    }[];
+    /**
+     * When true, buyer-managed audiences on the account not included in this sync will be removed. Does not affect seller-managed audiences. Do not combine with an omitted audiences array or all buyer-managed audiences will be deleted.
+     */
+    delete_missing?: boolean;
+    context?: ContextObject;
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Response from audience sync operation. Exactly one of three shapes: (1) synchronous success — per-audience results in the audiences array (best-effort processing with per-item status/failures); (2) terminal failure — errors array with no audiences processed; (3) submitted task envelope — status 'submitted' with task_id when the whole operation is queued (batch ingestion, governance-gated upload, or any flow where the seller cannot return per-audience results before the response is emitted). The submitted branch MAY carry advisory errors for non-blocking warnings; terminal failures belong in the error branch. Final per-audience results land on the task completion artifact, not this envelope. Per-audience asynchronous matching (an audience reported with status 'processing' while the rest of the sync resolves synchronously) belongs on the synchronous success branch via audience-status, NOT here — operation-level async is for when the seller has no per-item results to return yet. These three shapes are mutually exclusive — a response has exactly one.
+ */
+export type SyncAudiencesResponse = {
+    /**
+     * Session/conversation identifier for tracking related operations across multiple task invocations. Managed by the protocol layer to maintain conversational context. Distinct from `context` (per-request opaque echo, see below).
+     */
+    context_id?: string;
+    context?: ContextObject;
+    /**
+     * Unique identifier for tracking asynchronous operations. Present when a task requires extended processing time. Used to query task status and retrieve results when complete.
+     */
+    task_id?: string;
+    status: TaskStatus;
+    /**
+     * Human-readable summary of the task result. Provides natural language explanation of what happened, suitable for display to end users or for AI agent comprehension. Generated by the protocol layer based on the task response.
+     */
+    message?: string;
+    /**
+     * ISO 8601 timestamp when the response was generated. Useful for debugging, logging, cache validation, and tracking async operation progress.
+     */
+    timestamp?: string;
+    /**
+     * Set to true when this response was returned from the idempotency cache rather than from a fresh execution. Set to false (or omitted) when the request was executed fresh. Buyers use this to distinguish cached replays from new executions — matters for billing reconciliation, audit logs, state-machine routing (cached state-tracking fields are historical snapshots, not current state — re-read via the resource's read endpoint), and any downstream system that assumes exactly-once event semantics. From 3.1 onward, `replayed` MAY appear on responses to any request that resolved via the idempotency cache, including read tools — universal `idempotency_key` (see security.mdx §Idempotency) means the cache holds read responses too.
+     */
+    replayed?: boolean;
+    adcp_error?: Error;
+    push_notification_config?: PushNotificationConfig;
+    /**
+     * Governance context token issued by the account's governance agent during check_governance. Buyers attach it to governed purchase requests (media buys, rights acquisitions, signal activations, creative services); sellers persist it and include it on all subsequent governance calls for that action's lifecycle. An account binds to one governance agent (see sync_governance); governance is phased across `purchase` / `modification` / `delivery`, not partitioned across specialist agents, so the envelope carries a single token for the full lifecycle.
+     *
+     * Value format: governance agents MUST emit a compact JWS per the AdCP JWS profile (see Security — Signed Governance Context). Sellers MAY verify; sellers that do not verify MUST persist and forward the token unchanged. In 3.1 all sellers MUST verify. Non-JWS values from pre-3.0 governance agents are deprecated.
+     *
+     * This is the primary correlation key for audit and reporting across the governance lifecycle.
+     */
+    governance_context?: string;
+    /**
+     * Conceptual grouping for the task-specific response data defined by individual task response schemas (e.g., get-products-response.json, create-media-buy-response.json). `payload` is a documentary construct — it is NOT a required wire field, and its on-the-wire shape depends on transport (see Transport serialization below). Task response schemas declare body fields without wrapping them in a `payload` object; the wire representation places those body fields per transport convention. On MCP the body fields appear as siblings of envelope fields at the root of the tool response; on A2A they appear inside `task.artifacts[0].parts[].DataPart`; on REST they appear at the root of the JSON body.
+     */
+    payload?: {};
+    /**
+     * Release-precision AdCP version (VERSION.RELEASE, e.g. "3.0", "3.1", "3.1-beta"). On a request: the buyer's release pin — the seller validates against its supported_versions and returns VERSION_UNSUPPORTED on cross-major mismatch, or downshifts to the highest supported release within the same major. On a response: the release the seller actually served — clients SHOULD validate the response against that release's schema, not against their pin. Patches are not negotiated; surface them as build_version on capabilities for operational visibility. When omitted, falls back to adcp_major_version (deprecated) or server default. Buyers SHOULD emit both adcp_version and adcp_major_version through 3.x to remain compatible with sellers that only read the legacy field. NORMALIZATION: SDKs that read full-semver values from bundle metadata (e.g. ComplianceIndex.published_version = "3.1.0-beta.1") MUST normalize to release-precision ("3.1-beta.1") before emitting on the wire — meta-field values are NOT valid wire values.
+     */
+    adcp_version?: string;
+    /**
+     * DEPRECATED in favor of adcp_version (release-precision string). Servers MUST continue to honor this field through 3.x. Removed in 4.0. Original semantics: the AdCP major version the buyer's payloads conform to. Sellers validate against their supported major_versions and return VERSION_UNSUPPORTED if unsupported. When omitted, the seller assumes its highest supported version.
+     */
+    adcp_major_version?: number;
+} & (SyncAudiencesSuccess | SyncAudiencesError | SyncAudiencesSubmitted);
+
+/**
+ * Success response - sync operation processed audiences (may include per-item failures)
+ */
+export interface SyncAudiencesSuccess {
+    /**
+     * Results for each audience on the account
+     */
+    audiences: {
+        /**
+         * Audience ID from the request (buyer's identifier)
+         */
+        audience_id: string;
+        /**
+         * Name of the audience
+         */
+        name?: string;
+        /**
+         * Seller-assigned identifier for this audience in their ad platform
+         */
+        seller_id?: string;
+        /**
+         * Action taken for this audience. 'status' is present when action is created, updated, or unchanged. 'status' is absent when action is deleted or failed.
+         */
+        action: 'created' | 'updated' | 'unchanged' | 'deleted' | 'failed';
+        status?: AudienceStatus;
+        /**
+         * Number of members submitted in this sync operation (delta, not cumulative). In discovery-only calls (no audiences array), this is 0.
+         * @minimum 0
+         */
+        uploaded_count?: number;
+        /**
+         * Cumulative number of members uploaded across all syncs for this audience. Compare with matched_count to calculate match rate (matched_count / total_uploaded_count). Populated when the seller tracks cumulative upload counts.
+         * @minimum 0
+         */
+        total_uploaded_count?: number;
+        /**
+         * Total members matched to platform users across all syncs (cumulative, not just this call). Populated when status is 'ready'.
+         * @minimum 0
+         */
+        matched_count?: number;
+        /**
+         * Deduplicated match rate across all identifier types (matched_count / total_uploaded_count after deduplication). A single number for reach estimation. Populated when status is 'ready'.
+         * @minimum 0
+         * @maximum 1
+         */
+        effective_match_rate?: number;
+        /**
+         * Per-identifier-type match results. Shows which ID types are resolving and at what rate. Helps buyers decide which identifiers to prioritize. Populated when the seller can report per-type matching. Omitted when the seller only supports aggregate match counts.
+         */
+        match_breakdown?: {
+            id_type: MatchIDType;
+            /**
+             * Cumulative number of members submitted with this identifier type across all syncs (matches total_uploaded_count semantics, not uploaded_count). Compare with matched to calculate per-type match rate.
+             * @minimum 0
+             */
+            submitted: number;
+            /**
+             * Cumulative number of members matched via this identifier type across all syncs.
+             * @minimum 0
+             */
+            matched: number;
+            /**
+             * Match rate for this identifier type (matched / submitted). Server-authoritative — consumers should prefer this value over computing their own.
+             * @minimum 0
+             * @maximum 1
+             */
+            match_rate: number;
+        }[];
+        /**
+         * ISO 8601 timestamp of when the most recent sync operation was accepted by the platform. Useful for agents reasoning about audience freshness. Omitted if the seller does not track this.
+         * @format date-time
+         */
+        last_synced_at?: string;
+        /**
+         * Minimum matched audience size required for targeting on this platform. Populated when status is 'too_small'. Helps agents know how many more members are needed.
+         * @minimum 1
+         */
+        minimum_size?: number;
+        /**
+         * Errors for this audience (only present when action='failed')
+         */
+        errors?: Error[];
+    }[];
+    /**
+     * When true, this response contains simulated data from sandbox mode.
+     */
+    sandbox?: boolean;
+    context?: ContextObject;
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Error response - operation failed completely, no audiences were processed
+ */
+export interface SyncAudiencesError {
+    /**
+     * Operation-level errors that prevented processing any audiences (e.g., authentication failure, account not found, invalid request format)
+     */
+    errors: Error[];
+    context?: ContextObject;
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Async task envelope returned when the whole sync operation cannot be confirmed before the response is emitted — for example, when the seller batches ingestion, when governance review gates the upload before matching can start, or when an upstream clean-room flow needs to settle before any per-audience result can be issued. The buyer polls tasks/get with task_id or receives a webhook when the task completes; the audiences array with per-item action/status lands on the completion artifact, not this envelope. Per-audience asynchronous matching (one audience in 'processing' while the rest of the sync resolves synchronously) belongs on the SyncAudiencesSuccess branch with status: processing on that item, not here. Matching latency on the per-audience status enum (processing → ready / too_small) is the common case; this envelope is the less-common operation-level case.
+ */
+export interface SyncAudiencesSubmitted {
+    /**
+     * Task-level status literal. Discriminates this async envelope from the synchronous success shape, whose audiences array carries per-item matching state via audience-status. See task-status.json for the full task-status enum.
+     */
+    status: 'submitted';
+    /**
+     * Task handle the buyer uses with tasks/get, and that the seller references on push-notification callbacks. The audiences array is issued on the completion artifact, not here. Per AdCP wire conventions this is snake_case; A2A adapters MAY surface it as taskId, but the payload field emitted by the agent is task_id.
+     */
+    task_id: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional human-readable explanation of why the task is submitted — e.g., 'Batch ingestion queued; typical turnaround 15-30 minutes.' Plain text only. Buyers MUST treat this as untrusted seller input: escape before rendering to HTML UIs, and sanitize or isolate before passing to an LLM prompt context — a hostile seller may inject prompt-injection payloads aimed at the buyer's agent.
+     * @maxLength 2000
+     */
+    message?: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional advisory errors accompanying the submitted envelope. Use only for non-blocking warnings (e.g., throttled_severity advisories, governance observations). Terminal failures belong in the error branch, not here.
+     */
+    errors?: Error[];
+    context?: ContextObject;
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Account for product lookup. Returns products with pricing specific to this account's rate card.
+ */
+export type AccountReference = {
+    /**
+     * Seller-assigned account identifier (from sync_accounts or list_accounts)
+     */
+    account_id: string;
+} | {
+    brand: BrandReference;
+    /**
+     * Domain of the entity operating on the brand's behalf. When the brand operates directly, this is the brand's domain.
+     * @pattern ^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?)*$
+     */
+    operator: string;
+    /**
+     * When true, references the sandbox account for this brand/operator pair. Defaults to false (production account).
+     */
+    sandbox?: boolean;
+};
+
+/**
+ * A CRM audience member identified by a buyer-assigned external_id and at least one matchable identifier. All identifiers must be normalized before hashing: emails to lowercase+trim, phone numbers to E.164 format (e.g. +12065551234). Providing multiple identifiers for the same person improves match rates. Composite identifiers (e.g. hashed first name + last name + zip for Google Customer Match) are not yet standardized — use the ext field for platform-specific extensions.
+ */
+export type AudienceMember = {
+    [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
+} & {
+    /**
+     * Buyer-assigned stable identifier for this audience member (e.g. CRM record ID, loyalty ID). Used for deduplication, removal, and cross-referencing with buyer systems. Adapters for CDPs that don't natively assign IDs can derive one (e.g. hash of the member's identifiers).
+     */
+    external_id: string;
+    /**
+     * SHA-256 hash of lowercase, trimmed email address. Pseudonymous PII, not anonymous — the email namespace is small enough that an unsalted SHA-256 is recoverable via precomputed dictionaries. Treat as PII for retention, consent, and access-control purposes. See docs/reference/privacy-considerations#unsalted-hashed-identifiers-are-pseudonymous-not-anonymous.
+     * @pattern ^[a-f0-9]{64}$
+     */
+    hashed_email?: string;
+    /**
+     * SHA-256 hash of E.164-formatted phone number (e.g. +12065551234). Pseudonymous PII, not anonymous — the E.164 namespace is small enough that an unsalted SHA-256 is recoverable via precomputed dictionaries. Treat as PII for retention, consent, and access-control purposes. See docs/reference/privacy-considerations#unsalted-hashed-identifiers-are-pseudonymous-not-anonymous.
+     * @pattern ^[a-f0-9]{64}$
+     */
+    hashed_phone?: string;
+    /**
+     * Universal ID values (MAIDs, RampID, UID2, etc.) for user matching.
+     */
+    uids?: {
+        type: UIDType;
+        /**
+         * Universal ID value
+         */
+        value: string;
+    }[];
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Matching status. Present when action is created, updated, or unchanged; absent when action is deleted or failed.
+ */
+export type AudienceStatus = 'processing' | 'ready' | 'too_small' | 'suspended';
+
+/**
+ * Legacy authentication schemes for the webhook auth block. Bearer: token sent in Authorization header. HMAC-SHA256: legacy shared-secret signing. Both are deprecated; new integrations SHOULD omit the authentication block and use the RFC 9421 webhook signing profile (applicable on schemas where authentication is optional). Removed in AdCP 4.0.
+ */
+export type AuthenticationScheme = 'Bearer' | 'HMAC-SHA256';
+
+/**
+ * Brand identifier within the house portfolio. Optional for single-brand domains.
+ */
+export type BrandID = string;
+
+/**
+ * Brand reference for product discovery context. Resolved to full brand identity at execution time.
+ */
+export interface BrandReference {
+    /**
+     * Domain where /.well-known/brand.json is hosted, or the brand's operating domain
+     * @pattern ^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?)*$
+     */
+    domain: string;
+    brand_id?: BrandID;
+    /**
+     * Inline override for the brand's industries. Useful when the caller cannot modify the brand's canonical brand.json but needs to declare industries for governance (e.g., Annex III vertical detection). brand.json remains the canonical source; when omitted here, governance agents SHOULD resolve from brand.json.
+     */
+    industries?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Inline override for the brand's contestation contact point. Useful when the operator does not control brand.json but needs to discharge Art 22(3) for this plan. brand.json is canonical; when omitted, governance agents resolve brand → house → missing.
+     */
+    data_subject_contestation?: {
+        [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
+    };
+    /**
+     * Inline override for brand-kit fields normally resolved from `/.well-known/brand.json` on `domain` (logo, colors, voice, tagline). Use when brand.json is missing, stale, or inappropriate for this specific call — e.g., a campaign-scoped tagline, a co-branded creative, a freshly-rebranded color palette the brand.json hasn't shipped yet. Same inline-override pattern as `industries` and `data_subject_contestation` above: brand.json is canonical, the override is per-call. Adopters needing to override fields outside this subset (`voice_attributes`, `prohibited_terms`, etc.) MUST publish a different brand.json and reference it via a different `domain` — the inline override is intentionally narrow to a small high-traffic subset.
+     *
+     * **Merge semantics (normative).** The merge is **field-level**, not whole-object replacement. Each field within `brand_kit_override` (`logo`, `colors`, `voice`, `tagline`) is evaluated independently — when a field is present on the override the override value applies; when a field is absent the brand.json value applies (or is absent if brand.json doesn't carry one either). For composite fields (`colors.primary`, `colors.secondary`, `colors.accent`), the merge is one level deeper: each color slot is evaluated independently — a producer can override `colors.primary` while still inheriting `colors.secondary` from brand.json. SDKs MUST NOT treat a present `brand_kit_override.colors` as wiping the brand.json `colors` block entirely; only the per-slot fields present in the override take precedence. Without this rule, a partial-override semantics would diverge across SDKs and produce inconsistent rendering for the same payload.
+     */
+    brand_kit_override?: {
+        logo?: ImageAsset;
+        /**
+         * Override brand colors (hex strings).
+         */
+        colors?: {
+            /**
+             * @pattern ^#[0-9a-fA-F]{6}$
+             */
+            primary?: string;
+            /**
+             * @pattern ^#[0-9a-fA-F]{6}$
+             */
+            secondary?: string;
+            /**
+             * @pattern ^#[0-9a-fA-F]{6}$
+             */
+            accent?: string;
+        };
+        /**
+         * Override brand-voice description for surface-composed text/audio output.
+         */
+        voice?: string;
+        /**
+         * Override tagline.
+         */
+        tagline?: string;
+    };
+}
+
+/**
+ * C2PA action classification for this watermark
+ */
+export type C2PAWatermarkAction = 'c2pa.watermarked.bound' | 'c2pa.watermarked.unbound';
+
+/**
+ * GDPR lawful basis for processing this audience list. Informational — not validated by the protocol, but required by some sellers operating in regulated markets (e.g. EU). When omitted, the buyer asserts they have a lawful basis appropriate to their jurisdiction.
+ */
+export type ConsentBasis = 'consent' | 'legitimate_interest' | 'contract' | 'legal_obligation';
+
+/**
+ * Opaque correlation data that is echoed unchanged in responses. Used for internal tracking, UI session IDs, trace IDs, and other caller-specific identifiers that don't affect protocol behavior. Context data is never parsed by AdCP agents - it's simply preserved and returned.
+ */
+export interface ContextObject {
+}
+
+/**
+ * IPTC-aligned classification of AI involvement in producing this content
+ */
+export type DigitalSourceType = 'digital_capture' | 'digital_creation' | 'trained_algorithmic_media' | 'composite_with_trained_algorithmic_media' | 'algorithmic_media' | 'composite_capture' | 'composite_synthetic' | 'human_edits' | 'data_driven_media';
+
+/**
+ * How long the disclosure must persist during content playback or display
+ */
+export type DisclosurePersistence = 'continuous' | 'initial' | 'flexible';
+
+/**
+ * Where a required disclosure should appear within a creative. Used by creative briefs to specify disclosure placement and by formats to declare which positions they can render.
+ */
+export type DisclosurePosition = 'prominent' | 'footer' | 'audio' | 'subtitle' | 'overlay' | 'end_card' | 'pre_roll' | 'companion';
+
+/**
+ * How provenance data is carried within the content
+ */
+export type EmbeddedProvenanceMethod = 'manifest_wrapper' | 'provenance_markers';
+
+/**
+ * Extension object for platform-specific, vendor-namespaced parameters. Extensions are always optional and must be namespaced under a vendor/platform key (e.g., ext.gam, ext.roku). Used for custom capabilities, partner-specific configuration, and features being proposed for standardization.
+ */
+export interface ExtensionObject {
+}
+
+/**
+ * Override logo asset.
+ */
+export interface ImageAsset {
+    /**
+     * Discriminator identifying this as an image asset. See /schemas/creative/asset-types for the registry.
+     */
+    asset_type: 'image';
+    /**
+     * URL to the image asset
+     */
+    url: string;
+    /**
+     * Width in pixels
+     * @minimum 1
+     */
+    width: number;
+    /**
+     * Height in pixels
+     * @minimum 1
+     */
+    height: number;
+    /**
+     * Image file format (jpg, png, gif, webp, etc.)
+     */
+    format?: string;
+    /**
+     * Alternative text for accessibility
+     */
+    alt_text?: string;
+    provenance?: Provenance;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Identifier type. Combines hashed PII types (hashed_email, hashed_phone) with universal ID types (rampid, uid2, maid, etc.).
+ */
+export type MatchIDType = 'hashed_email' | 'hashed_phone' | 'rampid' | 'id5' | 'uid2' | 'euid' | 'pairid' | 'maid' | 'other';
+
+/**
+ * Provenance metadata for this asset, overrides manifest-level provenance
+ */
+export interface Provenance {
+    digital_source_type?: DigitalSourceType;
+    /**
+     * AI system used to generate or modify this content. Aligns with IPTC 2025.1 AI metadata fields and C2PA claim_generator.
+     */
+    ai_tool?: {
+        /**
+         * Name of the AI tool or model (e.g., 'DALL-E 3', 'Stable Diffusion XL', 'Gemini')
+         */
+        name: string;
+        /**
+         * Version identifier for the AI tool or model (e.g., '25.1', '0125', '2.1'). For generative models, use the model version rather than the API version.
+         */
+        version?: string;
+        /**
+         * Organization that provides the AI tool (e.g., 'OpenAI', 'Stability AI', 'Google')
+         */
+        provider?: string;
+    };
+    /**
+     * Level of human involvement in the AI-assisted creation process. Independent of `disclosure.required` — the protocol does not derive disclosure obligations from oversight level. Some regulations include carve-outs for human-edited or human-directed AI output, but those carve-outs have factual prerequisites the schema cannot evaluate. Asserting `edited` or `directed` does not by itself justify `disclosure.required: false`.
+     */
+    human_oversight?: 'none' | 'prompt_only' | 'selected' | 'edited' | 'directed';
+    /**
+     * Party declaring this provenance. Identifies who attached the provenance claim, enabling receiving parties to assess trust.
+     */
+    declared_by?: {
+        /**
+         * URL of the agent or service that declared this provenance
+         */
+        agent_url?: string;
+        /**
+         * Role of the declaring party in the supply chain
+         */
+        role: 'creator' | 'advertiser' | 'agency' | 'platform' | 'tool';
+    };
+    /**
+     * When this provenance claim was made (ISO 8601). Distinct from created_time, which records when the content itself was produced. A provenance claim may be attached well after content creation, for example when retroactively declaring AI involvement for regulatory compliance.
+     * @format date-time
+     */
+    declared_at?: string;
+    /**
+     * When this content was created or generated (ISO 8601)
+     * @format date-time
+     */
+    created_time?: string;
+    /**
+     * C2PA sidecar manifest reference. Links to a detached cryptographic provenance manifest for this content. Note: file-level C2PA bindings break when ad servers transcode, resize, or re-encode assets. For pipelines with intermediaries, consider embedded_provenance as the primary provenance mechanism.
+     */
+    c2pa?: {
+        /**
+         * URL to the C2PA manifest store for this content
+         */
+        manifest_url: string;
+    };
+    /**
+     * Provenance metadata embedded within the content stream. Each entry declares one embedding layer: structured provenance data carried inside the content itself, as distinct from sidecar references (c2pa.manifest_url). Embedded provenance survives operations that break sidecar and file-level bindings: ad-server transcoding, CMS ingestion, copy-paste, reformatting, and CDN re-encoding. For ad-tech pipelines where content passes through multiple intermediaries, embedded provenance is the reliable path for provenance that persists from declaration through delivery. This is a declaration by the embedding party. The receiving party (the seller) is the verifier-of-record: it confirms the claim by calling a governance agent it trusts (typically one published in `creative_policy.accepted_verifiers`).
+     */
+    embedded_provenance?: {
+        method: EmbeddedProvenanceMethod;
+        /**
+         * Standard the embedding conforms to, if any (e.g., 'c2pa' for C2PA Section A.7 text manifest embedding)
+         */
+        standard?: string;
+        /**
+         * Organization that performed the embedding (e.g., 'Encypher', 'Digimarc'). Display label and audit context — not a wire identifier.
+         */
+        provider: string;
+        /**
+         * Buyer's representation that this embedding can be verified by a governance agent on the seller's `creative_policy.accepted_verifiers` list. The `agent_url` MUST match (canonicalized) one of the seller's published `accepted_verifiers[].agent_url` entries; sellers reject `sync_creatives` submissions whose `verify_agent.agent_url` is off-list with `PROVENANCE_VERIFIER_NOT_ACCEPTED`. This is buyer-supplied evidence, not buyer-driven routing — the seller is the verifier-of-record and the seller controls which agent it actually calls (the seller MAY use a different on-list agent if it determines this is more appropriate; the seller does not call buyer-asserted endpoints outside its allowlist). MAY be omitted for self-verifiable embeddings (e.g., a C2PA text manifest with a public key the seller already trusts).
+         */
+        verify_agent?: {
+            /**
+             * URL of the governance agent the buyer represents was used to embed/verify this layer. MUST use the `https://` scheme and MUST appear in the seller's `creative_policy.accepted_verifiers[].agent_url` list (canonicalized per /docs/reference/url-canonicalization: lowercase scheme and host, strip default port, normalize path dot-segments). Sellers MUST NOT call this URL until the canonicalized match is confirmed.
+             * @pattern ^https:\/\/
+             */
+            agent_url: string;
+            /**
+             * Optional `feature_id` the buyer represents the seller should request via `get_creative_features` (e.g., `encypher.markers_present_v2`). SHOULD match the `feature_id` declared on the matching `accepted_verifiers[]` entry, or be omitted to defer the selector to the seller. When the seller's entry pins a `feature_id`, that value wins; when neither side pins, the seller selects from the agent's `governance.creative_features` catalog.
+             */
+            feature_id?: string;
+        };
+        /**
+         * When the provenance data was embedded (ISO 8601)
+         * @format date-time
+         */
+        embedded_at?: string;
+    }[];
+    /**
+     * Content watermarks applied to this asset. Each entry declares one watermarking layer: a content modification that encodes an identifier or fingerprint within the asset. Watermarks differ from embedded provenance: a watermark encodes an identifier (who generated it, who owns it), while embedded provenance carries or references a structured provenance record (the full chain of custody). A single asset may carry both. Aligns with C2PA action taxonomy: c2pa.watermarked.bound (watermark linked to a C2PA manifest) and c2pa.watermarked.unbound (watermark independent of any manifest). This is a declaration by the watermarking party. The receiving party (the seller) is the verifier-of-record: it confirms the claim by calling a governance agent it trusts (typically one published in `creative_policy.accepted_verifiers`).
+     */
+    watermarks?: {
+        media_type: WatermarkMediaType;
+        /**
+         * Organization that applied the watermark (e.g., 'Imatag', 'Steg.AI', 'Encypher'). Display label and audit context — not a wire identifier.
+         */
+        provider: string;
+        /**
+         * Buyer's representation that this watermark can be detected by a governance agent on the seller's `creative_policy.accepted_verifiers` list. The `agent_url` MUST match (canonicalized) one of the seller's published `accepted_verifiers[].agent_url` entries; sellers reject `sync_creatives` submissions whose `verify_agent.agent_url` is off-list with `PROVENANCE_VERIFIER_NOT_ACCEPTED`. This is buyer-supplied evidence, not buyer-driven routing — the seller is the verifier-of-record and the seller controls which agent it actually calls (the seller MAY use a different on-list agent if it determines this is more appropriate; the seller does not call buyer-asserted endpoints outside its allowlist).
+         */
+        verify_agent?: {
+            /**
+             * URL of the governance agent the buyer represents was used to apply/detect this watermark. MUST use the `https://` scheme and MUST appear in the seller's `creative_policy.accepted_verifiers[].agent_url` list (canonicalized per /docs/reference/url-canonicalization: lowercase scheme and host, strip default port, normalize path dot-segments). Sellers MUST NOT call this URL until the canonicalized match is confirmed.
+             * @pattern ^https:\/\/
+             */
+            agent_url: string;
+            /**
+             * Optional `feature_id` the buyer represents the seller should request via `get_creative_features` (e.g., `imatag.watermark_detected`). SHOULD match the `feature_id` declared on the matching `accepted_verifiers[]` entry, or be omitted to defer the selector to the seller. When the seller's entry pins a `feature_id`, that value wins; when neither side pins, the seller selects from the agent's `governance.creative_features` catalog.
+             */
+            feature_id?: string;
+        };
+        c2pa_action?: C2PAWatermarkAction;
+        /**
+         * When the watermark was applied (ISO 8601)
+         * @format date-time
+         */
+        embedded_at?: string;
+    }[];
+    /**
+     * Regulatory disclosure requirements for this content. Indicates whether AI disclosure is required and under which jurisdictions.
+     */
+    disclosure?: {
+        /**
+         * The declaring party's claim that AI disclosure is required for this content under applicable regulations. This is a declared signal carried through the supply chain — useful as a routing and audit input — not a regulatory determination made by the protocol. Receiving parties remain responsible for their own jurisdictional analysis and should not treat `required: false` as compliance cover.
+         */
+        required: boolean;
+        /**
+         * Jurisdictions where disclosure obligations apply
+         */
+        jurisdictions?: {
+            /**
+             * ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code (e.g., 'US', 'DE', 'CN')
+             */
+            country: string;
+            /**
+             * Sub-national region code (e.g., 'CA' for California, 'BY' for Bavaria)
+             */
+            region?: string;
+            /**
+             * Regulation identifier (e.g., 'eu_ai_act_article_50', 'ca_sb_942', 'cn_deep_synthesis')
+             */
+            regulation: string;
+            /**
+             * Required disclosure label text for this jurisdiction, in the local language
+             */
+            label_text?: string;
+            /**
+             * How the disclosure should be rendered for this jurisdiction. Expresses the declaring party's intent for persistence and position based on regulatory requirements. Publishers control actual rendering but governance agents can audit whether guidance was followed.
+             */
+            render_guidance?: {
+                persistence?: DisclosurePersistence;
+                /**
+                 * Minimum display duration in milliseconds for initial persistence. Recommended when persistence is initial — without it, the duration is at the publisher's discretion. At serve time the publisher reads this from provenance since the brief is not available.
+                 * @minimum 1
+                 */
+                min_duration_ms?: number;
+                /**
+                 * Preferred disclosure positions in priority order. The first position a format supports should be used.
+                 */
+                positions?: DisclosurePosition[];
+                ext?: ExtensionObject;
+            };
+        }[];
+    };
+    /**
+     * Third-party verification or detection results for this content. Multiple services may independently evaluate the same content. Provenance is a claim — verification results attached by the declaring party are supplementary. The enforcing party (e.g., seller/publisher) should run its own verification via get_creative_features or calibrate_content.
+     */
+    verification?: {
+        /**
+         * Name of the verification service (e.g., 'DoubleVerify', 'Hive Moderation', 'Reality Defender')
+         */
+        verified_by: string;
+        /**
+         * When the verification was performed (ISO 8601)
+         * @format date-time
+         */
+        verified_time?: string;
+        /**
+         * Verification outcome
+         */
+        result: 'authentic' | 'ai_generated' | 'ai_modified' | 'inconclusive';
+        /**
+         * Confidence score of the verification result (0.0 to 1.0)
+         * @minimum 0
+         * @maximum 1
+         */
+        confidence?: number;
+        /**
+         * URL to the full verification report
+         */
+        details_url?: string;
+    }[];
+    ext?: ExtensionObject;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Push notification configuration for async task updates (A2A and REST protocols). Echoed from the request to confirm webhook settings. Specifies URL, authentication scheme (Bearer or HMAC-SHA256), and credentials. MCP uses progress notifications instead of webhooks.
+ */
+export interface PushNotificationConfig {
+    /**
+     * Webhook endpoint URL for task status notifications. The wire contract is unconstrained beyond `format: "uri"` — in particular, publishers SHOULD NOT enforce a destination-port allowlist by default, since buyers legitimately host receivers on non-standard TLS ports (`:9443`, `:4443`, path-routed multi-tenant gateways). The SSRF guard the protocol relies on is the IP-range check + DNS-rebinding-resistant connect pin defined in [Webhook URL validation (SSRF)](/docs/building/by-layer/L1/security#webhook-url-validation-ssrf), not port filtering. Operators who want a hardened destination-port allowlist as defense-in-depth (e.g., locked-down enterprise egress) opt in explicitly — see [Destination port: permissive by default](/docs/building/by-layer/L1/security#destination-port-permissive-by-default).
+     */
+    url: string;
+    /**
+     * Buyer-supplied correlation identifier for the operation that will produce webhooks against this registration. The seller MUST echo this value verbatim into every webhook payload's `operation_id` field (see [`mcp-webhook-payload.json`](/schemas/core/mcp-webhook-payload.json) and [Webhooks — Operation IDs](/docs/building/by-layer/L3/webhooks#operation-ids-and-url-templates)). Buyers SHOULD generate a unique value per task invocation (UUID recommended). This field is the canonical registration channel for `operation_id`; buyers MAY additionally embed the same value in the URL path or query as a routing aid for their own HTTP server, but the URL is opaque to the seller and the wire-level source of truth is this field. Sellers MUST NOT parse the URL to recover `operation_id`. Sellers that receive a webhook registration without `operation_id` MAY reject the task with `INVALID_REQUEST`.
+     * @minLength 1
+     * @maxLength 255
+     * @pattern ^[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{1,255}$
+     */
+    operation_id?: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional client-provided token for webhook validation. The seller MUST echo this value verbatim in every webhook payload's `token` field (see [`mcp-webhook-payload.json`](/schemas/core/mcp-webhook-payload.json) for the receiver-side validation obligation). Length bounds give receivers a defensive range check on the echoed value; senders SHOULD generate tokens with at least 128 bits of entropy (≥22 base64url characters). This is a complementary authenticity mechanism that can layer on top of the RFC 9421 webhook signature — unlike the `authentication` block below, it is not on the 4.0 removal track. Receivers that registered both a signing key (RFC 9421) and a `token` MUST NOT treat a valid token echo as authorization to skip signature verification; both checks remain independent obligations.
+     * @minLength 16
+     * @maxLength 4096
+     */
+    token?: string;
+    /**
+     * Legacy authentication configuration (A2A-compatible). Opts the seller into Bearer or HMAC-SHA256 signing instead of the default RFC 9421 webhook profile. Deprecated; removed in AdCP 4.0. **Precedence is a switch, not a fallback:** presence of this block selects the legacy scheme; absence selects 9421. A seller MUST NOT sign the same webhook both ways, and a buyer MUST NOT attempt 'try 9421 first, fall back to HMAC' verification — signature mode is determined solely by whether this block was present at registration time. The seller's baseline 9421 webhook-signing key published at its brand.json `agents[]` `jwks_uri` does not override this selector; it is always discoverable but only used when `authentication` is omitted. See docs/building/implementation/security.mdx#webhook-callbacks for the full precedence and downgrade-resistance rules (including the `webhook_mode_mismatch` rejection a buyer MUST apply when a received webhook's signing mode does not match the registered mode).
+     */
+    authentication?: {
+        /**
+         * Array of authentication schemes. Supported: ['Bearer'] for simple token auth, ['HMAC-SHA256'] for legacy shared-secret signing. Both are deprecated; new integrations SHOULD omit `authentication` and use the RFC 9421 webhook profile.
+         */
+        schemes: AuthenticationScheme[];
+        /**
+         * Credentials for the legacy scheme. For Bearer: token sent in Authorization header. For HMAC-SHA256: shared secret used to generate signature. Minimum 32 characters. Exchanged out-of-band during onboarding.
+         * @minLength 32
+         */
+        credentials: string;
+    };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Current task execution state. Indicates whether the task is completed, in progress (working), submitted for async processing, failed, or requires user input. REQUIRED on every task response envelope. Synchronous tasks (including read-only metadata calls like `get_adcp_capabilities`) MUST emit `status: "completed"`; async tasks emit `submitted`, `working`, `input-required`, etc. per their lifecycle. Agents MUST NOT emit the legacy task_status or response_status fields alongside this field — the status field is the single authoritative task state.
+ */
+export type TaskStatus = 'submitted' | 'working' | 'input-required' | 'completed' | 'canceled' | 'failed' | 'rejected' | 'auth-required' | 'unknown';
+
+/**
+ * Type of user identifier. Used in audience sync, event logging, and TMP identity match requests to tell the receiver which identity graph to resolve against.
+ */
+export type UIDType = 'rampid' | 'rampid_derived' | 'id5' | 'uid2' | 'euid' | 'pairid' | 'maid' | 'hashed_email' | 'publisher_first_party' | 'other';
+
+/**
+ * Media category of the watermarked content
+ */
+export type WatermarkMediaType = 'audio' | 'image' | 'video' | 'text';