standard_id 0.36.2 → 0.37.0

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data/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,32 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [0.37.0] - 2026-08-05
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`refresh_tokens.session_id` is finally populated, and the cause was statement ordering, not a missing feature.** Every refresh token in every consuming app had a nil `session_id`, so every session→refresh revocation cascade — the gem's own `Session#revoke!`, `Session.revoke_sessions!`, and each app's equivalent — matched **zero rows**, and 0.35.0's parent-session check had no parent to consult. Measured in production: jumpdrive 15 tokens / 0 linked; nutripod 238 / 0, with **177 live at the time of measurement**.
+
+  `generate_token_response` created the refresh token one statement *before* `maybe_persist_session_for_token!` ran, inside the same transaction — so when `persist_refresh_token!` wrote `session_id`, there was no session yet to point at. The link was nil **by construction**, not by omission. Swapping the two statements is the fix; `refresh_token_session_id` now returns the session the same grant just materialised.
+
+  See rarebit-one/rarebit-ops#304.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **BEHAVIOUR NARROWED — `validate_parent_session!` now refuses only on a REVOKED parent, no longer on an expired one.** This is a deliberate relaxation of what 0.35.0 shipped, and hosts should read it before upgrading.
+
+  `Session#active?` is `!revoked? && !expired?`, so the original `return if session.active?` also refused a refresh whose parent had merely aged out. That was harmless while nothing was linked — with no parent, neither branch could fire. The moment linkage above becomes real, an expiry branch silently becomes a **lifetime policy**, and a badly-scaled one: an app running an 86400s `browser_session_lifetime` against a 2592000s `refresh_token_lifetime` would see its session-backed clients drop from monthly to **daily** re-authorization, as a side effect of a security fix that was never about login frequency.
+
+  Revocation is the property the estate wants: an operator revokes a session and access ends. Lifetime remains `refresh_token_lifetime`'s job, which already exists and is already configured per host. Keeping them separate is what lets linkage ship without renegotiating anyone's login cadence.
+
+- **`ServiceSession` is carved out of linkage on purpose.** Machine credentials keep their own lifecycle, matching the exclusion the `:account` revocation scope already makes, so a human's browser logout cannot kill a running CLI or MCP agent sharing the account.
+
+### Notes for hosts
+
+**This release does not retroactively repair your app.** Linkage happens only where the host materialises a session at token-issue time via `config.session.session_type_resolver`. A host with no resolver configured keeps nil `session_id` and is unchanged in every respect. The gem now makes the property *achievable and automatic*; enabling it per app is separate work.
+
+Existing rows cannot be linked retroactively — there is no record of which session issued them.
+
 ## [0.36.2] - 2026-08-04
 
 **The third release in one chain, and the last of it.** 0.36.0 made the account guards bite on live sessions; 0.36.1 repaired the 500 that exposed on `ApiEngine`; this repairs 0.36.1's own overreach onto the OAuth token endpoint. That reads like flailing, so state it plainly: 0.36.0 was a correct behaviour change, and each follow-up is a narrower blast radius of the same root cause — an exception pair that no controller in the ancestry had ever had to answer for, meeting two route families with two different wire contracts. 0.36.1 fixed the first family and, by rescuing on the shared parent, silently annexed the second. 0.36.2 draws the line between them. Nothing here reverts 0.36.0 or 0.36.1; resource-endpoint behaviour is byte-identical to 0.36.1.

data/lib/standard_id/oauth/refresh_token_flow.rb

@@ -84,9 +84,26 @@ module StandardId
       #
       # Checking the parent here makes the property true by construction: it
       # holds however the session was revoked — `revoke!`, a bare `update!`, a
-      # bulk `update_all`, a DBA, a data fix — and it covers expiry as well.
+      # bulk `update_all`, a DBA, a data fix.
       # See rarebit-one/rarebit-ops#297.
       #
+      # REVOCATION, NOT EXPIRY — deliberately, and this is a narrowing of what
+      # 0.35.0 shipped. `Session#active?` is `!revoked? && !expired?`, so the
+      # original `return if session.active?` also refused a refresh whose parent
+      # had merely aged out. That was harmless while `session_id` was nil
+      # everywhere; the moment rarebit-one/rarebit-ops#304 makes linkage real it
+      # silently becomes a lifetime policy — and a badly-scaled one. jumpdrive
+      # runs an 86400s browser_session_lifetime against a 2592000s
+      # refresh_token_lifetime, so tying the two would cut its session-backed
+      # MCP clients from monthly to DAILY re-authorization, as a side effect of
+      # a security fix nobody asked to change login frequency.
+      #
+      # Revocation is the property the estate actually wants: an operator clicks
+      # "revoke this session" and access ends. Expiry is a lifetime decision that
+      # belongs to `refresh_token_lifetime`, which already exists and is already
+      # configured per app. Keeping them separate means linkage can ship without
+      # renegotiating anyone's login cadence.
+      #
       # A refresh token with no session (`session_id` nil) is unaffected: that
       # is the machine-to-machine shape (client_credentials and any other grant
       # the gem issues without persisting a session), where there is no parent
@@ -99,7 +116,7 @@ module StandardId
       def validate_parent_session!
         session = @current_refresh_token_record.session
         return if session.nil?
-        return if session.active?
+        return unless session.revoked?
 
         raise StandardId::InvalidGrantError, "Refresh token is no longer valid"
       end

data/lib/standard_id/oauth/token_grant_flow.rb

@@ -63,8 +63,15 @@ module StandardId
         # (see there for why) — that path is safe because the swallowed
         # exception fires before any DB work in this block.
         ActiveRecord::Base.transaction do
+          # Session FIRST, refresh token second. The order is load-bearing, not
+          # stylistic: `persist_refresh_token!` writes `session_id`, so the
+          # session row has to exist before the token row is built or the link
+          # is nil by construction. It was the other way round until
+          # rarebit-one/rarebit-ops#304, which is the whole reason
+          # `refresh_tokens.session_id` was nil in every app in the estate —
+          # there was no session to point at yet.
+          @oauth_session = maybe_persist_session_for_token!
           response[:refresh_token] = generate_refresh_token if supports_refresh_token?
-          maybe_persist_session_for_token!
         end
 
         emit_token_issued(expires_in)
@@ -166,8 +173,33 @@ module StandardId
         )
       end
 
+      # The parent session for the refresh token issued by THIS grant, when the
+      # host materialised one via `config.session.session_type_resolver`.
+      #
+      # Returning a real id here is what makes "revoking a session ends that
+      # session's access" true by construction rather than an emergent property
+      # of every caller remembering to reach for the right method. With it nil —
+      # which it was everywhere before rarebit-one/rarebit-ops#304 — every
+      # session→refresh cascade in the gem and in the apps matched zero rows,
+      # and 0.35.0's parent-session check had no parent to consult.
+      #
+      # Still nil where there is genuinely no parent: no resolver configured
+      # (the default), or a grant the host does not materialise a session for.
+      # That keeps machine-to-machine grants (client_credentials) exactly as
+      # they were — there is no session to outlive.
+      #
+      # ServiceSessions are carved out on purpose. Machine credentials have
+      # their own lifecycle, and the gem's `:account` revocation scope already
+      # excludes them; linking one here would let a human's browser logout kill
+      # a running CLI or MCP agent sharing the account. `OauthSessionPersistence`
+      # refuses to build one at all, so this guard is belt-and-braces against a
+      # host that reaches around it — cheap, and the failure it prevents is
+      # silent.
       def refresh_token_session_id
-        nil
+        return nil if @oauth_session.nil?
+        return nil if @oauth_session.is_a?(StandardId::ServiceSession)
+
+        @oauth_session.id
       end
 
       def previous_refresh_token_record

data/lib/standard_id/version.rb

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 module StandardId
-  VERSION = "0.36.2"
+  VERSION = "0.37.0"
 end

metadata

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 --- !ruby/object:Gem::Specification
 name: standard_id
 version: !ruby/object:Gem::Version
-  version: 0.36.2
+  version: 0.37.0
 platform: ruby
 authors:
 - Jaryl Sim